To 

THE  LADS  WHO  WILL  COME 
UNDER  THE  NEXT  DRAFT 


"I  get  a  great  many  letters,  my  fellow-citizens,  from 
important  and  influential  men  in  this  country;  but  I  get  a 
great  many  other  letters.  I  get  letters  from  unknown  men, 
from  humble  women,  from  people  whose  names  have  never 
been  heard  and  will  never  be  recorded,  and  there  is  but 
one  prayer  in  all  of  these  letters:  'Mr.  President,  do  not 
allow  anybody  to  persuade  you  that  the  people  of  this 
country  want  war  with  anybody.' " — WOODROW  WILSON, 
to  the  New  York  Press  Club,  June  30,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    THE  AUTHOR  EXPLAINS i 

II    DID  THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE  WANT  WAR?  .     .  6 

III  WAS  AMERICA  EVER  IN  DANGER? 13 

DEMOCRACY  AND  GETTING  INTO  WAR 

IV  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  OF  ONE  MAN  ....  20 

V    PRESIDENTIAL    USURPATIONS   TO   ACHIEVE    BEL- 
LIGERENCY       26 

VI     OUR  STEALTHY  APPROACH  TO  WAR  ....  32 

VII    THE  1916  ELECTION 39 

DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  WAR 

VIII     EXECUTIVE  DUPLICITY  IN  IMPOSING  THE  WAR 

POLICIES 47 

IX    "DEMOCRATIC"  CZARISM  IN  WAR-TIME  ...  54 

X    THE  WAR  TERROR 64 

OUR  WAR  "CAUSES" 

XI     MOTIVES  CLAIMED  FOR  BELLIGERENCY     ...  80 

XII     PROTECTION  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE    ...  86 

XIII  PRESERVATION  OF  AMERICAN  LIVES    ....  97 

XIV  WAR  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 104 

XV    INTERNATIONAL  LAW — OUR  REVERSALS  ON  THE 

LAW  IN  1915  AND  1916 108 

XVI    INTERNATIONAL    LAW — BRITISH    AND    GERMAN 

VIOLATIONS  COMPARED 115 


CONTENTS 

OHAPTBB 

XVII     INTERNATIONAL  LAW — AMERICA'S  OFFENSES  AS 
BELLIGERENT 

XVIII     OTHER  "INTOLERABLE  WRONGS"  .... 

OUR  "OBJECTIVES" 
XIX    WAR  FOR  DEMOCRACY    ....... 

XX    PEACE  WITHOUT  VICTORY  VERSUS  PEACE  FROI 
VICTORY  

XXI    THE  GERMAN  WORLD  PERIL  BUGABOO  . 
XXII    OUR  MYTH  OF  THE  WAR'S  BEGINNING  . 

XXIII  THE  NOBLE  DEMOCRACIES — SCRAPS  OF  PAPEI 

ATROCITIES 

XXIV  THE  NOBLE  DEMOCRACIES  AND  SMALL  NATIONS 
XXV    WHAT  REALLY  STARTED  IT 

XXVI     PROMISE  AND  PERFORMANCE 

OUR  WAR  AND  BUSINESS 

XXVII    PATRIOTISM  OF  THE  PROFIT-MAKERS  . 

XXVIII    THE  PROFITS  OF  PATRIOTISM 

PROFIT-SEEKER  AND  PROFIT-SERVER     . 

SECRET  OF  THE  WAR  PROFITS 

WILSON  IMPERIALISM 

MEXICO 


XXIX 

XXX 

XXXI 

XXXII 


XXXIII    VIRGIN   ISLANDS,   HAITI,   SANTO  DOMINGO  AN: 
NICARAGUA  . 


XXXIV  STRICTLY  BUSINESS 

XXXV  "THE  ENEMY  AT  HOME" 

XXXVI  PROOF  OF  THE  PUDDING 

XXXVII  "RECONSTRUCTION" 

APPENDIX 

A  FEW  DEADLY  PARALLELS  OF  WOODROW  WILSOI 
INDEX 


SHALL  IT  BE  AGAIN  ? 


SHALL  IT  BE  AGAIN? 


THE  AUTHOR  EXPLAINS 


WERE  any  excuse  deemed  necessary  for  this  book,  it  would 
be  enough  to  point  to  the  likelihood  of  another  war.  No 
one  will  dispute  that,  notwithstanding  complete  victory  was 
accorded  us,  the  promised  goal,  permanent  peace,  was  not 
attained.  If,  indeed,  we  are  to  judge  by  the  demands  of 
the  Executive  for  greater  armament,  the  danger  of  future 
war  at  once  became  from  three  to  five  times  as  great  as  be- 
fore we  took  up  arms  to  repel  such  danger.  These  de- 
mands were  scaled  down,  but  our  peace-time  armament  re- 
mained far  heavier  than  before.  Those  of  us  who,  a  little 
while  ago,  were  most  confident  in  asserting  that  our  war 
would  end  war  are  the  same  who,  as  soon  as  it  was  over, 
became  most  certain  that  we  must  be  ready  for  the  next 
one. 

But  if  the  goal  was  not  reached,  our  war  could  not  have 
been  in  every  respect  the  glorious  thing  we  were  told  it  was. 
Nor  will  any  one  dispute  that  many  of  the  other  promised 
benefits  are  not  forthcoming.  Nearly  all  of  us  seem  to  be 
willing  to  assume — or  to  permit  our  neighbors  to  assume, 
which  comes  to  the  same  thing — that  the  "reasons"  justify- 
ing our  war  are  sound.  But  if  such  "reasons"  are  sound 
how  is  it  that  the  results  are  so  disappointing? 

The  question  cannot  be  dismissed  simply  by  blaming 
Wilson,  or  the  Republican  party,  or  Lloyd  George  and 
Clemenceau.  Did  we  not  fight  on  the  theory  of  the  perfect 


2  Shall; It  Be  Again? 

wisdom  and  purity  of  Wilson  and  the  Entente  statesmen— 
and,  for  that  matter,  of  ourselves,  which  includes  the  Re- 
publican party? 

If  we  have  been  betrayed,  it  is  not  sufficient  merely  to 
acknowledge  the  fact,  but  to  determine  how  and  why,  in 
order  that  provision  may  be  made  against  betrayal  in  the 
future.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  look  for  the  secret  in  what 
happened  at  Paris.  The  great  settlement — which,  in  the 
main,  still  stands — was  the  logical  and  almost  certain  result 
of  what  had  gone  before. 

Although  it  will  be  pleasant  for  all  who  served  or  sacri- 
ficed in  the  late  war  always  to  believe  the  best  of  it,  no  one 
who  really  sacrificed  will  wish  for  another  such  experience ; 
nor  would  any  one  wish  to  continue  believing  well  of  recent 
events  if  such  belief  were  to  add  to  the  danger  of  a  repeti- 
tion. 

Remember  that  for  more  than  four  years  one  side  was 
permitted  to  speak  and  the  other  forced  to  remain  silent. 
"The  perspective  that  only  time  can  give,"  some  say,  "is 
necessary  before  the  true  history  of  our  war  can  be  written, 
and  before  proper  criticism  can  be  made."  But  the  end  of 
the  fighting  saw  a  vast  and  complicated  machine  feverishly 
at  work  to  crystallize  into  "history"  the  story  of  the  war 
as  it  was  told  to  us  as  propaganda  in  the  heat  thereof.  If 
we  wait  a  generation  to  face  the  whole  truth  we  shall  prob- 
ably never  face  it. 

If  any  of  the  "reasons"  justifying  our  recent  war  is  valid, 
it  is  not  unlikely  that  one  or  more  of  them  will  again  apply, 
and  another  war  will  become  both  necessary  and  desirable. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  none  of  such  "reasons"  will  bear  the 
test  of  scrutiny,  any  probable  future  war  will  be  inexcus- 
able, since  all  probable  "causes"  and  "objectives"  were 
urged  for  the  recent  one. 

How,  then,  did  it  come  about  that  America,  in  1917, 


The  Author  Explains  3 

found  itself  a  partisan  in  a  conflict  which  evoked  only  hor- 
ror here  in  1914 — a  conflict  which  not  one  in  one  thousand 
dreamed  we  could  ever  enter — which  not  one  in  a  million 
had  the  temerity  to  advocate  entering?  How  did  it  come 
about  that  America  was  plunging  ahead  in  policies  which 
not  a  single  public  man  dared  openly  favor  in  1914? 

In  this  book  are  set  forth  the  essential  facts  tending  to 
prove  what  many  people  already  believe,  though  on  incom- 
plete evidence,  that  ours  was  a  war  for  business.  If,  how- 
ever, any  of  the  non-business  motives  mentioned  in  justifica- 
tion for  our  war  is  sound,  the  theory  of  a  war  for  business 
cannot  stand.  Thus  it  is  that  the  first  parts  of  the  book  are 
devoted  to  an  examination  of  such  alleged  motives. 

Business,  of  course,  was  farthest  from  the  minds  of  the 
masses  of  the  American  people.  But  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  masses,  the  government,  and  business  becomes 
clear.  Although  millions  fought  and  served,  the  millions 
decided  absolutely  nothing  except  the  physical  victory. 
One  man  chose  war  for  America,  dictated  the  war  policies, 
arrogated  to  himself  the  sole  power  to  arrange  the  condi- 
tions of  peace.  The  motives  of  the  men  who  fought  in 
Europe,  and  of  the  folks  who  served  at  home,  did  not  de- 
termine what  the  real  motives  of  their  war  should  be. 
The  real  motives  of  their  war  were  the  motives  which 
Woodrow  Wilson  personally  chose  to  serve,  whether  in 
public  or  in  secret,  and  only  those. 

From  this  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  Wilson  is  to  re- 
ceive the  entire  blame  for  the  delinquencies  of  our  war  and 
our  peace.  Although  the  responsibility  lies  as  heavy 
upon  Wilson  as  could  be  upon  any  individual,  the  culpa- 
bility of  Wilson  explains  only  one-third  of  the  riddle.  As 
for  ourselves,  the  motives  that  we  professed  are  the  same 
as  the  professed  motives  of  Wilson.  Is  it  already  forgot- 
ten that  the  rest  of  us  also  swore  allegiance  to  the  principles 


4.  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

by  which  Wilson  claimed  to  be  guided  in  entering  and  pros- 
ecuting the  war  "to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy"; 
that  the  propaganda  of  "loyal  patriots"  everywhere,  even 
among  his  bitterest  political  opponents,  was  little  more 
than  an  echo  of  the  President's  words;  that  "Stand  Behind 
the  President!"  was  the  war  slogan  while  the  issue  was  in 
the  balance,  and  trust  in  the  President  the  acid  test  of  pa- 
triotism after  we  were  in;  that  it  was  because  of  his  pro- 
claimed war  motives  that  we  glorified  Wilson  beyond  any 
other  man  in  history? 

The  question  of  Presidential  fraud  is  determined  by  the 
discrepancy  between  the  motives  professed  and  the  motives 
served.  The  question  of  national  fraud  is  determined  by 
the  discrepancy  between  the  motives  professed  and  the  mo- 
tives to  whose  service  we  complacently  agree.  For  the 
fruit  that  Wilson  plucked  for  us  we  still  retain.  Although 
the  Republican  party  altered,  in  outward  detail,  the  written 
forms  of  peace,  it  did  not  change  the  general  nature  of  the 
settlement,  nor  attempt  nor  wish  to  do  so.  Although  the 
phraseology  varies  at  times,  our  foreign  policies  remain  in 
principle  the  same.  Although  a  Republican  Congress  went 
through  motions  intended  to  discredit  Wilson,  it  met,  in  a 
large  measure,  his  wishes  as  to  "reconstruction"  legislation. 
Regardless  of  the  judgment  of  a  national  election,  Wilson's 
work,  on  the  whole,  has  been  accepted  by  the  "leaders  of 
the  people"  and  is  tolerated  by  the  country. 

Although  it  is  of  importance  to  present  in  a  true  light 
the  most  misunderstood  figure  in  American  history,  the 
theme  is  much  broader  than  that.  '  Instead  of  laying  the 
foundations  for  future  peace,  our  war  set  up  the  ground- 
work for  more  and  more  war.  This  groundwork  must  be 
cleared  away  or  there  is  no  hope.  Only  after  the  shams 
of  the  past  war  have  been  exploded,  its  true  motives  re- 
vealed, and  its  methods  and  results  shine  clear  in  the  light 


The  Author  Explains  5 

of  those  motives,  can  a  beginning  be  made  towards  ways 
that  will  insure  us  against  future  horrors. 

Instead  of  being  a  dead  issue,  therefore,  our  late  war  is 
the  livest  issue  of  the  day,  and  it  will  remain  an  issue  so 
long  as  future  war  is  in  the  reckoning.  Its  lessons  hold  not 
only  the  secret  of  averting  future  war,  but  also  the  solution 
of  other  public  questions  of  a  pressing  nature. 


II 

DID   THE   AMERICAN    PEOPLE   WANT   WAR? 

IT  was  invariably  assumed  during  our  war  against  Ger- 
many, as  well  as  afterwards — and  countless  times  asserted 
• — that  the  American  people  went  willingly  into  the  war. 
Said  President  Wilson,  for  example:  "I  say  that  the  heart 
of  the  country  is  in  this  war  because  it  would  not  have  gone 
into  it  if  its  heart  had  not  been  prepared  for  it."  (Red 
Cross  Memorial  Building  dedication,  May  12,  1917.) 
While  it  cannot  be  stated  with  absolute  certainty  whether  a 
majority  would  have  voted  for  or  against  war  on  April  6, 
1917 — since  they  were  not  accorded  an^opportunity  to  vote 
— there  is  a  collection  of  circumstances  which,  when  brought 
together,  would  seem  to  leave  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
American  people  would  not  have  chosen  to  enter  the  fight. 

Some  of  these  circumstances  are: 

I 

i.  The  Reelection  of  Wilson. 

Wilson,  candidate  of  a  minority  party,  was  elected  orig- 
inally because  of  a  split  in  the  majority  party.  Facing  a 
united  Republican  party  in  1916,  his  only  chance  for  victory 
lay  in  espousing  a  cause  appealing  so  powerfully  to  the  mas- 
ses as  to  induce  at  least  a  million  voters  to  break  away 
from  party  affiliations.  In  choosing  to  make  peace  his 
paramount  issue,  Wilson  correctly  guessed  the  most  fer- 
vent wish  of  the  people  at  large.  His  slogan,  "He  kept  us 
out  of  war,"  and  his  promise  to  continue  to  "keep  us  out  of 
war,"  won  him  reelection.  In  November,  1916,  the 
American  electorate  spoke  for  peace  and  against  war  with 

6 


Did  the  American  People  Want  War?       7 

Germany,  as  definitely  as  it  was  possible  for  it  to  speak  at 
that  or  any  other  time. 

2.  Our  Stealthy  Approach  to  War. 

The  successive  steps  by  which  President  Wilson  arrived 
at  war  were  screened  by  voluble  assurances  of  peaceful 
intention.  (See  Chapter  VI.)  The  jiation  was  almost 
wholly,  and  Congress  partly,  deceived  by  these  assurances. 
The  President  continued  to  reiterate  that  he  was  treading 
the  path  of  peace  even  after  he  broke  diplomatic  relations 
— even  when  he  sought  the  consent  of  Congress  to  arm  pri- 
vate ships  with  naval  crews — even  after  that.  What  other 
interpretation  is  to  be  placed  upon  this  except  that  he  him- 
self believed  that  the  masses  were  still  opposed  to  war? 
In  his  message  to  Congress  of  February  26,  the  President 
admitted:  "The  American  people  do  not  desire  it"  Be- 
tween this  date  anckApril  2,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the 
sentiment  of  the  masses  changed.  No  new  issue  whatever 
arose  to  change  it.  For  his  casus  belli,  President  Wilson 
himself  went  back  to  the  German  proclamation  of  Jan.  31. 

3.   Refusal  to  Submit  any  War  Issue  to  the  Public. 

While  the  declaration  of  war  was  impending,  and  during 
the  weeks  immediately  succeeding  it — when  President 
Wilson's  war  plans  were  being  revealed — numerous  pro- 
posals were  made,  usually  taking  the  form  of  resolutions 
or  amendments  introduced  in  Congress,  providing  that  the 
public  be  given  some  say  in  these  momentous  matters. 
Some  of  these  proposals  were:  that  the  choice  of  war  or 
peace  be  decided  by  referendum;  that  the  question  of  send- 
ing an  army  overseas  be  submitted  to  referendum;  that 
service  overseas  be  limited  to  volunteers.  That  the 
Executive  stood  uncompromisingly  against  all  such  propo- 
sals furnishes  a  strong  presumption  of  a  conviction  in  his 


8  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

own  mind  that,  if  afforded  an  opportunity,  the  people  would 
have  repudiated  his  war  programme  and  his  war. 

4.  Government  Press  Agency,  War  Education,  and  Repres- 
sion. 

With  America's  declaration  of  war,  the  government  or- 
ganized the  most  complete  and  expensive  press  agency  ever 
seen  anywhere  on  the  globe.  More  money  was  spent  for 
the  manufacture  of  public  opinion,  and  more  men  and 
women  were  employed,  than  in  any  previous  publicity  cam- 
paign in  history.  Of  the  official  publicity  organizations, 
the  Bureau  of  Information  was  but  one  of  many  depart- 
ments. Added  to  the  purely  government  press  bureaus, 
were  the  voluntary  war  committees,  organized  by  the  gov- 
ernment and  directed  by  pne  department  or  another. 
Every  postmaster  in  America  was  forced  to  serve  the  gov- 
ernment as  a  press  agent.  The  press,  as  a  whole,  the  thea- 
tres, and  even  the  public  schools,  became  a  part  of  the  ma- 
chine. With  their  teachers  as  officers,  the  school-children 
were  obliged  to  assist  the  government  in  the  imposition  of 
its  propaganda.  Every  person  in  America  was  reached, 
in  one  way  or  another,  and  almost  daily.  Is  not  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  press  agency  a  virtual  admission  that  America 
went  into  the  war  unconvinced  of  its  righteousness? 
Coupled  with  the  violent  suppression  of  all  opposition  to 
the  war,  is  it  not  material  evidence  of  a  determination  to 
force  distasteful  beliefs  upon  an  unwilling  people? 

5.  Circumstances  of  the  "Liberty  Loans." 

The  large  number  of  bond  purchasers  was  mentioned  as 
evidence  of  the  popularity  of  the  war.  It  is  no  evidence  of 
such  popularity,  since  all  Liberty  Loans  were  floated  chiefly 
by  coercion.  All  the  publicity,  agitation,  and  appeals  both 
to  patriotism  and  cupidity,  all  the  posters  and  literature, 


Did  the  American  People  Want  War?       9 

all  the  personal  solicitation,  were  not  considered  sufficient 
to  sell  the  bonds.  Coercion  was  resorted  to  as  a  policy. 
What  is  said  of  the  Liberty  Loan  applies,  in  a  somewhat 
lesser  degree,  to  the  Red  Cross.  Neither  the  large  number 
of  subscriptions  to  Liberty  Bonds,  nor  those  to  the  Red 
Cross  are  any  evidence  of  the  popularity  of  the  war. 

6.  The  New  York  Municipal  Election. 

After  America's  declaration  of  war,  the  only  important 
election  in  which  peace  was  permitted  to  become  the  issue, 
and  in  which  freedom  of  discussion  was  allowed  the  candi- 
dates, was  the  election  in  New  York,  November,  1917. 
The  Mayor,  Mr.  Mitchel,  deliberately  chose  to  make  his 
fight  on  the  issue  of  patriotism.  He  directly  charged  his 
chief  opponent,  Hylan,  with  abetting  German  propaganda, 
and  ''exposed"  him  as  an  associate  of  "paid  enemies  of 
America."  Mitchel  was  vigorously  supported  by  conspicu- 
ous patriots,  patriotic  societies,  and  all  the  "loyal"  city 
newspapers.  The  latter  expressly  warned  the  public  that 
the  defeat  of  Mitchel  would  be  a  virtual  repudiation  of  the 
war  by  New  York.  Nevertheless,  Hylan  achieved  the 
most  decisive  victory  ever  given  to  a  party  in  the  American 
metropolis,  while  the  Socialist  party,  which  frankly  attacked 
the  war,  became  a  factor  for  the  first  time.  The  Socialist 
candidate,  Hillquit,  who  had  announced  from  the  platform 
his  refusal  to  buy  Liberty  Bonds,  received  93  per  cent,  of 
the  vote  given  Mitchel,  while,  of  the  28,937  soldiers  and  sail- 
ors who  voted  in  New  York,  but  6,226,  or  less  than  twenty- 
two  out  of  each  one  hundred,  cast  their  ballot  for  Mitchel. 

7.  Circumstances  of  the  Draft. 

Of  the  total  number  called  in  the  first  draft,  more  than 
one-half  (50.62  per  cent.)  put  in  formal  claims  for  exemp- 


io  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

tion.  More  than  a  quarter  of  a  million  (252,294),  or 
eight  per  cent.,  failed  to  appear  and  succeeded  in  escaping 
arrest.  The  former  figure,  of  course,  does  not  represent 
all  of  the  registrants  who  did  not  want  to  go  to  war,  while 
the  latter  figure  represents  only  a  fraction  of  those  willing 
to  risk  terms  in  the  penitentiary  rather  than  go,  for  the 
number  evading  registration  is  unknown. 

Many  thousands  who  failed  to  register,  and  many  thou- 
sands who  registered  but  failed  to  respond  to  the  call,  were 
arrested.  In  the  "slacker  round-ups,"  staged  in  New  York 
City  alone,  in  the  last  days  of  August,  1918,  16,000  men 
were  held  for  offenses  of  this  kind.  So  many  men  of  draft 
age  fled  the  country  that  it  became  expedient  to  promulgate 
an  order  forbidding  the  departure  of  such  men,  and  to  es- 
tablish an  elaborate  system  of  espionage,  patrol,  and  pass- 
ports to  enforce  the  order.  In  a  statement  issued  Septem- 
ber 3,  1918,  the  War  Department  said:  "The  Department 
of  Justice  has  on  file  the  names  of  3000  slackers  who  fled 
to  Mexico  before  June  5,  1917,  to  escape  registration." 
So  many  married  to  avoid  the  draft  in  the  early  months 
that  it  became  expedient  to  serve  notice  on  the  country  that 
eleventh-hour  marriages  would  save  no  one  from  service. 
So  many  had  their  teeth  extracted  to  render  themselves 
physically  ineligible  that  the  War  Department  issued  a 
warning  to  dentists  that  they  were  liable  to  prosecution  for 
complicity  in  this  form  of  draft  evasion. 

In  the  ten  months  ending  May  i,  1918,  over  14,000 
desertions  were  reported  from  the  army.  The  numbers 
seeking  dishonorable  discharge  were  even  greater.  At  the 
end  of  December,  1917,  we  were  told  that  "for  several 
weeks  the  army  has  been  losing  men  at  the  rate  of  100  to 
150  a  day.  They  chose  to  commit  offenses  which  led  to 
their  dishonorable  discharge."  The  newspapers  gave  us 
instances  of  suicide  and  self-mutilations  which  were  resorted 


Did  the  American  People  Want  War?     n 

to  as  a  means  to  escape  the  draft,  and  of  men  turning  to 
crime  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  getting  into  the  peni- 
tentiary and  so  escaping  the  draft.  There  were  a  number 
of  anti-draft  riots,  and  so  much  anti-draft  sentiment  that 
it  became  expedient  to  prevent,  with  an  iron  hand,  the  pub- 
lic assembly  of  persons  opposing  the  draft,  and  to  prose- 
cute and  imprison  hundreds  of  those  most  conspicuous  in 
anti-draft  agitation.  There  was  also  uncovered  a  thriving 
trade  in  exemption  affidavits,  involving  the  crime  of  per- 
jury. 

When  the  draft  bill  became  a  law,  President  Wilson 
told  the  world:  "It  [the  draft]  is  in  no  sense  a  conscription 
of  the  unwilling;  it  is,  rather,  selection  from  a  nation  that 
has  volunteered  in  mass"  (Registration  Proclamation, 
May  1 8,  1917).  Thereafter,  an  elaborate  effort  was 
made  to  throw  a  glamor  about  the  draft,  to  make  it  appear 
that  submission  to  the  draft  was,  on  the  whole,  voluntary 
and  without  compulsion.  The  large  registration  was 
pointed  to  as  an  evidence  of  the  patriotism  of  America's 
young  men.  But  under  the  circumstances  the  large  regis- 
tration was  no  proof  of  willingness  to  serve;  it  showed, 
rather,  that,  in  general,  the  opposition  to  service  was  over- 
come by  fear  of  punishment,  of  which  the  President  and 
patriotic  leaders  were  careful  to  give  repeated  warning. 

The  fact  that  severe  penalties  faced  America's  young 
men  at  every  turn  is  itself  evidence  that  the  war  leaders 
were  well  aware  that,  without  coercion,  they  would  have 
been  unable  to  raise  an  army.  Out  of  the  first  draft  of 
three  million  men,  not  fewer  than  300,000,  and  probably 
500,000,  made  themselves  liable  to  punishment  in  the  peni- 
tentiary in  their  efforts  to  evade  service.  In  order  to  carry 
through  our  European  adventure,  it  became  necessary  to 
subject  millions  to  involuntary  servitude,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  to  create  a  multitude  of  felons  on  the  other. 


12  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

8.  Failure  of  Voluntary  Enlistments. 

It  is  supposed  that  the  people  can  be  depended  on  to  vol- 
unteer for  a  people's  war.  But,  although  the  army  recruit- 
ing service  was  extremely  active  throughout  nearly  all  of 
the  war  period,  and  although  special  inducements  were  held 
out  for  volunteers,  army  enlistments  from  the  date  of  the 
war  message  to  the  date  of  the  armistice  reached  only  the 
insignificant  total  of  393,931. 

Beginning  February  3,  after  the  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations,  extraordinary  efforts  were  put  forth  by  the  army, 
assisted  by  patriotic  organizations  and  great  business 
houses,  to  stimulate  recruiting.  But  during  February,  the 
army  received  only  4,852  recruits,  a  figure  not  noticeably 
above  the  normal.  From  April  i  to  May  14,  the  enlist- 
ments numbered  only  67,443.  A  supreme  effort  was  made 
during  the  last  week  of  June,  which  the  President  desig- 
nated as  Recruiting  Week.  But  Recruiting  Week  netted 
only  9,043  men  for  the  army.  Between  April  i  and  July 
i,  only  133,992  enlistments  were  received,  and  it  is  certain 
that  many  of  these  were  prompted  by  the  impending  draft. 
At  that  rate  it  would  have  taken  eighteen  months  to  raise 
the  first  one  million  men.  However,  by  July  i  recruiting 
had  come  almosf  to  a  standstill.  Volunteering  had  been 
tried  and  proveft  a  failure.  When  only  one  out  of  every 
one  hundred  men  of  the  most  courageous,  adventurous,  and 
self-sacrificing  age  responds  to  the  repeated  calls  of  his  gov- 
ernment, during  the  first  three  months  of  a  foreign  war,  it 
is  a  point  against  the  popularity  of  the  war  which  no  rhet- 
oric can  explain  away. 

The  impulse  for  America's  war  certainly  did  not  come 
from  the  common  people. 


Ill 

WAS   AMERICA    EVER   IN   DANGER? 

Why,  my  friends,  we  ought  not  to  turn  to  those  people  [the  na- 
tions at  war]  in  fear,  but  in  sympathy.  We  ought  to  realize  that 
after  this  exhaustion  they  will  need  us,  and  that  we  need  not  fear 
them. — Woodrow  Wilson,  in  speech  at  Cincinnati,  Oct.  26,  1916. 

THE  American  people  were  told  that  they  were  forced  into 
war  by  the  Kaiser;  that  America  had  been  attacked,  and 
that  there  was  no  other  recourse  except  to  defend  itself 
against  aggression;  that  the  very  sovereignty  of  the  coun- 
try was  imperiled;  even  that  we  were  threatened  with  actual 
invasion  and  domination  by  German  armies. 

President  Wilson  personally  gave  the  signal  for  this 
particular  note  in  the  official  and  unofficial  propaganda,  as 
for  all  others.  In  asking  for  war  he  advised:  "That  the 
Congress  declare  the  recent  course  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  to  be  in  fact  nothing  less  than  war  against  the 
government  and  people  of  the  United  States;  that  it  for- 
mally accept  the  status  of  belligerent  that  has  thus  been 
thrust  upon  it"  In  his  message  of  December  4,  1917,  he 
asserted:  "We  have  been  forced  into  it  [the  war]  to  save 
the  very  institutions  we  live  under  from  corruption  and  de- 
struction." At  Urbana,  January  31,  1918,  he  told  us: 
"We  are  fighting,  therefore,  as  truly  for  the  liberty  and 
self-government  of  the  United  States  as  if  the  war  of  our 
own  Revolution  had  to  be  fought  over  again" 

This  doctrine  was  preached  from  thousands  of  platforms, 
thousands  of  pulpits,  thousands  of  movie  screens,  millions 
of  posters,  in  the  daily  newspapers,  and  in  every  vehicle  of 

13 


14  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  propaganda.  To  carry  out  the  idea,  our  war  councils 
were  called  "defense  councils,"  our  private  patriotic  socie- 
ties "defense  societies."  The  necessity  for  defense  against 
invasion  and  outrage  became,  as  intended,  a  fixed  assump- 
tion of  millions  of  perfectly  sincere  and  truth-loving  Ameri- 
cans. 

But  what  are  the  facts? 

1.  Germany    had    not    attacked    the    jterritory    of    the 
United  States,  nor  threatened  to  attack  it.     The  only  sug- 
gestion of  the  kind  was  contained  in  the  proposal  for  a 
German-Mexican  alliance,   and  this  was  expressly  contin- 
gent upon  America's  first  making  war  on  Germany.      (See 
Chapter  XVIII.) 

2.  Germany  had  perpetrated  no  injury  against  an  Ameri- 
can not  perpetrated  also  against  neutrals  generally,  and 
such  injuries  as  she  had  perpetrated  were  wholly  incidental 
to  the  war  against  the  Entente  governments. 

3.  Germany  had  not  declared  war  against  the  United 
States.     The  German  government  had  striven  to  avoid  war, 
offering  every  concession  short  of  abandoning  submarine 
operations  in  European  waters,  even  making  overtures  for 
a  peaceful  understanding  subsequently  to  the  breaking  of 
diplomatic  relations. 

4.  Germany     was     physically     incapable     of     invading 
America  at  the  time  when  some  of  us  were  asserting  that 
our  war  was  to  repel  invasion. 

5.  Germany  would  have  been  physically   incapable   of 
invading  America  even  had  she  possessed  no  other  ene- 
mies.    This  was  the  judgment  of  the  highest  experts  in  the 
service  of  America,  sworn  to  before  Congressional  com- 
mittees while  this  country  was  neutral. 

December  9,  1914,  Admiral  Fletcher,  who  was  at  that 
time  the  highest  active  officer  of  the  navy,  informed  the 
House  Naval  Affairs  Committee  that,  even  were  it  possible 


Was  America  Ever  in  Danger?         15 

for  the  entire  German  navy  to  take  the  high  seas  and  attack, 
not  a  single  German  could  be  landed  on  American  soil, 
since  the  American  navy,  being  stronger,  would  defeat  it. 
In  April,  1917,  the  relative  strength  of  the  American  navy 
was  greater  than  in  December,  1914. 

During  these  Congressional  investigations,  it  was  shown 
that,  to  carry  a  little  army  of  96,000  men  across  the  sea 
would  require  270  troop  transport  vessels,  a  greater  col- 
lection of  ships  than  had  ever  sailed  together  in  the  annals 
of  naval  warfare ;  and  that  an  army  had  never  been  moved 
successfully  overseas  and  landed  under  hostile  guns,  the 
Dardanelles  catastrophe  having  been  the  result  of  the  only 
great  undertaking  of  that  character. 

Admiral  Fletcher  testified  that  the  war  in  Europe  had 
"conclusively  demonstrated  what  every  military  strategist 
knew  before,  that  it  is  impossible  for  sea  craft  successfully 
to  attack  land  fortifications" 

As  to  our  land  fortifications,  General  Weaver  testified 
that  they  were  already  "the  best  in  the  world."  The  guns 
mounted  and  contemplated  in  the  appropriations  for  our 
coast  defenses,  he  said,  would  give  us  "an  entirely  satis- 
factory defense." 

Admiral  Knight  characterized  the  difficulties  of  trans- 
porting a  fleet  across  either  the  Atlantic  or  Pacific  ocean 
and  maintaining  it  in  American  waters — a  necessary  feat  in 
a  successful  invasion — as  "almost  insuperable." 

Corroborating  Knight,  General  Miles  testified: 

I  will  suppose  an  unsupposable  case.  Suppose  they  could  put  an 
army  on  a  fleet  of  500  ships  and  move  it  across  the  Atlantic  without 
being  disturbed  by  any  naval  power,  and  they  could  land.  They 
certainly  could  not  go  into  any  port.  They  could  not  go  into  our 
ports  any  more  than  they  could  go  through  the  Dardanelles.  That 
has  been  demonstrated.  Our  forts  are  equipped  and  fortified  as 
well  as  the  Dardanelles.  Suppose  they  got  that  far — as  to  landing 


16  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

at  some  remote  point — if  we  could  not  gather  enough  men  in  the 
army  and  militia,  and  by  other  means,  to  destroy  that  army  before 
they  could  send  their  ships  back  and  get  another  load,  I  would  want 
to  move  to  another  country. 

May  i,  1917,  Admiral  Chocherprat  of  the  French  navy, 
here  with  the  French  war  mission,  told  the  newspaper  cor- 
respondents: uThe  United  States  is  in  possession  of  the 
most  powerful  fleet  in  the  world  next  to  the  British. " 

This  disposes  also  of  the  assertion,  heard  so  many  times 
from  1914  on,  that  the  United  States  owed  its  immunity 
from  German  invasion  to  the  protection  of  the  British 
navy. 

Finally,  when  the  German  high  seas  fleet  fell  into  Allied 
hands  at  the  end  of  the  war,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
bunker  capacity  of  the  German  battleships  was  extremely 
small,  demonstrating  that  they  had  been  designed  for  use 
only  near  the  home  ports.  The  very  structure  of  these 
great  ships  rendered  impracticable  any  sustained  or  ex- 
tended operations  in  distant  waters.  Of  themselves  they 
are  proof  that  the  German  government  had  not  entertained 
a  thought  of  attacking  the  territory  of  the  United  States. 

President  Wilson  himself,  in  the  period  preceding  war, 
repeatedly  rejected  the  idea  of  a  possible  invasion  of  this 
country.  In  his  message  of  December  8,  1914,  he  said: 
"No  one  who  speaks  counsel  based  on  facts  or  drawn  from 
a  just  and  candid  interpretation  of  the  realities  can  say  that 
there  is  any  reason  to  fear  that  from  any  quarter  our  inde- 
pendence or  the  integrity  of  our  territory  is  threatened*. 
Dread  of  the  power  of  other  nations  we  are  incapable  of." 
To  a  New  York  audience,  January  27,  1917,  he  declared: 
"Nobody  seriously  supposes,  gentlemen,  that  the  United 
States  needs  to  fear  an  invasion  of  its  own  territory" 

We  find  the  leaders  of  our  allies  in  agreement  with  this 


Was  America  Ever  in  Danger?        17 

view,  even  after  our  war  declaration.  In  the  speeches 
delivered  in  the  British  Parliament,  April  18,  1917,  acclaim- 
ing our  participation,  it  was  held  that  the  United  States  had 
not  been  directly  attacked  in  any  way,  much  less  invaded  or 
threatened  with  invasion. 

Mr.  Asquith  said  that  the  war  "was  doing  little  appre- 
ciable harm  to  the  material  fortunes  and  prosperity  of 
the  American  people.  Nor  were  American  interests,  at 
home  or  abroad,  directly  imperiled,  least  of  all  the  greatest 
interest  of  a  democratic  community,  the  maintenance  of 
domestic  independence  and  liberty." 

Earl  Curzon  said: 

The  case  of  America  entering  the  war  is  widely  differentiated 
from  that  of  any  of  the  other  allied  countries.  All  of  the  latter 
had  a  direct  personal  interest  in  the  war,  but  America's  interest  is 
secondary  and  remote. 

A  month  after  the  declaration  of  war,  President  Wilson 
used  the  words:  "We  have  gone  in  with  no  special  griev- 
ance of  our  own."  Challenged  for  appearing  to  suggest 
that  we  had  gone  into  the  war  for  no  cause  at  all,  he 
answered  that  we  had  grievances,  but  none  that  was  not 
shared  generally  by  the  neutral  countries. 

Finally,  after  the  fighting  was  over,  President  Wilson 
confessed:  "America  was  not  immediately  in  danger.  .  .  . 
America  was  not  directly  attacked."  (At  Billings,  Sept. 
n,  1919.) 

The  undeniable  truth  is  that,  in  order  to  come  to  grips 
with  the  enemy,  it  was  necessary  to  send  our  forces  across 
a  great  ocean,  into  another  hemisphere,  and  either  hunt  him 
down  on  a  narrow  strip  of  sea  or  attack  him  in  his  own 
trenches,  dug  in  another  continent.  Instead  of  the  enemy's 
carrying  the  war  to  us,  it  was  we  who  carried  the  war  to  the 
enemy.  Instead  of  being  placed  in  the  position  of  defend- 


18  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ing  our  soil  against  German  armies,  we  placed  the  Germans 
in  the  position  of  defending  their  soil  against  American 
armies. 

Where  was  the  element  of  self-defense? 

There  was  asserted  a  necessity  for  defense  of  the  alleged 
rights  to  trade  and  travel  through  a  narrow  zone  of  sea, 
three  thousand  miles  from  American  territory.  But  what 
has  this  to  do  with  the  horrible  pictures  of  German  fire 
and  sword  in  American  cities? 

The  nearest  connection  is  found  in  the  theory  that  the 
Kaiser  and  his  people  were  inflamed  with  an  ambition  to 
conquer  and  rule  the  world,  and  that  there  was  a  possi- 
bility of  their  doing  it  at  some  future  time.  Even  were 
there  a  reasonable  basis  for  such  a,  hypothesis  (and  there 
was  not) ,  it  would  not  have  justified  war,  either  under  exist- 
ing principles  of  international  law,  the  common  practices 
of  modern  governments,  or  in  common  sense.  For  to  pro- 
ceed consistently  upon  such  a  principle  would  require  us  to 
attack  every  other  powerful  nation,  and  attempt  at  once 
to  assert  a  world  supremacy  for  ourselves. 

America  was  never  in  danger  even  after  we  went  to  war 
with  Germany,  for  we  were  never  placed  beyond  the  pos- 
sibility of  turning  back  without  serious  hurt.  At  all  times 
we  were  in  a  position  to  make  peace  and  withdraw  without 
vital  injury  from  the  enemy. 

After  we  had  gone  to  war,  the  imposition  of  onerous 
terms  upon  the  Russian  Soviet  Government,  in  the  Treaty 
of  Brest-Litovsk,  was  seized  upon  as  a  horrible  example  of 
what  would  happen  to  America  should  she  not  put  her  heel 
upon  the  neck  of  the  Kaiser.  The  comparison  was  inept; 
the  Kaiser's  armies  were  never  in  America  and  there  was 
never  the  remotest  probability  of  their  coming  to  America 
or  attempting  to  do  so.  Will  any  one  contend  that  the 


Was  America  Ever  in  Danger?        19 

German  government  was  at  any  time  unwilling  to  conclude 
the  same  terms  of  peace  that  we  rejected  in  the  first  months 
of  1917 — friendship  on  any  basis  short  of  giving  up  the 
submarine  blockade  of  England  and  her  allies?  (See 
Chapter  XVI.) 

The  point  is  important;  for  the  bludgeoning  down  of  all 
domestic  opposition  to  the  war  was  excused  only  on  the 
plea  that,  once  we  were  at  war,  there  was  no  choice  except 
between  victory  and  disaster.  It  was  upon  this  assumption 
that  so  many  prominent  persons,  who  opposed  war  up  to 
the  declaration,  became  "now-that-we're-in"  patriots. 
They  were  willing  to  support  a  war  which  they  believed 
to  be  unjust,  merely  because  it  had  begun.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances that  America  happened  to  be  in,  there  was  no 
defensible  reason  why  any  one  who  opposed  the  war  before 
April  6,  1917,  should  have  favored  it  after  that  date. 

Whatever  the  merits  of  the  issues  with  the  Kaiser,  there 
was  no  issue  of  invasion,  no  issue  of  territorial  integ- 
rity, no  issue  of  domination  or  destruction  of  American 
institutions,  no  immediate  and  pressing  danger  of  any  kind. 
Self-defense  was  a  catchword.  The  Hun  invasion  was  a 
gigantic  hoax.  The  scare  propaganda  was  created  out  of 
whole  cloth.  These  stories  were  told  us  only  because  the 
element  of  fear  was  considered  necessary  for  patriotic  pur- 
poses. The  great  American  public  had  to  be  frightened 
in  order  to  induce  it  to  take  the  war  programme. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  GETTING  INTO  WAR 

IV 

THE   RESPONSIBILITY  OF  ONE  MAN 

Governments  have  gone  to  war  with  one  another.  Peoples,  so 
far  as  I  can  remember,  have  not,  and  this  is  a  government  of  the 
people,  and  this  people  is  not  going  to  choose  war. — Woodrow 
Wilson,  at  Milwaukee,  Jan.  31,  1916. 

AMERICA'S  declaration  of  war  was  adopted,  as  it  had  to 
be,  by  Congress,  but  only  after  Congress  had  been  called 
upon  to  do  so  by  the  President,  who  had  so  set  the  stage 
as  to  render  it  extremely  humiliating  to  himself,  and  politi- 
cally embarrassing  to  his  party,  to  turn  back.  The  decla- 
ration was  carried  by  a  vote  of  373  to  50  in  the  House,  and 
82  to  6  in  the  Senate,  a  large  majority  for  an  ordinary  mea- 
sure, but  not  so  large  for  a  declaration  of  war,  where  the 
pressure  for  unanimity  is  always  nearly  overwhelming. 
The  author  sat  in  the  Senate  gallery  throughout  the  war 
debate.  A  most  frequent  argument  in  favor  of  the  res- 
olution was  that  it  was  a  question  of  standing  behind  the 
President  in  a  controversy  with  a  foreign  power.  Speakers 
who  announced  their  intention  of  voting  "yes"  expressly  as- 
serted that  they  would  vote  "no,"  except  for  the  fact  that 
war  had  already  been  decided  on,  the  resolution  was  going 
through,  and  opposition  was  useless. 

President  Wilson  had  complete  control  of  our  end  of 
the  diplomatic  negotiations  which  failed  of  their  professed 
object,  peace,  and  by  progressive  steps  carried  the  nation 
into  belligerency. 


The  Responsibility  of  One  Man       21 

It  was  Wilson  who  sent  the  "strict-accountability"  note; 
Wilson's  uncompromising  attitude  that  caused  the  resig- 
nation of  Secretary  of  State  Bryan;  Wilson  who  threatened 
to  sever  diplomatic  relations  in  1916,  unless  Germany 
should  "now  immediately  declare  and  effect  an  abandon- 
ment of  its  present  methods  of  warfare  against  passenger 
and  freight  carrying  vessels." 

It  was  Wilson  who  led  the  preparedness  agitation,  who 
oversaw  the  drafting  of  bills  providing  for  the  largest 
military  and  naval  appropriations  ever  expended  by  any 
nation  in  the  world  in  peace  times,  and  urged  these  bills 
through  Congress. 

It  was  Wilson  who  omitted  to  hold  England  to  the  strict 
accountability  which  he  exacted  of  Germany;  Wilson  who 
broke  off  diplomatic  relations  when  Germany  announced 
its  purpose  of  waging  submarine  warfare  unrestricted; 
Wilson  who  rejected  Germany's  offer  to  reopen  relations 
looking  towards  a  continuation  of  American  neutrality.  It 
was  Wilson  who  requested  from  Congress  the  power  to  en- 
gage in  hostilities  at  his  own  discretion;  Wilson  who,  when 
that  request  was  not  acceded  to,  assumed  the  power  that 
Congress  had  failed  to  grant,  and  placed  public  fighting 
men  upon  private  ships.  It  was  Wilson  who  finally  de- 
manded of  Congress  a  declaration  of  war  against  Germany. 

It  may  be  thought  that  President  Wilson  was  forced 
into  belligerent  measures,,  or  into  measures  leading  towards 
belligerency,  by  some  other  public  factor.  Of  these  other 
factors  there  existed  three: 

1.  Congress. 

2.  The  general  public. 

3.  A  minority  of  the  public  having  an  interest  in  bellig- 
erency. 

But  whenever  our  controversy  with  Germany  found  its 
way  before  Congress,  it  invariably  appeared  that  Congress 


22  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

was  more  pacifically  inclined  than  was  the  President.  Dur- 
ing the  period  of  diplomatic  strife,  the  President  engaged 
in  two  notable  contests  with  Congress  in  which  his  aggres- 
sive attitude  toward  'Germany  was  seriously  opposed. 

The  first  of  these  contests  occurred  early  in  1916,  and 
was  occasioned  by  the  announcement  of  Germany  that  the 
armed  merchant  vessels  of  its  enemies  would  be  regarded 
as  ships  of  war.  A  strong  opinion  developed,  both  in  and 
out  of  Congress,  that  persons  taking  passage  on  such  armed 
ships  should  do  so  at  their  own  risk,  and  the  chairman  of 
each  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committees  notified  the  Pres- 
ident that  a  clear  majority  of  his  respective  committee 
and  house  favored  a  formal  warning  to  American  citizens 
against  risking  their  lives  on  such  vessels.  Speaker  Clark 
told  the  President  that  Congress  was  "three  to  one"  in 
favor  of  such  a  warning. 

But  the  President  opposed  warning  Americans  against 
taking  passage  on  armed  ships,  and  insisted  that  the  pend- 
ing resolutions  asking  him  to  warn  them  be  voted  down 
uto  prove  that  there  were  no  divided  councils  in  Congress 
in  regard  to  the  foreign  policy  of  the  government." 

During  this  struggle  between  the  comparatively  bellig- 
erent President  and  the  comparatively  pacific  Congress, 
Senator  Gore  charged  the  President  with  telling  various 
Senators  and  Representatives  that  war  with  Germany 
"might  not  be  an  evil."  The  testimony  of  Senator  Gore 
was  confirmed  publicly  and  privately  by  other  Senators. 
Following  the  tabling  of  the  Gore  and  McLemore  resolu- 
tions, three  members  of  Mr.  Wilson's  party — two  of  whom 
had  voted  to  table  the  resolutions  "for  party  reasons"- 
announced  their  intention  of  retiring  from  Congress  be- 
cause of  their  belief  that  the  President  was  directing  the 
course  of  the  country  into  war.  * 

1  Representatives     R.  Page  (N.  C.),  I.  Sherwood  (O.),  and  J.  Eagle    (Tex.). 


The  Responsibility  of  One  Man       23 

The  President's  other  notable  contest  with  Congress  oc- 
curred over  his  request  for  a  grant  of  power  "to  supply 
our  merchant  ships  with  defensive  arms  .  .  .  and  to  em- 
ploy any  other  instrumentalities  or  methods  that  may  be  nec- 
essary or  adequate  to  protect  our  ships  and  our  people  in 
their  legitimate  and  peaceful  pursuits  of  the  seas."  (Feb. 
26,  1917.)  A  bill,  the  Armed  Ships  Bill,  drawn  at  the 
White  House,  brought  out  the  President's  wishes  a  little 
more  definitely.  It  authorized  the  Executive  to  supply 
private  vessels  uwith  arms  and  also  the  necessary  ammuni- 
tion and  means  for  making  use  of  them,"  and  "to  employ 
such  other  instrumentalities  and  methods  as  may  in  his 
judgment  and  discretion  seem  necessary  and  adequate  to 
protect  such  vessels,"  as  well  as  a  grant  of  $100,000,000 
"for  the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  the  foregoing  pro- 


visions." 


The  Congressional  Record,  and  the  newspapers  of  the 
day,  show  that  a  large  number  of  Senators  and  Represen- 
tatives believed  that  war  would  inevitably  result  were  the 
President  permitted  to  carry  out  his  plans,  and  that  it  was 
due  chiefly  to  this  belief  that  the  bill  was  generally  opposed 
in  the  beginning.  Chairman  Flood,  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  was  sent  to  interview  the  President  and 
induce  him  to  modify  his  demands,  but  failed.  Senator 
Stone,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
refused  to  handle  the  bill  on  the  floor. 

It  was  only  under  the  President's  whip  that  in  the  end 
the  House  passed  the  bill,  but  so  modified  that  the  use  of 
"other  instrumentalities"  was  not  authorized.  In  the 
Senate,  numerous  amendments  were  offered  seeking  to  re- 
strict the  possible  belligerent  action  of  the  President.  The 
bill  failed  of  final  passage  through  the  opposition  of  twelve 
Senators,  who  pinned  their  hope  of  peace  on  forcing  the 
President  to  call  an  extra  session  of  Congress. 


24  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  tactics  of  the  President  at  the  time  led  to  the  con- 
clusion, freely  expressed  in  newspapers,  friendly  as  well  as 
unfriendly,  that  he  preferred  not  to  call  an  extra  session 
for  fear  Congress  would  interfere  with  the  vigorous  mea- 
sures that  he  had  determined  to  take  against  Germany. 

When,  February  13,  minority-leader  Mann  inserted  in 
the  Navy  Bill  an  amendment,  reaffirming  it  to  be  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  "to  adjust  and  settle  its  international 
disputes  through  mediation  or  arbitration,  to  the  end  that 
war  may  be  honorably  avoided,"  it  was  characterized  as 
ua  pacifist  ruse,"  and  "a  slap  at  Wilson."  Who  will  not 
recall  that  during  the  last  few  weeks  before  the  declaration 
of  war,  every  element  that  had  been  advocating  war,  in- 
cluding notable  political  opponents  of  the  President,  joined 
in  execration  of  the  Congressmen  who  were  "causing  de- 
lay," and  of  pacifism  and  pacifists;  in  a  chorus  of  praise  of 
Wilson,  and  of  supplication  to  the  nation  to  "stand  behind 
the  President?"  What  else  could  that  mean  except  that 
those  who  wanted  war  judged  that  the  course  of  the  Presi- 
dent led  to  war,  and  were  fearful  lest  Congress  might  "keep 
us  out  of  war,"  in  spite  of  the  President? 

From  the  above,  it  is  clear  that  Congress  did  not  force 
the  Executive  into  war  or  any  of  the  measures  that  led  to  it. 
The  pacific  wish  of  the  people  has  already  been  pointed  out. 
Did  any  minority  of  the  public  force  the  President  into 
steps  that  led  to  war? 

Did  Wall  Street  force  the  President  into  war? 

The  collected  facts  presented  in  later  chapters  will  an- 
swer the  question  of  Wall  Street's  part  in  the  responsibility 
for  war.  Meanwhile,  a  moment's  thought  on  the  com- 
manding position  in  which  the  President  stood  is  sufficient 
to  bring  the  conclusion  that  the  primary  responsibility  can- 
not be  shifted  to  the  shoulders  of  Wall  Street.  Whatever 


The  Responsibility  of  One  Man       25 

pressure  Wall  Street  may  have  exerted  upon  the  President, 
Wall  Street  did  not  have  the  power  to  compel  action. 

The  President  had  been  reelected  for  a  period  of  four 
years  on  a  peace  platform.  He  was  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  and  navy,  which  were  not  threatening  rebel- 
lion. Had  President  Wilson  chosen  to  pursue  policies  simi- 
lar to  those  of  Switzerland,  or  Holland,  or  Sweden,  or  Den- 
mark, or  Spain,  which  kept  those  countries  out  of  war,  he 
would  have  met  with  criticism,  but  no  means  short  of  revo- 
lution could  have  changed  the  course  of  the  country. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  Wall  Street  was  threatening 
revolution,  or  that  it  would  have  been  successful  in  a  revolu- 
tion had  it  started  one. 

Congress  and  every  other  element  of  influence  in 
American  life  must  bear  its  share  of  the  responsibility  for 
our  European  adventure,  but  the  political  and  moral 
responsibility  lies  first  upon  Woodrow  Wilson. 


V 

PRESIDENTIAL    USURPATIONS    TO    ACHIEVE    BELLIGERENCY 

The  provision  of  the  Constitution  giving  the  war-making  power  to 
Congress  was  dictated,  as  I  understand  it,  by  the  following  reasons: 
Kings  had  always  been  involving  and  impoverishing  their  people  in 
wars,  pretending  generally,  if  not  always,  that  the  good  of  the  peo- 
ple was  the  object.  This  our  convention  understood  to  be  the  most 
oppressive  of  all  kingly  oppressions,  and  they  resolved  so  to  frame 
the  Constitution  that  no  man  should  hold  the  power  of  bringing 
this  oppression  upon  us. — Abraham  Lincoln. 

"THE  Congress  shall  have  power  ...  to  declare  war," 
says  the  Constitution.  Is,  or  is  not,  the  power  to  declare 
war  inclusive  of  the  power  to  make  war?  And  is,  or  is 
not,  the  Executive  excluded  from  exercising  such  power? 
President  Wilson's  own  answer  was  given  to  the  public  a 
number  of  times  during  his  preparedness  tour.  At  Chi- 
cago, January  31,  1916,  he  said: 

This  war  was  brought  on  by  rulers,  not  by  the  people,  and  I 
thank  God  that  there  is  no  man  in  America  who  has  the  authority 
to  bring  on  war  without  the  consent  of  the  people. 

And  the  following  night  at  Des  Moines : 

I  was  saying  the  other  night  that  I  know  of  no  case  where  one 
people  made  war  upon  another  people.  No  government  can  make 
war  in  the  United  States.  The  people  make  war  through  their 
representatives.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  does  not 
give  the  President  even  a  participating  part  in  the  making  of  war. 
War  can  be  declared  only  by  Congress,  by  an  action  which  the 
President  does  not  take  part  in,  and  cannot  veto.  I  am  literally,  by 
constitutional  arrangement,  the  mere  servant  of  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives. 


Presidential  Usurpations  27 

But  Wilson  never  followed  this  theory  in  action.  From 
the  beginning  of  his  administration,  the  Congressional  de- 
bates frequently  brought  put  a  feeling  of  resentment 
against  his  assumption  of  all  power  over  foreign  relations, 
and  his  disinclination  to  take  Congress  into  his  confidence  in 
such  matters.  As  early  as  October,  1914,  we  find  him  is- 
suing the  warning:  "The  foreign  policy  of  the  government 
.  .  .  lies  outside  the  field  of  legislation."  (Letter  to  floor- 
leader  Underwood.) 

In  the  dispute  with  Germany,  we  find  him  asserting  the 
question  of  warning  Americans  against  traveling  on  the 
armed  ships  of  the  Entente  to  be  "clearly  within  the  field 
of  Executive  initiative,"  (Letter  to  Representative  Pou)  ; 
although  it  was  conceded  at  the  time  that  this  issue  was 
likely  to  determine  the  question  of  peace  or  war.  During 
the  same  period,  Senator  Jones  of  Washington  introduced 
a  resolution  asking  the  President  not  to  break  off  relations 
with  any  country,  nor  to  place  America  in  any  other  posi- 
tion where  it  could  not  with  honor  avoid  war.  But  the 
resolution  was  not  accorded  the  Presidential  favor. 

When  an  executive  ( i )  sends  an  ultimatum  to  a  foreign 
power  (threatening  to  sever  diplomatic  relations)  without 
first  notifying  or  seeking  the  advice  of  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives; (2)  breaks  diplomatic  relations  without  first 
notifying  or  seeking  the  advice  of  the  people's  representa- 
tives; (3)  refuses  mediation  without  notifying  or  seeking 
the  advice  of  the  people's  representatives;  (4)  arms  pri- 
vate ships  with  naval  crews  without  the  consent  of  the 
people's  representatives,  and  sends  these  ships  to  sea  with 
orders  to  the  crews  to  fire  at  sight  on  the  vessels  of  another 
nation  technically  at  peace  with  us,  it  can  hardly  be  main- 
tained that  he  is  acting  as  "the  mere  servant  of  the  people's 
representatives,"  or  that  he  is  not  exercising  "even  a 
>articipating  part  in  the  making  ot  war." 


28  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

In  overruling  Congress  on  the  question  of  warning 
American  citizens  against  taking  passage  on  the  armed 
ships  of  belligerent  countries,  President  Wilson  was  pro- 
ceeding from  an  assumption  that  Germany's  use  of  the  sub- 
marine was  an  offense  against  "the  sacred  and  indisputable 
rules  of  international  law."  (Note  of  Apr.  18,  1916.) 
But  as  Wilson  himself  had  substantially  admitted,  (Note 
of  July  21,  1915),  the  legal  and  illegal  uses  of  the  sub- 
marine had  not  been  adjudicated  in  any  international  court, 
treaty,  or  in  any  other  way.  The  President  had  no  right 
whatever  to  create,  by  Executive  fiat,  a  new  international 
law  for  the  world  to  go  by.  "Congress  shall  have  power 
...  to  define  and  punish  .  .  .  offenses  against  the  law 
of  nations."  His  extreme  recourse  would  have  been  to  go 
before  Congress  and  ask  that  body  to  lay  down  a  law  on 
the  submarine,  and  to  direct  him  as  to  any  procedure  to  be 
taken  to  meet  its  illegal  use. 

Again,  in  the  debates  on  the  Armed  Ships  Bill,  it  was 
repeatedly  admitted  that  the  President's  request  for  a 
grant  of  power  was  a  request  for  the  war-making  power, 
which  Congress  cannot  constitutionally  relinquish  or  give 
away.  Subsequently,  in  explaining  to  his  constituents  his 
opposition  to  the  bill,  Senator  LaFollette  quoted  two  deci- 
sions of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.  The  first  held 
that  when  Congress  authorized  private  armed  ships  of  the 
United  States  to  defend  themselves  against  the  armed  ships 
of  France,  it  constituted  a  declaration  of  war,  the  court 
asserting:  "Every  contention  by  force,  between  two  nations, 
in  external  matters,  under  the  authority  of  their  respective 
governments,  is  not  only  war,  but  public  war."  The  sec- 
ond held:  "To  the  legislative  power  alone  it  must  belong 
to  determine  when  the  violence  of  other  nations  is  to  be 
met  with  violence." 

In  the  same  debates,  it  was  generally  conceded  that  the 


Presidential  Usurpations  29 

arming  or  convoying  of  munitions  ships  would  constitute 
an  aggressive  act,  since  munitions,  being  absolute  contra- 
band, were  subject  to  seizure  and  destruction  under  all  in- 
terpretations of  international  law.  The  President,  never- 
theless, refused  to  accept  an  amendment  prohibiting  the 
arming  or  convoying  of  ships  carrying  munitions. 

During  the  week  ending  March  4,  therefore,  President 
Wilson  violated  his  oath  of  office  by  asking  Congress  for 
authority  which  it  was  constitutionally  precluded  from 
granting.  He  planned  a  violation  of  the  Constitution,  by 
the  uncontrolled  exercise  of  the  war-making  power.  He 
planned  a  violation  of  international  law,  in  seeking  to  be- 
gin hostilities  without  a  formal  declaration.  This  record, 
however,  was  surpassed  in  the  following  week.  The  Armed 
Ships  Bill  failed,  and  the  President  usurped  the  authority 
which  Congress  had  failed  to  grant,  arming  private  ships 
with  naval  guns,  and  making  no  distinction  between  muni- 
tions ships  and  others. 

Not  only  had  members  of  the  national  law-making  body 
taken  the  view  that  any  armament  upon  munitions  ships 
would  transform  such  ships  into  ships  of  war,  and  that  any 
use  of  such  armament  would  constitute  an  act  of  war,  but 
an  examination  of  the  American  White  Book  discloses  the^ 
fact  that  President  Wilson  had  also  taken  this  view;  more- 
over, that  the  other  conditions  under  which  our  armed  ships 
put  to  sea — armament  fore  and  aft,  orders  to  fire  before  be- 
ing fired  upon,  naval  crews,  submarine  chasers — swept 
away  all  the  salient  distinctions  which  the  American  govern- 
ment and  the  British  government  had  previously  drawn 
between  armed  merchant  ships  and  war  vessels.  (See 
Chapter  XV.) 

The  conclusion  must  be  that  our  war  with  Germany 
dates,  not  from  April  6,  1917,  but  from  March  17,  when 
our  first  "armed  merchantman"  put  to  sea;  that,  in  sending 


30  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

this  ship  to  sea,  the  President  knowingly  usurped  the  war- 
making  power. 

By  the  same  act,  also,  the  President  violated  definite 
Federal  statutes  which  prohibit  a  merchant  vessel  of  the 
United  States,  whether  carrying  contraband  or  not,  from 
defending  itself  against  the  fighting  craft  of  a  nation  with 
which  this  country  is  not  at  war.  This  was  admitted  by 
the  President  himself,  March  4,  in  a  "supplementary  state- 
ment from  the  White  House,"  in  which  the  President  con- 
ceded that  "there  were  certain  old  statutes  as  yet  unre- 
pealed  which  raised  insuperable  practical  obstacles  and  vir- 
tually nullified  his  power." 

True,  the  President  made  a  slight  modification  of  this 
statement  a  few  hours  later,  and  five  days  later  he  reversed 
himself  completely.  (For  quotations  see  Appendix,  p. 
435.)  But  the  statutes  to  which  the  President  referred  in 
his  "supplementary  statement  from  the  White  House"  are 
so  clear  that  a  layman  can  be  as  sure  of  their  meaning  as  a 
Supreme  Court  Judge.  Enacted  to  permit  the  arming  of 
merchant  vessels  against  pirates,  in  the  days  of  pirates,  they 
expressly  prohibit  the  use  of  such  armament,  even  for  de- 
fense, against  a  "public  armed  vessel  of  a  nation  in  amity 
with  the  United  States."  Although  in  March,  1917,  a 
German  submarine  was  certainly  a  "public  armed  vessel," 
and  Germany  under  the  law  "a  nation  in  amity  with  the 
United  States,"  there  appeared,  from  various  pro-war  sa- 
vants, arguments  upholding  the  right  of  the  President  to 
arm  private  ships  and  send  them  to  sea.  All  of  such  argu- 
ments were  based  upon  one  or  more  of  three  theories :  that 
t  (i)  the  statute  is  inapplicable,  because  of  old  age;  (2) 
submarines  are  pirate  ships  and  Germany  a  nation  of  pi- 
rates; or  (3)  Germany  was  already  waging  war  against 
the  United  States. 

The  answer  to  the  first  proposition  is  that  all  statutes 


Presidential  Usurpations  31 

are  equally  binding  until  repealed;  the  answer  to  the  second 
that,  even  did  the  German  submarine  warfare  correspond, 
in  essential  details,  with  the  practice  of  piracy,  the  Presi- 
dent did  not  possess  the  authority  to  act  upon  any  judgment 
of  his  own  that  it  was  piracy.  "Congress  shall  have  power 
...  to  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felonies  committed 
on  the  high  seas."  Congress  had  not  defined  German  sub- 
marine warfare  as  piracy.  As  to  the  third  proposition, 
the  same  answer  applies.  The  Constitution  precluded  the 
Executive  from  defining  the  submarine  operations  as  war- 
fare against  the  United  States.  Had  he  believed  the  oper- 
ations to  be  war,  his  only  legal  recourse  was  to  go  before 
Congress  and  ask  for  a  declaration  of  war  against  Ger- 
many. 

Why,  then,  did  not  President  Wilson  ask  Congress  to 
declare  war  on  February  26,  1917,  instead  of  requesting 
a  grant  of  power  to  start  war  at  his  own  discretion? 

The  answer  is  clearly  revealed  in  the  Congressional  de- 
bates of  that  period — because  Congress  could  not  have 
been  persuaded  to  declare  war  on  that  date.  It  was  easier 
to  procure  the  vote  of  a  Senator  or  Congressman  for  a 
proposition  to  trust  the  Executive  with  extraordinary 
powers,  than  to  obtain  that  vote  for  a  declaration  of  war. 

On  February  26,  Congress  had  not  been  sufficiently 
brought  under  control.  The  time  was  not  quite  ripe. 

The  nation  had  not  been  sufficiently  excited,  confused  and 
frightened.  The  Armed  Ships  Bill,  and  after  that,  the 
arming  of  the  ships,  were  a  part  of  the  process  of  prepara- 
tion, as  were  other  Presidential  maneuvers  that  will  next 
be  recalled. 


VI 

OUR  STEALTHY  APPROACH  TO  WAR 

"THE  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  is  a  serious  step, 
which  generally  ends  in  war,"  says  Professor  Lawrence. 
("Principles  of  International  Law,"  p.  301.)  Yet  in  his 
address  to  Congress  announcing  the  rupture  of  relations 
with  Germany  (Feb.  3,  1917),  President  Wilson  gave  the 
most  direct  assurances  of  peaceful  purpose: 

We  do  not  desire  any  hostile  conflict  with  the  Imperial  German 
Government.  We  are  the  sincere  friends  of  the  German  people, 
and  earnestly  desire  to  remain  at  peace  with  the  government  which 
speaks  for  them. 

During  the  following  week  nothing  whatever  happened 
to  change  the  situation  internationally.  The  German  gov- 
ernment then  made  an  effort,  through  the  Swiss  legation, 
which  was  in  charge  of  its  affairs  at  Washington,  to  resume 
peaceful  relations,  the  following  being  the  text  of  the  mem- 
orandum addressed  to  the  American  government: 

The  Swiss  government  has  been  requested  by  the  German  govern- 
ment to  say  that  the  latter  is  now,  as  before,  willing  to  negotiate, 
formally  or  informally,  with  the  United  States,  provided  that  the 
commercial  blockade  against  England  will  not  be  broken  thereby. 

This  offer  was  rejected  by  President  Wilson,  whose  an- 
swer contained  the  following  words: 

The  government  of  the  United  States  would  gladly  discuss  with 
the  German  government  any  questions  it  might  propose  for  discussion 
were  it  to  withdraw  its  proclamation  of  the  3ist  of  January  [an- 

32 


Our  Stealthy  Approach  to  War        33 

nouncing  unrestricted  submarine  warfare]  .  .  .  but  ...  it  does 
not  feel  that  it  can  enter  into  any  discussion  with  the  German  gov- 
ernment concerning  the  policy  of  submarine  warfare  against  neutrals 
which  it  is  now  pursuing  unless  and  until  the  German  government 
renews  its  assurances  of  the  4th  of  May,  and  acts  upon  this  assurance. 

No  issue  could  be  clearer.  Germany  was  determined  to 
meet  the  British  commercial  blockade  of  Germany  with  a 
German  commercial  blockade  of  England,  while  Wilson 
was  insisting  that  the  German  blockade  be  raised,  after 
having  receded  from  his  insistence  that  the  British  blockade 
be  raised.  Until  this  time,  any  theory  that  the  President 
did  not  yet  foresee  war  must  give  him  credit  for  a  far- 
fetched hope  that  Germany  would  consent  to  abandon  per- 
manently her  blockade,  notwithstanding  the  refusal  of 
England  to  abandon  her  blockade,  which  in  the  beginning 
Wilson  had  inveighed  against  on  similar  grounds  and  with 
almost  equal  vigor.  After  this  there  remained  not  a 
shadow  of  an  excuse  for  such  a  hope.  Nevertheless,  while 
moving  with  deadly  accuracy  towards  war,  the  President 
continued  to  assure  the  country  that  he  was  treading  the 
path  of  peace. 

His  next  belligerent  step  came  in  the  request  for  a  grant 
of  power.  This  step  was  taken  in  spite  of  the  virtual  prom- 
ise, given  February  3,  that  no  further  moves  would  be 
made  until  Germany  should  commit  "actual  overt  acts." 
In  the  speech  of  February  26,  indeed,  the  President  admit- 
ted that  "the  overt  act  which  I  have  ventured  to  hope  the 
German  commanders  would  in  fact  avoid  has  not  occurred." 
The  hostile  nature  of  the  request  for  a  grant  of  power  was 
covered  by  another  eloquent  declaration  of  pacific  purpose, 
as  follows : 

There  may  be  no  recourse  but  to  armed  neutrality,  which  we  shall 
know  how  to  maintain,  and  for  which  there  is  abundant  American 


34  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

precedent.  It  is  devoutly  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  not  be  necessary 
to  put  armed  forces  anywhere  into  action.  The  American  people  do 
not  desire  it,  and  our  desire  is  not  different  from  theirs.  ...  I  am  a 
friend  of  peace,  and  mean  to  preserve  it  for  America  as  long  as  I 
am  able.  I  am  not  now  proposing  or  contemplating  war,  or  any 
steps  that  lead  to  it.  ...  No  course  of  my  choosing  will  lead  to 
war.  ...  I  believe  that  the  people  will  trust  me  to  act  with  re- 
straint, with  prudence,  and  in  the  true  spirit  of  amity  and  good  faith 
that  they  have  themselves  displayed  throughout  these  trying  months. 

But  if  the  President  did  not  expect  war  to  begin  when 
one  of  his  naval  crews  upon  a  munitions  ship,  sighting  a 
submarine,  fired  upon  it,  what  did  he  think  would  happen? 

Had  the  fighting  begun  in  this  way,  of  course,  the  claim 
would  have  been  made  that  the  conflict  had  been  initiated 
by  an  act  of  Germany.  Even  had  this  been  true,  it  would 
not  have  changed  the  fact  that  no  surer  road  to  war  could 
have  been  chosen  than  the  one  contemplated. 

But  it  would  not  have  been  true.  For  the  President's 
plans  were  not  in  any  legal  sense  defensive.  Not  only  was 
it  his  purpose  to  arm  the  private  ships  fore  and  aft,  but  he 
had  other  plans  of  so  aggressive  a  nature  that  he  attempted, 
guiltily,  to  conceal  them  from  Congress.  The  plan  to  use 
submarine  chasers  had  been  confided  to  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  only,  and  when  Senator  Stone  re- 
vealed it,  there  was  an  uproar  against  him  from  Adminis- 
tration supporters.  It  was  also  denied  that  the  President 
intended  to  arm  munitions  ships.  President  Wilson  could 
not  but  have  known  that  he  intended  to  initiate  technical 
war  against  Germany;  that  by  the  very  act  of  sending  the 
armed  ships  to  sea,  under  such  conditions,  he  was  making  a 
belligerent  attack  upon  a  technically  friendly  power,  as 
clearly  so  as  if  he  had  sent  a  fleet  of  battleships  to  bombard 
the  German  coasts. 

Throughout  the  speech  of  February  26,  the  President 


Our  Stealthy  Approach  to  War        35 

rang  the  changes  upon  the  idea  of  American  rights.  But, 
under  the  circumstances  planned  by  him,  America  would 
possess  no  rights  whatever,  no  matter  what  the  merits  of 
the  issue  with  the  Kaiser,  and  would  remain  altogether  in 
the  wrong  until  a  legal  declaration  of  war  should  be  made. 

The  term,  "armed  neutrality,"  itself  was  highly  mis- 
leading. For  there  is  no  precedent,  "abundant"  or  other- 
wise, for  such  an  armed  neutrality  as  was  proposed,  either 
in  American  history  or  in  the  history  of  other  countries. 
An  armed  neutrality  is  an  alliance  of  powers  banded  to- 
gether to  enforce  their  views  of  neutral  rights  on  the  high 
seas.  In  all  history  there  have  been  but  two,  that  of  1780 
and  that  of  1800.  In  both  cases  they  came  into  existence 
in  an  effort  to  curb  British  lawlessness.  Both  were  fail- 
ures; both  were  broken  up  and  the  component  parts  drawn 
into  war  itself.  During  the  frantic  efforts  to  put  forth  a 
plausible  precedent  for  the  President's  scheme,  the  ac- 
tion of  America  in  1798  was  called  into  comparison,  and 
was  tarred  with  the  name,  "armed  neutrality."  The  act 
of  Congress  of  1798  was  directed  against  France,  which 
was  seizing  neutral  shipping  engaged  in  the  British  trade; 
it  empowered  the  President  to  take  hostile  measures  on  be- 
half of  American  shipping.  It  was  this  very  action  which 
our  Attorney-General  and  our  courts  interpreted  as  war, 
and  not  neutrality,  armed  or  unarmed.  The  President  put 
into  effect  the  measures  authorized,  and  war  was  actually 
carried  on  upon  the  seas  for  a  considerable  period.  Nei- 
ther of  these  cases  furnishes  a  precedent  upon  which  any 
sane  executive  would  act  with  a  view  to  preserving  peace. 

Continuing  his  protestations  of  peaceful  intention,  the 
President  denounced  the  Senators  who  defeated  the  Armed 
Ships  Bill,  not  on  the  ground  that  they  had  made  war  more 
difficult,  but  on  the  ground  that  they  had  made  peace  more 
difficult!  In  his  inaugural  address,  March  5,  he  assured 


36  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  country:  uWe  stand  firm  in  armed  neutrality." 
Whereupon  he  proceeded  to  the  next  hostile  step,  the  arm- 
ing of  the  ships. 

The  first  armed  ship  that  the  President  started  for  the 
barred  zone  was  the  "St.  Louis,"  which  belonged  to  the 
American  Line,  a  subsidiary  to  the  International  Mercan- 
tile Marine  Company,  whose  stock  control  was  held  in 
England,  and  whose  financial  head  in  the  United  States  was 
J.  P.  Morgan,  financial  agent  of  the  British  government. 
The  beautiful  processes  of  our  armed  "neutrality"  were 
pictured  by  Senator  LaFollette  in  a  letter  explaining  his 
opposition  to  the  Armed  Ships  Bill: 

Mr.  P.  A.  S.  Franklin,  whose  visits  to  the  Navy  Department  to 
secure  guns  for  his  ships,  whose  interviews  and  movements  have 
been  featured  as  though  he  were  the  head  and  front  of  the  American 
merchant  marine,  is  the  active  manager  of  these  combined  properties 
— British,  Belgian,  and  American.  When  one  of  the  American 
Line  ships,  armed  with  United  States  guns,  sails  out  to  sea,  the 
orders  to  fire  will  be  given  by  Mr.  Franklin's  master  of  the  ship, 
not  by  the  United  States  gunner.  The  English  owners  give  orders 
to  Franklin.  The  English  owners  take  their  orders  from  the  Bri- 
tish Admiralty.  Hence  we,  professing  to  be  a  neutral  nation,  are 
placing  American  guns  and  American  gunners  practically  under  the 
orders  of  the  British  Admiralty. 

By  April  2,  however,  matters  had  progressed  so  far 
that  President  Wilson  himself  was  ready  to  admit  the 
very  worst  that  had  been  said,  or  could  be  said,  about  his 
scheme  to  "save  the  nation  from  war."  Said  he  on  that 
date: 

Armed  neutrality,   it  now  appears,  is  impracticable  .  .  .  because 
...  it  is  impossible  to  defend  ships  against  their   [submarines'] 
attacks  as  the  law  of  nations  has  assumed  that  merchantmen  would 
defend   themselves.  .  .  .  Armed   neutrality  ...  is   practically   cer- 
tain to  draW  us  into  the  war. 


Our  Stealthy  Approach  to  War        37 

Which  is  precisely  what  he  had  denounced  the  "wilful 
twelve"  for  saying. 

What  had  happened  to  cause  the  President  to  see  the 
light?  Had  anything  happened  to  test  the  practicability  of 
his  "armed  neutrality?"  Not  one  of  his  armed  ships  had 
yet  met  a  submarine! 

The  enormity  of  the  thing  can  be  grasped  only  when  it 
is  remembered  that  the  end  of  the  64th  Congress  was  near. 
The  Armed  Ships  Bill  reached  the  House  and  Senate 
sixty-eight  and  fifty  hours,  respectively,  before  ad- 
journment. Meanwhile,  Administration  leaders  had  de- 
layed many  important  bills,  among  them  the  great  appro- 
priation bills.  What  deduction  is  to  be  drawn  from  this 
except  that  there  was  a  studied  purpose  to  limit  debate  and 
rush  the  bill  through  along  with  necessary  bills,  at  the  last 
moment,  to  let  Congress  go,  leaving  the  President  in  con- 
trol of  the  situation,  with  the  country  confident  of  his  in- 
tent for  peace,  while  he  stood  clothed  with  the  power  and 
intent  to  make  war?  What  other  conclusion  is  possible  ex- 
cept that  the  term,  "armed  neutrality,"  was  chosen  only  be- 
cause it  sounded  like  peace,  and  for  the  moment  served  to 
cloak  a  belligerent  purpose? 

The  defeat  of  the  Armed  Ships  Bill  prevented  the  plan 
from  working  in  exactly  that  way.  But  the  end  was 
reached  by  a  slightly  different  path.  The  President  began 
by  sending  the  armed  ships  to  sea  without  authorization. 
Forced  to  call  an  extra  session,  he  at  first  set  the  date  for 
April  1 6,  when  it  was  to  be  expected  that  the  first  gun 
would  have  been  fired  in  "defense"  of  an  "American  mer- 
chant" ship  "attacked"  by  a  submarine,  and  that  it  would 
then  be  possible  to  inform  Congress  that  we  were  already 
at  war  by  virtue  of  aggression  on  the  part  of  Germany. 

The  order  to  our  naval  crews  was  to  fire  at  sight.  But, 
whether  by  design  or  accident,  German  submarines  kept 


38  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

out  of  sight.  The  arming  of  the  ships  served  its  purpose, 
nevertheless;  for  it  rendered  an  ultimate  clash  certain. 
Since  war  was  assured,  to  stand  for  peace  was  to  stand  for 
the  enemy;  to  stand  for  war  was  to  stand  for  the  country; 
to  stand  behind  the  President  was  to  stand  for  war. 

The  press  finished  the  business — the  press,  the  suddenly 
swarming  patriotic  societies,  the  suddenly  awakened  coun- 
cils of  defense,  the  suddenly  omnipresent  Department  of 
Justice.  It  is  true  that  the  "leaders"  of  the  people  proved 
to  be  for  war.  The  public  was  confused,  frightened,  dis^ 
organized;  the  cry  for  war  deafened  every  other  sound— 
until,  presently,  the  President  dared  call  Congress  for  an 
earlier  date,  dared  confess  his  "armed  neutrality"  "imprac- 
ticable," dared  acknowledge  the  fraudulent  nature  of  all  of 
his  pacific  utterances,  from  February  3  on,  by  going  back 
for  his  casus  belli  to  the  German  proclamation  of  January 
37  announcing  unrestricted  submarine  warfare. 


VII 

THE  1916  ELECTION 

When  I  have  made  a  promise  as  a  man  I  try  to  keep  it,  and  I 
know  of  no  other  rule  permissible  to  a  nation.  The  most  distin- 
guished nation  in  the  world  is  the  nation  that  can  and  will  keep  its 
promises,  even  to  its  own  hurt. — Woodrow  Wilson,  iri  address  at 
Philadelphia,  July  4,  1914. 

BRITISH  statesmen  agree  with  the  conclusion  that  the  re- 
sponsibility for  America's  participation  in  the  war  rests  first 
upon  Woodrow  Wilson,  even  that  the  President  plotted 
war  long  before  it  was  possible  to  bring  it  about.  Here 
are  three  quotations  from  leading  members  of  the  British 
government,  made  in  speeches  in  the  British  Parliament, 
April  1 8,  1917,  acclaiming  America's  participation: 

A  twice-elected  President,  representing  100,000,000  people  of  the 
most  peace-loving  and  least  aggressive  nation  of  the  earth,  has  sum- 
moned his  people  to  arms  with  a  trumpet  call. — Earl  Curzon. 

What,  then,  has  enabled  the  President,  after  waiting  with  the 
patience  which  Pitt  described  as  the  first  virtue  of  statesmanship — to 
carry  with  him  a  united  nation  into  the  hazards  and  horrors  of  the 
greatest  war  in  history? — Mr.  Asquith. 

The  difficulties  with  which  President  Wilson  has  been  confronted 
in  the  last  two  and  one-half  years  have  not  been  sufficiently  ap- 
preciated in  this  country.  He  had  to  keep  the  nation  united  and 
bring  it  united  into  the  war.  He  had  to  deal  with  a  people  who 
had  a  deep-seated  and  ineradicable  hatred  of  war.  To  bring  the 
United  States  into  the  war  was  to  make  them  go  against  one  of  the 
deepest  instincts  of  the  soul  of  the  race. — John  Dillon. 

39 


40  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  speech  of  the  Honorable  John  Dillon  is  a  polite 
suggestion  that  the  President  consciously  deceived  the 
American  people  for  two  and  one-half  years,  with  a  view  ul- 
timately to  bringing  it  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  England. 

The  fact  that  the  most  emphasized  war  motives  claimed 
by  the  Administration  after  April,  1917  (a  crusade  against 
German  autocracy,  militarism  and  imperialism),  run  far 
back  of  two  and  one-half  years — far  back  even  of  1914 
— gives  ground  for  the  Dillon  theory.  For  any  assump- 
tion that  these  professed  motives  were  sincere  would  neces- 
sarily include  an  admission  either  that  the  President  plan- 
ned war  on  Germany  during  all  the  period  in  which  he  was 
promising  peace,  or  that  he  was  profoundly  ignorant  of 
what  was  going  on  in  the  world  prior  to  August,  1914,  as 
well  as  subsequently  to  that  time. 

During  the  first  several  months  following  August,  1914, 
however,  President  Wilson  apparently  had  no  idea  of  in- 
volving America  in  the  European  struggle.  He  not  only 
declared  repeatedly  that  the  war  was  no  business  of  ours, 
that  its  causes  could  not  touch  us,  that  America  could  not 
be  endangered  by  it,  that  we  had  no  interest  in  its  out- 
come, that  war  was  invariably  futile,  anyhow ;  not  only  sug- 
gested that  both  sides  were  at  fault,  and  urged  many  rea- 
sons why  America  could  best  serve  the  world  by  holding 
aloof,  but  acted  accordingly;  he  opposed  preparedness, 
and  took  a  high  and  far-seeing  stand  in  announcing  that 
Wall  Street  loans  to  either  side  would  be  "inconsistent 
with  the  spirit  of  neutrality." 

It  is  interesting  to  recall  that,  in  the  Congressional  cam- 
paign of  1914,  President  Wilson  was  claiming  votes  for  his 
party  on  his  stand  on  the  war  loan  question.  In  the  Demo- 
cratic Congressional  campaign  book  of  that  year  appears 
an  extended  explanation  by  Secretary  of  State  Bryan  of 
the  Wilson  position.  Said  the  Secretary  in  part: 


The  1916  Election  41 


It  is  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  neutrality  for  a  neutral  nation 
to  make  loans  to  belligerent  nations,  for  money  is  the  worst  of 
contrabands — it  commands  all  other  things.  A  very  forcible  illus- 
tration has  been  used  in  support  of  this  proposition,  namely,  that, 
as  a  neutral  government  does  all  in  its  power  to  discourage  its  citi- 
zens from  enlisting  in  the  armies  of  other  countries,  it  should  dis-  - 
courage  those  who,  by  loaning  money,  Would  do  more  harm  than 
they  could  do  by  enlisting.  The  government  withdraws  the  pro- 
tection of  citizenship  from  those  who  enlist  under  other  flags — why 
should  it  give  protection  to  money  when  it  enters  into  foreign 
military  service?  There  is  only  one  answer.  — 

Could  this  argument  be  sound  in  1914,  and  unsound  in 
1915? 

President  Wilson's  first  reversal  on  the  war  occurred 
when  he  gave  his  consent  to  the  first  Anglo-French  loan. 
From  this  moment  his  war-deceptions  began.  In  his  an- 
nual message  to  Congress,  December  7,  1915,  he  declared: 
"We  have  stood  apart  studiously  neutral.  It  was  our  mani- 
fest duty  to  do  so."  But,  in  withdrawing  his  opposition  to 
the  Anglo-French  loan,  had  he,  or  had  he  not,  violated  his 
own  interpretation  of  neutrality?  From  the  arrangement 
of  that  first  loan,  also,  dates  the  Wilson  deviation  in  gen- 
eral from  equal  treatment  of  the  opposing  sides,  which  is 
the  essence  of  neutrality. 

Mr.  Wilson's  second  notable  reversal  on  the  war  was, 
no  doubt,  a  direct  consequence  of  the  first.  In  1914  and 
during  a  part  of  1915  he  had  been  against  any  noticeable 
increase  in  the  army  or  navy  establishments.  But  when 
Wall  Street  began  loaning  large  sums  to  the  Entente,  the 
President  suddenly  became  a  preparedness  convert.  In 
the  early  months  of  1916  he  toured  the  country  on  the  pre- 
paredness issue. 

From  early  in  1915,  the  President's  diplomacy  had  been 
at  variance  with  the  pacific  utterances  made  to  his  own  peo- 


42  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

pie.  His  first  submarine  note  to  Germany  was  a  threat. 
But  his  attitude  towards  England  was  almost  equally  threat- 
ening. Not  until  the  first  months  of  1916,  when  he  re- 
versed himself  on  essential  points  in  the  dispute  with  both 
sides,  swinging  into  a  position  less  out  of  harmony  with 
England,  and  of  greater  hostility  towards  Germany,  was  it 
quite  plain  that  he  "contemplated  war"  with  Germany.  In 
his  handling  of  the  armed  ships  question,  early  in  1916,  he 
notified  both  Germany  and  America  that  he  was  willing  to 
go  to  war  in  defense  of  his  stand  upon  this  issue. 

Shortly  afterwards,  the  President  put  his  preparedness 
programme  through  Congress.  This  programme  included 
the  National  Defense  Act,  providing  for  a  council  of  na- 
tional defense  in  time  of  national  "danger."  It  included 
other  measures  hardly  conceivable  by  any  administration 
not  seriously  contemplating  war  in  the  near  future. 

In  a  letter  dated  April  15,  1917,  and  read  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  Attorney-General  Gregory  revealed 
the  fact  that  "long  before  we  entered  the  war"  his  depart- 
ment, in  anticipation  of  war,  had  begun  "to  strengthen  and 
build  up  its  bureau  of  investigation." 

In  spite  of  all  such  circumstances,  except  to  a  few  of  us, 
the  war  came  like  a  thunderbolt  out  of  a  clear  sky,  with 
stunning  and  inexplicable  suddenness.  How  did  the  Presi- 
dent manage  it?  How  (Mr.  Asquith's  question)  did  he 
solve  the  "difficulties"  with  which  he  was  "confronted"  in 
"the  two  and  one-half  years"  before  April,  1917?  How 
did  he  "deal  with"  "the  most  peace-loving  and  least  aggres- 
sive nation  on  earth,"  in  order  to  "carry"  it  "into  the  haz- 
ards and  horrors  of  the  greatest  war  in  history?" 

The  answer  is  that  the  tactics  followed  throughout  were 
the  same  as  those  described  in  the  preceding  chapter.  The 
President  sought  to  create  the  impression  that  his  prepar- 
edness measures  were  for  peace,  instead  of  war;  that  his 


The  1916  Election  43 

diplomacy  was  calculated  to  preserve  the  peace,  instead 
of  getting  us  into  the  war.  Only  after  the  fighting  was 
over  did  we  learn  that  the  advisory  commission  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  consisting  of  seven  men,  had 
secretly  worked  out  the  details  of  the  war  legislation 
months  before  war  was  declared,  and  at  a  time  when  the 
President  was  still  promising  to  keep  the  country  out  of 
war.  (Report  of  Rep.  W.  J.  Graham,  chairman,  Select 
Committee  on  Expenditures  in  War  Department,  July  7, 
1919.) 

Finally,  in  his  September  treaty  tour  (1919),  in  boasting 
that  he  "waited  on"  the  American  people  a  long  time  be- 
fore calling  for  the  war  declaration,  the  President  himself 
acknowledged,  in  effect,  that  he  had  been  "contemplating" 
war  at  the  very  time  that  he  was  solemnly  asserting  the 
contrary. 

As  an  incident  in  the  Presidential  policy  indicated,  occur- 
red trie  election  of  1916.  President  Wilson  chose  the  is- 
sue of  1916.  As  is  generally  known,  he  absolutely  domi- 
nated his  party  convention  of  that  year.  He  approved 
the  selection  of  ex-Governor  Glynn  of  New  York  as  tem- 
porary chairman,  and  in  uttering  the  keynote  speech  Glynn 
was  simply  Wilson's  mouthpiece.  The  paramount  issue  of 
the  campaign,  as  laid  down  by  Glynn,  was  "that  the  United 
States  is  constrained  by  the  traditions  of  its  past,  by  the 
logic  of  its  present,  and  by  the  promise  of  its  future,  to 
hold  itself  apart  from  the  conflict  that  now  devastates  the 
nations  across  the  seas" 

The  Glynn  keynote  speech  was  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  a  defense,  an  historical  justification,  and  a  glorifica- 
tion of  the  policy  of  American  neutrality,  which  he  asserted 
President  Wilson  had  faithfully  followed  and  would  con- 
tinue to  follow.  The  Glynn  speech  may  be  found  in  the 
Congressional  Record  of  June  15,1916.  It  was  a  master- 


44  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

piece  of  convincing  eloquence  and  historical  data.  It  was 
printed  by  hundreds  of  thousands,  and  distributed  through- 
out the  country.  It  furnished  the  material  for  thousands 
of  campaign  speeches.  It  furnished  the  basis  for  the  Wil- 
son campaign,  and  next  to  Wilson's  personal  utterances, 
was  undoubtedly  a  determining  factor  in  his  election. 

It  ought  to  be  obvious  that  an  executive  can  hardly  be 
credited  with  keeping  his  country  out  of  war  when  a  vast 
majority  of  his  own  people  are  definitely  against  war,  when 
the  other  party  to  the  dispute  is  anxious  to  avoid  war,  and 
when  the  only  factors  favoring  war  are  a  small  minority  of 
his  own  people  and  the  influence  of  certain  interested  for- 
eign governments.  The  truth  is  that  it  is  doubtful  whether 
President  Wilson  could  have  departed  farther  than  he  did 
from  neutrality,  or  proceeded  towards  war  any  faster  than 
he  did,  without  jeopardizing  his  control  of  the  country 
and  encompassing  his  own  defeat  in  the  election  of  1916. 

Wilson's  belligerent  record — his  insistence  on  courses 
of  procedure  highly  calculated  to  embroil  us  in  the  Euro- 
pean struggle — were  well  known  to  his  political  enemies  in 
the  campaign  of  1916.  Why,  then,  did  they  not  explode 
the  myth  of  his  having  "kept  us  out  of  war,"  demolish  his 
paramount  issue,  and  so  insure  the  defeat  of  Wilson? 

The  answer  simply  is  that  the  dominant  faction  in  the 
Republican  party  approved  of  this  part  of  the  Wilson  rec- 
ord; they  and  their  candidate  had  taken  a  frankly  bellig- 
erent position,  and  an  exposure  of  Wilson's  spurious  paci- 
fism would  have  placed  them  in  a  ridiculous  situation. 

Although  President  Wilson  did  not  "keep  us  out  of 
war,"  he  did  lead  us  into  war,  and  with  the  material  as- 
sistance of  our  leading  peace  advocates.  Although  Mr. 
Hughes  was  more  frankly  inclined  towards  belligerency 
than  was  Wilson,  it  is  barely  possible  that,  had  Hughes 


The  1916  Election  45 

been  elected,  the  history  of  America  and  of  the  world  might 
have  been  somewhat  different  from  1917  on.  For  had 
Wilson  failed  of  reelection,  he  would  have  had  much  more 
difficulty  in  executing  the  various  belligerent  steps,  taken 
between  February  i  and  March  4,  which  were  such  impor- 
tant factors  in  the  attainment  of  war  in  April.  Hughes, 
moreover,  on  assuming  charge  March  4,  would  have  faced  a 
decidedly  less  pliant  Congress  than  did  Wilson.  For  in 
his  approach  towards  belligerency,  the  Democratic  Sena- 
tors and  Representatives  gave  Wilson  more  trouble  than 
did  the  Republicans.  Had  Wilson's  demand  for  a  declara- 
tion of  war  failed,  it  would  have  been  a  party  calamity. 
But  had  the  demand  come  from  a  Republican  President,  it 
is  not  unlikely  that  he  would  have  been  opposed  not  only 
by  such  Progressive  Republicans  as  opposed  Wilson,  but  by 
the  Democratic  party  as  a  group.  Again,  neither  the  pub- 
lic nor  Congress  would  ever  have  been  misled  as  to  the  aims 
of  Hughes,  to  the  extent  that  they  were  misled  as  to  the 
aims  of  Wilson.  It  seems  certain,  at  least,  that  a  longer 
period  of  preparation  would  have  been  necessary. 

But  had  America  not  entered  the  European  war  in  April, 
1917,  or  very  soon  thereafter,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the 
war  would  have  ended  in  that  year.  (See  Chapter 
XXVI.)  If  this  judgment  is  correct,  it  was  by  the  votes  of 
pacifists  that  America  went  to  war,  and  by  the  votes  of 
pacifists  that  world  peace  failed  in  1917. 

There  is  no  intention  here  to  reflect  upon  the  good  faith 
of  the  gentlemen  who  in  past  years  were  notable  in  their 
advocacy  of  peace.  But  a  reflection  upon  their  intelligence 
is  in  order,  since,  while  assuming  to  be  students  of  modern 
statesmanship,  they  overlooked  the  first  trick  in  the  trade 
of  statesmen — duplicity.  Our  leading  peace  advocates 
took  Wilson  at  his  word.  Worse  than  that,  they  paid  at- 


46  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

tention  only  to  such  words  as  pleased  them.  They  over- 
looked other  words  that  contradicted  the  pleasing  words,  as 
well  as  his  action  in  the  matter  of  preparedness,  his  man- 
euvers in  the  armed  ships  dispute,  and,  above  all,  his  tell- 
tale diplomacy. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  WAR 

VIII 

EXECUTIVE    DUPLICITY    IN    IMPOSING    THE    WAR    POLICIES 

If  it  be  contended  that  the  war,  having  once  commenced,  the 
President  of  the  United  States  may  direct  it  to  the  accomplishment 
of  any  object  he  pleases,  without  consulting  and  without  regard  to 
the  will  of  Congress,  the  [Constitutional]  convention  will  have  ut- 
terly failed  in  guarding  the  nation  against  the  abuses  and  ambitions 
of  a  single  individual.  Either  Congress  or  the  President  must  have 
the  right  of  determining  upon  the  objects  for  which  a  war  shall 
be  prosecuted.  There  is  no  other  alternative.  If  the  President 
possess  it  ...  where  is  the  difference  between  our  free  government 
and  that  of  any  other  nation  which  may  be  governed  by  an  absolute 
czar,  emperor  or  king?  It  is  the  privilege  of  the  people  in  their 
primary  assemblies,  and  of  every  private  man,  however  humble,  to 
express  an  opinion  in  regard  to  the  purposes  for  which  the  war 
should  be  continued. — Henry  Clay,  in  speech  on  the  Mexican  War, 
Nov.  13,  1847. 

THE  obligation  of  the  chief  executive  of  a  democracy,  to 
comport  his  acts  and  policies  with  previous  promises  and 
pronouncements,  had  been  many  times  acknowledged  by 
President  Wilson.  For  example,  on  one  occasion  he  spoke 
as  follows: 

I  set  myself  this  very  strict  rule  .  .  .  that  I  am  not  at  liberty  to 
urge  upon  Congress,  in  messages,  policies  which  have  not  had  the 
organic  consideration  of  those  for  whom  I  am  spokesman.  For  that 
reason,  you  see,  I  am  by  my  own  principles  shut  out,  in  the  language 
of  the  street,  from  'starting  anything.'  I  have  to  confine  myself  to 
those  things  which  have  been  embodied  as  promises  to  the  people 
at  an  election.  That  is  the  strict  rule  I  set  for  myself.  (Speech 
to  delegation  of  suffragists,  White  House,  Dec.  8,  1913.) 

47 


48  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

But  not  one  of  the  salient  war  policies  of  Wilson  ever 
had  "the  organic  consideration"  of  those  for  whom  he  was 
"spokesman."  Not  one  was  embodied  as  a  promise  to  the 
people  at  an  election. 

Nor  can  this  be  excused  on  the  plea  of  sudden  and  un- 
foreseen contingency.  The  1916  election  occurred  only 
five  months  before  war  was  declared.  During  the  cam- 
paign the  question  of  war  was  constantly  before  the  people. 
It  was  inevitable  that,  in  case  of  war,  the  question  of  con- 
scription should  arise.  But  the  question  of  conscription 
was  not  given  "organic  consideration"  in  the  Democratic 
Convention  of  1916. 

Do  not  imagine  that  the  question  of  conscription  was 
overlooked  in  that  period.  Wilson  did  not  overlook  it. 
He  pronounced  against  the  policy.  Early  in  the  year  he 
had  told  the  people:  "Every  true  believer  in  democracy  be- 
lieves that  it  is  upon  the  voluntary  action  of  the  men  of 
a  great  nation  like  this  that  it  must  depend  for  its  military 
force."  (Milwaukee,  Jan.  31,  1916.)  And  in  his  Memo- 
rial Day  address:  "America  does  not  want  anything  but 
the  compulsion  of  the  spirit." 

If  the  President  experienced  a  change  of  mind  upon  this 
vital  policy  later,  would  not  democratic  ethics  require  him 
at  once  and  publicly  to  acknowledge  the  fact?  But  not 
until  the  night  of  April  2,  while  in  the  actual  delivery  of 
the  war  message,  did  the  American  public,  or  any  part 
thereof,  learn  that  the  President  would  favor  conscrip- 
tion. 

What  other  conclusion  is  possible  except  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  well  aware  that  the  idea  of  conscription  was 
repugnant  to  the  masses  of  the  people;  that  a  pro- 
posal, at  an  earlier  juncture,  to  conscript  Americans  would 
jeopardize  the  plan  to  go  into  the  war  itself;  that  he  pur- 
posefully kept  the  people  and  Congress  in  the  dark,  know- 


Executive  Duplicity  49 

ing  that  the  longer  he  waited  the  better  chance  he  would 
have  to  impose  the  policy? 

After  the  President  came  out  for  conscription,  it  was  still 
not  too  late,  in  the  opinion  of  various  members  of  Con- 
gress, to  procure  a  form  of  "organic  consideration"  of  the 
proposal.  Bills  were  introduced  providing  for  an  advisory 
referendum  on  conscription.  But  the  President  was  not 
for  "organic  consideration,"  now,  and  all  such  measures 
were  smothered. 

Likewise,  the  public  was  misled  as  to  the  extent  to  which 
the  Administration  contemplated  cooperating  with  the 
Entente  governments. 

The  President  had  pronounced  definitely  against  entan- 
gling alliances,  and  indeed,  against  alliances  of  any  kind 
with  any  nation.  He  had  declared  that  we  had  no  interest 
in  the  outcome  of  the  European  quarrel.  He  had  even 
declared,  in  effect,  that  the  aims  and  purposes  of  Germany 
were  as  clean  as  those  of  England.  By  a  hundred  such  pro- 
nouncements he  had  created  the  assumption  that,  should 
America  be  drawn  into  the  war,  it  would  participate  inde- 
pendently and  only  to  a  limited  degree,  and  with  the  single 
purpose  of  protecting  American  commerce  and  passengers 
in  actual  transit  through  the  zone  of  submarine  warfare. 

In  the  last  days  before  the  war,  the  Administration 
actually  took  occasion  to  strengthen  this  assumption  by 
causing  the  newspaper  correspondents  at  Washington  to 
send  out  reports  that  the  government  did  not  intend  to  be- 
come an  ally  of  the  Entente,  but  in  case  of  a  declaration  of 
war  would,  in  fact,  confine  its  warfare  to  naval  operations 
directed  solely  towards  protecting  American  rights  on  the 
high  seas  immediately  menaced  by  Germany  and  her  allies. 

Nothing  whatever  was  said  about  a  vast  military  crusade 
against  autocracy,  or  anything  of  that  sort.  Nothing  was 
said  about  sending  an  army  overseas.  Not  even  in  his  war 


50  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

message  did  the  President  hint  at  sending  soldiers  to 
France.  Even  in  the  war  debates,  the  fact  that  the  Admin- 
istration planned  to  rush  an  army  to  France  was  hidden 
from  the  Senators  and  Congressmen  themselves.  The 
great  American  "democracy"  went  to  war  without  a  sus- 
picion among  the  public  at  large  that  the  Executive — whom 
they  had  reflected  to  keep  them  out  of  war,  to  save  them 
from  entangling  alliances,  and  to  protect  them  from  con- 
scription and  every  war  terror — had  chosen  to  rush  a  great 
conscript  army  overseas  and  make  America  a  partisan  in  the 
European  "chaos  of  competing  and  hostile  ambitions" ! 

No  military  reason  can  be  urged  as  an  excuse  for  this 
secrecy.  The  reason  was  political.  To  have  admitted  the 
truth  before  the  declaration  of  war  would  have  vastly  in- 
creased public  opposition  to  taking  up  the  cudgels. 

As  with  the  draft,  efforts  were  made  to  obtain  a  form 
of  "organic  consideration"  of  the  project  to  send  an  army 
overseas.  Bills  were  introduced,  providing  that  no  con- 
script be  sent  overseas  without  his  consent.  But  all  such 
bills  were  smothered  at  the  dictation  of  the  President. 
The  President  denied  even  the  right  of  Congress  to  pro- 
nounce upon  this  question.  American  forces  were  sent 
overseas  by  Executive  direction.  Here,  again,  the  public 
was  misled.  For,  at  first,  the  public  was  told  that  the 
American  flag  was  going  to  France  chiefly  for  its  "moral 
effect,"  and  that  our  army  overseas  would  be  small.  Only 
a  little  at  a  time,  as  our  war  autocracy  fixed  its  hold  more 
and  more  firmly  upon  the  country,  was  the  truth  permitted 
to  reach  the  people  of  America. 

Farthest  from  the  public  mind  had  been  the  thought  that 
the  wishes  of  any  other  government  could  influence  America 
to  go  to  war.  It  remained  for  Lloyd  George  to  tell  us: 
"We  not  only  desired  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into 


Executive  Duplicity  51 

the  war;  we  solicited  it."      (Interview  in  Paris  Matin,  July 

4,  1917-) 

The  drafting  of  the  State  militia  organizations  into  the 

national  service,  and  the  obligatory  employment  of  the 
militiamen  abroad,  is  another  illustration  of  the  President's 
ease  at  reversal  and  his  contempt  for  his  own  interpreta- 
tions of  the  Constitution.  During  his  preparedness  tour, 
while  urging  public  support  for  an  increase  in  the  regular 
army,  the  President  repeatedly  discounted  the  value  of  the 
National  Guard,  explaining  that  the  Constitution  prohib- 
ited him  from  calling  on  it  except  in  case  of  actual  inva- 
sion. At  New  York,  for  example,  January  27,  1916,  he 
said: 

Under  the  Constitution  .  .  .  only  upon  occasion  of  actual  in- 
vasion has  the  President  of  the  United  States  the  right  to  ask  these 
men  [members  of  the  National  Guard]  to  leave  their  respective 
States. 

But  this  did  not  prevent  him  from  writing  into  his  Con- 
scription Bill  the  following  words: 

The  President  ...  is  hereby  authorized  ...  to  draft  into  the 
military  service  of  the  United  States,  organize  and  officer  .  .  .  any 
and  all  members  of  the  National  Guard  and  of  the  National  Guard 
Reserves,  and  said  members  so  drafted  into  the  military  service  of 
the  United  States  shall  serve  therein  for  the  existing  emergency. 

The  law  was  passed  in  this  form.  The  President  imme- 
diately, by  proclamation,  drafted  the  National  Guard,  in 
its  entirety,  and  within  a  few  weeks  various  units  thereof 
were  on  their  way,  under  compulsion,  to  France.  The  Con- 
stitution had  not  been  amended,  meanwhile,  and  no  other 
formalities  had  occurred  than  those  set  forth  above. 

The  American  people  had  been  in  the  habit  of  express- 
ing their  honest  opinions  freely,  without  persecution  or 


52  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

punishment.  How  many  of  us  had  any  inkling  that,  after 
war  was  declared,  we  might  speak  of  the  war  only  in  terms 
of  approval? 

'How  many  had  any  idea  that  we  would  be  suffered  to 
mention  the  President  of  the  United  States  only  in  adula- 
tion? 

How  many  would  have  supposed  that  it  would  become  a 
crime  to  quote  our  own  school  textbooks  against  England? 

How  many  would  have  thought  that  every  word  spoken 
of  our  enemies  must  be  charged  with  execration? 

How  many  imagined  that  they  would  be  prohibited  from 
putting  forth  any  efforts  towards  peace,  or  mentioning 
terms  of  peace  except  as  a  question  to  be  determined  ex- 
clusively by  one  man  in  all  our  hundred  millions? 

How  many  would  have  believed  that  a  public  endorse- 
ment of  principles  for  which  Woodrow  Wilson  assumed  to 
stand  before  the  war — and  upon  which  he  gained  reelec- 
tion— would  have  swiftly  and  surely  landed  the  offender  in 
prison? 

President  Wilson's  declamations  on  free  speech,  both 
before  and  after  we  entered  the  European  war,  are  too 
numerous  and  well  remembered  to  require  quotation. 
While  the  Espionage  Act  was  in  the  balance  he  wrote  to 
Arthur  Brisbane  saying  that  he  could  "imagine  no  greater 
disservice  to  the  country  than  to  establish  a  censorship  that 
would  deny  to  the  people  of  a  free  republic  their  indisputa- 
ble right  to  criticize  their  own  public  officials"  and  defi- 
nitely promised :  "/  shall  not  expect  or  permit  any  part  of 
this  law  to  apply  to  me  or  any  of  my  official  acts  or  in  any 
way  to  be  used  as  a  shield  against  criticism" 

Nevertheless,  under  the  Espionage  Act,  numerous  per- 
sons were  prosecuted  and  imprisoned  for  no  other  cause 
than  criticism  of  President  Wilson. 


Executive  Duplicity  53 

A  study  of  each  Presidential  deception  of  this  character 
reveals  the  fact  that  its  aim  was  to  concentrate  all  power 
and  all  discretion  in  the  hands  of  one  Woodrow  Wilson. 
Here  again  the  policy  of  the  President  is  a  contradiction  of 
his  stand  while  campaigning  for  reelection : 

.x 

If  I  understand  the  life  of  America,  the  central  principle  is  this, 
that  no  small  body  of  persons,  however  influential,  shall  be  trusted 
to  determine  ...  the  policy  of  America. —  (Address  before  Asso- 
ciated Advertising  Clubs  of  the  World,  Philadelphia,  June  29, 
1916.) 

The  Constitution  does  not  hold  that  this  principle  may 
be  set  aside  in  time  of  war.  Nor  do  the  great  interpreters 
of  democracy.  Nor  did  Woodrow  Wilson  himself.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  President  particularly  called  attention 
to  the  democratic  necessity  for  preventing  the  control  in 
a  few  hands  of  a  nation  at  war;  to  wit: 

I  should  say  that  it  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  traditions  of  the 
country  tHat  the  people  should  know  how  to  take  care  of  themselves ; 
but  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  traditions  of  the  country  that  their 
knowledge  of  arms  should  be  used  by  a  governmental  organization 
which  would  make  and  organize  a  great  army  subject  to  orders  to  do 
what  a  particular  group  of  men  might  at  the  time  think  it  was  best 
to  have  them  do. 

That  is  the  militarism  of  Europe,  where  a  few  persons  can  deter- 
mine what  an  armed  nation  is  to  do. 

That  is  what  I  understand  militarism  to  be. — (Statement  made 
to  a  committee  from  the  American  Union  Against  Militarism,  White 
House,  May  9,  1916.) 

In  other  words,  the  policy  which  President  Wilson  in- 
sisted that  he  be  allowed  to  follow  in  1917  and  1918  is 
precisely  the  policy  which  he  defined  as  militarism  in  1916. 


IX 

"DEMOCRATIC"  CZARISM  IN  WAR-TIME 

It  is  important,  likewise,  that  the  habits  of  thinking  in  a  free 
country  should  inspire  caution  in  those  entrusted  with  its  adminstra- 
tion,  to  confine  themselves  within  their  respective  constitutional 
spheres,  avoiding  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  one  department  to 
encroach  upon  another.  The  spirit  of  encroachment  tends  to  consol- 
idate the  powers  of  all  the  departments  in  one,  and  thus  to  create, 
whatever  the  form  of  government,  a  real  despotism.  A  just  esti- 
mate of  the  love  of  power  and  proneness  to  abuse  it,  which  predom- 
inate in  the  human  heart,  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  us  of  the  truth  of 
this  position.  If,  in  the  opinion  of  the  people,  the  distribution  or 
modification  of  the  constitutional  powers  be  in  any  particular  wrong, 
let  it  be  corrected  by  an  amendment  in  the  way  in  which  the  Con- 
stitution designates,  but  let  there  be  no  change  by  usurpation,  for 
though  this  in  one  instance  may  be  the  instrument  of  good,  it  is 
the  customary  weapon  by  which  free  governments  are  destroyed. 
The  precedent  must  always  greatly  overbalance  in  permanent  evil 
any  partial  or  transient  benefit  which  the  use  can  at  any  time  yield. 
— George  Washington,  in  his  Farewell  Address. 

IN  the  first  session  of  the  war  Congress,  all  legislation  that 
passed  was  either  approved  by  the  President  or  written  at 
his  direction.  Although  not  quite  all  of  the  President's 
programme  went  through,  the  powers  which  he  procured 
in  that  session — powers  everywhere  bristling  with  the  most 
drastic  repressive  provisions — were  far  greater  than  those 
ever  voted  to  or  exercised  by  any  previous  American  Exec- 
utive. At  the  conclusion  of  that  session,  the  President  of 
the  American  republic — in  the  name  of  a  war  for  democ- 

54 


"Democratic"  Czarism  in  War-Time       55 

racy — stood  out  as  the  most  unrestrained  autocrat  to  be 
found  in  any  great  country  in  the  world. 

These  extraordinary  powers  were  not  procured  with- 
out a  constant,  and  sometimes  bitter,  struggle  with  Con- 
gress, in  which  at  times  the  President  was  opposed  even  by 
his  own  party  leaders.  The  struggles  over  conscription, 
the  embargo,  censorship,  and  food-control,  were  especially 
closely  contested.  At  the  beginning,  the  House  Military 
Affairs  Committee  actually  recorded  an  adverse  vote 
against  conscription.  Chairman  Dent,  Speaker  Clark,  and 
majority-leader  Kitchin  all  opposed  it,  and  the  latter  in- 
formed the  President  that,  if  an  immediate  vote  were  taken, 
the  House  as  a  whole  would  reject  the  proposition.  On 
behalf  of  this  and  other  bills,  the  President  made  repeated 
visits  to  the  Capitol,  an  unusual  proceeding.  The  Presi- 
dent was  forced  to  put  the  Conscription  Bill  in  the  hands 
of  a  Republican  to  be  piloted  through;  in  fact,  it  was  due 
to  the  rallying  of  the  Republicans  that  the  bill  went  over. 

In  a  statement  to  the  public  on  behalf  of  the  Food-Con- 
trol Bill,  the  President  admitted  that  "these  powers  [which 
he  asked  for]  are  very  great.'1  Senator  Owen  offered  an 
amendment  to  this  bill,  creating  a  joint  committee  to  super- 
vise the  financial  conduct  of  the  war.  The  President  con- 
tested the  point,  declaring  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Lever  (July 
23>  I9I7):  "I  could  only  interpret  the  final  adoption  of 
Section  23  as  arising  from  a  lack  of  confidence  in  myself." 
Which  quite  astonished  various  of  the  national  legislators. 
Said  Senator  Hardwick  (Aug.  6)  : 

It  is  incomprehensible  to  me  how  any  one  anywhere  could  oppose 
a  proposal  to  have  Congress  share  with  him  [the  President]  respon- 
sibility for  war  expenditures. 

Senator  LaFollette  introduced  a  resolution  declaring 
that  Congress  has  complete  authority  under  the  Constitu- 


56  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

tion  to  state  the  objects  of  the  war.  It  was  smothered, 
with  the  approval  of  the  President. 

On  every  important  point  of  conflict  with  Congress  the 
President  ultimately  won,  and  at  the  end  of  that  first  ses- 
sion he  was  able  to  announce  that  what  he  called  "the  war- 
making  branch  of  the  government,"  meaning  himself,  uhas 
been  abundantly  equipped  with  the  powers  that  were  neces- 
sary to  make  the  action  of  the  nation  effective."  This  was 
an  expression  of  satisfaction,  from  which  it  was  to  be  ex- 
pected that  the  Executive  Department  not  only  would  con- 
fine its  activities  within  the  limits  set  by  the  legislation  re- 
ferred to,  but  also  that  it  would  refrain  from  demanding 
any  notable  enlargements  of  power  at  the  following  session. 

The  Executive  Department,  however,  at  once  proceeded 
(to  employ  the  words  of  Senator  Hiram  Johnson)  to 
"do  what  it  wished  to  do,  law  or  no  law,  authority  or  no  au- 
thority." 

Moreover,  when  the  second  war  session  convened,  it 
sought  from  Congress  grants  of  power  so  sweeping  as  to 
be  undefinable,  except  in  a  general  way — limited  neither  by 
Congress  itself,  by  the  Constitution,  by  the  rights  of  States 
or  of  individuals,  nor  by  any  other  means  except  the  will  of 
the  individual  occupying  the  White  House. 

What  the  Administration  asked  of  the  second  war  ses- 
sion— and  the  manner  of  its  asking — is  the  best  evidence 
that  it  had  been  unwilling  to  wait  for  legal  additions  to  the 
extraordinary  powers  already  voted,  and  was  then  follow- 
ing a  course  of  lawless  usurpation  in  domestic  affairs. 

In  urging  the  passage  of  the  Passport  Act,  Attorney- 
General  Gregory  wrote  (Apr.  12,  1918)  that  "there  is  no 
law  providing  for  the  control  of  departures  from  or  en- 
tries into  the  United  States  by  persons  other  than  those  who 
are  alien  enemies."  But  the  Executive  Department  had 
for  many  months  been  actually  preventing  the  departure 


"Democratic"  Czarism  in  War-Time       57 

from  the  United  States  of  not  only  men  of  draft  age,  but 
of  every  one  else  excepting  persons  whose  business  had  been 
particularly  examined  into  and  approved  by  it. 

During  the  efforts  of  the  Administration  to  procure  the 
enactment  of  what  was  in  that  period  known  as  its  Sedition 
Bill,  Attorney-General  Gregory  declared  (Official  Bulle- 
tin, Apr.  19,  1918),  that  "Not  all  unpatriotic  utterances 
subject  the  author  to  criminal  prosecution"  But  "unpa- 
triotic" utterances  of  every  kind  were  at  that  time  actually 
subjecting  the  authors  thereof  to  criminal  proceedings  under 
the  Espionage  Act. 

The  President  took  over  the  railroads  of  the  country, 
December  26,  1917.  In  February,  1918,  we  find  him  urg- 
ing the  passage  of  a  bill  to  legalize  this  action.  March  2, 
1918,  we  discover  Federal  Judge  Walter  Evans,  at  Louis- 
ville, Kentucky,  handing  down  a  decision  containing  the 
words:  "We  can  find  no  statute  authorizing  the  control  of 
the  railroads  under  the  Treasury  Department  nor  by  the 
Director  General  of  the  railroads."  During  the  discussion 
of  the  Railroad  Bill  in  Congress,  it  was  repeatedly  admitted 
that  the  President  had  overstepped  his  authority  in  the 
means  by  which  he  had  assumed  control  of  the  roads. 

During  the  second  war  session,  efforts  were  made  by  Ad- 
ministration supporters,  although  not  with  the  open  ap- 
proval of  the  President,  to  put  through  a  law  prohibiting 
strikes  in  any  industrial  plants  holding  war  contracts,  as 
had  already  been  provided  for  in  plants  operated  directly 
by  the  government.  Although  no  such  law  was  enacted, 
the  President  and  his  subordinates  repeatedly  prohibited 
strikes  in  such  industries,  and,  through  threats  and  coer- 
cion, the  right  to  strike  was  in  practice  taken  away  by  the 
Executive  power. 

September  13,  1918,  the  President  addressed  a  letter 
to  striking  workmen  at  Bridgeport,  Connecticut,  ordering 


58  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

them  to  return  to  work,  threatening  all  with  blacklisting, 
and  threatening  all  of  draft  age  with  the  revocation  of  any 
deferred  classification  based  on  their  usefulness  in  war  pro- 
duction. The  strikers  returned  to  their  jobs.  February 
17,  1918,  the  President  addressed  a  telegram  to  the  general 
president  of  the  United  Brotherhood  of  Carpenters  and 
Joiners  of  America,  telling  the  latter  significantly  that,  un- 
less he  advised  the  men  whom  he  represented  to  return  to 
work,  he  was  "giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy."  The 
official  advised  his  men  to  return  to  work.  Similar  tactics 
were  employed  by  officials  of  the  Fuel  and  Food  Adminis- 
trations, the  President's  Mediation  Commission,  and  other 
subordinates  of  the  President,  as  a  means  to  preventing  or 
breaking  strikes. 

I  mention  only  a  few  signal  instances  of  a  policy  that  was 
generally  followed.  Even  the  legality  of  the  "work  or 
fight"  regulations  of  the  army  was  questioned,  and  a 
"work  or  fight"  clause  was  placed  in  the  new  Conscription 
Bill,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  legalizing  the  Executive 
manipulation  of  the  existing  law.  The  clause,  however, 
was  stricken  out,  but  the  "work  or  fight"  policy  was  not 
abandoned.  In  a  report  on  the  Administration's  propo- 
sals to  amend  the  draft  law,  giving  greater  power  over 
draft  registrants,  March  13,  1918,  six  members  of  the 
Senate  Military  Affairs  Committee  declared  the  powers 
sought  for  "unheard  of,"  and  argued  that  the  proposal 
would  subject  "to  the  arbitrary  will  and  authority  of  those 
in  control  of  the  nation's  military  power  the  9,000,000  men 
registered" ;  also: 

If  Congress  is  prepared  to  deliver  the  bodies  of  these  9,000,000 
men  into  the  hands  of  the  military  authorities  without  condition  or 
limitation,  then  it  should  pass  this  joint  resolution;  if  not,  it  should 
be  defeated. 


"Democratic"  Czarism  in  War-Time        59 

In  urging  the  passage  of  the  Food-Control  Bill,  Mr. 
Hoover  sought  to  create  the  impression  that  its  primary 
purpose  was  to  protect  both  the  producer  and  consumer 
from  speculators.  That  it  did  not  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose satisfactorily  was  virtually  admitted  by  Hoover  him- 
self eight  months  later,  when  engaged  in  an  effort  to  pro- 
cure an  enlargement  of  his  powers.  In  a  statement  issued 
Feburary  21,  1918,  Hoover  admitted  that  "the  [price] 
margins  between  the  farmer  and  the  consumer  in  many 
localities  were  never  wider  than  to-day." 

In  a  letter  to  the  President,  July  10,  1917,  intended  to 
influence  Congress  and  the  public  in  favor  of  the  Food- 
Control  Bill,  Hoover  wrote  : 

It  is  absolutely  vital  that  we  shall  protect  the  farmer  from  a 
slump  in  prices  this  year  due  to  a  glut.  .  .  .  Unless  some  strong  and 
efficient  government  action  is  immediately  settled  and  brought  into 
play,  the  American  producer  will  face  a  slump  in  wheat. 

The  "strong  and  efficient  government  action"  was  soon 
"settled."  That  is,  the  Food-Control  Bill  was  passed. 
But,  instead  of  preventing  a  slump  in  wheat,  the  passage 
of  the  bill  was  manipulated  to  cause  it.  One  of  the  first 
steps  of  the  President  was  to  fix  the  price  of  wheat.  The 
figure  fixed  by  the  President  was  $1.05  per  bushel  lower 
than  it  had  been  at  the  very  time  that  the  President, 
Hoover,  and  others,  were  asserting  that  a  primary  pur- 
pose of  the  bill  was  to  protect  the  wheat  farmer  from  a 
slump  in  prices ! 

Naturally,  there  was  great  dissatisfaction  among  the 
farmers,  and  so  many  refused  to  market  their  wheat  that 
the  great  mills  of  the  country  were  reported  as  threatened 
with  a  shut-down  at  the  busiest  season  of  the  year. 

Some  of  our  wheat  growers  may  be  surprised,  even  at 
this  late  day,  to  know  that  the  Administration  was  clothed 


60  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

with  no  authority  to  seize  their  wheat  or  even  to  fix  the 
price"  thereof.  In  the  hearings  on  the  Food-Control  Bill, 
Mr.  Hoover  assured  Congress  that  the  bill  carried  no  au- 
thority to  fix  wheat  prices.  Several  months  later,  testify- 
ing before  the  Sugar  Investigating  Committee  of  the  Sen- 
ate, he  was  forced  to  admit  that  the  price  had  been  fixed 
in  violation  of  the  law.  When  Senator  Reed  suggested 
that  Hoover  had  been  guilty  of  a  criminal  act,  his  excuse 
was:  "Whatever  I  have  done  has  been  done  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  President."  (Jan.  3,  1918.) 

The  Food-Control  Bill  carried  a  limited  authority  to 
fix  food  prices,  but  no  authority  to  fix  prices  to  the  farmer. 
In  his  first  public  statement  on  behalf  of  that  bill  (May 
T9>  I9I?)>  tne  President  pointed  out  that  this  limited 
authority  was  asked  for  "not  in  order  to  limit  the  profits  of 
the  farmers,  but  only  to  guarantee  them,  when  necessary, 
a  minimum  price." 

The  law  gave  a  limited  authority  to  seize  food  to  pre- 
vent hoarding.  But  Section  6  specifically  exempted  farm 
products  from  seizure  on  such  ground: 

Sec.  6.  ...  Provided,  however,  that  any  accumulating  or  with- 
holding by  any  farmer  or  gardener,  cooperative  association  of  farmers 
or  gardeners,  including  live-stock  farmers,  or  any  other  person,  of 
the  products  of  any  farm,  garden,  or  other  land  owned,  leased  or 
cultivated  by  him  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  hoarding  within  the 
meaning  of  this  act. 

September  13,  1917,  Hoover  admitted  that  he  was  help- 
less to  force  the  farmers  to  sell  their  wheat.  Neverthe- 
less, before  the  1917-18  winter  was  over,  the  Administra- 
tion was  seizing  the  wheat  on  the  farms,  as  a  means  to 
breaking  the  wheat  strike,  and  compelling  the  farmers  to 
accept  the  President's  price. 

Hoover  and  his  aides  also  repeatedly  promised  that  the 


"Democratic"  Czarism  in  War-Time       61 

American  householder  would  not  be  put  on  rations.  In 
the  hearings  on  the  Food-Control  Bill,  Hoover  assured 
Congress  that  he  did  not  purpose  fixing  consumers'  rations, 
and  that  the  law  did  not  contemplate  any  such  authority, 
nor  should  it.  (June  19,  1917.)  Section  10  of  the  bill, 
in  fact,  contained  a  clause  intended  to  exempt  householders 
from  seizure  of  food  stocks : 

Provided,  that  nothing  in  this  section,  or  in  the  section  that  fol- 
lows, shall  be  construed  to  require  any  natural  person  to  furnish  to 
the  government  any  necessaries  held  by  him  and  reasonably  required 
for  consumption  or  use  by  himself  and  dependents. 

But  many  Americans  will  not  soon  forget  the  system  of 
rationing  put  into  effect  by  Hoover's  responsible  aides,  the 
espionage,  the  brutal  invasions  of  homes,  the  prosecutions 
and  threats  of  prosecutions,  and  at  times  the  seizure  of 
stocks  of  flour  or  sugar  in  ridiculously  small  amounts. 

The  history  of  the  second  war  session  of  Congress  is 
a  history  of  successful  efforts,  on  the  part  of  the  Executive, 
to  wring  from  the  legislative  branch  enlargements  of  power 
wrung  from  it  in  the  first  war  session.  Nearly  every  piece 
of  war  legislation  of  the  first  session  was  amended,  and  al- 
ways to  give  the  Executive  greater  power,  never  to  limit  it. 
The  efforts  of  the  President  were  constantly  directed,  with 
success,  towards  taking  from  the  legislative  branch  of  the 
government  its  constitutional  powers,  and  towards  concen- 
trating these  powers  in  himself,  towards  shutting  out  Con- 
gress from  any  part  whatever  in  the  war  policy  and  pro- 
gramme, domestic  or  foreign,  towards  reducing  it  to  the 
impotent  position  of  having  nothing  left  to  vote  upon  ex- 
cept appropriations  and  more  appropriations — towards 
placing  the  legislative  power,  the  military,  and  the  civil 
community,  completely  at  the  mercy  of  the  Executive 
bureaucracy. 


62  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Due,  evidently,  to  a  realization  that  too  great  authority 
had  already  been  voted  the  Executive,  and  that  this  au- 
thority had  been  abused,  the  second  war  session  began  with 
committee  investigations  of  various  phases  of  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  and  with  efforts  towards  retaining  for  Congress 
a  modicum  of  control. 

Although  the  investigations  brought  out  some  scandal- 
ous truths,  revealing  mismanagement  and  graft  on  a  large 
scale,  the  President  resented  them,  denounced  them,  and 
finally  succeeded  in  throttling  them. 

In  debating  the  powers  demanded  for  the  President  in 
the  Railroad  Bill,  Senator  Underwood,  one  of  Wilson's 
party  leaders,  issued  a  solemn  warning,  declaring  that 
"when  Congress  reaches  the  point  where  it  is  prepared  to 
Abandon  constitutional  limitations,  and  surrender  govern- 
ment of  law  for  government  by  a  man,  then  danger  is  ahead 
for  the  people  of  the  United  States."  (Feb.  20,  1918.) 

In  speaking  on  the  War  Finance  Corporation  Bill,  Rep- 
resentative Longworth  pointed  out  that  "No  war  lord  in 
history,  no  kaiser,  no  czar,  ever  had  such  power.  .  .  .  The 
mere  transmittal  to  Congress  of  such  a  bill  is  illustrative 
of  a  danger  every  day  growing  in  menace  to  the  institu- 
tions bequeathed  to  us  by  our  fathers.  I  mean  the  continu- 
ous reaching  out  of  the  executive  branch  of  this  government 
for  more  and  more  power.  It  is  a  danger  not  to  be  lightly 
passed  over."  (Mar.  16,  1918.) 

The  climax  of  the  President's  efforts  for  absolute  power 
came  with  the  bill  introduced  by  Senator  Overman,  after 
floor-leader  Martin  and  other  Senators  had  refused  to  pilot 
it  because  of  its  autocratic  features.  In  the  beginning,  the 
Overman  Bill  was  hooted  by  both  Democratic  and  Republi- 
can members.  Even  Senator  Hitchcock,  Wilson's  most 
conspicuous  and  steady  support  throughout  the  war,  as- 
serted: "It  would  mean  nothing  but  an  abdication  by  Con- 


"Democratic"  Czarism  in  War-Time        63 

gress  of  its  law-making  power.  It  is  the  most  astonishing 
piece  of  legislation  I've  ever  heard  of";  while  Senator  Over- 
man himself  urged,  on  behalf  of  the  bill:  "Now  let's  be 
done  with  it  by  passing  a  bill  that  will  let  the  President  or- 
ganize things  the  way  he  wants,  so  he  won't  have  to  ask 
any  more  legislation  from  us." 

In  spite  of  all  predictions  to  the  contrary,  the  President 
whipped  Congress  into  line  in  the  end,  and  the  Overman 
Bill  became  a  law.  Only  one  conceivable  measure  re- 
mained to  render  the  President's  conduct  of  the  war  and  his 
control  of  the  country  practically  absolute.  That  was  to 
widen  the  draft  ages  to  include  all  males  between  boyhood 
and  senility,  and  to  give  over  to  the  Executive  power  to 
draw  upon  them  at  his  own  discretion,  and  in  unlimited 
numbers.  In  a  typical  protest  against  Wilson's  "Man 
Power  Bill,"  Chairman  Dent  of  the  House  Military  Af- 
fairs Committee  exclaimed  passionately: 

I  am  willing  to  vote  for  an  army  of  5,000,000.  ...  I  would 
willingly  vote  for  even  more.  But  I  will  not  vote  for  an  indefinite 
proposition,  a  bill  which  says  that  a  department  may  do  as  it  wishes 
without  check  of  any  kind.  Congress  might  as  well  be  abolished. 

Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  Executive's  wishes,  in  the  end, 
were  enacted  into  law. 


THE  WAR  TERROR 

The  means  of  defense  against  foreign  danger  have  always  been 
the  instruments  of  tyranny  at  home.  Among  the  Romans,  it  was 
a  standing  maxim  to  excite  war  whenever  a  revolt  was  apprehended. 
Throughout  all  Europe,  the  armies,  kept  up  under  the  pretext  of 
defending,  have  enslaved  the  people.  It  is  perhaps  questionable 
whether  the  best  concerted  system  of  absolute  power  in  Europe  could 
maintain  itself  in  a  situation  where  no  alarms  of  external  danger 
could  tame  the  people  to  the  domestic  yoke. — James  Madison. 

AFTER  our  war  declaration,  the  Conscription  Bill  embodied 
the  first  notable  attack,  directly  involving  " American  liber- 
ties," upon  the  document  towards  which  our  patriots  of 
1917-1921  professed  such  exaggerated  reverence. 

Conscription  had  been  resorted  to  in  America  before, 
when,  however,  it  had  been  contested  energetically  on  con- 
stitutional grounds.  But  the  fact  that  it  had  been  resorted 
to  before  established  no  valid  precedent,  inasmuch  as  it 
had  not  been  resorted  to  since  the  adoption  of  the  Thir- 
teenth Amendment:  "Neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  ser- 
vitude, except  as  punishment  for  crime,  whereof  the  party 
shall  have  been  duly  convicted,  shall  exist  within  the  United 
States,  or  any  place  subject  to  their  jurisdiction." 

In  a  test  case,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  (Jan.  7, 
1918),  declared  the  Wilson  conscription  law  constitutional. 
Referring  to  the  power  vested  in  Congress  to  "raise  and 
support  armies,"  Chief  Justice  White  argued:  uAs  the  mind 
cannot  conceive  of  an  army  without  the  men  to  compose  it, 
on  the  face  of  the  Constitution  the  objection  that  it  does 

64 


The  War  Terror  65 

not  give  the  power  to  provide  for  such  men  would  seem  too 
frivolous  for  further  notice. " 

But  a  moment's  thought  is  sufficient  to  reveal  this  dictum 
of  the  Chief  Justice  as  too  frivolous  for  further  notice. 
The  Constitution  gives  Congress  power  to  raise  and  sup- 
port armies,  but  only  within  all  limits  set  by  the  other  pro- 
visions of  the  Constitution.  No  power  vested  in  Congress 
or  any  other  authority  under  the  Constitution  carries  with 
it  a  license  to  disregard  any  of  the  prohibitions  thereof. 
Involuntary  servitude  is  forbiddefn  for  all  purposes  and 
under  all  circumstances,  except  as  punishment  for  crime, 
and  if  Congress  cannot  get  sufficient  men  for  a  large  army 
without  involuntary  servitude,  it  must  be  content  to  raise  as 
large  an  army  as  it  can  within  the  means  not  forbidden  it. 

The  decision  of  America's  august  Supreme  Court  is  not 
surprising,  inasmuch  as  Chief  Justice  White  conspicuously 
led  the  applause  on  the  occasion  of  the  President's  war  mes- 
sage, and  was  enthusiastically  seconded  by  his  associates. 
The  childish  reasoning  of  these  eminent  gentlemen  is  only 
evidence  of  their  own  prejudiced  determination  to  bolster 
up  an  untenable  cause.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  lay- 
man is  justified  in  feeling  that  he  understands  the  meaning 
of  the  words  "involuntary  servitude"  quite  as  well  as  any 
sophist  masquerading  in  the  black  gown  of  a  Supreme 
Court  Judge.  (To  condemn  our  draft  law,  indeed,  one 
would  not  need  to  go  farther  than  the  President's  own  word 
that  "Under  the  Constitution  .  .  .  only  upon  occasion  of 
actual  invasion  has  the  President  of  the  United  States  the 
right  to  ask  these  men  [militiamen]  to  leave  their  respec- 
tive States.") 

When,  near  the  end  of  the  War  of  1812,  a  conscription 
bill  was  placed  before  Congress,  Daniel  Webster,  on  the 
floor  of  the  House  (Dec.  9,  1814),  denounced  it  as  in  fla- 
grant opposition  to  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  and  de- 


66  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

clared  that  the  adoption  of  such  a  measure  would  oblige  a 
free  people  to  resist  it  even  to  the  extent  of  insurrection: 

That  measures  of  this  nature  should  be  debated  at  all  in  the 
councils  of  a  free  government,  is  a  cause  for  dismay.  The  question 
is  nothing  less  than  whether  the  most  essential  rights  of  personal 
liberty  shall  be  surrendered,  and  despotism  embraced  in  its  worst 
form.  ...  I  express  the  sentiments  here  as  I  shall  express  them  to 
my  constituents.  .  .  .  With  the  same  earnestness  with  which  I  now 
exhort  you  to  forbear  from  these  measures,  I  shall  exhort  them  to 
exercise  their  unquestionable  right  of  providing  for  the  security  of 
their  liberty. 

The  first  amendment  to  the  Constitution  says:  "Congress 
shall  make  no  law  .  .  .  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech 
or  of  the  press."  But  in  the  Wilson  Sedition  Law  (after- 
wards known  as  the  amended  Espionage  Act)  we  find  the 
words : 

.  .  .  and  whoever,  when  the  United  States  is  at  war,  shall  wilfully 
utter,  print,  wtrite,  or  publish  any  disloyal,  profane,  scurrilous  or 
abusive  language  about  the  form  of  government  of  the  United  States, 
or  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  or  the  military  or  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  or  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  or  the 
uniform  of  the  army  or  navy  of  the  United  States;  or  any  language 
intended  to  bring  the  form  of  government  of  the  United  States,  or 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  or  the  military  or  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States,  or  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  or  the  uni- 
form of  the  army  or  navy  of  the  United  States  into  contempt,  scorn, 
contumely  or  disrepute  ...  or  ...  shall  .  .  .  by  word  or  act  op- 
pose the  cause  of  the  United  Stares  therein  [in  the  war]  shall  be  pun- 
ished by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $10,000,  or  imprisonment  for  not 
more  than  twenty  years,  or  both. 

Any  person  competent  to  understand  the  meaning  of  the 
English  language  is  competent  to  judge  whether  or  not  the 
above  law  abridges  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press. 

The  Fifth  Amendment  says: 


The  War  Terror  67 

No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  other  infamous 
crime  unless  on  a  presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury;  except 
in  cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia,  when  in 
actual  service  ...  nor  shall  any  person  ...  be  deprived  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;  nor  shall  private 
property  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation. 

"Due  process  of  law"  is  a  legal  term  comprehending  an 
adequate  hearing  before  a  judicial  tribunal.  The  provi- 
sions of  the  Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act,  under  which  the 
Executive  confiscated  alien  enemy  property,  without  due 
process  of  law,  and  without  compensation,  as  well  as  the 
internment  of  alien  enemies  by  Executive  whim,  without 
presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury  and  without  due 
process  of  law,  constitute  not  only  an  abuse  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions and  of  international  law  (see  Chapter  XVII)  but 
also  a  gross  violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment. 

Article  3  of  the  Constitution  says: 

He  [the  President]  shall  have  power,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  two-thirds  of  the 
Senators  present  concur. 

By  implication,  the  above  words  prohibit  the  President 
from  making  any  treaty  without  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  expressed  in  a  two-thirds  majority  vote.  Nev- 
ertheless, at  the  outset  of  our  war,  the  President  entered 
into  certain  arrangements,  understandings,  and  compacts 
with  the  various  Entente  governments — the  terms  of  which 
are  unknown  because  kept  a  profound  secret — without  the 
advice  or  consent  of  the  Senate,  and  without  even  consult- 
ing that  body  or  taking  it  into  his  confidence.  Through 
his  State  Department,  he  entered  into  a  written  agreement 
with  Japan,  a  version  of  which  was  published,  without  the 
advice  or  consent  of  the  Senate.  These  arrangements, 


68  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

understandings,  and  compacts,  if  not  technically  treaties, 
are  substantially  so.  If  not  in  technical  violation  of  the 
Constitution,  they  are  an  evasion  of  its  provisions  and  an 
offense  against  its  spirit. 

Section  8  of  the  Constitution,  indeed,  seems  to  vest  in 
Congress  a  general  authority  over  the  affairs  of  state,  in 
peace  as  well  as  in  war. 

Congress  can  impeach  the  President,  but  the  President 
cannot  impeach  Congress.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Consti- 
tution that  gives  the  President  authority  to  decide  whether 
or  not  the  army  shall  be  sent  to  fight  on  another  continent, 
to  decide  when  the  fighting  shall  begin,  or  under  what  con- 
ditions and  terms  it  shall  cease.  The  President  is  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  military  forces,  but  apparently  the 
Constitution-makers  intended  that  Congress  should  be  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  President. 

The  purpose  of  President  Wilson's  struggle  for  unlim- 
ited power  became  more  and  more  clear — to  carry  on  war 
when,  where,  and  how  he  pleased,  for  as  long  as  he  pleased, 
for  such  ends  as  pleased  him;  to  employ  the  entire  military 
power  of  the  nation,  its  police  power,  its  industrial  power, 
every  power  of  whatever  kind  possessed  by  it,  the  flesh  and 
blood  and  wealth  of  105,000,000  people,  for  objects  de- 
fined and  limited  only  by  himself,  changeable  only  by  him- 
self, known  only  to  himself. 

To  attain  this  end  it  was  necessary  to  reduce  not  only 
Congress  to  submission,  but  the  masses  also. 

To  make  war  in  Europe  as  Woodrow  Wilson  wished  to 
make  war,  it  was  necessary,  in  the  words  of  Senator  Hiram 
Johnson,  first  to  "make  war  on  the  American  people" 
(Speech  against  Sedition  Bill,  Apr.  24,  1918.) 

It  was  not,  of  course,  within  the  power  of  any  one  man 
alone  to  impose  such  a  despotism  upon  America.  But  it 
was  within  the  power  of  one  man,  backed  by  a  minority 


The  War  Terror  69 

in  control  of  the  finances  of  the  country,  the  press,  and  the 
public  offices. 

Our  war  Terror  began  during  the  critical  weeks  of 
March,  1917,  and  was  unquestionably  helpful  in  dissipating 
the  efforts  towards  a  united  expression  of  real  public  opinion 
against  entering  the  war.  The  Terror  of  those  first  days 
took  the  form  chiefly  of  personal  assaults,  invasions  of  pri- 
vate homes,  threats,  mobbings,  raiding  of  public  halls, 
breaking  up  of  meetings  and  demonstrations,  by  private 
persons  or  mobs,  led  or  instigated  by  members  of  the  official 
or  semi-official  bodies. 

Soldiers  of  the  regular  army  and  of  the  militia,  also, 
organized  in  squads,  under  the  command  of  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  conducted  regular  raids  to  break  up  public 
meetings,  on  the  streets  as  well  as  in  halls,  wrecked  offices 
of  organizations  working  against  war,  and  in  a  number  of 
cases  invaded  private  homes.  This  outrageous  misuse  of 
the  uniform  could  not  have  been  carried  as  far  as  it  was 
carried  without  the  approval  of  responsible  military  officers, 
and  the  tacit  consent  of  the  Federal  Administration. 

Except  for  its  pursuit  of  alien  enemies,  the  part  of  the 
Federal  government  in  the  Terror  became  more  or  less 
open  only  with  the  passage  of  the  war  legislation.  In  pro- 
curing the  enactment  of  such  repressive  legislation  as 
passed  the  first  session  of  the  war  Congress,  the  President 
and  his  supporters  had  given  the  fullest  assurances  that 
there  was  no  intent  to  override  constitutional  rights.  At 
the  beginning,  therefore,  here  and  there  was  found  a  judge 
so  artless  as  to  interpret  the  Constitution  as  it  had  always 
been  interpreted,  and  to  lay  down  the  law  strictly  as  it 
read — and  here  and  there  was  found  a  patriotic  newspaper 
so  lacking  in  logic  as  to  suggest  mildly  that  the  Constitution 
was  still  in  force  until  abolished  by  the  specific  means  set 
forth  in  the  document  itself. 


yo  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

A  police  judge  of  New  York  sentenced  a  young  man  to 
ninety  days  in  the  workhouse  for  distributing  extracts  from 
the  Constitution  and  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  in 
which  emphasis  was  placed  upon  certain  passages.  The 
case  was  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State,  the 
young  man  was  freed,  and  the  Supreme  Court  Justice 
(Hendrick)  set  forth  the  rights  of  the  people  in  part  as 
follows : 

Aliens  have  the  right  to  criticize  the  law  the  same  as  citizens.  .  .  . 
Every  one  in  this  country  has  the  right  to  criticize  the  government 
and  the  laws  that  exist,  and  has  the  right  to  agitate  for  the  repeal 
of  a  law  so  long  as  those  acts  are  not  accompanied  by  violence  or 
statements  which  might  be  interpreted  as  inciting  other  people  to 
break  the  law.  .  .  .  We  still  have  free  speech  and  a  free  press  in 
the  United  States. 

But  this  sort  of  foolish  honesty  was  frowned  down.  It 
was  expedient  that  Terror  be  imposed,  law  or  no  law,  Con- 
stitution or  no  Constitution.  In  a  letter  to  Congressman 
Currie,  April  12,  1918,  Attorney-General  Gregory  com- 
plained that  the  clause  in  section  3  of  the  Espionage  Act, 
aimed  to  prevent  obstruction  of  enlistment  and  recruiting, 
"has  been  the  only  weapon  with  which  the  government 
could  attack  this  dangerous  evil  [disloyal  utterances]. " 
This  situation  obtained  until  the  so-called  Sedition  Act  be- 
came a  law,  thirteen  months  after  the  declaration  of  war. 

Americans  are  more  or  less  aware,  however,  of  what  ac- 
tually happened.  "Disloyal  utterances"  were,  in  fact,  at- 
tacked. All  "disloyal  utterances"  were  attacked.  No  ut- 
terance of  "disloyalty"  was  permitted  to  pass.  In  the  cam- 
paign against  "disloyalty,"  every  legal  safeguard,  Federal, 
State,  and  local,  intended  to  protect  personal  liberty  against 
official  outrage,  was  ridden  down.  It  may  be  imagined 
that  this  lawless  Terror  was  due  to  an  over-zealous  patrio- 


The  War  Terror  71 

tism  of  State  and  local  officials,  or  even  to  a  spontaneous 
rising  of  popular  anger  against  "disloyalty."  It  will  be  of 
importance,  then,  to  read  this  description  of  the  situation, 
written  by  Attorney-General  Gregory  himself  : 

To  meet  these  demands  [of  the  war  upon  the  Department  of 
Justice]  we  have  been  compelled  to  increase  many  fold  the  personnel 
of  certain  branches  of  the  work,  and  to  encourage  the  organization 
of  patriotic  bodies,  and  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  these  bodies,  as 
well  as  that  of  national,  State,  county,  municipal,  and  private  organi- 
zations, on  a  hitherto  unprecedented  scale. 

One  patriotic  association  has  a  membership  of  over  200,000,  with 
branches  in  over  1,100  cities  and  towns;  it  is  truly  national;  it  keeps 
tens  of  thousands  of  individuals  under  observation;  it  reports  dis- 
loyalty and  other  violations  of  law  to  the  official  representatives  of 
the  Department;  it  develops  the  facts  involved  in  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  complaints;  and  it  does  all  this  and  much  more  at  its  own 
expense,  with  little  publicity.  ...  It  is  but  one  of  several  such  bod- 
ies, and  when  to  their  membership  is  added  that  of  the  various  State 
Councils  for  national  defense,  the  State,  municipal  and  county  con- 
stabulary, and  the  various  other  intelligence  agencies,  which  are 
cooperating  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  involved,  the  United 
States  marshals  and  their  deputies,  the  agents  of  the  investigating- 
bureau  of  the  Department  of  Justice,  and  individuals  who  are  lend- 
ing their  assistance,  the  number  of  men  assisting  the  government  in 
this  capacity  aggregates  several  hundred  thousand. 

The  Bureau  of  Investigation  of  the  Department  of  Justice  works 
in  close  cooperation  with  the  Intelligence  Service  of  the  other  bran- 
ches of  the  government.  If  it  were  possible  to  give  details,  the 
public  would  be  amazed  at  the  success  of  the  results  secured.  This 
country  was  never  so  thoroughly  policed  in  its  history,  and  it  is 
doubtful  if  any  nation  in  the  world  is  to-day  more  carefully  guarded 
than  the  United  States.  —  (Statement  in  Official  Bulletin,  Apr.  19, 


From  which  it  is  clear  that  the  Federal  government  was 
in  active  control  of  the  situation  in  every  State,  city,  county 


72  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

and  community  in  America;  that  the  system  of  espionage 
was  organized  by  it  throughout;  that  the  Federal  govern- 
ment not  only  formed  but  directed  the  work  of  such  "pa- 
triotic" bodies  as  were  classified  as  unofficial;  that  no  policy 
of  lawlessness  against  "disloyalty"  could  have  been  effective 
in  any  community  without  the  approval  of  subordinates  of 
Mr.  Gregory;  that  every  agency  of  Terror,  of  whatever 
kind,  even  to  the  lynching  parties  of  the  night,  must  have 
worked  either  under  the  direction,  or  with  the  connivance, 
of  Federal  officials ;  that,  therefore,  Terror  must  have  been 
a  policy,  planned  by  the  Federal  government,  worked  out 
by  the  Federal  government,  imposed  by  the  Federal  govern- 
ment, directed  by  the  Federal  government. 

The  President  himself  gave  the  Terror  signal  in  his  Flag 
Day  address:  "Woe  be  to  the  man  or  group  of  men  that 
seeks  to  stand  in  our  way.  .  .  "  And  the  vast  organiza- 
tion which  Mr.  Gregory  describes,  and  which  is  so  reminis- 
cent of  Russia  in  the  days  of  the  Czar,  proceeded  to  admin- 
ister the  woe,  "law  or  no  law,  authority  or  no  authority." 

But  Mr.  Gregory's  list  of  the  instruments  of  Terror  is 
not  complete.  The  courts  of  the  country  belong  to  the 
list;  the  Terror  would  have  been  impossible  without  them. 
America  heard  no  more  such  pronouncements  as  that  of 
Justice  Hendrick.  Judges  who  did  not  become  quickly 
subservient  were  disciplined.  In  one  case  a  judge  was 
actually  impeached  for  appearing  as  a  character  witness  for 
a  man  accused  of  "disloyalty." 

Pretending  to  interpret  the  law,  we  find  a  Federal  judge 
announcing  from  the  bench:  "Persons  expressing  opposi- 
tion to  policies  of  the  government,  whether  aliens  or  not, 
should  be  indicted.'9  (Rose  Pastor  Stokes  case.)  We 
find  another  eminent  judge  advocating  mob  violence  from 
the  public  platform. 

Judges   habitually    made   patriotic    speeches    from    the 


The  War  Terror  73 

bench,  habitually  refused  to  listen  to  any  argument  involv- 
ing the  constitutional  rights  of  persons  prosecuted  for  "dis- 
loyalty," habitually  refused  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  ac- 
cused from  violation  by  police  or  mobs,  habitually  fixed  ex- 
cessive bail,  habitually  misrepresented  the  law  in  instruct- 
ing juries,  habitually  incited  juries  against  the  defendants, 
habitually  imposed  harsh  punishments. 

A  few  salient  acts  of  Mr.  Gregory  himself,  and  other 
cabinet  heads,  at  the  beginning,  gave  the  cue  to  all  Terror- 
ists. In  the  month  following  the  declaration  of  war,  the 
government  refused  passports  to  a  committee  of  Socialists 
who  wished  to  attend  a  Socialist  peace  conference  at 
Stockholm,  a  neutral  capital — and  Mr.  Gregory  threatened 
the  committee  with  prosecution  if  it  took  part  in  any  con- 
ference of  the  kind  anywhere.  So  America  received  its 
first  formal  notification  that  terms  of  peace  were  to  be  left 
to  the  President  alone,  and  were  not  even  to  be  discussed 
except  in  the  form  of  parroting  the  President's  phrases. 

On  the  day  the  Espionage  Act  went  into  effect,  the  Post- 
master-General ordered  the  suspension  of  the  greater  part 
of  the  "unpatriotic"  press.  So  America  received  its  first 
formal  notice  that  no  question  either  of  peace  or  of  war 
was  to  be  discussed  through  the  printed  page  except  in  a 
manner  satisfactory  to  the  Administration. 

During  the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war,  an  organization 
known  as  "The  People's  Council  on  Democracy  and  Terms 
of  Peace"  assumed  notable  proportions  throughout  the 
country.  On  the  announcement  that  it  intended  to  enter 
the  political  field  and  to  send  pacifists  to  Congress,  the  Ad- 
ministration proceeded  vigorously  against  it.  Conven- 
tions were  invaded,  broken  up,  or  prevented,  by  police  and 
military,  and  leaders  were  placed  under  arrest.  The  move- 
ment was  reduced  to  inactivity  solely  by  the  iron  heel. 
So  America  was  notified  that  the  people  were  not  to  be 


74  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

permitted  to  express  their  wishes  even  at  the  polls — that 
political  liberty  was  to  be  suspended  for  the  period  of  the 
war. 

Another  unpatriotic  organization  of  national  scope,  the 
Industrial  Workers  of  the  World,  was  assailed  in  its  en- 
tirety as  a  conspiracy  to  violate  the  Espionage  Act.  Thou- 
sands of  members  were  jailed  simultaneously.  The  simple 
possession  of  a  membership  card  was  treated  as  justifying 
the  most  extravagant  brutalities.  The  avowed  purpose  of 
the  hunt  was  to  extirpate  the  organization,  root  and  branch. 
More  than  one  hundred  leaders  thereof  were  assembled 
before  one  court,  convicted  after  a  grossly  unfair  trial, 
and  sentenced  to  prison  terms  running  up  to  twenty  years. 
One  of  the  most  hideous  outrages  of  America's  war  despo- 
tism was  the  systematic  destruction  of  the  means  of  de- 
fense of  accused  Industrial  Workers,  through  the  arrest 
as  co-conspirators  of  persons  who  attempted  to  hire  law- 
yers, collect  money,  or  in  any  way  assist  in,  or  prepare  for, 
the  legal  defense  of  the  accused.  Scores  of  such  persons 
were  jailed  and  thousands  of  dollars  of  defense  money 
were  seized  and  held.  So  America  was  notified  that  nei- 
ther laws  nor  constitutions  were  to  be  allowed  to  stand  in 
the  way  of  crushing  out  all  opposition  to  the  incumbent  of 
the  White  House — even  to  stamping  out  all  organizations 
whose  principles  might  at  some  future  date  bring  them  into 
conflict  with  his  plans. 

Hand  in  hand  with  the  policy  of  nipping  in  the  bud  all 
opposition  of  whatever  kind,  went  the  policy  of  compelling 
cooperation.  Military  conscription,  of  course,  was  the 
centre  of  the  scheme.  The  power  of  conscription  was  ap- 
plied with  singular  ruthlessness.  A  price  of  $50  was 
placed  upon  the  head  of  each  and  every  American  within 


The  War  Terror  75 

the  prescribed  ages  who  failed  to  register  or  who  evaded 
service  at  any  stage.  So  cupidity  became  a  motive  in  a 
country-wide  "slacker  hunt"  which  never  ended. 

In  the  beginning,  it  was  the  policy  to  throw  every  sus- 
pected "slacker"  in  jail  for  a  period  of  days,  without  per- 
mitting him  to  communicate  with  his  relatives  or  an  at- 
torney, or  to  procure  the  evidence  that  might  free  him. 
Later,  America  was  presented  with  a  spectacle  of  gigantic 
"slacker  raids,"  in  which  squads  of  police,  soldiers  and  citi- 
zens, violated  the  homes  of  the  people  and  dragged  them  to 
jail  by  the  thousands.  In  denouncing  such  raids  on  the 
floor  of  the  Senate  (Sept.  5,  1918),  Senator  Hiram  John- 
son said  that  it  was  like  a  chapter  from  the  French  Reign 
of  Terror,  when  the  "law  of  suspects"  was  in  full  swing  and 
the  prisons  were  crowded  with  innocent  victims : 

No  man  would  have  said  it  were  possible  in  our  country.  .  .  . 
The  very  purpose,  according  to  my  idea,  of  this  kind  of  proceeding,  is 
the  purpose  that  has  ever  attended  this  kind  of  thing  the  world  over 
— terrorism — the  same  sort  of  terrorism  that  makes  it  impossible 
to-day  for  any  newspaper  in  this  land  to  print  what  it  desires;  the 
same  sort  of  terrorism  that  makes  it  a  crime  for  any  citizen  in  this 
nation,  loyally,  legitimately  and  honestly  to  speak  his  sentiments 
upon  the  rostrum  or  to  his  neighbors.  .  .  .  Was  ever  any  such  pre- 
sentation made  in  any  government  under  the  sun  that  made  a  pre- 
tense of  freedom? 

The  cruel  and  unusual  punishments  meted  out  by  the 
drumhead  courts  were  a  part  of  the  Terror  also.  Not  all 
the)  "slackers"  were  sent  to  prison;  there  were  too  many 
of  them.  But  terrible  examples  were  frequently  made. 
Defiant  slackers  were  given  thirty  years  and  even  life  im- 
prisonment. After  the  fighting  was  over,  Senator  Cham- 
berlain revealed  the  fact  that  15,000  of  our  young  men 
had  become  "victims"  of  army  courts-martial.  Whole- 


76  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

sale  and  almost  unbelievable  brutality  visited  upon  young 
conscripts,  in  camps  and  guardhouses  overseas,  was  admit- 
ted by  responsible  officers. 

At  home,  the  draft  law  was  abused  to  facilitate  the  in- 
duction of  pacifists  into  the  military  organization,  where 
they  could  be  better  controlled.  As,  through  Terror,  the 
war  despotism  fixed  its  grip  more  and  more  firmly  upon 
the  throat  of  the  nation,  the  law  was  abused  again  to  com- 
pel workmen  to  concentrate  in  the  war  industries.  While 
the  purpose  to  conscript  labor  was  denied,  conscription  of 
labor  was  put  into  operation  on  a  larger  and  larger  scale. 
Only  the  early  ending  of  the  war  prevented  the  system 
from  being  put  into  general  practice. 

The  policy  of  forced  cooperation  extended  throughout 
every  phase  of  the  war  activities.  The  law  required  the 
public  to  cooperate  in  a  multitude  of  ways,  but  forced  co- 
operation was  applied  as  a  policy  even  in  the  fields  that 
were  legally  prescribed  as  voluntary.  Federal  espionage 
was  applied  to  persons  who  refused  to  sign  the  "voluntary" 
food  pledge  cards.  Federal  espionage  was  applied  to  per- 
sons who  refused  to  subscribe  to  "voluntary"  funds.  The 
world  looked  on  in  grim  humor  while  the  "great  democ- 
racy" of  the  western  hemisphere  compelled  the  people  to 
subscribe  to  its  Liberty  Bonds! 

The  President's  dictum:  "Woe  be  to  the  man  or  group 
of  men  who  seeks  to  stand  in  our  way,"  was  echoed  by  per- 
sons of  power  and  eminence  in  every  walk  of  life.  It  was 
interpreted  by  them,  unrebuked,  to  mean  that  there  was  to- 
be  an  open  season  for  pacifists.  The  Vice-President,  two 
ex-Presidents,  Senators,  governors  of  States,  presidents  of 
famous  colleges,  ministers  of  the  gospel,  and  eminent 
judges,  joined  in  violent  denunciations  of  every  form  of 
"disloyalty,"  and  voiced  suggestions  of  punishment  that 
can  only  be  interpreted  as  deliberate  incitement  to  lawless 


The  War  Terror  77 

proceedings.  The  heads  of  the  President's  departments 
themselves  gave  the  cue;  their  immediate  subordinates  set 
the  styles.  The  hundreds  of  thousands  of  members  of  the 
propaganda  machine  and  the  Terror  machine  passed  the 
word. 

And  the  open  season  for  pacifists  came  to  pass.  Cow- 
ards were  in  clover.  Gangs  of  self-constituted  police, 
prosecutors,  judges,  and  executioners,  were  let  loose  in 
every  State.  Murder  became  heroism,  if  only  patriotism 
was  named  as  the  motive.  To  dissent  in  any  regard  from 
the  programme  of  the  Administration  meant  to  suffer  as 
a  pro-German  and  a  traitor.  It  became  impossible  even 
to  protest  against  the  Terror  itself.  An  opposition  polit- 
ical party  became  as  much  a  practical  impossibility  as  it 
was  in  Mexico  in  the  days  of  Diaz.  Socialist  candidates 
who  dared  appear  before  the  people  were  indicted  under  the 
Espionage  Act.  Councils  of  defense  terrorized  farmers 
to  stop  the  spread  of  a  political  organization  known  as 
the  Non-partisan  League.  Even  the  right  to  choose  one's 
own  vocation  was  denied.  When  the  work-or-fight  regula- 
tion could  not  be  applied,  and  where  no  special  State  law 
had  been  enacted,  councils  of  defense  at  times  undertook 
to  tell  citizens  what  work  they  should  engage  in. 

They  were  not  councils  of  defense,  but  councils  of  terror. 
In  the  newspapers,  from  day  to  day,  were  paraded  a  long 
list  of  outrages,  perpetrated  by  members  of  these  bodies, 
or  at  their  instigation.  Even  freedom  of  conscience,  en- 
joyed in  silence,  was  not  tolerated;  for  those  who  failed  to 
proclaim  their  "loyalty"  in  words,  and  to  back  those  words 
with  "voluntary"  contributions,  were  listed  and  persecuted 
in  their  business  relations  or  private  lives.  The  Terror 
extended  to  the  halls  of  Congress.  The  rights  of  a  Sena- 
tor were  so  far  forgotten  that  he  was  officially  threatened 
with  expulsion,  and  unofficially  with  hanging.  It  became 


78  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

dangerous  and  inexpedient  for  him  or  for  any  other  Sena- 
tor or  Representative  to  express  any  general  opposition  to 
the  policies  of  the  ex-college-professor  who  had  termed 
himself  ua  mere  servant  of  the  people's  representatives." 

It  is  impossible  here  to  present  an  adequate  picture  of 
the  American  war  Terror.  The  present  effort  is  to  point 
out  merely  the  responsibility,  the  purpose,  and  the  effects. 
The  primary  responsibility  of  the  Federal  government  can- 
not be  evaded.  The  final  item  of  proof  is  the  fact  that 
crimes  of  Terror  were  never  punished.  After  an  out- 
rage, if  the  authorities  put  any  one  in  jail,  it  was  almost  in- 
variably the  victim,  not  the  criminals.  The  bands  of 
masked  assassins  themselves  were  the  agents  of  the  Ameri- 
can autocracy  as  directly  as  the  Russian  Black  Hundreds 
were  the  agents  of  the  Czar.  * 

But  the  President  issued  a  magnificent  manifesto  against 
mob  violence.  Yes,  after  looking  passively  on  for  seven- 
teen months!  When  the  President  issued  his  manifesto 
(July  26,  1918),  the  Terror  had  accomplished  its  purpose. 
The  people  had  been  reduced  to  submission.  The  country 
was  under  control.  Congress  was  also  under  control. 

"This  disgraceful  evil  [mob  violence],'*  said  the  Presi- 
dent in  his  manifesto,  ''cannot  live  where  the  community 
does  not  countenance  it."  Under  the  circumstances  that 
existed,  it  could  not  possibly  have  lived  where  the  Federal 
government  did  not  countenance  it.  But  by  July,  1918,  the 
President  was  ready  to  pretend  that  he  had  never  approved 
of  it,  and  to  order  it  discontinued.  The  President  now 
held  in  his  hands  every  power  that  he  coveted.  Having 
made  successful  war  on  the  American  people,  he  was  in  a 


lawlessness,  inspired  and  stimulated  by  our  government  and  our 
"best  people"  for  war  purposes  in  1917  and  1918,  was  a  major  cause  of  the 
long  period  of  civil  violence  following  the  war,  so  solemnly  and  gravely 
deprecated  under  the  name  of  "the  spirit  of  lawlessness"  by  some  of  the 
very  eminent  persons  who  were  responsible  for  it. 


The  War  Terror  79 

position  to  make  war  as  he  wished  in  Europe.  So  disor- 
derly terror  gave  place  to  orderly  absolutism. 

Apologists  for  America's  situation  at  the  end  of  1918 
will  suggest  that  similar  conditions  obtained  in  the  other 
countries  at  war.  If  it  were  true,  that  would  be  no  justi- 
fication. But  it  was  not  true.  In  England,  France,  and 
other  countries,  extra  war-time  powers  were  exercised,  not 
by  a  single  man,  holding  office  for  four  years,  regardless  of 
the  approval  of  the  country  or  of  Congress,  but  by  a  cabinet, 
whose  existence  from  day  to  day  depended  upon  the  con- 
tinued support  of  the  legislative  body. 

In  no  European  country  were  free  speech  and  a  free 
press  so  ruthlessly  stamped  under  foot.  The  writings  of 
Lichnowsky,  Harden,  and  the  press  attacks  upon  the  Kai- 
ser, prove  that  freedom  of  discussion  in  the  enemy  coun- 
tries existed  to  an  extent  unknown  in  the  United  States. 

For  the  autocracy  that  was  imposed  upon  America  in 
1917  and  1918  there  is  no  palliation  in  the  fact  that  the 
President  was  elected,  that  the  Congress  which  yielded  to 
him  was  elected.  Since  they  were  elected  on  their  promise 
to  do  the  diametrically  opposite  thing,  their  offense  is  as 
great  as  if  they  had  overturned  an  existing  Constitutional 
government  by  a  military  coup,  and  installed  themselves  in 
power  to  carry  out  policies  which  the  people  had  pro- 
nounced against. 

In  no  modern  country  can  autocracy  sit  in  the  saddle  as 
autocracy.  It  must  masquerade  as  democracy.  So  the 
machinery  of  deceit  is  set  up.  And  for  those  who  cannot 
be  deceived  there  must  be  Terror. 

No  one  had  the  temerity  to  defend  the  system  under 
which  America  found  itself  at  the  end  of  1918  on  any 
other  ground  than  that  the  end  justified  the  means.  The 
means  themselves  tend  to  throw  suspicion  upon  the  ends. 
What  are  the  ends? 


OUR  WAR  "CAUSES" 
XI 

MOTIVES  CLAIMED  FOR  BELLIGERENCY 

IN  examining  our  excuses  for  war,  the  first  noticeable  cir- 
cumstance is  their  great  number  and  variety.  The  number 
rendered  it  easy  for  our  propagandists  to  shift,  to  leap 
about  from  one  point  to  another,  to  dodge  about  in  a  maze 
of  affirmation  and  denunciation;  while  the  variety  was  cal- 
culated to  raise  some  consideration  appealing  to  every  class, 
temperament,  and  type  of  mind. 

On  many  occasions  we  proclaimed  the  utter  unselfishness 
of  our  motives.  Yet  on  other  occasions  we  urged  motives 
as  selfish  as  can  well  be  imagined.  Where  selfish  motives 
are  acknowledged,  however  justifiable  they  may  be,  com- 
mon decency  would  seem  to  require  that  no  profession  of 
unselfishness  be  made. 

In  his  message  of  December  4,  1917,  President  Wilson 
divided  our  claimed  war  motives  into  two  classes,  causes 
and  objectives;  the  causes  comprising  the  motives  men- 
tioned in  the  pre-war  disputes,  the  objectives  comprising 
those  which  were  brought  forward  only  after  we  were  in. 
Since  the  former  were  urged  exclusively  before  the  Ameri- 
can people  and  the  American  Congress,  in  defense  of  each 
and  every  step  towards  belligerency,  it  would  be  only  just  to 
test  our  sincerity  strictly  by  them.  .These  were  the  only 
motives  of  which  America  was  officially  told,  and  of  which 
Germany  was  told. 

80 


Motives  Claimed  for  Belligerency      81 

Wars  are  always  preceded — and  always  ought  to  be — 
by  disputes,  recitals  of  specific  grievances,  or  ultimatums  set- 
ting forth  the  course  which  the  offending  government  may 
pursue  in  order  to  avoid  war.  But  our  official  spokesman 
did  not  demand  that  Germany  get  out  of  Belgium;  he  did 
not  demand  that  the  Kaiser  resign  or  reorganize  his  gov- 
ernment along  more  democratic  lines;  he  did  not  demand 
that  Germany  cede  France  Alsace-Lorraine,  he  did  not  de- 
mand that  Italy  be  given  parts  of  Austria;  he  did  not  de- 
mand that  Germany  renounce  her  alliance  with  Austria, 
Turkey,  and  Bulgaria,  or  that  Germany  abandon  imperial- 
ism. His  quarrel  was  concerned  entirely  with  Germany's 
use  of  the  submarine,  and  almost  entirely  with  America's 
rights  involved  therewith.  Not  a  single  complaint  was  of- 
fered that  was  not  professedly  based  upon  some  specific  in- 
jury to  American  lives,  or  trade,  or  danger  thereto.  On 
several  occasions,  the  President  did  assume  to  stand  as  the 
champion  of  the  rights  of  neutral  nations  in  general,  or  as 
the  defender  of  international  law  as  such,  but  on  every  such 
occasion  his  complaints  proceeded  from  alleged  injury  to 
selfish  interests  of  certain  Americans,  and  were  scrupulously 
confined  to  submarine  issues. 

In  strict  justice,  our  objectives  are  invalidated  at  the 
beginning  by  the  very  fact  that  they  are  after-thought  rea- 
sons. They  will  not,  however,  be  so  treated  here. 

America  having  ridden  into  war  on  the  submarine  issue, 
that  issue  will  be  examined  first.  The  motives  urged  in 
the  submarine  dispute  were : 

1.  Protection  of  American  commerce. 

2.  Preservation  of  American  lives. 

3.  Championship  of  international  law. 

4.  Maintenance  of  American  honor. 

On  a  number  of  occasions,  both  before  and  after  April, 
1917,  our  spokesman  proclaimed  the  sufficiency  of  these 


82  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

causes.     For  example,  at  Urbana  (Jan.  31,  1918),  he  told 
his  audience: 

You  will  not  need  to  be  convinced  that  it  was  necessary  for  us 
as  a  free  people  to  take  part  in  this  war.  It  had  raised  its  evil  hand 
against  us.  The  rulers  of  Germany  had  sought  to  exercise  their 
power  in  such  a  way  as  to  shut  off  our  economic  life,  so  far  as 
our  intercourse  with  Europe  was  concerned, 

And  in  a  letter  to  Congressman  Heflin,  May  22,  1917,  he 
wrote : 

I  have  again  and  again  stated  the  very  serious  and  long  continued 
wrongs  which  the  Imperial  German  Government  has  perpetrated 
against  the  rights,  the  commerce,  and  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  The  list  is  long  and  overwhelming.  No  nation  that  re- 
spected itself  or  the  rights  of  humanity  could  have  borne  these 
wrongs  any  longer. 

Previously,  in  each  successive  step  towards  belligerency, 
the  President  had  hinted  that  he  was  willing  to  go  to  war 
strictly  on  the  submarine  issue.  As  far  back  as  February, 
1915,  he  uttered  this  threat  to  Germany,  conditioned 
wholly  upon  the  protection  of  selfish  American  rights: 

The  government  of  the  United  States  would  be  constrained  to 
hold  the  Imperial  German  Government  to  a  strict  accountability  for 
such  acts  of  their  naval  authorities,  and  to  take  any  steps  it  might 
be  necessary  to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives  and  property,  and 
to  secure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their  acknowl- 
edged rights  on  the  high  seas.  (Strict-accountability  note.) 

Looking  over  his  preparedness-tour  speeches,  we  find 
that  the  President  presented  the  following  propositions,  to 
each  of  his  audiences,  practically  in  the  same  terms : 

1.  He  asked  the  country  to  prepare  for  war. 

2.  He  promised  to  keep  the  country  out  of  war. 


Motives  Claimed  for  Belligerency      83 

3.  He  hinted  at  danger  of  war. 

4.  In  promising  to  keep  the  country  out  of  war,  he  left 
a  loophole — war  for  the  maintenance  of  American  honor. 

5.  He  made  it  plain  that,  by  American  honor,  he  meant 
the   obligation  to   protect  American   rights  to  trade   and 
travel  upon  the  high  seas,  as  these  rights  are  defined  by 
international  law. 

Here  is  the  argument  in  typical  quotations: 

Country  Must  Prepare. 

I  should  feel  that  I  was  guilty  of  an  unpardonable  omission  if 
I  did  not  go  out  and  tell  my  fellow-countrymen  that  new  circum- 
stances have  arisen  which  make  it  absolutely  necessary  that  this 
country  should  prepare  herself.  (Pittsburgh  speech) 

Yet  He  Will  Keep  Us  Out  of  War. 

I  pledge  you  that,  God  helping  me,  I  will  keep  you  out  of  war. 
(Milwaukee  speech) 

Still,  There  May  Be  Trouble. 

I  cannot  tell  twenty-four  hours  at  a  time  whether  there  is  going 
to  be  trouble  or  not.  (Kansas  City  speech) 

For  Honor  May  Require  War. 

You  have  laid  upon  me  this  double  obligation:  'We  are  relying 
upon  you,  Mr.  President,  to  keep  us  out  of  this  war,  but  we  are 
relying  upon  you,  Mr.  President,  to  keep  the  honor  of  the  nation 
unstained.'  Do  you  not  see  that  a  time  may  come  when  it  is  im- 
possible to  do  both  of  these  things?  (Cleveland  speech) 

Although  There  is  No  Danger  of  Invasion. 

Nobody  seriously  supposes,  gentlemen,  that  the  United  States 
needs  to  fear  an  invasion  of  its  own  territory.  (New  York  speech) 

Rights  Abroad  Must  be  Protected,  by  Force,  if  Necessary. 

It  may  be  necessary  to  use  the  forces  of  the  United  States  to  vin- 
dicate the  rights  of  American  citizens  everywhere  to  enjoy  the  rights 
of  international  law.  (Topeka  speech) 


84  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

For  We  are  Morally  Obliged  to  Protect  Commerce. 

There  is  a  moral  obligation  laid  upon  us  to  keep  free  the  courses 
of  our  commerce  and  our  finance,  and  I  believe  that  America  stands 
ready  to  vindicate  those  rights.  (Topeka  speech) 

The  Destruction  of  Even  One  American  Cargo  May  Mean  War. 
One  commander  of  a  submarine  .  .  .  might  set  the  world  on  fire. 
.  .  .  There  are  cargoes  of  cotton  on  the  seas;  there  are  cargoes  of 
wheat  on  the  seas;  there  are  cargoes  of  manufactured  articles  on  the 
seas;  and  any  one  of  those  cargoes  may  be  the  point  of  ignition. 
(St.  Louis  speech) 

For  We  Must  Maintain  Our  Right  to  Ship  Products  Abroad. 

There  is  one  thing  Kansas  ought  to  be  interested  in,  and  that  is 
that  we  must  maintain  our  rights  to  sell  our  products  to  any  neutral 
country  anywhere  in  the  world.  We  should  be  allowed  to  send  the 
wheat  that  grows  on  the  Kansas  fields  and  the  cotton  in  our  south- 
ern states  to  neutrals  who  need  them,  without  interference  from  any 
of  the  warring  nations.  (Topeka  speech) 

And  See  that  Americans  Everywhere  are  Respected. 

Americans  have  gone  to  all  quarters  of  the  world.  Americans  are 
serving  the  business  of  the  wtorld  .  .  .  and  every  one  of  these 
men  ...  is  our  ward  and  we  must  see  to  his  rights  and  that  they 
are  respected.  (Cleveland  speech) 

That  the  true  import  of  the  President's  preparedness 
speeches  was  not  grasped  by  his  audiences  was  due  only  to 
his  policy  of  mixing  such  remarks  with  sentiments  that 
seemed  to  lead  to  a  diametrically  opposite  conclusion. 

Growing  directly  out  of  the  President's  determination 
to  champion  the  interests  of  certain  Americans  was  his  as- 
sertion of  those  interests  as  rights  under  international  law. 
Growing  directly  out  of  his  determination  to  champion 
these  specified  American  "rights"  was  his  assumption  of 
the  championship  of  law  on  principle.  Growing  out  of 
this  position  was  his  assumption  of  the  championship  of  the 


Motives  Claimed  for  Belligerency       85 

rights  of  neutrals  in  general,  although  neutral  nations  were 
not  asking  for  his  peculiar  kind  of  championship.  Grow- 
ing out  of  this  position  was  his  championship  of  that  all- 
embracing  thing,  "humanity." 

The  apparently  contradictory  role  of  champion  of  others 
and  champion  of  ourselves,  apostle  of  unselfishness  and 
apostle  of  selfishness,  our  Executive  played  throughout  the 
pre-war  disputes.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the 
best  means  of  testing  the  validity  of  our  professed  motives 
is  to  segregate  and  examine  them  one  by  one. 


XII 

PROTECTION   OF   AMERICAN    COMMERCE 

CAN  the  protection  of  American  commerce  from  U-boat 
attacks  be  defended  as  a  valid  cause — as  one  of  the  causes 
— for  our  war  with  Germany? 

Our  war  represents  an  infinitely  greater  expense  than 
the  gross  value  of  American  commerce  concerned  in  the 
dispute. 

Compare  the  cost  of  war  with  the  value  of  the  com- 
merce that  we  entered  the  arena  to  protect.  Forget  the 
blood-cost  and  every  other  cost  except  in  immediate  dol- 
lars and  cents.  The  gross  value  of  all  exports  from  the 
United  States  to  Great  Britain  and  France,  for  the  record- 
breaking  year  of  1916,  was  only  $2,155,537,090,  or  but 
one-ninth  of  the  appropriations  of  the  first  session  of  the 
war  Congress. 

Consider  the  volume  of  commerce  at  issue,  in  comparison 
with  the  entire  volume  of  America's  commerce.  In  a 
speech  at  Cincinnati,  October  26,  1916 — less  than  one  hun- 
dred days  before  he  broke  relations  with  Germany — Presi- 
dent Wilson  said: 

If  you  take  the  figures  of  our  commerce,  domestic  and  foreign 
included,  you  will  find  that  the  foreign  commerce,  even  upon  the 
modest  reckoning  of  our  domestic  commerce,  does  not  include  four 
per  cent,  of  the  total,  and  the  exports  in  munitions — and  not  merely 
in  munitions,  but  in  everything  that  goes  to  supply  armies — draft  ani- 
mals, automobile  trucks,  food  directly  intended  for  that  purpose, 
shoes,  clothes,  everything  that  is  needed  by  the  commissary  of  an 

86 


Protection  of  American  Commerce      87 

army,   that  all  of  these  things  put  together  do  not  constitute  one 
per  cent,  of  the  total  of  our  commerce. 

And  only  a  fraction  of  this  very  small  portion  of  Ameri- 
ca's total  commerce  passed  through  the  submarine  zone. 
The  great  increase  in  America's  foreign  commerce  between 
1913  and  1916  was  due  only  in  part  to  the  war  trade  with 
the  Entente  countries.  A  portion  of  it  was  represented  by 
an  inflation  of  neutral  trade,  due  to  the  disappearance  of 
competition  for  world  trade  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 
warring  nations.  For  his  "modest  reckoning  of  our  domes- 
tic commerce"  the  President  took  the  New  York  Annalist 
figures  for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1916 — five  hundred 
billion  dollars.  American  exports  to  England  and  France, 
during  the  same  period,  represented  less  than  one-half  of 
one  per  cent,  of  this  sum. 

And  even  that  one-half  of  one  per  cent,  represents  a 
great  deal  more  than  the  fraction  of  America's  export 
trade  covered  by  American  representations  to  Germany  on 
behalf  of  American  commerce.  In  making  such  represen- 
tations, the  government  of  the  United  States  concerned  it- 
self only  with  the  safety  of  American  ships  and  their  car- 
goes. Where  ships  flying  other  flags  came  into  the  dispute, 
the  theme  was  not  commerce,  but  lives.  The  ships  which 
carried  American  goods  through  the  U-boat  zone  were, 
more  than  ten  to  one,  of  foreign  registry,  sailing  under 
foreign  flags.  The  "American  commerce"  at  issue  as  such 
was  less  than  one-twentieth  of  one  per  cent,  of  the  total 
commerce  of  America. 

American  commerce  thrived  and  expanded  without  war, 
and  its  growth,  even  through  the  war  area,  was  never  en- 
dangered by  the  enemy. 

The  entire  loss  of  one-twentieth  of  one  per  cent,  of  a 


88.  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

country's  commerce  could  hardly  be  a  staggering  blow  to 
that  country  as  a  whole.  Such  a  loss,  however,  never 
occurred.  America's  trade  with  England  and  France  was 
not  destroyed  by  the  submarine.  It  was  never  in  danger 
of  destruction  as  a  whole.  Interference  with  it  was  never 
so  serious  as  to  prevent  its  steady  growth. 

In  February,  1917,  following  the  breaking  of  relations 
with  Germany,  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers 
issued  a  special  bulletin  characterizing  the  submarine  war- 
fare, up  to  the  intensified  period,  as  a  "failure." 

And,  from  the  beginning  of  the  intensified  period,  it  was 
the  same  kind  of  a  failure.  Although  the  trade  of  Febru- 
ary fell  off  from  that  of  January,  this  was  not  due  to  any 
increased  destruction  on  the  part  of  the  submarine,  but  to 
a  conspiracy  of  certain  shipping  and  financial  interests,  al- 
lied with  the  British  government,  to  coerce  America  into 
more  war-like  action.  (See  Chapter  XXVII.) 

But  even  then,  the  value  of  February  exports  was  greater 
than  that  of  the  same  month  of  the  previous  year,  and  the 
recovery  in  succeeding  months — before  America  began  to 
assist  in  combating  the  submarine — was  complete. 

In  an  interview  in  the  New  York  Times t  February  18, 
1917,  the  editor  of  Export  American  Industries,  organ  of 
the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers,  said: 

Our  regular  export  trade  has  suffered  but  little  from  the  new 
German  blockade.  Without  any  possibility  of  interruption,  the  lines 
to  the  great  neutral  markets  and  to  the  colonies  of  the  warring  na- 
tions are  open  to  our  shipments.  It  is  too  bad  the  steamship  news 
and  the  sailings  cannot  have  a  prominent  place  in  the  papers,  as  it 
would  go  far  in  offsetting  the  idea  that  our  export  trade  is  killed 
by  the  new  submarine  zone.  Every  day,  from  New  York  harbor 
alone,  there  are  sailings  of  dozens  of  big  cargo  carriers  that  leave  for 
Latin  America,  the  West  Indies,  Australia,  South  Africa,  and  the 
Orient,  and  these  are  not  mentioned  in  the  newspapers.  And  this 


Protection  of  American  Commerce      89 

does  not  include  the  shipments  going  out  from  Boston,  Balti- 
more, Savannah,  and  our  other  Atlantic  ports,  or  from  the  Pacific 
Coast. 

The  trade  routes  from  our  different  ports  spread  out  like  the 
delta  of  a  great  river.  The  most  aggressive  submarine  warfare  may 
dam  some  of  these  channels,  but  the  current  of  our  export  trade  will 
seek  other  outlets,  and  the  result  will  be  a  deepening  and  broadening 
of  the  channels  that  cannot  be  obstructed.  The  coast  line  of  the 
United  States  is  too  extensive,  the  ports  are  too  widely  separated,  to 
make  any  submarine  blockade  effective  in  the  slightest  degree. 

Consider  what  England  has  done  in  continuing  her  export  trade 
since  the  war.  Hampered  by  an  ebbing  labor  market  and  the  highest 
insurance  rates,  and  surrounded  by  the  submarine  zone,  her  foreign 
sales  have  steadily  increased  until  her  exports  stand  at  approximately 
the  same  figure  as  in  1913.  If  Germany  could  not  retard  this 
foreign  trade  of  England,  then  how  little  have  we  to  fear  for  the 
interruption  of  our  export  trade! 

In  spite  of  all  the  hullaballoo  that  was  raised,  up  to 
America's  declaration  of  war  but  seventeen  ships  flying  the 
American  flag  were  attacked  by  U-boats.  (State  Depart- 
ment figures  presented  during  war  debates  by  Representa- 
tive Rogers  of  Massachusetts.) 

Actually,  our  war  protection  did  not  protect.  Destruc- 
tion of  "our"  merchant  ships  in  war  became  immediately 
greater  than  it  had  been  in  peace. 

Over  against  the  seventeen  American  merchant  ships  at- 
tacked by  Germany  in  nearly  three  years  before  our  declara- 
tion of  war,  we  find  sixty-three  American  merchant  ships 
sunk  in  the  ten  months  following. 

During  the  first  two  months  of  Germany's  intensified 
campaign — which  were  the  last  two  before  America  went 
to  war — six  ships  were  attacked,  or  three  per  month.  But 
in  the  following  ten  months — the  first  ten  months  of  our 
war  "protection" — Germany  sank  an  average  of  six  and 


90  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

one-half  per  month.      (Department  of  Commerce  figures 
published  Jan.  30,   1918.) 

The  war  trade  was  of  no  value  whatever  to  America 
as  a  whole,  but  an  injury  per  se,  and  the  nation  would  have 
lost  nothing  by  its  disappearance. 

Not  only  were  the  ships  which  sailed  the  U-boat  zone, 
in  overwhelming  majority,  of  foreign  registry,  but  the  ships 
flying  the  American  flag  belonged,  in  a  great  part,  to  for- 
eigners, including  the  seventeen  ships  attacked  by  Germany. 

The  majority  stock  of  the  organization  sometimes  known 
as  the  "Shipping  Tr'ust'" — the  International  Mercantile 
Marine  Company  and  its  subsidiaries — was  owned  in  Eng- 
land. Although  its  American  head  was  an  American  citi- 
zen, J.  P.  Morgan,  a  large  share  of  the  profits  of  this  or- 
ganization went  to  foreigners. 

To  what  extent  were  the  American  people  interested  in 
the  shipping  profits  of  Mr.  Morgan  and  his  partners,  for- 
eign and  American?  President  Wilson  on  at  least  two 
occasions  gave  a  partial  answer  to  this  question — once  in 
the  early  days  of  the  war  trade,  and  again  after  America 
became  a  belligerent.  In  a  speech  at  Indianapolis,  Jan- 
uary 8,  1915,  the  President  told  his  audience: 

Do  you  know  that  the  ocean  freight  rates  have  gone  up  in  some 
instances  to  ten  times  their  ordinary  figures?  And  that  the  farmers 
of  the  United  States,  those  who  raise  grain  and  those  who  raise 
cotton,  cannot  get  any  profit  out  of  the  great  prices  that  the  world 
is  willing  to  pay  for  these  things,  because  the  whole  profit  is  eaten 
up  by  the  extortionate  charges  for  ocean  carriage? 

And  in  his  statement  to  American  business  interests,  July 
n,  1917,  the  President  said: 

The  ship  owners  of  the  United  States  ...  are  doing  everything 
that  high  freight  charges  can  do  to  make  the  war  a  failure,  to  make 
it  impossible.  .  .  .  The  fact  is  that  those  who  have  fixed  the  war 


Protection  of  American  Commerce     91 

freight  rates  have  taken  the  most  effective  means  in  their  power  to 
defeat  the  armies  engaged  against  Germany. 

Yet  the  protection  of  the  business  of  these  very  people 
was  one  of  the  President's  excuses  for  our  war ! 

Not  only  was  the  American  public  as  a  whole  precluded 
from  sharing  in  any  degree  in  the  war-trade  profits  of  Mor- 
gan and  his  partners,  but  that  war  trade  actually  put  the 
American  public  out  of  pocket.  This  is  proven  by  a  com- 
parison of  the  increase  in  the  prices  of  the  necessaries  of 
life,  with  the  increase  in  returns  to  the  numerically  large 
classes  that  constitute  the  American  public. 

There  were  some  notable  increases  in  wages,  and  some 
considerable  increases  in  the  returns  for  certain  farm  prod- 
ucts, but  millions  of  Americans  had  been  unable  to  add  a 
penny  to  their  incomes.  In  general,  the  rise  in  prices  was 
not  offset  by  corresponding  increases  in  wages,  in  prices 
of  farm  products,  and  in  the  returns  to  the  other  numer- 
ically large  classes. 

It  can  be  conceded  that  a  certain  measure  of  foreign 
commerce  is  beneficial  to  the  country  at  large,  that  when 
such  commerce  falls  below  a  certain  point  it  may  be  inju- 
rious to  the  body  politic  generally;  and  at  the  same  time  it 
may  be  proven  that  when  foreign  trade  rises  beyond  a  cer- 
tain level  it  does  so  at  the  expense  of  the  public  at  home, 
though  the  few  directly  participating  in  such  trade  may  be 
reaping  tremendous  profits.  Especially  did  that  part 
of  America's  foreign  trade  classed  as  war  trade  react  un- 
favorably upon  the  public  pocketbook.  The  chief  reason 
is  that  the  greater  part  of  such  trade — far  exceeding  even 
the  trade  in  munitions — consisted  of  food  and  other  nec- 
essaries of  the  American  people. 

The  result  was  the  high  prices  which  caused  wide-spread 
suffering  and  numerous  food  riots  during  the  weeks  just 
preceding  America's  declaration  of  war. 


92  Shall  It  Be  Again? 


did  not  think  it  necessary  to  go  to  war  with  England, 
although  the  latter  interfered  with  American  commerce  to 
a  much  greater  degree  than  did  Germany. 

England's  interference  with  American  commerce  repre- 
sented infinitely  greater  sums  in  dollars  and  cents  than 
Germany's  interference  with  American  commerce. 

'Moreover,  while  American  trade  with  England  contin- 
ued to  grow  in  the  face  of  the  submarine  peril,  American 
trade  with  Germany  completely  disappeared  in  the  face  of 
the  mine  and  cruiser  peril. 

While  Germany's  interference  with  American  trade  was 
confined  altogether  to  trade  with  Germany's  enemies,  Eng- 
land's interference  with  American  trade  extended  to  our 
trade  with  neutral  countries.  In  the  first  eleven  months  of 
the  European  war,  England  seized  2,000  ships  with  Ameri- 
can cargoes  bound  for  Europe.  (State  Department  figures 
quoted  by  Prof.  Edwin  J.  Clapp,  "Economic  Aspects  of  the 
War,"  p.  53.) 

Practical  means  were^  open  to  the  United  States  for  the 
protection  of  American  commerce  from  all  belligerents 
without  war. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  European  conflict  in  August, 
1914,  until  America  herself  became  an  enemy,  Germany 
made  repeated  efforts  to  bring  about  practicable  arrange- 
ments for  the  protection  of  all  American  commerce  from 
interference  by  any  belligerent. 

Immediately  after  the  initiation  of  hostilities,  the  Ameri- 
can government,  on  behalf  of  American  commercial  inter- 
ests, proposed  that  all  belligerents  agree  to  conduct  their 
naval  warfare  in  conformity  with  the  Declaration  of  Lon- 
don. Germany  assented  unconditionally  to  the  proposal; 
her  enemies  refused  to  do  so. 

When  Germany  established  a  military  area  on  the  high 


Protection  of  American  Commerce      93 

seas,  in  retaliation  for  England's  military  area  on  the  high 
seas,  although  England  was  already  intercepting  nearly  all 
neutral  commerce  to  Germany,  the  latter  announced  that 
"the  German  navy  has  received  instructions  to  abstain  from 
all  violence  against  neutral  vessels  recognizable  as  such" 
(German  memorial,  Feb.  4,  1915.)  At  the  same  time  it 
recommended  that  the  American  government  convoy  Ameri- 
can ships  to  insure  their  recognition,  in  order  that  they 
might  proceed  unharmed. 

The  German  memorial  establishing  a  war  zone  was  an- 
swered by  our  "strict-accountability  note."  (Feb.  10.) 
This  marked  the  beginning  of  the  dispute  with  Germany. 
Replying  to  the  "strict-accountability  note,"  the  German 
government  offered  definitely  to  withdraw  its  war-zone 
decree  if  the  United  States  should  succeed  in  bringing 
about  an  acceptance  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  on  the 
part  of  its  enemies.  Furthermore,  it  declared: 

The  German  government  is  prepared  to  accord,  in  conjunction 
with  the  American  government,  the  most  earnest  consideration  to 
any  measure  that  might  be  calculated  to  insure  the  safety  of  legit- 
imate shipping  of  neutrals  within  the  seat  of  war.  (Note  of  Feb. 
1 6,  1915.) 

Proceeding  on  the  above  suggestion,  the  American  gov- 
ernment proposed  to  the  belligerents  (Feb.  20,  1915),  "a 
basis  of  agreement"  to  safeguard  neutral  shipping,  and  ob- 
viate disputes  between  neutrals  and  belligerents.  Reply- 
ing (Feb.  28),  Germany  characterized  the  proposal  as  "a 
suitable  basis  for  the  practical  solution  of  the  questions 
which  have  arisen"  Taking  up  the  American  points  seri- 
atim, it  agreed  in  essentials,  declaring:  uThe  German  gov- 
ernment would  undertake  not  to  use  its  submarines  to  at- 
tack mercantile  of  any  flag  except  when  necessary  to  en- 
force the  right  of  visit  and  search."  Which  is  all  that 


94  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  American  government  was  at  the  time  contending  for 
regarding  submarines. 

These  negotiations  fell  through  only  because  the  British 
reply  was  a  peremptory  rejection.  (Note  of  Mar.  I.) 

Nevertheless,  thereafter  the  German  government  con- 
tinued to  try  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  American  govern- 
ment in  its  undersea  warfare.  In  its  note  of  May  9,  1915, 
it  disclaimed  any  intention  of  attacking  neutral  ships,  de- 
clared that  it  had  given  orders  to  the  contrary,  and  prom- 
ised to  pay  for  all  damages  to  American  ships  caused  by 
mistakes  of  submarine  commanders.  In  its  note  of  Sep- 
tember I,  1915,  it  quoted  its  orders  to  submarine  com- 
manders, instructing  them  to  follow  the  rules  of  cruiser 
warfare  in  dealing  with  neutrals.  That  these  orders  were 
sincerely  given  and  carried  out  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that, 
in  the  two  years  of  submarine  activity  up  to  the  beginning 
of  the  "intensified"  period,  of  the  many  hundreds  of  ves- 
sels attacked  by  submarines,  but  eleven  were  American,  and 
a  majority  of  these  were  sunk  in  conformity  with  the  rules 
of  cruiser  warfare,  against  which  the  United  States  govern- 
ment could  make  no  complaint  and  did  not  do  so. 

In  fact,  so  little  fault  was  found  with  the  German  policy, 
so  far  as  its  effect  upon  American  commerce  was  concerned, 
that  the  United  States  practically  changed  the  basis  of  the 
dispute.  A  relatively  greater  stress  was  laid  upon  com- 
plaints on  behalf  of  American  rights  to  travel  on  belliger- 
ent ships,  and  greater  emphasis  upon  its  assumption  of 
championship  of  neutral  rights  in  general  and  "the  sacred 
and  indisputable  rules  of  international  law." 

Following  the  German  announcement  of  intensified  war- 
fare, the  protection  of  American  commerce  again  came  to 
the  fore  as  an  acknowledged  motive  for  our  successive  steps 
towards  belligerency.  The  German  announcement  of  in- 


Protection  of  American  Commerce      95 

tensified  warfare  was  made  only  after  two  years  of  nego- 
tiations in  which  Germany  sought  to  arrive  at  an  under- 
standing that  would  safeguard  American  commerce  within 
the  zone  of  warfare.  It  was  made  only  after  Germany 
had  every  reason  to  despair  of  obtaining  impartial  and  neu- 
tral treatment  from  this  country.  It  was  the  direct  and 
logical  result  of  the  German  failure  to  obtain  such  treat- 
ment from  the  Wilson  Government. 

The  responsibility  for  the  intensified  policy  lies,  there- 
fore, largely  upon  ourselves.  For  throughout  the  entire 
dispute,  another  course  lay  open  and  clear  for  America — 
an  impartial  and  feasible  course  that  would  have  assured 
the  safety  of  American  commerce  from  all  belligerents, 
without  the  abandonment  of  neutrality,  and  without  war. 
That  course  was  to  stand  by  the  Declaration  of  London, 
to  accept  Germany's  consent  to  conform  to  it,  to  compel 
England  to  conform  to  it — to  compel,  not  by  war  or  threats 
of  war,  or  any  hostile,  unneutral,  or  dishonorable  act,  but 
by  the  simple  pressure  of  economic  force,  the  application  of 
the  sovereign  right  of  embargo,  which  would  have  been  suf- 
ficient, as  every  American  government  official  knew  at  the 
time. 

What  is  the  answer  to  all  this? 

When  it  becomes  evident  that  the  war  cannot  be  justified 
on  any  basis  of  immediate  dollars  and  cents,  is  the  answer 
that  future  dollars  and  cents  will  make  it  worth  while  ? 

When  it  is  shown  that  the  nation  was  not  profiting  but 
was  losing  by  the  war  trade,  is  the  answer  that  we  had  to 
fight  for  that  trade,  nevertheless,  in  order  to  protect  the 
"right"  of  such  trade  to  pass  unmolested,  on  the  theory  that 
in  some  future  war  the  trade  of  this  class  might  become 
nationally  profitable?  Will  any  one  dare  contend  that  the 
American  people  stood  to  reap  financial  benefits  from  our 


96  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

war,  in  this  or  any  future  generation,  sufficient  to  compen- 
sate it  for  the  blood  and  treasure  that  it  proceeded  to  pour 

OUtj? 

Or  is  the  answer  that  it  was  a  question  of  honor?  But 
if  a  question  of  honor,  why  mention  commerce  unless  honor 
is  in  some  way  involved  with  commerce  ?  In  what  manner 
are  commerce  and  honor  related  in  the  dispute  that  carried 
America  into  the  most  terrible  war  in  history? 

Commerce  was  one  immediate  subject  of  contention  in 
the  submarine  dispute;  the  other  was  American  lives. 


XIII 

PRESERVATION   OF   AMERICAN    LIVES 

CAN  the  preservation  of  American  lives  be  defended  as 
a  cause  for  our  war  with  Germany? 

This  point  is  disposed  of  on  grounds  similar  to  those  ap- 
plied to  commerce.  Our  war,  of  course,  represents  an  ex- 
penditure of  many  more  American  lives  than  were  con- 
cerned in  the  dispute. 

Our  war  protection  did  not  even  protect  from  the  partic- 
ular kind  of  danger  from  which  the  obligation  to  protect 
was  alleged.  Before  April,  1917,  but  226  American  lives 
were  lost  on  all  ships,  American  and  foreign,  as  a  result  of 
Germany's  action;  this  includes  the  114  American  lives  lost 
on  the  "Lusitania."  (State  Department  figures  presented 
during  war  debates  by  Representative  Rogers  of  Massachu- 
setts.) But  in  the  first  ten  months  of  American  belliger- 
ency, more  than  300  American  lives  were  lost  as  a  result 
of  Germany's  operations  upon  the  seas.  (Department  of 
Commerce  figures  published  Feb.  i,  1918.) 

Moreover,  practicable  means  were  always  open  to  the 
United  States  for  the  preservation  of  American  lives  from 
any  of  the  incidents  of  the  European  conflict.  Had  the 
preservation  of  American  lives  been  at  any  time  a  real  con- 
sideration our  government  would  have  taken  one  or  the 
other  of  two  courses : 

1.  It  would  have  notified  American  citizens  to  travel 
within  the  barred  zone  only  at  their  own  risk, 

2.  It  would  have  accepted  the  means  offered  by  Germany 

97 


98  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

for  safe  travel  for  American  citizens  through  the  barred 
zone. 

Many  Americans  have  no  doubt  forgotten  that  the  Ger- 
man government  repeatedly  expressed  a  willingness  to 
enter  into  any  arrangements  whatever — short  of  abandon- 
ing her  commercial  blockade — looking  towards  the  preser- 
vation of  the  lives  of  neutrals. 

In  its  note  of  July  8,  1915,  the  German  government  of- 
fered to  give  its  submarine  commanders  instructions  "to 
permit  the  free  and  safe  passage  of  American  passenger 
steamers  when  made  recognizable  by  special  markings  and 
notified  a  reasonable  time  in  advance."  It  proposed  that 
an  arrangement  be  entered  into  covering  details.  It  went 
farther  and  expressed  a  willingness  to  agree  to  "the  installa- 
tion in  the  passenger  service  of  neutral  steamers,  the  exact 
number  to  be  agreed  upon,  under  the  American  flag  under 
the  same  conditions  as  the  American  steamers  above  men- 
tioned." It  even  offered: 

If,  howjever,  it  should  not  be  possible  for  the  American  govern- 
ment to  acquire  an  adequate  number  of  neutral  passenger  steamers, 
the  Imperial  Government  is  prepared  to  interpose  no  objections  to 
the  placing  under  the  American  flag  by  the  American  government  of 
four  enemy  passenger  steamers  for  the  passenger  traffic  between 
America  and  England.  The  assurances  of  free  and  safe  passage  for 
American  passenger  steamers  would  then  be  extended  to  apply  under 
the  identical  pre-conditions  to  these  formerly  hostile  passenger 
ships. 

In  the  note  of  May  4,  1916,  the  German  government 
pointed  out  that  it  had  made  "several  proposals  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  in  order  to  reduce  to  a  mini- 
mum for  American  travelers  the  inherent  dangers  of  naval 
warfare,"  all  of  which  proposals  we  had  declined;  neverthe- 
less it  declared  that  "the  German  government  still  stands 
by  its  offer  to  come  to  an  agreement  along  these  lines." 


Preservation  of  American  Lives        99 

Finally,  in  announcing  the  intensified  commercial  block- 
ade— which  furnished  the  occasion  for  President  Wilson  to 
break  diplomatic  relations  and  move  rapidly  towards  war — 
Germany  laid  down  conditions  under  which  American  pas- 
sengers could  still  travel.  (See  annex  to  note  of  Jan.  31, 
1917.) 

We  had  a  dispute  with  England,  as  well  as  with  Germany. 
In  comparing  the  wrongs  which  we  suffered  from  each,  a 
great  point  was  made  of  the  fact  that,  while  England  may 
have  interfered  with  American  commerce  quite  as  flagrantly 
as  did  Germany,  our  grievance  against  the  latter  was  very 
much  greater  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  Germany's  interfer- 
ence involved  the  sacrifice  of  American  lives,  while  that  of 
England  did  not. 

It  was  pointed  out  at  the  time  that  this  contention  was  not 
true,  American  lives  having  been  lost  from  British  mines  in 
at  least  two  instances,  in  the  sinking  of  the  American  ships 
"Evelyn"  and  "Carib."  Supposing,  however,  it  were  true, 
the  answer  would  be  that,  if  the  German  sea  warfare  re- 
sulted in  the  sacrifice  of  American  lives  and  the  British  war- 
fare did  not,  it  was  not  because  of  any  difference  in  goodwill 
between  Germany  and  England,  but  it  was  wholly  due  to 
the  choice  of  Americans. 

No  informed  persons  will  seriously  contend  that  Germany 
wished  to  kill  Americans — any  more  than  that  England 
wished  to  kill  Americans,  The  blockade  on  each  side  was 
aimed  solely  at  commerce.  Both  wished  to  avoid  causing 
the  loss  of  neutral  lives,  but  both  were  determined  to  hurt 
the  commerce  of  the  other,  even  though  it  cost  the  lives  of 
neutrals.  Both  laid  down  conditions  for  neutral  commerce 
which,  if  disregarded,  would  result  in  the  loss  of  neutral 
lives,  and,  if  obeyed,  would  mean  that  no  neutral  lives 
would  be  lost.  Had  Americans  persisted  in  sailing  the 


ioo  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

North  Sea  in  defiance  of  British  orders  they  would  surely 
have  been  sunk  by  mines;  or  if  they  avoided  mines  they 
would  have  been  pursued  by  cruisers,  and  if  they  attempted 
to  escape  they  would  have  been  fired  upon.  The  sole 
reason  why  Americans  were  killed  by  Germans  and  not  by 
Britons  was  that  they  persisted  in  disregarding  the  German 
orders,  while  carefully  complying  with  the  British  orders. 

American  citizens  took  such  a  course  for  several  reasons. 
First,  the  chances  of  successfully  evading  the  German  or- 
ders were  greater.  Second,  the  American  government  en- 
couraged them  to  attempt  to  evade  the  German  orders  while 
not  encouraging  them  to  attempt  to  evade  the  British  or- 
ders. 

For  not  only  did  our  government  unconditionally  reject 
all  German  offers  for  the  safeguarding  of  American  lives, 
but  it  used  American  lives  as  pawns  in  the  dispute.  It  de- 
liberately encouraged  Americans  to  go  into  danger.  In 
this  it  cooperated  with  England,  whose  policy  could  have 
been  dictated  only  by  a  desire  to  embroil  the  United  States 
with  Germany. 

Great  Britain  placed  restrictions  upon  the  travel  of  Brit- 
ish women  and  children  through  the  barred  zone.  In  this 
policy  it  was  acting  out  of  consideration  for  British  lives. 
But  it  had  no  such  consideration  for  American  lives.  Nor 
did  our  own  government.  Great  Britain  was  quite  will- 
ing for  American  citizens  to  be  killed,  if  that  would  only 
pave  the  way  to  American  hostility  to  Germany.  And  the 
Wilson  Administration  played  into  the  hands  of  England. 
Meanwhile,  Germany  was  begging  the  United  States  not 
to  send  its  citizens  into  danger.  Germany  was  showing 
more  consideration  for  American  lives  than  was  the  Ameri- 
can government.  Of  course  it  was  doing  this  in  the  hope 


Preservation  of  American  Lives       JOI 

of  avoiding  war  with  us.     But  what  was  the  motive  for  our 
peculiar  policy? 

President  Wilson  was  so  willing  for  our  citizens  to  risk 
their  lives  that  he  permitted  them  to  do  so  even  in  violation 
of  our  own  statutes.  A  notable  case  is  that  of  the  "Lusi- 
tania."  In  the  words  of  Senator  LaFollette: 

Four  days  before  the  'Lusitania'  sailed,  President  Wilson  was 
warned  in  person  by  Secretary  of  State  Bryan  that  the  'Lusitania' 
had  six  million  rounds  of  ammunition  aboard,  besides  explosives,  and 
that  the  passengers  who  proposed  to  sail  on  that  vessel  were  sailing 
in  violation  of  a  statute  of  this  country,  that  no  passenger  shall 
travel  upon  a  railroad  train  or  sail  upon  a  vessel  that  carries  dan- 
gerous explosives.  And  Mr.  Bryan  appealed  to  President  Wilson  to 
stop  passengers  from  sailing  upon  the  'Lusitania.'  (Speech  at  St. 
Paul,  Sept.  20,  1917.) 

Two  weeks  before  the  "Lusitania"  sailed,  the  passen- 
gers had  been  warned  also  from  German  sources.  Who, 
then,  was  primarily  responsible  for  the  loss  of  American 
lives  on  the  "Lusitania"? 

A  year  later  the  issue  was  even  more  clearly  defined.  In 
opposition  to  the  view  of  Congress,  the  President  insisted 
on  the  "right"  of  American  citizens  to  travel  as  passengers 
upon  the  fighting  "merchant"  ships  of  the  warring  coun- 
tries, encouraging  them  to  risk  their  lives  in  this  manner. 

From  all  this  it  is  obvious  that  the  preservation  of 
American  lives  was  only  a  pretext.  Did  the  President  de- 
liberately seek  to  use  American  lives  to  protect  the  muni- 
tions trade  as  such?  Certainly  he  used  American  lives  for 
some  other  purpose  than  for  the  preservation  of  American 
lives,  for  the  way  to  protect  life  is  to  protect  it,  and  not 
send  it  into  danger. 

In  its  note  of  July  8,  1915,  the  German  government  de- 


102  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

clared  itself  "unable  to  admit  that  American  citizens  can 
protect  an  enemy  ship  through  the  mere  fact  of  their  pres- 
ence on  board."  If  President  Wilson's  willingness  to  sac- 
rifice American  life  in  opposition  to  this  view  was  not  due 
to  a  determination  to  protect  the  American  war  trade,  even 
that  carried  in  belligerent  ships,  what  was  the  motive? 

Again — as  with  commerce — was  it  a  question  of  honor? 

In  what  manner  are  trade  and  travel  within  the  barred 
zone  related  with  honor,  in  the  dispute  that  carried  America 
into  the«  most  terrible  war  in  history? 

We  find  Wilson's  own  answer  in  his  famous  letter  to 
Senator  Stone,  opposing  a  warning  to  American  citizens 
against  traveling  as  passengers  on  the  armed  ships  of  the 
Entente  allies.  Here  is  the  most  complete  existing  ampli- 
fication of  President  Wilson's  position  as  the  professed 
champion  of  international  law,  and  his  most  connected  ex- 
position of  the  relationship  which  this  professed  champion- 
ship bears  to  the  selfish  American  interests  of  trade  and 
travel;  the  relationship  which  these  selfish  interests  bear  to 
American  honor,  and  the  relationship  between  the  sup- 
posedly unselfish  championship  of  neutral  rights  gener- 
ally, and  the  obviously  selfish  interest  of  American  sover- 
eignty. Said  President  Wilson  to  Senator  Stone  (Feb.  24, 
1916)  : 

I  cannot  consent  to  any  abridgement  of  the  rights  of  American  citi- 
zens in  any  respect.  The  honor  and  self-respect  of  the  nation  is  in- 
volved. We  covet  peace  and  shall  preserve  it  at  any  cost  but  the  loss 
of  honor.  To  forbid  our  people  to  exercise  their  rights  for  fear  we 
might  be  called  upon  to  vindicate  them  would  be  ...  an  implicit, 
all  but  explicit,  acquiescence  in  the  violation  of  the  rights  of  man- 
kind everywhere  and  of  whatever  nation  or  allegiance.  It  would 
be  a  deliberate  abdication  of  our  hitherto  proud  position  as  spokesman 
even  amidst  the  turmoil  of  war  for  the  law  and  the  right.  ...  It 
is  important  to  reflect  that,  if  in  this  instance  we  allowed  expediency 


Preservation  of  American  Lives       103 

to  take  the  place  of  principle,  the  door  would  inevitably  be  opened  to 
still  further  concessions.  Once  accept  a  single  abatement  of  right, 
and  many  other  humiliations  would  certainly  follow  and  the  whole 
fine  fabric  of  international  law  would  crumble  under  our  hands, 
piece  by  piece.  What  we  are  contending  for  in  this  matter  is  of  the 
the  very  essence  of  the  things  that  have  made  America  a  sovereign 
nation.  She  cannot  yield  them  without  conceding  her  own  impo- 
tency  as  a  nation  and  making  vital  surrender  of  her  independent 
position  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

If  you  follow  this,  you  get  the  official  theory  almost 
clear.  Honor  is  involved  with  trade  and  travel  because 
trade  and  travel  are  involved  with  international  law,  and 
international  law  is  involved  with  sovereignty.  For  our 
own  sakes  we  must  maintain  our  proud  position  as  cham- 
pion of  neutral  rights  and  of  humanity. 

We  do  not  pretend  that  Americans  must  be  left  to  trade 
and  travel  under  all  circumstances.  It  is  not  the  actual 
interference  with  commerce  and  lives  that  obliges  us  to 
fight;  it  is  the  method — and  the  method  stands  or  falls  by 
the  rules  of  international  law.  Of  such  overshadowing  im- 
portance is  international  law,  indeed,  that  we  must  stand 
prepared  to  sacrifice  both  commerce  and  lives  to  it.  We 
must  stand  prepared  to  spend  even  "our  last  man  and  our 
last  dollar"  in  order  to  maintain  the  simple  right,  under 
international  law,  of  any  American  to  ship  the  food  we  need 
to  other  countries,  or  the  simple  right  of  the  same  Ameri- 
can to  travel  anywhere  upon  the  high  seas,  in  pursuit  of 
the  patriotic  business  of  causing  a  scarcity  of  food  and  high 
prices  within  his  own  country. 

Very  well,  all  motives  of  the  submarine  dispute  are  re- 
duced to  terms  of  international  law. 


XIV 

WAR    FOR   INTERNATIONAL    LAW 

IN  view  of  the  universally  admitted  fact  that  international 
law  had  largely  gone  by  the  board,  as  a  result  of  the  war 
measures  of  both  belligerents,  and  the  universal  belief  that 
after  the  war,  a  new  and  more  definite  code  would  be 
drawn  up,  was  it  not  a  bit  ridiculous  to  pretend  to  go  to 
war  to  save  the  existing  code  from  the  scrap-heap? 

In  the  British  note  of  February  10,  1915,  appears  the 
following:  "No  war  has  yet  been  waged  in  which  neutral 
individuals  have  not  occasionally  suffered  from  unjustifiable 
action."  Supposing  America  had  not  gone  to  war  with 
Germany,  there  is  no  ground  whatever  for  the  theory  that 
Germany  would  then  have  gone  out  of  her  way  to  violate 
other  American  "rights"  than  those  involved  in  the  sub- 
marine dispute,  or  would  in  any  way  have  assailed  the  in- 
dependence of  this  country. 

It  would  seem  to  be  obvious  that,  under  the  circumstan- 
ces, expediency  should  have  been  the  guide.  It  would  seem 
to  have  been  expedient  to  keep  out  of  the  war  except  for 
some  interest  immediately  vital  to  sovereignty,  or  for  some 
practicable  ideal  impossible  to  arrive  at  through  any  alter- 
native course. 

Every  one  surely  knows  that  governments  do  not  habit- 
ually rush  into  war  on  any  such  principle  as  that  enunciated 
by  Wilson.  Nor  had  America  in  the  past  followed  any 
such  policy.  Justification  of  a  diametrically  opposite  course! 
was  the  main  thesis  of  the  campaign  upon  which  Wilson  was 
reflected  in  1916,  although  at  that  very  time  he  had  given 
enunciation  to  his  war-for-the-championship-of-interna- 

104 


War  for  International  Law  105 

tional-law  theory.  In  the  keynote  speech,  at  the  St.  Louis 
convention,  Governor  Glynn  sought  to  show  that  his  chief 
was  following  the  course  of  expediency,  wisely  pursued  by 
his  illustrious  predecessors.  In  support  of  his  argument, 
Glynn  gave  a  long  list  of  instances  from  our  history,  in 
which  America  had  suffered  grievous  injury,  chiefly  from 
England  and  France,1  during  the  presidential  terms  of 
Washington,  Adams,  Jefferson,  Van  Buren,  Pierce,  Lincoln, 
Harrison,  and  Grant,  in  which  our  disputes  had  been  set- 
tled by  negotiation,  without  resort  to  war. 

Do  not  forget  that  the  expedient  course  was  always  open 
to  our  Executive,  that  it  was  made  easily  possible  by  the 
conciliatory;  attitude  of  Germany,  and  that  a  numerous 
group  within  his  own  party  urged  it  from  the  start,  and  con- 
tinued to  urge  it  down  to  the  very  verge  of  war. 

In  support  of  his  resolution  seeking  to  warn  American 
citizens  against  traveling  as  passengers  in  armed  belliger- 
ent ships,  Senator  Gore  had  argued  (Mar.  2,  1916)  : 

The  progress  of  civilization  consists  of  the  withdrawal  of  individ- 
ual rights  when  they  become  incompatible  with  the  paramount  in- 

1  Among  other  things,  Mr.  Glynn  referred  to  the  efforts  of  the  French 
minister  during  Washington's  administration,  to  "rally  this  country  to  the 
support  of  France  in  return  for  the  help  France  gave\  us  in  the  revolution- 
ary war."  "Our  debt  to  France"  was  a  special  reason  frequently  pro- 
claimed by  our  war  propagandists  for  American  intervention  against  Ger- 
many. On  one  occasion  President  Wilson  asserted  that  the  American 
people  had  been  waiting  for  more  than  a  century  an  opportunity  to  repay 
the  alleged  debt.  President  Harding  expressed  himself  in  similar  terms 
in  a  speech,  October  19,  1921.  On  arriving  in  France,  General  Pershing 
shouted  loudly,  "Lafayette,  we  are  here!"  The  gesture  was  not  without  its 
sentimental  effect.  But  for  more  than  a  century  the  prevailing  American 
view  had  been  that  we  owed  France  nothing,  as  the  French  official  help 
to  the  colonies  in  the  Revolutionary  War  was  given  selfishly,  as  an  in- 
cident in  the  French  war  with  England,  which  happened  at  the  time  to  be 
more  "democratic"  than  France.  The  "opportunity"  mentioned  by  Wilson 
had  come  to  President  Washington  himself,  who  rejected  it.  Had  there 
been  any  debt  to  France,  moreover,  it  would  have  been  wiped  off  the  slate 
generations  ago  by  the  unfriendly  acts  mentioned  by  Wilson's  spokesman  at 
St.  Louii. 


106  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

terests  of  organized  society.  It  is  perhaps  true  that  any  one  of  the 
100,000,000  American  citizens  has  a  right  to  travel  on  an  armed 
merchant  ship.  He  has  the  right  to  run  the  risk  of  losing  his  life 
and  engulfing  this  republic  in  a  sea  of  carnage  and  blood,  but  I  be- 
lieve that  the  100,000,000  citizens  have  a  right  to  be  protected 
against  his  recklessness.  The  right  of  100,000,000  to  be  protected 
from  butchery  is  not  to  be  weighed  in  the  balance  with  the  sacred 
and  inherited  right  to  imperil  his  own  life. 

A  few  days  earlier,  Senator  Stone,  chairman  of  the  For- 
eign Relations  Committee,  had  argued  with  the  President 
as  follows: 

I  find  it  difficult  for  my  sense  of  duty  and  responsibility  to  con- 
sent to  plunge  this  nation  into  the  vortex  of  this  world  war  be- 
cause of  the  unreasonable  obstinacy  of  any  of  the  powers,  upon  the 
one  hand,  or  upon  the  other  hand,  of  foolhardiness,  amounting  to  a 
sort  of  moral  treason  against  the  republic,  of  our  people  recklessly 
risking  their  lives  on  armed  belligerent  ships.  I  cannot  escape  the 
conviction  that  such  would  be  so  monstrous  as  to  be  indefensible.  I 
insist  that  neither  a  private  citizen  nor  the  President  nor  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States  can  be  justified  in  driving  this  nation  into 
war  or  endangering  its  peace  by  any  such  false  sense  of  courage  or 
national  prestige  or  dignity.  (Letter  of  Feb.  24,  1916.) 


A  similar  position  was  taken  by  many  Republicans,  a 
large  proportion  of  whom  held  to  it  even  after  the  Presi- 
dent had  broken  diplomatic  relations,  and  almost  down  to 
the  day  when  he  had  practically  embroiled  us.  Had  the 
President  himself  taken  this  position,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  for  him  to  have  found  grounds  for  a  serious  quar- 
rel. Moreover,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  would  have 
lost  his  leadership  by  doing  so.2 

2  According  to  Joseph  P.  Tumulty,  President  Wilson's  secretary  ("Wood- 
row  Wilson  as  I  Know  Him,"  Chapter  XXIV.),  the  members  of  Wilson's 
own  cabinet  advised  him  against  the  belligerent  position  which  he  took 


War  for  International  Law  107 

In  the  keynote  speech  previously  referred  to,  President 
Wilson's  mouthpiece  accused  the  political  opposition  of  urg- 
ing the  very  theory  that  ua  single  abatement  of  right" 
would  require  America  to  plunge  into  the  war,  and  pointed 
where  such  a  policy,  if  carried  out,  would  inevitably  lead: 

Fighting  for  every  degree  of  injury  would  mean  perpetual  war, 
and  this  is  the  policy  of  our  opponents,  deny  it  how  they  will.  It 
would  not  allow  the  United  States  to  keep  the  sword  in  the  scabbard 
as  long  as  there  remains  an  unrighted  wrong  or  an  unsatisfied  hope 
between  the  snowy  wastes  of  Siberia  or  the  jungled  hills  of  Borneo. 
...  It  would  give  us  a  war  abroad  each  time  the  fighting  cock  of 
the  European  weather  vane  shifted  with  the  breeze.  It  would 
make  America  the  cockpit  of  the  world.  It  would  mean  the  reversal 
of  our  traditional  policy  of  government.  It  would  mean  the  adopt- 
tion  of  imperialistic  doctrines  which  we  have  denounced  for  over  a 
century.  ...  In  a  word,  this  policy  of  our  opponents  would  make 
the  United  States  the  policeman  of  the  world.  Rome  tried  to  be 
policeman  of  the  world,  and  went  down ;  Portugal  tried  to  be  police- 
man of  the  world,  and  went  down;  Spain  tried,  and  went  down; 
and  the  United  States  proposes  to  profit  by  the  experience  of  the 
ages  and  avoid  ambitions  whose  reward  is  sorrow  and  whose  crown 
is  death. 

upon  this  crucial  occasion,  on  the  very  ground  that  he  might  thereby  suffer 
defeat  and  lose  his  leadership. 


XV 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW — OUR  REVERSALS  ON  THE  LAW 
IN  1915  AND  1916 

OUR  dispute  with  Germany  hinged  upon  three  legal  points : 
the  law  of  the  submarine,  the  law  of  the  armed  merchant- 
man, and  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  as  an  attribute 
of  neutrality.  On  all  three  of  these  points,  the  Adminis- 
tration at  Washington  flagrantly  reversed  itself  during  the 
course  of  the  controversy. 

At  one  time  our  spokesman  virtually  admitted  that  the 
law  of  the  submarine  had  never  been  fixed,  in  the  following 
words : 

The  government  of  the  United  States  is  not  unmindful  of  the  ex- 
traordinary conditions  created  by  this  war,  or  of  the  radical  altera- 
tions of  circumstances  and  methods  of  attack  produced  by  the  use 
of  instrumentalities  of  warfare  which  the  nations  of  the  world  can- 
not have  had  in  view  when  the  existing  rules  of  international  law 
wjere  formulated,  and  it  is  ready  to  make  every  reasonable  allowance 
for  these  novel  and  unexpected  aspects  of  war  at  sea.  (Note  to 
Germany,  July  21,  1915.) 

Notwithstanding  this  admission,  he  proceeded  to  form- 
ulate rules  of  submarine  procedure  and  to  put  forth  these 
rules  as  a  part  of  "the  fine  fabric  of  international  law!" 

In  doing  so,  far  from  holding  the  submarine  to  be  an 
outlaw,  he  conceded  it  to  be  a  proper  weapon  of  warfare, 
and  at  times  conceded  that  it  could  properly  be  employed  in 
operations  against  commerce.  On  one  occasion  he  de- 
clared : 

108 


Our  Reversals  on  the  Law  109 

The  events  of  the  past  two  months  have  clearly  indicated  that  it 
is  possible  and  practicable  to  conduct  such  submarine  operations  as 
have  characterized  the  activity  of  the  Imperial  German  Navy  within 
the  so-called  zone  in  substantial  accord  with  the  accepted  practices 
of  regulated  warfare.  (Note  of  July  21,  1915,  to  Germany.) 

On  another  occasion  he  declared: 

I  do  not  feel  that  a  belligerent  should  be  deprived  of  the  proper 
use  of  submarines  in  the  interruption  of  enemy  commerce.  (Letter! 
of  Secretary  Lansing  to  British  ambassador,  Jan.  18,  1916.) 

But  at  another  time  he  held : 

Manifestly  submarines  cannot  be  used  against  merchantmen  .  .  . 
without  an  inevitable  violation  of  many  sacred  principles  of  justice 
and  humanity.  (Note  of  May  13,  1915,  to  Germany.) 

And  at  another  time  he  held: 

The  use  of  submarines  for  the  destruction  of  an  enemy's  com- 
merce is  ...  utterly  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  humanity, 
the  long-established  and  incontrovertible  rights  of  neutrals,  and  the 
sacred  immunities  of  non-combatants.  (Note  of  Apr.  18,  1916,  to 
Germany. ) 

A  comparison  of  these  four  quotations  shows  that,  in 
attempting  to  lay  down  the  law  of  the  submarine,  we  flatly 
reversed  ourselves,  first  in  19 15,  and  again  in  1916,  on  the 
legality  of  the  submarine  for  the  destruction  of  com- 
merce. 

The  law  of  the  armed  merchantman  was  of  prime  im- 
portance in  the  dispute  with  Germany  because  it  involved 
the  question  of  the  right  of  attack  without  warning.  The 
most  unfavorable  view  ever  held  of  the  submarine  by  our 
government  was  that  it  must  not  be  employed  at  all  against 
bona  fide  merchant  vessels ;  at  no  time  did  we  hold  that  its 
unrestricted  use  against  war  vessels  was  not  legitimate. 

We  never,  of  course,  claimed  that  American  citizens  had 


no  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

any  right  to  protection  when  found  upon  enemy  war  vessels. 
The  question  was,  therefore,  when  does  a  merchant  ship  be- 
come a  warship?  May  a  merchant  vessel  arm  purely  for 
defense  and  fight  defensively?  And  if  so,  what  procedure 
must  it  follow  in  order  to  retain  its  character  as  a  merchant- 
man, and  continue  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  immunities  of  a 
merchantman  ? 

On  this  point  our  reversal  was  even  more  flagrant  than 
upon  the  law  of  the  submarine.  In  the  beginning  (Memo- 
randum of  Sept.  19,  1914)  we  held  that  the  mere  presence 
of  any  armament  on  board  a  merchant  vessel  would  create 
a  presumption  of  offensive  purjtose,  and  that  this  presump- 
tion could  be  overcome  only  by  the  marshalling  of  concrete 
evidence  to  prove  that  the  armament  was  intended  usolely 
for  defense.7'  Such  evidence,  we  held,  must  include  the 
facts  "that  no  guns  are  mounted  on  the  forward  part  of  the 
vessel" ;  "that  the  calibre  of  the  guns  carried  does  not  ex* 
ceed  six  inches" ;  "that  the  guns  and  small  arms  carried  are 
few  in  number";  "that  the  quantity  of  ammunition  carried 
is  small" ;  "that  the  speed  of  the  ship  is  slow" ;  that  the  ves- 
sel is  manned  only  by  its  usual  crew,  follows  the  usual 
route  of  a  merchant  vessel,  engages  in  regular  trade,  etc. 
etc. 

This  position  was  concurred  in  by  the  British  govern- 
ment. In  a  memorandum  dated  August  25,  1914,  the  Brit- 
ish ambassador  notified  us  that  he  had  been  instructed  to 
give  *'the  fullest  assurances  that  British  merchant  vessels 
will  never  be  used  for  purposes  of  attack  .  .  .  that  they 
will  never  fire  unless  fired  upon}  and  that  they  will 
never  under  any  circumstances  attack  any  vessel"  In  a 
memorandum  dated  September  7,  he  admitted  the  impro- 
priety of  an  armed  merchantman's  carrying  war  material 
or  military  forces.  And  in  a  memorandum  dated  Septem- 
ber 9,  he  defined  defensively  armed  craft  as  "merchant  ves- 


Our  Reversals  on  the  Law  in 

sels  which  are  bona  fide  engaged  in  commerce  and  carry 
guns  at  the  stern  only." 

For  a  brief  period,  indeed,  we  took  the  position  that 
no  armament  whatever  could  be  considered  defensive,  and 
that  the  so-called  armed  merchantman  was  never  a  mer- 
chantman at  all,  but  always  a  ship  of  war : 

The  placing  of  guns  on  merchantmen  at  the  present  day  of  sub- 
marine warfare  can  be  explained  only  on  the  ground  of  a  purpose  to 
render  merchantmen  superior  in  force  to  submarines,  and  to  prevent 
warning  and  visit  and  search  by  them.  Any  armament,  therefore, 
on  a  merchant  vessel,  would  seem  to  have  the  character  of  an  of- 
fensive armament.  ...  I  should  add  that  my  government  is  im- 
pressed with  the  reasonableness  of  the  argument  that  a  merchant 
vessel  carrying  an  armament  of  any  sort,  in  view  of  the  character  of 
submarine  warfare  and  the  weakness  of  undersea  craft,  should  be 
held  to  be  an  auxiliary  cruiser  and  so  treated  by  a  neutral  as  well  as 
by  a  belligerent  government,  and  is  seriously  considering  instructing 
its  officials  accordingly.  (Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the 
British  Ambassador.  Jan.  18,  1916.) 

A  complete  reversal  from  this  position  came  only  sixty- 
seven  days  later.  In  a  memorandum  dated  March  25, 
1916,  we  not  only  abandoned  our  stand  of  January  18,  but 
conceded  to  armed  merchant  vessels  greater  freedom  of  ac- 
tion than  we  had  conceded  them  originally,  greater  freedom 
even  than  the  British  government  had  dared  to  ask.  From 
holding  that  merchantmen  could  not  arm  against  subma- 
rines at  all  we  faced  squarely  about  to  the  position  that 
merchantmen  might  not  only  arm  against  submarines,  but 
might  fire  before  being  fired  upon ;  that,  in  effect,  while  the 
armed  merchantman  was  entitled  to  attack  without  warn- 
ing, the  submarine  was  not  entitled  to  do  so;  that  neutral 
persons  traveling  as  passengers  upon  such  armed  ships  were 
entitled  to  the  same  immunities  as  if  traveling  upon  peace- 
ful passenger-vessels. 


ii2  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

On  the  question  of  the  presumption  to  be  drawn  from 
the  presence  of  armament,  the  two  memoranda  present  a 
perfect  deadly  parallel.  (See  appendix,  p.  433.)  The 
new  ruling,  indeed,  would  not  permit  the  submarine  to  fire 
upon  the  "merchantman"  under  any  circumstances,  until 
after  it  had  been  attacked  by  the  latter. 

It  was  in  support  of  this  reversal,  and  no  other,  that 
Wilson  threatened  to  break  diplomatic  relations  with  Ger- 
many in  1916.  It  was  this  kind  of  law  that  Wilson  charac- 
terized as  "sacred  and  indisputable."  It  was  this  kind  of 
championship  of  "immutable"  principles  by  which  the  Pres- 
ident sought  to  explain  our  alliance  with  England  and  our 
war  with  Germany. 

In  the  diplomatic  controversies  which  preceded  war,  our 
official  spokesman  unfitted  us  for  the  role  of  knightly  cru- 
sader for  international  law,  not  only  by  disputing  and 
changing  his  own  position  on  essential  questions  of  princi- 
ple, but  by  presenting  an  unequally  inflexible  front  toward 
different  offenders  against  his  various  positions  upon  such 
questions. 

When  a  neutral  nation  fails  to  maintain  its  claimed 
rights  against  one  belligerent,  only  to  quarrel  with  another 
belligerent  over  rights ,of  a  similar  character,  and  finally  go 
to  war  with  it,  becoming  an  ally  of  the  first,  its  course  can- 
not be  justified  on  any  ground  of  championship  for  inter- 
national right. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  European  war  our  government 
observed  this  principle  in  action,  and  at  times  also  pro- 
claimed it  in  words.  For  example,  in  the  note  of  Febru- 
ary 20,  1915,  to  England,  we  find: 

To  admit  (any)  claim  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  of  justifica- 
tion for  interfering  with  these  clear  rights  of  the  United  States  and 


V 

Our  Reversals  on  the  Law  113 

its  citizens  as  neutrals  .  .  .  would  be  to  assume  an  attitude  of  un- 
neutrality  toward  the  present  enemies  of  Great  Britain,  which  would 
be  obviously  inconsistent  with  the  solemn  obligations  of  this  govern- 
ment. 

Fifteen  months  later,  however,  we  find  President  Wilson 
putting  forth  this  astonishing  proposition: 

In  order,  howtever,  to  avoid  any  possible  misunderstanding,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  notifies  the  Imperial  Government; 
that  it  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain,  much  less  discuss,  a  sug- 
gestion that  respect  by  German  naval  authorities  for  the  rights  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States  upon  the  high  seas  should  in  any  way  or 
in  the  slightest  degree  be  made  contingent  upon  the  conduct  of  any 
other  government  affecting  the  rights  of  neutrals  and  non-combatants. 
Responsibility  in  such  matters  is  single,  not  joint;  absolute,  not  rela- 
tive. (Note  of  May  8,  1916.) 

Even  the  British  government,  which  profited  so  greatly 
by  this  reversal,  had  expressed  the  opposite  view.  In 
pleading  justification  of  its  own  violations  of  international 
law,  on  the  ground  that  Germany  had  violated  interna- 
tional law,  it  urged  (Note  of  Feb.  10,  1915)  : 

It  is  impossible  for  one  belligerent  to  depart  from  rules  and  prece- 
dents and  for  the  other  to  remain  bound  by  them. 

Neither  then  nor  at  any  other  time  did  President  Wilson 
contend  against  this  plea  of  England,  although  contending 
against  the  self-same  plea  by  Germany,  and  ultimately  man- 
euvering America  into  the  European  war  by  means  of  such 
contention. 

President  Wilson's  reversal  on  this  point  would  seem 
to  constitute  nothing  less  than  a  confession  of  a  conscious 
abandonment  of  a  single  standard  of  international  morality, 
and  the  application  of  a  double  standard,  in  favor  of  the 
enemies  of  Germany;  a  confession,  therefore,  of  a  depar- 


H4  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ture  from  neutrality,  although  for  nearly  a  year  longer  he 
continued  telling  his  own  people  and  the  world  that  we 
were  neutral.1 

1  The  account  of  Joseph  P.  Tumulty,  Wilson's  secretary,  although  self- 
contradictory  at  times,  bears  out  the  view  that  the  President  was  deliber- 
ately unneutral  almost  from  the  beginning.  ("Woodrow  Wilson  as  I  Know 
Him,"  Chapters  XXIII  to  XXVI.) 


XVI 

INTERNATIONAL    LAW BRITISH   AND   GERMAN   VIOLATIONS 

COMPARED 

Now  what  led  to  our  remarkable  reversals  on  the  points 
of  law  involved  in  the  dispute  with  Germanyj? 

Was  it  principle — or  expediency? 

Were  England's  violations  of  international  law,  in  rela- 
tion to  American  rights,  any  less  clear  or  pervasive  than 
those  of  Germany?  Were  they  less  reprehensible,  either 
in  number  or  degree,  or  by  any  other  material  or  moral 
measure? 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  beginning  we  characterized 
the  British  offenses  in  quite  as  emphatic  terms  as  we  did 
those  of  Germany;  we  asserted  the  same  obligation  to  re- 
sist them.  Here  are  some  notable  quotations: 

Protest  against  seizures  and  detentions,  December  26, 
1914: 

The  present  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Government  toward  neutral 
ships  and  cargoes  .  .  .  constitutes  restrictions  upon  the  rights  of 
American  citizens  on  the  high  seas  which  are  not  justified  by  the 
rules  of  international  law  or  required  under  the  principles  of  self- 
preservation. 

Blockade  note,  March  30,  1915: 

The  Order  in  Council  of  the  I5th  of  March  would  constitute, 
wtere  its  provisions  to  be  actually  carried  into  effect  as  they  stand, 
a  practical  assertion  of  unlimited  belligerent  rights  over  neutral 
commerce  within  the  whole  European  area,  and  an  almost  unquali- 
fied denial  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  nations  now  at  peace.  .  . 
It  is  manifest  that  such  limitations,  risks  and  liabilities,  placed  upon 

"5 


u6  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  ships  of  a  neutral  power  on  the  high  seas  ...  are  a  distinct 
invasion  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  nation  whose  ships,  trade,  or 
commerce,  is  interfered  with  .  .  .  [The]  course  of  action  [of  the 
British  government]  is  without  precedent  in  modern  warfare  .  .  . 
[and]  clearly  subversive  of  the  rights  of  neutral  nations  on  the 
high  seas. 

Protest  against  prize-court  confiscations,  July  14,  1915: 

Insofar  as  the  interests  of  American  citizens  are  concerned,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  will  insist  upon  their  rights  under 
the  principles  and  rules  of  international  law  as  hitherto  established, 
governing  neutral  trade  in  time  of  war,  without  limitation  or  impair- 
ment by  Orders  in  Council  or  other  municipal  legislation  by  the 
British  government,  and  will  not  recognize  the  validity  of  prize- 
court  proceedings  taken  under  restraints  imposed  by  British  munici- 
pal law  in  derogation  of  the  rights  of  American  citizens  under 
international  law. 

Blockade  note,  October  21,  1915: 

It  has  been  conclusively  shown  that  the  methods  sought  to  be  em- 
ployed by  Great  Britain  to  obtain  and  use  evidence  of  enemy  destina- 
tion of  cargoes  bound  for  neutral  ports,  and  to  impose  a  contraband 
character  upon  such  cargoes,  are  without  justification;  that  the 
blockade,  upon  which  such  methods  are  partly  founded,  is  ineffec- 
tive, illegal  and  indefensible;  that  the  judicial  procedure  offered  as 
a  means  of  reparation  for  an  international  injury  is  inherently  defec- 
tive for  the  purpose,  and  that  in  many  cases  jurisdiction  is  asserted 
in  violation  of  the  law  of  nations.  The  United  States,  therefore, 
cannot  submit  to  the  curtailment  of  its  neutral  rights  by  these 
measures.  .  .  .  The  United  States  .  .  .  cannot  with  complacence 
suffer  subordination  of  its  rights  and  interests  to  the  plea  that  the 
exceptional  geographical  position  of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain 
requires  or  justifies  oppressive  and  illegal  practices.  ...  It  is  of  the 
highest  importance  to  neutrals  not  only  of  the  present  day  but  of 
the  future  that  the  principles  of  international  law  be  maintained 
unimpaired. 


British  and  German  Violations       117 

This  task  of  championing  the  integrity  of  neutral  rights,  which 
have  received  the  sanction  of  the  civilized  world  against  the  law- 
less conduct  of  belligerents  arising  out  of  the  bitterness  of  the 
great  conflict  which  is  now  wasting  the  countries  of  Europe,  the 
United  States  unhesitatingly  assumes,  and  to  the  accomplishment  of 
that  task  it  will  devote  its  energies,  exercising  always  that*  impartial- 
ity which  from  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  has  sought  to  exercise 
in  its  relations  with  the  warring  nations. 

Note  of  May  24,  1916: 

The  present  practice  [of  seizing  ships  on  high  seas,  taking  them 
into  port,  and  there  confiscating  mail]  is  a  violation  of  ...  the 
Hague  convention  .  .  .  The  government  of  the  United  States  .  .  . 
can  no  longer  tolerate  the  wrongs  which  citizens  have  suffered  and 
continue  to  suffer  through  these  methods.  .  .  .  Manifestly,  a  neutral 
nation  cannot  permit  its  rights  on  the  high  seas  to  be  determined  by 
belligerents,  or  the  exercise  of  those  rights  to  be  permitted  or  denied 
arbitrarily  by  the  government  of  a  warring  nation.  The  rights 
of  neutrals  are  as  sacred  as  the  rights  of  belligerents  and  must  be  as 
strictly  observed.  .  .  .  Only  a  radical  change  in  the  present  British 
and  French  policy,  restoring  to  the  United  States  its  full  rights 
as  a  neutral  power,  will  satisfy  this  government. 

The  arguments  upon  which  these  denunciations  of  Eng- 
land are  based  are  infinitely  better  reasoned  and  supported 
than  the  arguments  upon  which  the  denunciations  of  Ger- 
many are  based.  Against  England,  we  were  able  to  cite 
copiously  from  authority  and  precedent,  to  quote  British 
statesmen  against  Britain,  to  call  up  England's  record  with 
telling  effect;  while  against  Germany,  we  were  forced  to 
lay  down  new  principles,  which  we  dubbed  international 
law,  bolstering  them  up  with  rhetoric;  and  even  upon  these 
we  put  ourselves  out  of  court  by  reversals  on  essential 
points. 

The  only  fair  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  a  study  of 
this  pre-war  correspondence  is  that  the  record  of  England, 


u8  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

in  trampling  upon  American  rights,  is  not  only  as  vulnerable 
and  reprehensible  as  that  of  Germany,  but  far  more  so. 
The  very  points  of  law  which  America  alleged  against 
Germany  could  be  brought  against  England  with  greater 
reason. 

Our  complaints  against  England  specified  violations  in 
definition  of  contraband;  seizures  and  detentions,  instead 
of  visit  and  search  upon  the  high  seas;  practices  of  British 
prize  courts  in  condemning  ships  and  cargoes;  hovering  of 
British  warships  off  American  coasts;  misuse  of  the  neutral 
flag;  confiscation  of  American  mail  from  ships  illegally  de- 
tained; the  blacklist;  and  the  so-called  blockade;  while  the 
single  complaint  against  Germany  was  that  at  times  she 
failed  to  conduct  her  submarine  operations  in  conformity 
with  the  accepted  practices  of  cruiser  warfare. 

But  England  also  failed  to  conduct  her  operations  in  con- 
formity with  the  accepted  practices  of  cruiser  warfare. 
Moreover,  England,  operating  with  cruisers,  could  not  urge 
the  extenuating  circumstances  which  America  had  (at 
times)  admitted  applied  to  submarines.  When  America 
complained  to  England — on  precisely  the  same  grounds 
under  international  law  upon  which  all  of  the  complaints 
against  Germany  were  based — England's  only  defense  was 
convenience.  Said  England  complacently  to  America: 

To  do  so  [bring  ships  into  port  without  evidence]  is  not  to  be 
looked  upon  as  a  belligerent  right,  but  as  an  adaptation  of  the 
existing  right  to  the  modern  conditions  of  commerce.  (British  note 
of  Feb.  10,  1915.) 

Germany  could  have  used  precisely  the  same  words,  with 
better  justice,  in  excusing  her  submarine  policy.  England 
never  gave  up  the  practice  which  she  here  admits  is  illegal. 
But  our  President  claimed  justification  for  war  in  the  fact 


British  and  German  Violations        119 

that  Germany  finally  refused  to  yield  on  exactly  the  same 
principle. 

To  allege  a  difference,  it  was  necessary  to  shift  from 
questions  of  principle  to  questions  of  effect.  "How  about 
the  'Lusitania' ?"  But  the  question  of  effect  is  irrelevant, 
since  the  effect,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  was  not  chosen  by 
the  offending  party.  As  Senator  Norris  demanded,  in  the 
debate  on  the  Armed  Ships  Bill: 

Why  have  we  kept  out  of  the  North  Sea?  ...  Simply  because 
it  is  altogether  more  dangerous  for  ships  to  go  through  a  mine  field 
than  it  is  for  ships  to  go  through  a  submarine  field.  Mining  the 
high  seas  is  incomparably  more  inhuman  and  ruthless  than  warfare 
by  means  of  submarines. 

In  the  matter  of  warning,  Germany  invariably  showed 
greater  concern  for  preventing  injuries  to  neutrals  than  did 
England.  England  gave  the  world  but  three  days'  notice 
of  the  establishment  of  her  military  area  upon  the  high 
seas.  Her  "blockade"  went  into  effect  on  the  day  of  its 
announcement,  and  was  applied  retroactively  upon  all  ships 
which  had  left  their  ports  later  than  two  weeks  previously. 
Many  enlargements  in  England's  contraband  lists,  and  new 
"wrinkles"  in  her  aggressions  upon  neutrals,  were  not  an- 
nounced at  all  until  after  she  had  put  them  into  practice 
and  made  neutrals  suffer  from  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  Germany  gave  the  world  fourteen 
days'  notice  of  the  establishment  of  her  military  area  upon 
the  high  seas,  and  twenty-one  days'  notice  of  her  determina- 
tion to  deal  with  all  armed  merchant  ships  as  ships  of  war. 
Of  her  "unrestricted  warfare,"  only  one  day's  notice  was 
given,  but,  in  practice,  action  against  neutral  ships  was  with- 
held for  a  reasonable  period,  as  was  promised  in  the  noti- 
fication. 


120  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

In  its  effort  to  retain  the  friendship  of  the  United  States 
(Note  of  Mar.  6,  1917),  Austria-Hungary  argued  that 
the  submarines  of  the  Teutonic  powers  had  never  really  at- 
tacked any  merchant  vessel  without  adequate  warning.  As 
it  was  suicidal — because  of  the  vulnerability  of  undersea 
craft — for  the  submarine  to  attempt  always  to  give  warn- 
ing immediately  before  an  attack,  the  governments  of  the 
Central  Powers  took  great  pains  to  give  general  warning 
beforehand.  Austria-Hungary  pointed  out  that  such  warn- 
ing was  mjore  humane  and  considerate  if  given  before  the 
embarkation  of  the  passengers,  than  if  reserved  until  im- 
mediately before  the  destruction  of  the  vessel,  as  was  the 
practice  in  cruiser  warfare.  The  note  pointed  out  that, 
under  the  latter  circumstances,  it  is  impossible  absolutely 
to  guarantee  the  lives  of  passengers,  since  the  best  thing 
that  can  be  done  is  to  take  the  passengers  aboard  the  war- 
ship, which  is  subject  to  fire  in  case  of  meeting  an  enemy 
before  reaching  port. 

American  war  propagandists,  during  the  first  few  months 
after  our  declaration  of  war,  habitually  worked  themselves 
into  a  great  heat  over  the  proposition  that  Germany  broke 
some  very  solemn  promises  which  she  had  made  to  the 
United  States.  This  accusation  originated  with  the  Pres- 
ident, who,  in  announcing  to  Congress  his  break  with  Ger- 
many (Feb.  3,  1917),  asserted  that  the  declaration  of  Ger- 
many, initiating  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  "withdraws 
the  solemn  assurance  given  in  the  Imperial  Government's 
note  of  the  4th  of  May,  1916." 

Taking  the  cue,  Secretary  Lansing  was  found  declar- 
ing a  little  later:  "Of  course,  the  immediate  cause  of  our 
war  against  Germany  was  the  announced  purpose  of  the 
German  government  to  break  its  promise  as  to  indiscrim- 
inate warfare."  (War-Information  Series,  No.  5,  p.  3.) 


British  and  German  Violations        121 

This  alleged  action  he  further  characterized  as  a  "deliber- 
ate breach  of  faith"  and  an  "act  of  perfidy  "  even  declar- 
ing it  to  be  "in  itself  sufficient  to  force  us  to  enter  the  war  if 
we  would  preserve  our  self-respect."  f 

What  are  the  facts? 

Here  is  the  alleged  ''solemn  promise"  of  May  4,  ex- 
actly as  it  was  made : 

As  the  German  government  repeatedly  declared,  it  cannot  dis- 
pense with  the  use  of  the  submarine  weapon  in  the  conduct  of 
warfare  against  enemy  trade.  The  German  government,  however, 
has  now  decided  to  make  a  further  concession,  adapting  methods  of 
submarine  warfare  to  the  interests  of  neutrals.  .  .  .  The  German 
government,  guided  by  this  idea,  notifies  the  government  of  the 
United  States  that  German  naval  forces  have  received  the  following 
order: 

'In  accordance  with  the  general  principles  of  visit  and  search  and 
the  destruction  of  merchant  vessels  recognized  by  international  law, 
such  vessels,  both  within  and  without  the  area  declared  a  naval 
war  zone,  shall  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  without  safe- 
guarding human  lives,  unless  the  ship  attempt  to  escape  or  offer  re- 
sistance.' 

But  neutrals  cannot  expect  that  Germany,  forced  to  fight  for 
existence,  shall  for  the  sake  of  neutral  interests  restrict  the  use  of 
an  effective  weapon,  if  the  enemy  is  permitted  to  continue  to  apply 
at  will  methods  of  warfare  violating  rules  of  international  law. 
Such  a  demand  would  be  incompatible  with  the  character  of  neu- 
trality. .  .  .  Accordingly,  the  German  government  does  not  doubt 
that  the  government  of  the  United  States  will  now  demand  and 
insist  that  the  British  government  shall  forthwith  observe  the  rules 
of  international  law  universally  recognized  before  the  w*ar,  as  are 
laid  down  in  the  notes  presented  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States  to  the  British  government  December  28,  1914,  and  November 
5,  1915. 

Should  steps  taken  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  not  at- 
tain the  object  it  desires,  to  have  the  laws  of  humanity  followed  by 


122  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

all  belligerent  nations,  the  German  government  would  then  be  fac- 
ing a  new  situation  in  which  it  must  reserve  to  itself  complete  lib- 
erty of  decision.  ^  ..,.  ,  T 

Lrottlieb  von  J  agow. 

This  was  the  last  of  a  long  series  of  appeals  to  the 
United  States  for  the  equal  and  impartial  treatment  which 
neutrality  requires.  When,  after  nine  months  of  wait- 
ing, in  which  the  equal  and  impartial  treatment  was  not 
forthcoming,  Germany  announced  the  unrestricted  use  of 
her  submarines,  she  pointed  out  distinctly  the  situation 
which,  to  use  her  own  words,  "gives  back  to  Germany  the 
freedom  of  action  which  she  reserved  in  her  note  addressed 
to  the  government  of  the  United  States  on  May  4,  1916." 

Where  is  the  "breach  of  faith?"  Where  is  the  "per- 
fidy?" Where  are  the  "broken  promises?" 

Nothing  could  be  more  eloquent  of  the  weakness  of  the 
case  against  Germany  than  this  stock  charge,  known  by 
every  American  government  official  and  every  student  of 
the  war  to  be  baseless. 

Did  the  breaking  of  promises,  with  regard  to  the  con- 
duct of  warfare  affecting  American  rights,  require  us  to 
go  to  war  "if  we  would  preserve  our  self-respect,"  then 
America  would  have  been  at  war  with  England  before  the 
end  of  1914.  For  in  the  note  of  October  21,  1915,  we 
find  America  protesting  against  the  breaking  of  two  prom- 
ises, made  and  broken  in  1914:  the  first  that  England 
would  not  "interfere  with  trade  with  the  countries  con- 
tiguous to  the  territories  of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain"; 
the  second,  that  "inconvenience  would  be  minimized  by  the 
discretion  left  to  the  courts  in  the  application  of  the  Order 
in  Council,  and  by  the  instructions  which  it  was  said  would 
be  issued  [as  to  the  execution  of  the  blockade  'of  Ger- 
many]." 

The  promise  of  August  25,    1914,   that  "British  mer- 


British  and  German  Violations        123 

chant  vessels ....  will  never  fire  unless  fired  upon,  and 
that  they  will  never  under  any  circumstances  attack  any 
vessel,"  was  also  habitually  broken,  and  by  express  orders 
from  the  British  government,  as  is  shown  by  the  "confiden- 
tial instructions"  reproduced  in  the  American  White  Book, 
(vol.  Ill,  p.  181). 

Regarding  the  Declaration  of  London,  England  com- 
menced breaking  promises  during  the  first  days  of  the  war, 
and  broke  them  repeatedly  thereafter. 

Much  was  made  of  the  fact,  by  apologists  for  Eng- 
land, that  the  latter  country  never  ratified  the  Declara- 
tion of  London.  Even  were  this  strictly  true,  it  would 
be  scant  extenuation  for  British  violations  thereof;  for 
the  Declaration  of  London  was  not  a  new  code  of  laws, 
but  simply  <(an  agreement  as  to  what  are  the  generally 
recognized  rules  of  international  law" — to  employ  the 
words  of  the  document  itself.  The  fact  is  that,  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  the  British  government  did  agree  to 
abide  by  the  Declaration  of  London,  with  certain  speci- 
fied amendments,  then  and  there  set  down.  We  were  so 
notified  in  the  note  of  August  22,  1914.  In  the  Order 
in  Council  of  August  20,  1914,  the  thing  was  put  in  this 
way: 

Whereas,  the  governments  of  France  and  Russia  have  informed 
His  Majesty's  Government  that  during  the  present  hostilities  it  is 
their  intention  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  con- 
vention known  as  the  Declaration  of  London,  signed  on  the  26th  day 
of  February,  1909,  so  far  as  may  be  practicable. 

Now,  therefore,  His  Majesty,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  his 
Privy  Council,  is  pleased  to  order,  and  it  is  hereby  ordered,  that 
during  the  present  hostilities  the  convention  known  as  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  shall,  subject  to  the  following  additions  and  modifica- 
tions, be  adopted  as  if  the  same  had  been  ratified  by  His  Majesty. 


124  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

But  the  promise  was  broken  by  further  "modifications, " 
which  followed,  one  after  another — all  dictated  purely  by 
British  convenience — until  it  became  too  ridiculous  to  pre- 
tend any  regard  whatever  for  the  document  in  question. 

The  first  violations  of  American  rights  in  the  European 
war  consisted  in  the  sowing  of  mines  upon  the  high  seas. 
The  question  as  to  whether  England  or  Germany  sowed 
the  first  of  these  mines  is  a  matter  of  dispute,  the  merits 
of  which  may  never  be  determined.  But  the  point  is  not 
essential  in  determining  to  which  side  belongs  the  defense 
of  retaliation*  The  essential  question  is  not  who  per- 
petrated the  original  violation  of  international  law,  but 
(i)  who  perpetrated  the  violations  against  which  Amer- 
ica first  protested,  and  (2)  who  held  most  tenaciously  to 
the  course  which  America  contended  against  as  unlawful. 

An  examination  of  the  American  White  Book  shows 
that,  until  February  10,  1915,  America  had  no  complaint 
whatever  against  Germany  on  grounds  of  international 
law,  while  she  was  at  variance  with  England  on  questions 
of  international  law  from  the  first  week  of  the  war. 

When,  February  4,  Germany  issued  her  military-area 
proclamation,  frankly  defending  it  as  a  retaliatory  meas- 
ure, she  had  America's  own  condemnation  of  her  adver- 
sary's measures  in  support  of  her  stand.  But  when,  Feb- 
ruary 10,  England  for  the  first  time  advanced  retaliation 
as  a  defense  for  her  own  violations  of  international  law, 
she  had  no  American  protests  whatever  upon  which  to  base 
her  claim — no  argument  that  was  admissible  from  the 
American  point  of  view. 

The  evidence  of  the  relative  tractability  of  Germany 
is  no  less  overwhelming.  In  the  early  months  of  the  war 
the  United  States  was  continually  striving  to  procure  for 
neutrals  "a  standard  by  which  to  measure  their  rights  or 


British  and  German  Violations        125 

to  avoid  danger  to  their  ships  and  cargoes"  (Note  of 
Mar.  5,  1915.)  Germany  was  continually  trying  to  do 
the  same.  England  was  continually  refusing. 

England's  military  area  upon  the  high  seas  was  estab- 
lished November  5,  1914;  Germany's  was  established  Feb- 
ruary 1 8,  1915.  But  even  then  Germany  showed  a 
greater  regard  for  neutral  rights,  since  Germany's  war 
was  declared  only  against  enemy  vessels.  England's  war, 
however,  was  declared  against  neutral  vessels. 

In  its  note  of  May  4,  1916,  Germany  pointed  out: 

The  German  government  will  only  state  that  it  has  imposed  far- 
reaching  restraints  upon  the  use  of  the  submarine  weapon,  solely  in 
consideration  of  neutrals'  interests,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  these 
restrictions  are  necessarily  of  advantage  to  Germany's  enemies.  No 
such  consideration  has  ever  been  shown  neutrals  by  Great  Brit- 
ain and  her  allies. 

Three  months  previously,  President  Wilson  had  publicly 
admitted  tha,t  the  instructions  given  to  commanders  of 
German  submarines  "are  consistent  for  the  most  part  with 
the  law  of  nations"  (Speech  at  St.  Louis,  Feb.  3,  1916.) 

One  cannot  read  the  diplomatic  correspondence  between 
America  and  England,  and  between  America  and  Ger- 
many, without  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the  Wilson 
Administration  was  fully  aware  that  it  was  closer  to  Ger- 
many than  to  England,  in  matters  of  principle.  This  fact 
was  at  times  even  acknowledged  in  words.  For  example: 

The  government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial  German 
Government  are  contending  for  the  same  great  object;  have  long 
stood  together  in  urging  the  very  principles  upon  which  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  now  so  solemnly  insists.  They  are  both 
contending  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  (American  note  to  Ger- 
many, July  21,  1915.) 

Not  at  any  time,  nor  for  any  period,  until  February  i, 


T26  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

1917,  did  Germany  stand  as  squarely  against  America's 
contentions  as  England  stood  from  November  5,  1914. 
Germany's  unrestricted  warfare  against  merchant  ves- 
sels, within  a  certain  area  upon  the  high  seas,  began  Feb- 
ruary i,  1917.  England's  began  November  5,  1914. 
There  is  not  an  iota  of  difference  in  principle  between  these 
two  decrees — and  to  Germany  belongs  the  defense  of  re- 
taliation. 

Why  did  not  America  break  diplomatic  relations  with 
England,  November  5,  1914,  and  move  rapidly  toward 
war?  Why  did  not  the  United  States  insist,  as  it  re- 
peatedly told  England  that  it  would,  "that  the  relations 
between  it  and  His  Majesty's  Government  be  governed, 
not  by  a  policy  of  expediency,  but  by  those  established  rules 
of  international  conduct  upon  which  Great  Britain  in  the 
past  has  held  the  United  States  to  account  when  the  latter 
nation  was  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  national  existence?" 
(Note  of  Oct.  21,  1915.) 

Why  did  America  reverse  itself  suddenly  on  the  status 
of  armed  merchant  ships,  on  the  use  of  the  submarine  for 
operations  against  commerce,  and  on  the  single  standard 
as  a  condition  of  neutrality,  thus  swinging  itself  around 
into  less  glaring  inharmony  with  the  British  position,  and 
squarely  against  the  German  position? 

We  happen  to  have  the  answer  of  President  Wilson  him- 
self, as  given  by  his  State  Department  to  the  United  States 
Senate,  which  had  propounded  similar  questions  to  the 
above : 

The  fact  that  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  is  interrupted  by 
Great  Britain  is  consequent  upon  the  superiority  of  her  navy  upon 
the  high  seas.  History  shows  that  whenever  a  country  has  possessed 
that  superiority,  our  trade  has  been  interrupted,  and  that  few  arti- 
cles essential  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war  have  been  allowed  to 


British  and  German  Violations        127 

reach  its  enemy  from  this  country.  (Answer  of  American  Secre- 
tary of  State  to  U.  S.  Senate,  Jan.  20,  1915 — American  White  Book, 
vol.  II.  p.  59.) 

In  a  word,  we  are  guided,  not  by  principle,  but  by — ex- 
pediency.  We  yield  to  superior  force,  and  fight  the  infe- 
rior— on  the  same  principle. 

The  fact  stands  out,  dodge  as  one  may,  that  the  only 
cause  in  dispute  between  the  United  States  and  Germany, 
was  the  right  to  ship  supplies  and  passengers  to  the  ene- 
mies of  Germany,  in  the  face  of  having  given  up  the  right 
to  ship  supplies  and  passengers  to  Germany  itself. 

Our  own  record  puts  us  out  of  court.  The  British  proc- 
lamation of  November,  1914,  establishing  a  military  area 
upon  the  high  seas,  was  not  included  in  the  American  White 
Book.  So  important  a  paper  could  hardly  have  been  omit- 
ted without  deliberate  intent.  The  purpose  must  have 
been  to  conceal,  in  a  measure,  our  diplomatic  inconsisten- 
cies. But,  in  spite  of  the  suppression,  the  official  record 
is  completely  self-convicting.  Our  own  White  Book  for- 
ever disposes  of  any  claim  to  championship  of  international 
law  as  a  cause  for  America's  war. 


XVII 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW — AMERICA'S  OFFENSES  AS  A 
BELLIGERENT 

IF  offenses  against  the  law  of  nations  required  the  Ameri- 
can people,  in  honor,  to  go  to  war  with  the  offender,  then 
we  would  have  gone  to  wai^not  only  with  Germany  and  her 
allies,  but  with  England  and  her  allies,  and  with  our  own 
government  as  well. 

In  his  war  message,  President  Wilson  made  this  solemn 
promise:  "We  shall  ...  as  belligerents  .  .  .  observe 
with  proud  punctilio  the  principles  of  right  and  of  fair  play 
we  profess  to  be  fighting  for." 

In  actual  practice  he  perpetrated  many  infractions  of 
these  principles  not  only  in  relation  to  our  enemies,  but  in 
relation  to  the  world  of  neutrals.  Far  from  championing 
the  rights  of  neutrals,  if  the  standards  which  we  ourselves 
laid  down  in  our  pre-war  disputes  had  been  accepted  and 
applied  by  the  neutral  nations  of  the  earth,  every  neutral 
flying  a  flag  upon  the  high  seas  would  have  been  compelled 
to  go  to  war  against  us. 

So  far  as  our  declared  enemies  were  concerned,  our  Presi- 
dent began  to  offend,  under  "the  principles  of  right  and 
fair  play,"  long  before  we  formally  entered  war.  He  be- 
gan to  offend  on  the  day  he  withdrew  his  opposition  to 
the  loaning  of  money  by  American  bankers  to  belligerent 
governments,  and  so  departed  from  his  own  interpretation 

of  strict  neutrality. 

128 


America's  Offenses  As  a  Belligerent   129 

Against  the  letter  of  the  law,  he  began  to  offend  when  he 
ceased  to  preserve  an  equally  inflexible  front  toward  viola- 
tions of  American  rights,  respectively,  by  Germany  and 
England,  and — in  order  to  conceal  this  offense — he  set  up 
the  ridiculous  "single,  not  joint;  absolute,  not  relative" 
theory  of  responsibility. 

Quotations  from  the  letter  of  international  law  in  this 
chapter  are  taken  from  Professor  T.  J.  Lawrence,  whose 
writings  are  used  as  textbooks  both  by  the  English  Admi- 
ralty and  the  American  navy.  Dealing  with  the  law  of 
neutrality,  Professor  Lawrence  lays  down  as  a  primary 
duty  of  a  nation  to  "refrain  from  giving  to  one  side,  in  mat- 
ters connected  with  hostilities,  privileges  which  it  denies 
to  others" 

The  same  position  had  been  taken  by  George  Washing- 
ton more  than  a  century  before.  When,  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  England  attempted  to  stop  all  American  commerce 
with  France,  just  as  in  1915  she  attempted  to  stop  all 
American  commerce  with  Germany,  Thomas  Jefferson, 
Washington's  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  into  his  protest  to 
England  (Sept.  7,  1793)  :  "Were  we  to  withhold  from  her 
[France]  supplies  of  provisions  we  should  in  like  manner 
be  bound  to  withhold  them  from  her  enemies  also." 

As  to  the  deliberate  plan  of  President  Wilson  to  begin 
hostilities  without  first  declaring  war,  the  third  convention 
of  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907,  signed  by  both  the 
United  States  and  Germany,  laid  down  the  principle  that 
hostilities  <(must  not  commence  without  previous  and  expli- 
cit ivarning,  in  the  form  either  of  a  declaration  of  war  with 
the  reasons  assigned  for  it,  or  of  an  ultimatum  with  condi- 
tional declaration  of  war" 

America  has  her  scraps  of  paper,  as  well  as  other  coun- 
tries. Our  Treaty  of  1828  with  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia 


130  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

is  one  of  them.  In  a  note  to  Germany  dated  May  13, 
1915,  the  Wilson  Government  admitted  that  the  Treaty  of 
1828  was  still  in  force: 

The  United  States  and  Germany  are  bound  together  not  only 
by  special  ties  of  friendship,  but  also  by  the  explicit  stipulations  of 
the  Treaty  of  1828  between  the  United  States  and  the  Kingdom  of 
Prussia. 

But  the  Treaty  of  1828  revives  parts  of  the  Treaty 
of  1799  with  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  including  the  whole 
of  Articles  23  and  24.  Article  23  reads : 

If  war  should  arise  between  the  two  contracting  parties,  the 
merchants  of  either  country  then  residing  in  the  other  shall  be 
allowed  to  remain  nine  months  to  collect  their  debts  and  settle 
their  affairs,  and  may  depart  freely,  carrying  off  all  their  effects 
without  molestation  or  hindrance;  and  all  the  women  and  children, 
scholars  of  every  faculty,  cultivators  of  the  earth,  artisans,  manufac- 
turers and  fishermen,  unarmed  and  inhabiting  unfortified  towns, 
villages  or  places,  and,  in  general,  all  others  whose  occupations  are 
for  the  common  subsistence  and  benefit  of  mankind,  shall  be  al- 
lowed to  continue  their  respective  employments,  and  shall  not  be 
molested  in  their  persons,  nor  shall  their  houses  or  goods  be  burnt 
or  otherwise  destroyed,  nor  their  fields  wasted  by  the  armed  force  of 
the  enemy  into  whose  power  by  the  events  of  war  they  may  happen  to 
fall;  but  if  anything  is  necessary  to  be  taken  from  them  for  the  use 
of  such  armed  force  the  same  shall  be  paid  for  at  a  reasonable  price. 

But  upon  declaring  war,  we  prohibited  the  departure  of 
any  German  subject  from  the  territory  of  the  United  States. 
We  placed  German  subjects  under  restriction.  We  seized 
more  than  one  hundred  ships  belonging  to  German  subjects, 
in  American  harbors,  and  used  them  in  the  war  against 
Germany.  We  confiscated  many  millions  of  dollars'  worth 
of  property  of  German  subjects,  of  all  kinds  and  in  all 
parts  of  the  United  States.  We  sold  many  millions  of  dol- 


America's  Offenses  As  a  Belligerent   131 

lars'  worth  of  this  property,  and  used  the  money  to  fight 
Germany.  We  so  arranged  the  circumstances  of  such  sales 
that  the  owners  will  probably  never  be  able  to  recover  their 
possessions.  Not  a  dollar  of  compensation  was  given,  and 
there  was  no  pretense  that  adequate  compensation  would 
ever  be  given. 

President  Wilson  offered,  at  the  time,  what  may  be 
termed  an  excuse  for  tearing  up  the  Treaty  of  1828.  It 
was  that  Germany  had  violated  American  rights.1  The 
point  is  irrelevant,  since  the  stipulation  in  question  was 
framed  exclusively  for  a  state  of  war;  by  its  very  provi- 
sions it  begins  to  operate  only  when  war  begins,  and  pre- 
war differences  cannot  call  its  validity  into  question.  This 
is  acknowledged  in  the  treaty,  itself;  Article  24  concludes 
with  the  following  words: 

And  it  is  declared  that  neither  the  pretense  that  war  dissolves 
treaties,  nor  any  other  whatever,  shall  be  considered  as  annulling  or 
suspending  this  and  the  next  preceding  article;  but  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  state  of  war  is  precisely  that  for  which  they  are  provided, 
and  during  which  they  are  to  be  as  sacredly  observed  as  the  most 
acknowledged  articles  in  the  law  of  nations. 

Such  stipulations  as  those  quoted  above,  providing  for  the 
safety  of  alien  enemies,  are  to  be  found  in  almost  innumer- 
able treaties  between  governments.  In  discussing  them, 
Lawrence  says: 

Such  stipulations  are  hardly  needed  now;  for  the  old  right  of 
arrest  has  been  rendered  obsolete  by  the  continuous  contrary  custom 
of  nearly  a  hundred  and  fifty  years.  The  only  case  of  detention  to 
be  found  in  modern  times  occurred  in  1803,  when  Napoleon  ar- 
rested the  British  subjects  found  in  France  after  the  rupture  of  the 
Treaty  of  Amiens;  but  this  was  placed  on  the  ground  of  reprisal, 
and  has  almost  always  been  regarded  as  a  violent  proceeding  in  de- 
fiance of  right-  ("Principles  of  International  Law,"  p.  388.) 

1  Reply  to  German  protocol,  Mar.  20,  1917. 


132  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Regarding  the  rightful  policy  to  be  pursued  toward 
enemy  property  in  general,  he  says : 

In  modern  times,  the  real  property  of  enemy  subjects  has  not 
been  interfered  with  by  the  belligerent  states  in  whose  territory  it  was 
situated,  even  when  the  owners  resided  in  their  own  or  neutral  states, 
the  one  exception  being  an  act  of  the  Confederate  Congress  passed 
in  1 86 1  for  the  appropriation  of  all  enemy  property,  found  within 
the  Confederacy,  except  public  stocks  and  securities.  This  proceed- 
ing was  deemed  unwarrantably  severe;  and  contrary  usage  has  been 
so  uniform  that  we  may  safely  regard  the  old  right  to  confiscate  or 
sequestrate  as  having  become  obsolete  through  disuse.  .  .  .  What  is 
done  by  a  weaker  party  in  a  bitter  civil  war  is  hardly  a  guide  for 
ordinary  belligerents  in  a  struggle  between  independent  states.  If 
it  is  right  to  argue  from  the  practice  of  nations  to  the  law  of  nations, 
we  may  join  the  great  majority  of  continental  publicists,  in  the 
assertion  that  the  international  law^'of  our  own  times  does  not  per- 
mit of  the  confiscation  of  the  private  property  of  enemy  subjects 
found  on  the  land  territory  of  the  state,  at  the  outbreak  of  war. 
(pp.  424-426.) 

Regarding  merchantmen  which  are  found  in  an  enemy 
port  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  in  the  sixth  Hague 
convention  of  1907,  appear  the  following  clauses: 

(a)  When  a  merchant  ship  belonging  to  one  of  the  belligerent 
powers  is  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities  in  an  enemy  port,  it  is 
desirable  that  it  should  be  allowed  to  depart  freely,  either  imme- 
diately, or  after  a  reasonable  number  of  days  of  grace,  and  to  pro- 
ceed, after  being  furnished  with  a  pass,  direct  to  its  port  of  destina- 
tion or  any  other  port  indicated.  .  .  . 

(b)  A  merchant  ship  unable,   owing  to   circumstances  of   force 
majeure,  to  leave  the  enemy  port  within  the  period  contemplated  in 
the  above  article,  or  which  was  not  allowed  to  leave,  cannot  be 
confiscated. 

When  war  was  declared  against  Spain  in  1898,  a  Presi- 
dential proclamation  allowed  Spanish  ships  thirty  days  in 


America's  Offenses  As  a  Belligerent   133 

which  to  depart  from  our  harbors  and  reach  home.  Enemy 
aliens  were  disturbed  neither  in  their  persons  nor  in  their 
property. 

By  one  who  holds  the  extreme  theory  that  the  German 
people  are  a  race  of  savages,  bent  on  the  destruction  of 
the  world,  that  they  had  to  be  exterminated  or  brought 
to  their  knees  at  all  costs,  it  may  be  that  any  offense  under 
international  law  against  these  people  will  be  condoned, 
but  what  excuse  can  be  given  for  our  offenses  against  the 
world  of  neutrals? 

The  President's  own  answer,  on  July  24,  1915,  was  that 
there  can  be  no  excuse : 

Illegal  and  inhuman  acts,  however  justifiable  they  may  be  thought 
to  be  against  an  enemy  who  is  believed  to  have  acted  in  contraven- 
tion of  law  and  humanity,  are  manifestly  indefensible  when  they 
deprive  neutrals  of  their  acknowledged  rights.  (Note  to  Germany.) 

Before  April,  1917,  we  professed  to  be  guided  by  con- 
sideration for  the  rights  of  neutrals  in  general.  We  noti- 
fied the  world  that  we  stood  ready  to  go  to  war  in  defense 
of  neutral  rights.  We  even  professed  to  go  to  war  as  a 
champion  of  neutral  rights.  But  after  April,  1917,  what 
treatment  did  neutral  rights  receive  at  our  hands? 

After  April,  1917,  England  did  not  abate  in  a  single  de- 
tail her  violations  of  neutral  rights;  yet  we  became  an  ally 
of  England  and  joined  heartily  in  trampling  upon  the  very 
rights  which  we  had  so  loftily  promised  to  defend.  We 
even  carried  our  own  aggressions  upon  neutral  rights  to 
greater  extremes  than  they  had  ever  been  carried  against 
us. 

We  had  signed  the  Declaration  of  London  ourselves. 
We  had  asked  the  belligerents  to  abide  by  it.  Germany  and 
her  allies  had  at  all  times  been  willing  to  abide  by  it,  pro- 


134  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

vided  their  enemies  would  abide  by  it,  also.  When  we  be- 
came an  ally  of  Germany's  enemies,  did  we  again  propose 
that  all  belligerents  abide  by  the  Declaration  of  London? 
Would  we  have  accepted  such  a  proposal  made  by  Ger- 
many? When  we  went  to  war  we  paid  no  heed  whatever 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London.  It  was 
an  offense  against  Germany  for  which  retaliation  cannot  be 
offered  as  an  excuse.  It  was  an  offense  against  neutrals 
absolutely  indefensible,  when  judged  either  by  our  own  pre- 
viously professed  standards  of  international  conduct,  or  by 
the  letter  of  the  law  itself. 

Again,  in  January,  1916,  England  announced  her  Trad- 
ing with  the  Enemy  Act,  which  contemplated  a  blacklist. 
After  the  act  had  been  in  force  for  six  months,  America  de- 
nounced it  in  the  following  terms: 

It  is  evident  that  they  [the  blacklist  measures]  are  inevitably  and 
essentially  inconsistent  with  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  all  the  na- 
tions not  involved  in  war  .  .  .  [and]  .  .  .  inconsistent  with  that 
true  justice,  sincere  amity,  and  impartial  fairness  which  should  char- 
acterize the  dealings  of  friendly  governments  with  one  another. 
(Note  of  July  26,  1916,  to  England.) 

Yet  our  own  Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act,  including 
the  blacklist  features,  was  a  copy  of  England's,  and  we 
applied  it  to  neutrals  more  severely  than  England  ever  ap- 
plied it  to  us. 

In  its  protest  of  December  26,  1914,  to  England,  Amer- 
ica quoted  a  pronouncement  of  the  British  Premier,  Lord 
Salisbury,  during  the  South  African  war,  as  follows: 

Foodstuffs,  though  they  have  a  hostile  destination,  can  be  con- 
sidered as  contraband  of  war  only  if  they  are  for  the  enemy's 
forces;  it  is  not  sufficient  that  they  are  capable  of  being  so  used; 
it  must  be  shown  that  this  was  in  fact  their  destination  at  the 
time  of  their  seizure. 


America's  Offenses  As  a  Belligerent   135 

In  reply  England  admitted : 

No  country  has  maintained  more  stoutly  than  Great  Britain,  in 
modern  times,  the  principle  that  a  belligerent  should  abstain  from 
interference  with  the  foodstuffs  intended  for  the  civil  population. 
(Note  of  Feb.  10,  1915.) 

Yet  England  only  made  more  and  more  stringent  her 
measures  of  starvation  against  Germany;  while  America, 
on  becoming  an  ally  of  England,  took  drastic  action  to 
make  the  system  of  starvation  absolutely  complete.  Not 
only  did  we  offend  .against  Germany,  but  we  offended 
against  the  entire  neutral  world  in  precisely  the  same  man- 
ner as  England  had  offended  against  us. 

Our  blockade  note  to  England,  of  October  21,  1915, 
ought  to  be  read  by  every  patriot  who  really  cares  for  his 
country's  honor.  That  note  is  unanswerable.  It  outlaws 
the  British  paper  blockade  on  half  a  dozen  counts.  The 
British  precedent,  which  America  quotes,  alone  constitutes 
an  overwhelming  case. 

"Blockades"  says  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  which  Brit- 
ain signed,  "in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective;  that 
is  to  say,  maintained  by  force  sufficient  really  to  prevent  ac- 
cess to  the  coasts  of  the  enemy"  But  America  pointed 
out  that  the  coasts  of  Germany  had  always  been  open  to 
Scandinavian  trade. 

"There  is  no  better  settled  principle  of  the  law  of  na- 
tions than  that  which  forbids  the  blockade  of  neutral  ports 
in  time  of  war"  urged  America.  Against  the  blockade 
of  Scandinavian  ports,  we  quoted  the  instructions  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  the  British  delegates  to  the  London  con- 
ference, "setting  out  the  views  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, founded  on  the  decisions  of  the  British  courts,"  as  fol- 
lows: "A  blockade  must  be  confined  to  the  ports  and  coasts 
of  the  enemy,"  and  "Where  the  ship  does  not  intend  to 


136  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

proceed  to  the  blockaded  port,  the  fact  that  goods  are  to 
be  sent  by  sea,  or  inland  transport,  is  no  ground  for  con- 
demnation" 

We  showed  that  the  blockade  of  Scandinavian  ports  was 
intentionally  not  applied  by  ^England  to  her  own  ships, 
doubly  condemning  it  under  a  decision  of  England  during 
the  Crimean  War,  that  "if  belligerents  themselves  traded 
with  blockaded  ports  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  effectively 
blockaded." 

It  was  on  grounds  like  these  that  President  Wilson  based 
his  conclusion  that  the  British  blockade  was  "ineffective,  il- 
legal, and  indefensible,"  and  announced  his  high  decision  to 
devote  the  energies  of  America  to  the  vindication  of  neu- 
tral rights.  Yet  when  we  went  to  war,  we  devoted  our 
energies  largely  to  making  more  completely  operative  this 
very  "indefensible"  aggression  upon  such  rights. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  offenses  ever  perpetrated 
against  a  neutral  nation  was  our  seizure  of  a  large  fraction 
of  the  merchant  fleet  of  Holland,  and  our  employment  of 
these  vessels  in  the  war  against  Germany.  Previously  to 
our  becoming  her  ally,  England  had  confiscated  a  number 
of  American  ships,  but  she  had  made  no  wholesale  grabs 
of  shipping,  and  in  each  case  she  had  offered  a  specific 
pretext,  against  which  America  had  protested  under  the 
rules  of  international  law.  But  when  President  Wilson 
took  the  merchant  vessels  of  Holland,  he  gathered  in  all 
he  could  lay  his  hands  on — sixty-eight  ships,  totaling  in 
round  numbers,  half  a  million  tons. 

If,  in  confiscating  the  merchant  vessels  of  German  sub- 
jects found  in  our  harbors  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  we 
trampled  upon  international  law,  how  much  more  flagrantly 
must  we  have  trampled  upon  international  law  in  confiscat- 
ing ships  of  neutrals  whom  we  had  invited  to  trade  with  us ! 

True,  the  President  professed  to  act  "in  accordance  with 


America's  Offenses  As  a  Belligerent   137 

international  law  and  practice."  (Proclamation  taking  over 
Dutch  ships,  Mar.  20,  1918.)  And  the  newspapers,  day 
after  day,  referred  to  the  action  as  being  within  our  rights 
under  international  law,  and  mentioned  the  "law  of  an- 
gary," as  if  it  were  a  common  and  accepted  course  of 
belligerents  in  time  of  war. 

It  may  be  that  this  particular  deception  did  not  pass  dis- 
cerning laymen  as  successfully  as  certain  others.  It  may  be 
that  the  inconsistency,  not  to  say  rank  injustice,  of  our  pro- 
ceeding was  sensed  by  many.  We  confiscate  outright  many 
millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  the  property  of  neutral  peo- 
ples, whose  conduct  toward  us  is  without  reproach,  whose 
vessels  enjoy  a  certain  guarantee  of  safety  in  our  ports 
under  commercial  treaty.  We  strike  a  staggering  blow  at 
that  nation's  foreign  commerce,  which  happens  to  be  of 
very  much  greater  importance  to  it  than  our  own  foreign 
commerce  ever  was  to  us.  We  do  this  with  no  other  ex- 
cuse than  that  we  can  use  these  foreign  ships  to  our  own 
advantage,  and  we  defend  our  action  under  the  pretense 
that  we  are  within  our  rights  under  international  law ! 

Discerning  laymen  may  also  remember  that,  in  all  the 
official  and  press  camouflage  connected  with  the  taking  over 
of  the  Dutch  ships,  only  one  international  precedent  for  the 
action  was  mentioned,  and  that  precedent  came  from  Ger- 
many, against  whom  we  were  making  the  most  exaggerated 
charges  of  lawlessness! 

The  "law  of  angary!"  Is  it  a  law?  Here  is  what 
Lawrence  has  to  say  of  the  grabbing  of  neutral  ships  by 
countries  at  war,  of  the  "law  of  angary,"  and  the  "German 
precedent,"  which  we  refer  to  in  defense  of  our  own  ac- 
tion : 

No  recent  case  of  such  a  high-handed  proceeding  is  to  be  found. 
Treaty  after  treaty  forbids  it.  ...  We  may  imagine  how  fiercely 
it  might  be  resented  if  we  contemplate  for  a  moment  what  would 


138  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

be  the  consequences  of,  say,  the  seizure  by  the  United  States  govern- 
ment of  all  the  liners  in  the  port  of  New  York,  in  order  to  carry  to 
its  destination  an  expedition  against  a  Central  American  republic 
hastily  planned  in  a  sudden  emergency.  Half  the  civilized  world 
would  suffer,  and  the  other  half  would  make  common  cause  with  it. 
Even  the  milder  manifestations  of  the  power  to  seize  are  looked 
on  askance,  and  provoke  so  much  controversy  that  belligerent  states 
will  be  unwilling  to  resort  to  them  in  the  future.  The  last  in- 
stance bears  out  this  view.  In  1870,  the  Germans  sank  six  English 
colliers  in  the  Seine  at  Duclair  to  stop  the  advance  up  the  river  of 
some  French  gunboats.  Compensation  was  demanded,  and  after 
some  hesitation  given;  and  the  act  was  excused  on  the  ground  that 
the  danger  was  pressing  and  could  not  be  met  in  any  other  way.  .  .  . 
The  practice  ...  is  so  indefensible  that  it  is  now  scarcely  defended. 
Belligerents  must  make  war  with  their  own  resources,  and  what  they 
can  capture  from  the  enemy,  not  with  neutral  property  which  is 
unfortunate  enough  to  be  for  the  moment  in  their  power.  ...  In 
the  vigorous  words  of  Dana,  '  "angary"  is  not  a  right  at  all,  but  an 
act  resorted  to  from  necessity,  for  which  apology  and  compensation 
must  be  made  at  the  peril  of  war/  (pp.  626-628.) 

We  cannot  defend  the  seizure  of  the  Dutch  ships  on  the 
ground  of  immediate  necessity.  We  did  not  apologize 
for  their  seizure;  we  preferred  hypocritically  to  pretend 
that  our  wrong  was  a  right.  We  promised  compensation, 
uat  the  end  of  the  war,"  but  it  is  easy  to  understand  that 
such  compensation,  based  on  the  assessed  value  of  the  ships, 
in  view  of  the  existing  need  of  the  Dutch  nation,  could  not 
be  satisfactory. 


XVIII 
OTHER  "INTOLERABLE  WRONGS" 

"I  SHALL  not  go  back  to  debate  the  causes  of  the  war,"  said 
President  Wilson,  in  his  message  to  Congress,  December  4, 
1917.  "The  intolerable  wrongs  done  and  planned  against 
us  by  the  sinister  masters  of  Germany  have  long  since  be- 
come too  grossly  obvious  and  odious  to  every  true  American 
to  need  to  be  rehearsed" 

We  have  disposed  of  the  "intolerable  wrongs"  involved 
in  the  submarine  dispute.  What  others  appear  in  the  of- 
ficial list  of  America's  war  causes? 

The  President's  most  complete  statement  of  them  ap- 
pears in  his  Flag  Day  address,  June  14,  1917: 

It  is  plain  how  we  were  forced  into  the  war.  The  extraordinary 
insults  and  aggressions  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  left  us 
no  self-respecting  choice  but  to  take  up  arms  in  defense  of  our  rights 
as  a  free  people  and  of  our  honor  as  a  sovereign  government.  The 
military  masters  of  Germany  denied  us  the  right  to  be  neutral.  They 
filled  our  unsuspecting  communities  with  vicious  spies  and  conspira- 
tors and  sought  to  corrupt  the  opinion  of  our  people  in  their  own  be- 
half. When  they  found  that  they  could  not  do  that,  their  agents 
diligently  spread  sedition  amongst  us  and  sought  to  draw  our  own 
citizens  from  their  allegiance.  .  .  .  They  sought  by  violence  to  de- 
stroy our  industries  and  arrest  our  commerce.  They  tried  to  incite 
Mexico  to  take  up  arms  against  us  and  draw  Japan  into  a  hostile  al- 
liance with  her.  .  .  .  They  impudently  denied  us  the  use  of  the 
high  seas,  and  repeatedly  executed  their  threat  that  they  would  send 
to  their  death  any  of  our  people  who  ventured  to  approach  the  coasts 
of  Europe.  .  .  .  What  great  nation,  in  such  circumstances,  would 
not  have  taken  up  arms? 

139 


140  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Stripped  of  rhetoric,  the  "intolerable  wrongs,"  the  "ex- 
traordinary insults  and  aggressions" — aside  from  those  per- 
taining to  the  submarine  issue — are  reduced  to  the  follow- 
ing terms: 

1.  Spies  in  America. 

2.  Pro-German  propaganda. 

3.  Bomb  plots  against  munition  works  and  ships  supply- 
ing Germany's  enemies. 

4.  Conspiracy  to   cause   Mexico   and  Japan  to  become 
enemies  of  America. 

If  the  maintenance  of  spies  in  a  foreign  country  be  a 
cause  for  war,  then  every  neutral  nation  on  earth  has  a 
cause  for  war  against  America ;  since  we  maintain  spies  all 
over  the  world,  and  especially;  in  the  countries  directly 
south  of  us.  Whether  German  spies  may  be  termed  vi- 
cious, or  whether  American  spies  may  be  termed  vicious, 
depends,  obviously,  not  upon  their  being  spies,  but  upon 
their  acts  and  purposes  as  such. 

And  what  acts  and  purposes  were  alleged  against  the 
"vicious"  German  spies  and  conspirators?  First,  that  they 
"sought  to  corrupt  the  opinion  of  our  own  people  in  their 
behalf!"  A  terrible  crime,  surely,  inasmuch  as  Germany's 
enemies  were  doing  exactly  the  same  thing  in  America, 
and  as  America  proceeded  to  do  exactly  the  same  thing  in 
every  neutral  country. 

Everybody  knows  that  Wilson's  Bureau  of  Information 
sent  propagandists  all  over  the  world,  and  that  all  consular 
officers,  Secret  Service  men,  and  government  agents  of  all 
kinds  abroad,  engaged,  more  or  less,  in  "corrupting  the 
opinion"  of  the  neutral  peoples  in  our  behalf — quite  natur- 
ally. When  they  found  that  they  could  not  "corrupt  the 
opinion  of  our  people  in  their  behalf,"  what  did  they  do, 
these  vicious  spies  and  conspirators?  They  "diligently 


Other  "Intolerable  Wrongs"          141 

spread  sedition  amongst  us  and  sought  to  draw  our  own 
citizens  from  their  allegiance" 

It  sounds  quite  terrible.  But  the  President  could  not 
have  been  thinking  of  anything  more  heinous  than  the  peace- 
ful and  lawful  efforts  of  Germans  within  the  United  States 
to  avert  war  with  Germany;  for  nothing  more  heinous 
than  that  occurred.  Everybody  knows  that  there  was  no 
actual  seditious  uprising  against  the  government  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  America  to  become  a  vassal  of  Germany, 
or  any  attempt  at  anything  of  the  kind. 

The  President  possibly  had  in  mind  the  "Bernstorff 
peace  plot."  On  January  22,  1917,  Mr.  Bernstorff,  the 
German  ambassador,  wrote  to  his  government  asking  for 
$50,000  to  assist  peace  societies  in  the  United  States  to 
spread  propaganda  intended  to  keep  America  out  of  war. 
The  Bernstorff  letter,  published  the  following  September, 
was  put  out  by  the  Administration  as  proof  of  a  heinous 
German  plot  directed  against  the  peace  and  security  of 
the  United  States,  and  was  so  treated  by  the  newspapers. 
It  happens  that,  on  January  22,  President  Wilson's  own  pro- 
fessed purposes  were  precisely  those  for  which  Bernstorff 
wanted  his  $50,000.  Wherefore,  if  the  interpretation 
placed  upon  the  Bernstorff  letter  is  just,  the  President  him- 
self was  implicated  in  a  German  plot  directed  against  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  United  States! 

Third,  there  were  the  bomb  plots  against  munitions 
works  and  ships  supplying  Germany's  enemies.  But  Wil- 
son never  brought  the  bomb  plots  diplomatically  to  the 
attention  of  the  Kaiser,  claiming  them  as  offenses  requiring 
reparation,  with  war  as  the  alternative.  Wilson's  govern- 
ment did  obtain  some  evidence  of  unneutral  activities  on  the 
part  of  a  number  of  acknowledged  representatives  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  But  its  manner  of  dealing  with  these 


142  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

cases  proves  that  it  did  not  consider  that  war  was  required 
as  an  answer  to  them.  Bomb  plots  and  offenses  of  that 
sort  were,  in  general,  dealt  with  as  crimes  of  individuals;  if 
the  government  had  actual  evidence  of  guilt,  it  sent  the  indi- 
vidual to  prison,  and  that  was  the  end  of  it. 

In  the  cases  of  Ambassador  Dumba,  of  Austria,  and  Cap- 
tains Von  Papen  and  Boy-Ed,  German  military  and  naval 
attaches,  diplomatic  representations  were  made.  Against 
Dumba  it  was  alleged  that  he  had  "admitted  that  he  had 
proposed  to  his  government  plans  to  instigate  strikes  in 
American  manufacturing  plants";  Von  Papen  and  Boy-Ed 
were  accused  of  having  connection  "with  the  illegal  and 
questionable  acts  of  certain  persons  within  the  United 
States."  America  asked  reparation  in  the  recall  of  the  of- 
fending officials.  That  reparation  was  given.  No  further 
reparation  of  any  kind  was  asked,  and  the  incident  was 
closed.  To  bring  such  matters  up  again,  and  list  them 
among  our  official  war  causes,  is  only  additional  evidence 
of  the  frantic  extremities  to  which  the  President  was  driven 
in  the  effort  to  justify  the  war. 

While  German  spies,  German  propaganda,  and  bomb 
plots  were  never  officially  suggested  as  a  possible  cause  for 
war  until  the  war  message,  what  was  known  as  the  "Ger- 
man-Mexican plot"  was  brought  forward  during  the  debate 
on  the  Armed  Ships  Bill,  and  was  adroitly  used  to  manu- 
facture belligerent  sentiment,  and  to  coerce  Congress  into 
permitting  one  of  the  unconstitutional  steps  by  which  the 
President  achieved  belligerency  for  America.  During  the 
debate  on  the  Armed  Ships  Bill,  Senator  Works  of  Cali- 
fornia charged  that  the  Zimmermann  letter  had  been  pro- 
duced to  influence  votes  and  secure  the  passage  of  the  bill; 
that  it  had  been  used  to  line  up  both  Democrats  and  Repub- 
licans, and  had  lined  them  up ;  that,  although  a  half-dozen 


Other  "Intolerable  Wrongs"          143 

votes  could  not  be  mustered  in  the  Senate  for  a  declaration 
of  war,  the  Senate  was  being  persuaded,  under  cover  of  the 
excitement  stirred  up  by  the  Zimmermann  letter,  uto  do 
something  that  will  lead  us  just  as  surely  and  certainly  to 
war  as  if  we  had  openly  declared  it."  The  newspaper  re- 
ports of  the  day  tell  the  same  story.  The  Washington  dis- 
patch to  the  New  York  Tribune  on  February  28,  1917, 
said: 

It  was  a  disheartening  spectacle  that  was  presented  in  Congress 
to-day  before  the  news  of  the  German-Mexican  plot  came.  In  the 
Capitol,  the  pro-Germans  and  the  pacifists  were  making  all  the  noise 
and  there  seemed  no  possibility  of  a  declaration  of  war  by  Congress. 
There  was  not  even  a  chance  to  vote  upon  the  legislation  conferring 
(upon  the  President  authority  to  arm  merchant  ships  .  .  .  The  com- 
ing of  the  news  of  the  plot  changed  all  this,  and  it  seems  now  that 
real  action  will  be  taken  almost  by  acclamation. 

Although  the  Armed  Ships  Bill  barely  failed  to  pass, 
in  spite  of  the  Zimmermann  letter,  that  missive  greatly  as- 
sisted in  reaching  the  end  for  which  it  was  employed. 
Many  Senators  and  Representatives  who  had  not  yet  dared 
to  go  against  the  peace  spirit  of  their  constituencies,  now 
dared  to  go  against  it.  President  Wilson,  his  hand  greatly 
strengthened,  dared  embark  upon  his  misnamed  policy  of 
armed  neutrality,  even  without  express  authority  from 
Congress.  The  path  to  war  became  far  less  thorny. 

After  we  were  at  war,  our  propagandists  continued  pas- 
sionately to  ring  the  changes  upon  the  horrible  "German- 
Mexican  plot."  Said  President  Wilson  in  the  message  of 
December  4,  1917:  "Their  [the  Germans']  sinister  and 
secret  diplomacy  has  sought  to  take  the  very  territory  away 
from  us,  and  disrupt  the  union  of  our  States." 

What  are  the  merits  of  the  charge? 


144  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Here  is  the  famous  Zimmermann  letter  in  full,  as  the 
Wilson  Administration  gave  it  to  the  press : 

BERLIN,  January  19,  1917. 

On  the  first  of  February,  we  intend  to  begin  submarine  warfare 
unrestricted.  In  spite  of  this,  it  is  our  intention  to  keep  neutral  the 
United  States  of  America. 

If  this  attempt  is  not  successful,  we  propose  an  alliance  on  the 
following  basis  with  Mexico:  That  we  shall  make  war  together 
and  together  make  peace.  We  shall  give  general  financial  support, 
and  it  is  understood  that  Mexico  is  to  reconquer  the  lost  territory 
in  New  Mexico,  Texas,  and  Arizona.  The  details  are  left  to  you 
for  settlement. 

You  are  instructed  to  inform  the  President  of  Mexico  of  the  above 
in  the  greatest  confidence,  as  soon  as  it  is  certain  that  there  will  be 
an  outbreak  of  war  with  the  United  States,  and  suggest  that  the 
President  of  Mexico,  on  his  own  initiative,  should  communicate 
with  Japan  suggesting  adherence  at  once  to  this  plan.  At  the  same 
time,  offer  to  mediate  between  Germany  and  Japan. 

Please  call  to  the  attention  of  the  President  of  Mexico  that  the 
employment  of  ruthless  submarine  warfare  now  promises  to  compel 
England  to  make  peace  in  a  few  months. 

(Signed) 
Zimmermann. 

The  letter  is  from  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  at 
Berlin  to  the  German  ambassador  at  Mexico.  It  is  seen 
that  the  proposal  of  an  alliance  is  conditional  on  the  United 
States'  declaring  war  on  Germany,  and  that  the  matter  is 
not  to  be  broached  at  all,  unless  it  becomes  "certain  that 
there  will  be  an  outbreak  of  war  with  the  United  States" 
— a  thing  that  the  German  government  will  try  to  avoid. 

How  did  this  precautionary  measure  of  the  German  gov- 
ernment differ  from  the  efforts  that  governments  habitually 
put  forth  to  procure  the  assistance  of  as  many  other  coun- 
tries as  possible  on  the  eve  of  a  serious  conflict?  How  did 


Other  "Intolerable  Wrongs"          145 

it  differ  from  the  effort  that  the  Entente  governments  ha- 
bitually and  frankly  made  from  the  beginning  to  draw  in  as 
large  a  fraction  of  the  world  as  possible  against  their  ene- 
mies? How  did  it  differ  from  the  efforts  that  President 
Wilson  himself  put  forth  to  turn  as  many  of  the  neutrals 
as  possible  against  the  Central  Powers? 

Compare  the  Zimmermann  letter  with  the  message  that 
President  Wilson  sent  to  all  the  neutral  governments  in  the 
world,  on  severing  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany.  In 
that  message,  the  President  flatly  requested  all  other  neu- 
trals to  follow  the  example  of  America,  and  break  rela- 
tions with  Germany.  While  it  is  theoretically  conceivable 
that  America  might  have  broken  relations  and  kept  out  of 
war,  it  is  not  conceivable  that  such  a  course  would  have  been 
possible  for  Holland,  Switzerland,  or  any  other  neutral 
on  the  borders  of  Germany.  Practically,  then,  the  Presi- 
dent was  asking  these  countries  to  go  to  war,  although  at 
the  time,  and  for  nearly  two  months  afterwards,  he  was 
disclaiming  any  intention  of  going  to  war  himself. 

Moreover,  while  the  German  government  merely  re- 
quested Mexico  to  join  her,  in  the  event  of  war,  we  employed 
coercion  in  the  effort  to  compel  other  nations  to  go  in 
against  the  Central  Powers.  By  various  means  we  induced 
China  and  some  Latin  American  countries  to  join  us.  The 
most  flagrant  example  of  such  coercion,  however,  is  found 
in  our  manner  of  applying  the  embargo  to  the  European 
neutrals. 

The  domestic  right  of  a  country  to  prohibit  exports  of  its 
products,  either  in  peace  or  war,  is  unquestionable.  The 
international  right  or  wrong  of  such  a  procedure  depends 
upon  its  purpose  and  effects. 

When  a  country  at  peace  resorts  to  an  embargo  either  to 
conserve  its  products  for  its  own  use,  to  maintain  its  neutral- 
ity, or  to  compel  another  country  to  respect  its  commercial 


146  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

or  other  prerogatives  under  international  law,  it  is  clearly 
within  its  rights.  When  a  country  at  war  resorts  to  em- 
bargo to  conserve  its  own  products  for  its  own  use,  it  is 
clearly  within  its  rights. 

But  when  a  country  at  war  resorts  to  embargo  in  pur- 
suance of  a  general  policy  of  violation  of  the  rights  of  neu- 
tral countries,  and  employs  the  embargo  as  a  means  to  de- 
stroying neutral  rights,  to  punishing  neutrals  for  being  neu- 
tral, and  to  bribing  or  coercing  them  into  unneutrality — 
seeking  to  range  them  on  its  own  side,  whether  they  will  or 
no — the  offense  can  never  be  condoned. 

No  serious  criticism  can  be  made  of  the  purposes  acknowl- 
edged in  President  Wilson's  statement  explaining  the 
American  embargo.  (July  8,  1917.)  But  the  embargo 
was  not  limited  to  its  acknowledged  purposes.  At  the  very 
time  that  the  President's  statement  was  issued,  neutral 
ships  in  American  ports  were  refused  clearance,  and  condi- 
tions were  laid  down  to  neutrals  requiring  them  to  submit 
to  and  aid  the  blockade  of  Germany — the  same  blockade 
that  America  had  characterized  as  "ineffective,  illegal,  and 
indefensible,"  "a  practical  assertion  of  unlimited  belligerent 
rights  over  neutral  commerce,"  "an  almost  unqualified  de- 
nial of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  nation  whose  ships,  trade, 
or  commerce,  is  interfered  with." 

Not  only  that,  but  we  proceeded  to  erect  an  illegal  block- 
ade upon  the  land,  as  well  as  upon  the  sea;  to  compel  the 
neutral  nations  to  surrender  their  right  to  trade  with  our 
enemies  by  sea  or  land,  and  to  compel  them  to  trade  with 
us  instead,  and  on  our  own  terms. 

That  the  chief  purpose  of  our  embargo  was  to  coerce  un- 
willing neutrals  into  the  war  was  admitted,  behind  closed 
doors,  by  the  Administration  itself.  On  May  9,  1917,  af- 
ter what  the  newspapers  described  as  a  stormy  secret  ses- 
sion of  the  Senate,  Senator  Townsend  insisted  on  debating 


Other  "Intolerable  Wrongs"          147 

the  subject  matter  of  the  secret  session  in  the  open.  In 
the  course  of  his  remarks  on  the  Senate  floor,  Senator 
Townsend  said: 

I  am  not  willing  to  vote  for  the  very  German  methods  we  have 
condemned.  I  understand  that  this  provision  now  before  us  is  not 
to  be  used  for  the  protection  of  American  products,  or  to  protect 
the  American  supply,  but  to  coerce  neutral  countries. 

We  stood  for  neutrality,  and  urged  the  nations  of  the  world  to 
support  neutrality.  Now  that  we  are  engaged  in  the  war,  we  ought 
not  to  coerce  other  nations  and  force  them  to  enter  the  struggle. 
I  can't  believe  that  a  war  of  this  sort  would  result  in  good  to  the 
world.  If  this  is  the  purpose  of  the  United  States,  we  have  aban- 
doned the  high  ideal  we  set  as  our  reason  for  going  to  war. 

I  don't  want  to  seem  antagonistic  to  the  President  or  to  the  gov- 
ernment in  their  prosecution  of  this  war.  But  it  seems  to  me  that 
this  measure  will  intensify  the  war.  Even  though  I  subject  myself 
to  criticism  I  cannot  vote  for  something  that  is  unjust.  I  am  not 
willing  to  force  war  upon  those  neutral  countries — especially  little 
countries — by  methods  we  have  condemned.  If  there  is  a  God  in 
Heaven,  whose  aid  we  are  invoking,  we  will  hardly  get  His  aid  by 
these  measures,  which  are  unjust,  unfair,  and  uncivilized. 

Although  we  did  not  succeed  in  bringing  the  European 
neutrals  formally  into  the  war  on  our  side,  we  did  push 
them  into  a  position  of  unneutrality,  and  forced  them  to  sup- 
port our  illegal  blockade.  We  accomplished  this  through 
our  control,  in  conjunction  with  our  allies,  of  the  available 
food  supplies  of  the  earth,  and  of  the  ships  upon  the  seas. 
We  refused  to  allow  any  of  the  food  under  our  control  to 
go  to  the  neutral  countries  in  question,  or  any  of  the  ships 
under  our  control  to  carry  food  to  the  neutral  countries  in 
question.  We  refused  to  allow  any  of  the  coal  under  our 
control  to  bunker  any  ships  whatever  intending  to  carry 
food  to  the  neutral  countries  in  question. 

But  this  was  not  enough.     We  refused  to  allow  these 


148  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

countries  to  use  their  own  ships  and  their  own  coal  to  carry 
their  own  food  to  one  another,  or  to  themselves.  To  in- 
sure the  attainment  of  this  purpose  we  held  the  merchant 
ships  of  these  neutral  countries  in  our  ports. 

Our  terms  specifically  were,  that  these  neutral  countries 
lease  the  greater  part  of  their  merchant  fleets  to  us  for  the 
period  of  the  war,  turn  over  their  commerce  to  us  and  the 
control  of  their  trade,  submit  to  a  system  of  rationing  for 
themselves,  formally  surrender  their  right  to  trade  with 
Germany  in  all  commodities  carried  in  our  ships  or  theirs, 
and  deliver  their  own  surplus  products  to  us,  under  terms 
and  conditions  which  we  laid  down. 

What  President  Wilson  asked  these  neutral  nations  to 
"agree"  to  was  the  same  thing  in  principle  as,  though  more 
offensive  in  effect  than,  the  thing  which  he  himself  had  char- 
acterized as  "an  attitude  of  unneutrality  toward  the  pres- 
ent enemies  of  Great  Britain  which  would  be  obviously  in- 
consistent with  the  solemn  obligations  of  this  government." 
It  was  on  this  ground  that  the  European  neutrals  all  re- 
fused, at  first,  to  enter  into  any  such  "agreement." 

But  we  held  the  whip  hand — we  had  their  ships.  Our 
action  compelled  these  neutrals  to  choose  between  four 
courses:  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente;  war  on  the  side  of 
Germany;  national  starvation;  or  a  perilous  unneutrality 
favorable  to  the  Entente  and  an  offense  against  Germany. 

At  no  time  had  either  Germany  or  England  so  contemp- 
tuously ridden  over  the  rights  of  America.  The  "negotia- 
tions" continued  for  months.  Norway,  Sweden,  and 
Denmark  surrendered  only  when  face  to  face  with  starva- 
tion. Holland  held  out,  and  its  ships  were  confiscated  with- 
out  the  formality  of  an  "agreement."  The  neutrals 
yielded  because  they  were  intent  on  avoiding  war  at  all 
costs.  They  had  suffered  from  Germany,  but  Germany 


Other  "Intolerable  Wrongs''          149 

had  never  demanded  of  them  any  such  surrender  of  their 
neutral  rights  as  did  we. 

America's  offenses  against  the  neutral  world  come  out  in 
their  most  unlovely  proportions  only  when  it  is  remembered 
with  what  self-righteousness  they  were  perpetrated. 
Through  our  spokesman,  President  Wilson,  we  declared 
ourselves  "the  trustees  of  the  moral  judgments  of  the 
world,"  proclaimed  "our  proud  position  even  amidst  the 
turmoil  of  war  for  the  law  and  the  right"  pledged  our 
country  to  the  golden  rule  in  international  affairs,  asserting 
the  "basis  of  honor"  as  "the  treatment  of  others  as  we 
would  be  treated  ourselves." 

For  ourselves  we  declared  that  "the  first  and  primary 
obligation  is  the  maintenance  of  our  own  sovereignty" 
Yet  we  violated  the  sovereignty  of  others.  "The  territory 
of  a  neutral  power  is  inviolable"  said  the  second  Hague 
convention.  We  signed  it,  and  we  professed  to  go  to  war 
"to  assert  the  principles  of  law  in  a  world  in  which  the 
principles  of  law  have  broken  down" 

Yet  we  violated  the  territory  of  a  neutral,  Russia.  We 
proclaimed  the  international  code:  "First,  that  every  peo- 
ple has  the  right  to  choose  the  sovereignty  under  which  they 
live."  Yet  we  intervened  in  Russia,  hoping  to  overthrow 
the  constituted  government  and  to  replace  it  with  one  that 
would  serve  our  interests  better. 

While  killing  Russians,  we  disclaimed  intervention,  dis- 
claimed wrong,  and  spoke  of  aid.  "Any  intervention  in  an 
internal  struggle,"  says  Lawrence,  "is  an  attempt  to  pre- 
vent the  people  of  a  state  from  settling  their  own  affairs  in 
their  own  way.  ...  It  is  an  attack  upon  independence 
.  .  .  and  consequently  a  gross  violation  of  international 
law."  ("Principles  of  International  Law,"  pp.  134-135.) 

With  our  embargo  we  make  Mexico  feel  the  pinch  of 


ISO  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

hunger;  our  embargo  is  our  right.  At  the  same  time  we 
let  Mexico  understand  that  we  will  permit  no  Mexican  em- 
bargo on  oil;  Mexico  has  no  right  to  an  embargo. 

We  confiscate  the  Dutch  ships,  asserting:  "By  exercising 
in  this  crisis  our  admitted  right  to  control  all  property 
within  our  territory  we  do  no  wrong  to  Holland."  At 
the  same  time  we  threaten  Mexico  with  intervention,  as- 
serting that  certain  taxes  are  "confiscatory." 

The  other  "intolerable  wrongs"  justify  our  war  as  inad- 
equately as  the  wrongs  of  the  submarine  dispute.  As  for 
American  honor,  instead  of  being  maintained,  it  was  de- 
based exactly  to  the  extent  that  principle  was  outraged, 
pledges  were  broken,  and  high  professions  proven  a  mock- 
ery. 


OUR  "OBJECTIVES" 
XIX 

WAR   FOR  DEMOCRACY 

OUR  professed  objectives,  as  voiced  by  President  Wilson, 
and  echoed  by  all  "loyal  patriots"  who  "stood  behind"  him, 
do  not  admit  of  dispute  as  to  their  nature,  so  long  as  they 
were  expressed  in  abstract  terms.  From  the  beginning  of 
the  war  to  its  finish,  all  declarations  of  aim  were  put  for- 
ward as  leading  to  the  same  ends — democracy — permanent 
peace.  Permanent  peace  was  laid  down  as  essential  to  the 
safety  of  democracy — and  a  certain  measure  of  democracy 
was  laid  down  as  essential  to  permanent  peace.  Absolute 
equality  among  nations,  great  and  small;  equal  and  absolute 
independence  in  domestic  affairs;  freedom  of  the  seas  for 
all,  upon  terms  of  equality,  in  peace  and  in  war;  the  self- 
determination  of  peoples;  some  international  understand- 
ing for  the  enforcement  of  these  principles;  open  diplo- 
macy, the  abolition  of  militarism  and  autocracy — these 
were  put  forward  simply  as  conditions  of  that  measure  of 
democracy  which  a  permanent  peace  requires. 

These  principles  of  a  permanent  peace  were  not  new. 
They  are  not  Wilson  creations  or  discoveries.  They  were 
urged  upon  the  world  by  a  few  men  in  all  countries  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  during  the  war  they  were  ac- 
cepted— in  words — by  the  leading  statesmen  of  both  sides. 

We  have  the  word  of  President  Wilson  himself  that: 
"The  objects  which  the  statesmen  of  the  belligerents  on 
both  sides  have  in  mind  in  this  war  are  virtually  the  same, 

151 


152  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

as  stated  in  general  terms  to  their  own  people  and  to  the 
world."  (Dec.  18,  1916.)  What  governments,  if  any, 
in  fact  went  to  war  for  democracy?  It  is  obvious  that  the 
answer  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  abstract  professions  of 
statesmen,  but  in  the  record  of  concrete  performances. 

Even  had  President  Wilson  been  sincere  in  his  professed 
regard  for  the  principles  of  democracy  and  permanent 
peace,  that  alone  would  not  have  justified  him  in  leading 
America  into  war.  He  would  still  have  been  under  the 
obligation  to  arrive  at  war  through  constitutional  and  hon- 
est means.  Furthermore,  the  practicability  of  reaching 
the  desired  ends  through  war  would  have  had  to  be  over- 
whelmingly clear. 

It  happens  that  we  have  Wilson's  own  word  on  the  inex- 
pediency of  going  to  war  for  democracy,  permanent  peace, 
or  for  almost  any  other  end,  however  desirable.  Although, 
from  the  beginning  of  his  tenure  of  office,  the  President 
proclaimed  adherence  to  the  same  principles  of  international 
conduct  as  he  later  translated  into  war  objectives,  until 
April,  1917,  he  not  only  refrained  from  going  to  war  for 
their  attainment,  but  argued  copiously  and  eloquently  upon 
the  futility  of  such  a  course.  "There  is  nothing  that  the 
United  States  wants  that  it  has  to  get  by  war.  .  .  .  Force 
will  not  accomplish  anything  that  is  permanent.  .  .  .  We 
are  not  interested  in  seeing  one  group  of  nations  prevail 
over  another.  .  .  .  I  challenge  you  to  cite  me  an  instance 
in  the  history  of  the  world  where  liberty  was  handed  down 
from  above"  Even  after  April,  1917,  President  Wilson, 
at  times,  pronounced  against  a  crusade  at  arms  to  impose 
democracy  upon  other  countries,  as  we  shall  soon  see. 

Even  were  a  government  to  be  found  unselfish  enough  to 


War  for  Democracy  153 

assume  the  fearful  cost  of  war,  simply  for  the  sake  of  ex- 
tending democracy,  the  very  attempt  to  impose  democracy 
upon  another  nation  would  constitute  a  violation  of  sover- 
eignty, which  happens  to  be  one  of  the  conditions  of  de- 
mocracy which  President  Wilson  laid  down  as  a  prerequi- 
site to  permanent  peace. 

How,  for  that  matter,  can  autocracy  and  militarism  be 
banished  from  the  earth,  by  opposing  the  autocracy  and 
militarism  of  one  country,  with  autocracy  and  militarism 
set  up  in  other  countries?  During  the  fighting,  the  beau- 
ties in  the  so-called  German  system  were  urged  upon  us,  no- 
tably in  the  President's  proclamation  of  May  18,  1917,  and 
frequently  by  such  men  as  James  W.  Gerard,  ex-ambassa- 
dor to  Germany,  and  one  of  the  President's  most  trusted 
propagandists.  But  if  the  system  is  so  fine,  why  should  we 
wish  to  destroy  it,  in  Germany  or  anywhere  else?  If  it  be 
desirable  for  us,  why  not  for  our  neighbors?  For  the  very 
gentlemen  who  shouted  most  violently  for  the  overthrow 
of  German  militarism  advocated  the  same  system  for 
America,  not  merely  as  a  temporary  measure  for  the  over- 
throw of  German  militarism;  after  German  militarism  was 
overthrown  they  continued  to  advocate  it  as  a  permanent 
feature  of  American  "democracy" ! 

One  of  the  most  universally  accepted  principles  of  the 
international  law  for  which  we  professed  to  fight  was  that 
one  country  may  not  attempt  to  dictate  the  form  of  govern- 
ment of  another,  or  any  of  its  internal  affairs,  or  find  a  basis 
for  dispute  in  any  of  its  policies  except  where  the  latter  may 
involve  either  a  direct  infringement  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  first  country,  or  an  attack  upon  its  vital  interests.  The 
principle  of  self-determination  precludes  any  government 
from  attempting  to  serve  democracy  abroad  by  force,  ex- 
cept as  that  might  be  possible  in  the  adjustment  of  the 


154  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

external  affairs  of  nations.  The  question  of  reform  within 
any  country  must  be  left  strictly  to  be  worked  out  by  the 
population  of  that  country.  The  very  term,  ua  war  for 
democracy,"  carries  a  contradiction  within  itself;  for  the 
act  destroys  the  aim. 


XX 

PEACE  WITHOUT  VICTORY  VERSUS  PEACE  FROM  VICTORY 

PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  first  formal  and  comprehensive  state- 
ment of  the  terms  requisite  for  a  permanent  peace,  and  the 
means  for  attaining  such  a  peace,  was  made  January  22, 
1917,  in  the  famous  Senate  address  in  which  originated  the 
phrase,  "peace  without  victory."  On  going  to  war  he  did 
not  repudiate  his  peace-without-victory  speech  as  such,  nor 
at  any  time  confess  himself  wrong  in  the  basic  principles 
there  laid  down.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  war  message  he 
assured  us:  "I  have  exactly  the  same  thing  in  mind  now  that 
I  had  in  mind  when  I  addressed  the  Senate  on  the  22nd  of 
January  last."  In  the  message  of  December  4,  of  the  same 
year,  he  again  referred  to  the  January  address,  asserting 
positively:  "Our  entrance  into  the  war  has  not  altered  our 
attitude  toward  the  settlement  that  must  come  when  it  is 


over." 


Accordingly,  here  and  there  among  the  President's  later 
pronouncements  appear  declarations  that  prove  to  be 
strictly  in  harmony  with  the  original  formula.  Yet,  side 
by  side  with  these,  appear  others  of  a  flatly  contradictory 
nature. 

The  principle  of  first  importance  in  the  President's  origi- 
nal formula  related,  not  to  the  actual  conditions  of  a  demo- 
cratic and  permanent  peace,  but  to  the  means  for  attaining 
it,  and  was  expressed  by  the  phrase  itself,  "peace  without 
victory" : 

It  must  be  a  peace  without  victory.  .  .  .  Victory  would  mean 
peace  forced  upon  the  loser,  a  victor's  terms  imposed  upon  the  van- 

155 


156  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

quished.  It  would  be  accepted  in  humiliation,  under  duress,  at  an 
intolerable  sacrifice,  and  would  leave  a  sting,  a  resentment,  a  bitter 
memory,  upon  which  terms  of  peace  would  rest,  not  permanently, 
but  only  as  upon  quicksand. 

Yet,  in  the  war  message,  the  President  advised  that  Con- 
gress "exert  all  its  power  and  employ  all  its  resources  to 
bring  the  government  of  the  German  Empire  to  terms" ;  and 
thereafter  he  repeated  the  sentiment  innumerable  times. 

Did  the  President  change  his  convictions  as  to  the  means 
for  attaining  a  permanent  peace  after  January,  1917? 
Why,  then,  did  he  continue  to  affirm  his  allegiance  to  that 
original  formula?  How  great  the  inconsistency,  is  seen 
from  the  President's  elaboration  of  this  article  of  his  orig- 
inal book  of  faith: 

Fortunately  .  .  .  the  statesmen  of  both  of  the  groups  of  nations 
now  arrayed  against  one  another  have  said,  in  terms  that  could 
not  be  misinterpreted,  that  it  was  no  part  of  the  purpose  they  had  in 
mind  to  crush  their  opponents. 

Yet,  in  the  message  of  December  4,  we  find  this  declara- 
tion, characteristic  of  later  utterances: 

The  German  power  .  .  .  must  be  crushed. 

Why  should  it  be  fortunate,  at  the  beginning  of  1917, 
that  England,  France,  and  their  allies  did  not  wish  to  crush 
Germany?  The  President  answered  as  follows: 

Only  a  peace  between  equals  can  last;  only  a  peace  the  very 
principle  of  which  is  equality  and  a  common  participation  in  a  com- 
mon benefit.  .  .  .  The  equality  of  nations  upon  which  peace  must 
be  founded,  if  it  is  to  last,  must  be  an  equality  of  rights. 

If  this  and  previous  quotations  from  the  same  address 
mean  anything  at  all,  they  mean  that  the  primary  condition 
for  the  attainment  of  a  permanent  and  democratic  peace 
is  that  the  various  belligerents  shall  meet  at  the  peace  table 


Peace  Without  Victory  157 

on  terms  of  absolute  equality,  that  neither  shall  hold  a 
military  advantage  over  the  other,  that  neither  shall  be  in 
a  position  to  dictate  to  the  other.  The  corollary  of  this  is 
that,  should  circumstances  require  America  to  enter  the 
war,  we  would  not  be  justified  in  continuing  until  victory, 
but  only  until  such  a  time  as  the  enemy  became  willing  to 
meet  us  at  the  peace  table  on  terms  of  equality. 

But,  throughout  the  war  addresses,  the  military  advan- 
tages of  victory  were  frequently  urged,  even  for  the  specific 
purpose  of  dictating  a  permanent  and  democratic  peace. 
"We  are  .  .  .  seeking  to  make  conquest  of  peace  by  arms," 
said  the  President,  in  the  December  4  address.  And  in 
the  Buffalo  speech  (Nov.  12,  1917),  he  proclaimed  that 
"the  way  to  get  peace,  if  you  want  it  for  more  than  a  few 
minutes,"  would  be  to  win  the  war. 

It  was  on  this  opposite  theory  that  President  Wilson 
acted  in  dealing  with  the  enemy's  overtures  for  peace.  In 
the  note  of  October  5,  1918,  he  demanded  that,  as  one  of 
the  conditions  precedent  to  talking  peace,  the  Germans 
withdraw  from  Allied  soil.  This  demand  would  have  been 
perfectly  consistent  with  the  permanent  peace  formula,  had 
compliance  with  it  equalized  the  position  of  the  opposing 
sides;  but  it  happened  that  it  made  for  greater  ^equality. 
So  long  as  the  powers  associated  with  us  occupied  more 
German  territory — to-wit,  the  German  colonies — than  the 
Allied  territory  occupied  by  Germany,  and  so  long  as  the 
demand  that  Germany  withdraw  was  not  accompanied  by 
an  offer  of  the  Allies  to  withdraw,  the  principle  of  "equality 
of  rights"  was  flagrantly  violated. 

Moreover,  in  subsequent  notes,  replying  to  Germany's 
consent  to  withdraw  from  invaded  territory — and  other 
concessions  of  Germany — the  President  acknowledged  that 
inequality  was  the  very  thing  he  was  seeking,  and  that, 
unless  Germany  would  accept  inequality  at  the  peace 


158  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

table,  there  would  be  no  armistice  and  no  peace.  In  the 
note  of  October  14,  he  insisted  upon  "absolutely  satisfac- 
tory safeguards  and  guarantees  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
present  military  supremacy  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Allies  in  the  field" ;  and  in  the  note  of  October  23,  upon  a 
situation  "which  would  leave  the  United  States  and  the 
powers  associated  with  her  in  a  position  to  enforce  any  ar- 
rangements that  may  be  entered  into." 

The  President's  position  in  action,  therefore,  was  that 
only  a  peace  with  victory  would  be  considered,  only  a  peace 
between  wwequals,  only  such  a  peace  as  "would  rest,  not 
permanently,  but  "only  as  upon  quicksand."  It  was  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  formula  that  the  armistice  terms  were 
framed  and  imposed. 

In  spite  of  all  this,  during  his  exhortations  to  victory, 
President  Wilson  at  times  showed  that  he  was  fully  aware 
that  "peace  without  victory"  signifies  equality  in  the  field  as 
a  means  to  arriving  at  equality  in  the  terms — particularly 
in  the  reply  to  the  Pope,  and  in  the  Baltimore  speech  (Apr. 
6,  1918).  At  the  same  time,  he  was  advancing  an  argu- 
ment forecasting  a  refusal  of  equality  for  the  Kaiser. 
This  argument  was  that  the  word  of  the  German  govern- 
ment could  not  be  trusted.  "They  observe  no  covenants," 
said  he,  September  27,  1918.  "We  cannot  'come  to  terms' 
with  them.  They  have  made  it  impossible." 

In  the  course  of  such  denunciations,  however,  it  was  al- 
ways made  clear  that  the  application  was  to  the  then  exist- 
ing German  government.  Far  from  suggesting  that  the 
word  of  the  German  people  was  less  trustworthy  than  the 
word  of  any  other  people,  Wilson  gave  the  world  to  under- 
stand that  the  word  of  a  reformed  German  government 
would  be  worth  as  much  as  that  of  other  governments. 
When  it  is  remembered  that  the  President  did  not,  at  any 
time,  advance  any  other  argument  why  a  peace  between 


Peace  Without  Victory  159 

wwequals  should  be  imposed  upon  Germany,  except  that 
the  word  of  the  Kaiser's  government  was  worthless,  his 
war  speeches  have  to  be  taken  as  embodying  a  most  unequiv- 
ocal pledge  to  the  German  people  that,  on  the  day  they 
overturned  the  Kaiser,  they  would  be  acceptable  as  equals 
at  the  peace  table. 

As  late  as  October  23,  1918,  we  find  the  President  re- 
fusing peace  on  the  ground  that  "the  nations  of  the  world 
do  not  and  cannot  trust  the  word  of  those  who  have  hith- 
erto been  the  masters  of  German  policy."  With  this  prop- 
osition held  before  them,  in  their  desperate  need  for  peace, 
the  German  people  overthrew  the  Kaiser  and  his  entire 
circle  in  a  manner  so  emphatic  that  its  genuineness  was  not 
questioned. 

What,  then,  became  of  the  President's  promises?  What 
became  of  his  eloquent  differentiations  between  the  Kaiser's 
government  and  the  German  people?  Did  he  accord  the 
reformed  German  government  equality  at  the  peace- 
table?  Did  he  exert  any  effort  in  that  direction?  Did 
the  German  revolution  make  any  difference  whatever  in 
his  course  of  action?  Were  the  armistice  terms  one  whit 
less  crushing  than  they  would  have  been  had  the  Kaiser  him- 
self remained  at  Potsdam?  Just  how  much  was  the  word 
of  Woodrow  Wilson  worth  ? 

The  truth  is  that  all  of  the  President's  utterances  about 
the  worthless  word  of  the  Kaiser  standing  as  a  bar  to  a  dem- 
ocratic peace  are  answered  by  other  utterances  of  the 
President.  His  original  peace  formula  does  not  require 
that  the  word  of  any  government  whatever  be  taken  as  a 
means  to  guaranteeing  the  peace  covenants.  Fully  recog- 
nizing that  the  peace  of  the  world  in  the  past  has  been  dis- 
turbed by  governments  dishonoring  their  word — not  the 
German  government  alone,  but  governments  in  general — 
it  fully  provides  for  means  to  compel  all  to  keep  their  word, 


160  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

in  spite  of  any  possible  lapses  of  conscience.     Here  is  the 
provision : 

It  will  be  absolutely  necessary  that  a  force  be  created,  as  a  guaran- 
tor of  the  permanency  of  the  settlement,  so  much  greater  than  the 
force  of  any  nation  now  engaged,  or  any  alliance  hitherto  formed 
or  projected,  that  no  nation,  no  probable  combination  of  nations, 
could  face  or  withstand  it.  If  the  peace  presently  made  is  to  en- 
dure, it  must  be  a  peace  made  secure  by  the  organized  major  force  of 
mankind. 

This  scheme  is  either  efficacious  or  it  is  not.  If  it  is 
efficacious,  then  the  question  of  the  untrustworthiness  of 
the  word  of  the  German  government  is  irrelevant.  If  it  is 
not  efficacious,  then  it  is  ridiculous  to  continue  advocating 
it.  Nevertheless,  along  with  his  advocacy  of  a  peace  be- 
tween unequals  because  of  the  moral  incapacity  of  our  ene- 
mies, the  President  continued  his  advocacy  of  a  scheme  to 
enforce  a  peace  between  equals,  regardless  of  moral  incapa- 
cities, wherever  found.  Here  is  the  form  which  this  advo- 
cacy took  as  late  as  June  7,  1918 : 

Very  well,  let  us  make  an  arrangement  by  which  we  will  give 
bonds.  Let  us  have  a  common  guarantee  that  all  of  us  will  sign  a 
declaration  of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity.  Let 
us  agree  that  if  any  one  of  us,  the  United  States  included,  violates 
the  political  independence  or  territorial  integrity  of  any  of  the  others, 
all  others  will  jump  on  her.  .  .  .  Now  that  is  the  kind  of  an  agree- 
ment that  will  have  to  be  the  foundation  of  the  future  life  of  the 
nations  of  the  world,  gentlemen.  The  whole  family  of  nations  will 
have  to  guarantee  to  each  nation  that  no  nation  shall  violate  its 
political  independence  or  its  territorial  integrity.  That  is  the  basis 
— the  only  conceivable  basis — for  the  future  peace  of  the  world. 
(Address  to  Mexican  editors.) 

So  much  for  the  means  requisite  for  attaining  a  perma- 
nent and  democratic  peace.  Contradictions  quite  as  re- 


Peace  Without  Victory  161 

markable  appear  in  the  terms  themselves,  as  soon  as  they 
begin  to  be  stated  in  concrete  form. 

As  "equality  of  rights"  is  the  vital  principle  of  both  the 
means  and  the  terms  of  the  President's  original  peace  creed, 
so  equality  of  sovereignty  is  the  primary  essential  of  the 
terms.  In  the  peace-without-victory  address,  the  propo- 
sition was  put  in  the  following  words : 

I  am  proposing  .  .  .  that  all  nations  should  henceforth  with  one 
accord  adopt  the  doctrine  .  .  .  that  no  nation  should  seek  to  extend 
its  polity  over  any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every  people 
should  be  left  free  to  determine  its  own  polity,  its  own  way  of  devel- 
opment, unhindered,  unthreatened,  unafraid. 

This  is  a  principle  to  which  the  President  had  frequently 
professed  allegiance  from  the  beginning  of  his  tenure  of 
office.  That  it  means  that  one  government  may  not  at- 
tempt to  abolish  another  government,  however  pernicious 
the  latter  may  be — and  however  pure  the  former — is  ob- 
vious, and  it  was  so  interpreted  on  almost  innumerable  oc- 
casions in  pre-war  days  by  the  President  himself.  It  was 
even  interpreted  by  him  as  imposing  "upon  each  nation  the 
duty  of  seeing  to  it  that  all  influences  proceeding  from  its 
own  citizens  meant  to  encourage  or  assist  revolution  in 
other  states  shall  be  sternly  and  effectually  suppressed  and 
prevented"  (Inaugural  address,  1917.) 

After  we  entered  the  war,  he  pledged  himself  to  apply 
the  principle  to  our  enemies,  as  a  matter  of  course.  In 
the  message  of  December  4,  1917,  he  made  this  sweeping 
commitment : 

We  owe  it,  however,  to  ourselves  to  say  that  we  do  not  wish  in 
any  way  to  impair  or  rearrange  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  It 
is  no  affair  of  ours  what  they  do  with  their  own  life,  either  indus- 
trially or  politically.  We  do  not  propose  or  desire  to  dictate  to 
them  in  any  way.  We  only  desire  to  see  that  their  affairs  are  left 


i62  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

in  their  own  hands  in  all  matters,  great  or  small.  .  .  .  And  our  atti- 
tude and  purpose  with  regard  to  Germany  herself  are  of  a  like 
kind.  We  intend  no  wrong  against  the  German  Empire,  no  inter- 
ference with  her  internal  affairs.  We  should  deem  either  the  one 
or  the  other  absolutely  unjustifiable,  absolutely  contrary  to  the  prin- 
ciples we  have  professed  to  live  by  and  to  hold  most  sacred  through- 
out our  life  as  a  nation.  .  .  .  No  one  is  threatening  the  existence  or 
the  independence  of  the  German  Empire.  .  .  . 

In  the  speech  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  Jan.  8,  1918,  these 
promises  were  reaffirmed,  both  to  Germany  and  to  Austria. 

Presidential  pronouncements  alternating  with  these,  in 
point  of  time,  and  flatly  contradicting  them,  begin  with  the 
war  message  and  do  not  cease.  The  war  message  is,  in 
considerable  part,  an  argument  that  America  is  justified 
in  going  to  war  to  reform  the  German  government,  as  well 
as  other  governments:  "We  shall  fight  .  .  .  for  the  right 
of  those  who  submit  to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their 
own  governments."  He  even  proceeded  to  make  revolu- 
tion in  Germany  an  objective  in  war,  and  a  condition  of 
peace.  In  the  note  of  October  14,  1918,  he  insisted  that 
the  German  people  "alter"  their  government.  In  the  note 
of  October  23  he  laid  down  the  ultimatum: 

The  President  deems  it  his  duty  to  point  out  that,  in  concluding 
peace  .  .  .  the  government  of  the  United  States  cannot  deal  with 
any  but  veritable  representatives  of  the  German  people  who  have  been 
assured  of  a  genuine  constitutional  standing  as  the  real  rulers  of 
Germany. 

Dismemberment  itself  became,  in  actual  practice,  a  war 
aim  of  America,  although  it  had  been  pronounced  against, 
in  one  form  or  another,  all  the  way  from  the  peace-without- 
victory  address,  to  the  address  of  February  n,  1918,  and 
even  afterwards.  "The  dismemberment  of  empires,"  the 
President  told  the  Pope,  "we  deem  inexpedient  and  in 


Peace  Without  Victory  163 

the  end  worse  than  futile,  no  proper  basis  for  a  peace  of 
any  kind,  least  of  all  for  an  enduring  peace,"  while  in  the 
message  of  December  4,  1917,  he  quoted  the  phrase,  "no 
annexations,  no  contributions,  no  indemnities,"  asserting 
that  they  expressed  his  own  thought.  Yet  as  early  as  his 
message  to  Russia  (May  26,  1917)  he  was,  at  times,  shuf- 
fling on  the  whole  matter.  He  was  saying:  "The  status 
quo  must  be  altered."  Also: 

No  territory  must  change  hands  except  for  the  purpose  of  secur- 
ing those  who  inhabit  it  a  fair  chance  of  life  and  liberty.  No  in- 
demnities must  be  insisted  upon  except  those  that  constitute  pay- 
ment for  manifest  wrongs  done.  No  readjustments  of  power  must 
be  made  except  such  as  will  tend  to  secure  the  future  peace  of  the 
world,  and  the  future  welfare  and  happiness  of  its  peoples. 

We  soon  find  that  the  President  himself  intends  to  deter- 
mine upon  the  exceptions,  and  that  they  are  always  to  be 
at  the  expense  of  our  enemies,  never  of  our  allies.  Al- 
though in  the  message  of  February  n,  1918,  the  President 
disclaimed  any  "desire  to  interfere  in  European  affairs  or 
to  act  as  arbiter  of  European  territorial  disputes,"  he  had 
already  put  forward  his  Fourteen  Points,  three  of  which 
forecasted  the  process  of  dismemberment.  Germany  must 
cede  France  Alsace-Lorraine.  Austria  must  surrender  to 
Italy  territory  that  had  never  belonged  to  the  kingdom  of 
Italy.  An  independent  Poland  must  be  created,  in  part, 
out  of  territory  long  recognized  as  belonging  to  our  ene- 
mies. In  the  message  of  December  4,  the  President  had 
even  announced  the  dissolution  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance 
as  a  war  objective.  Finally,  in  October,  1918,  he  notified 
Austria-Hungary  that  the  first  condition  of  a  cessation  of 
hostilities  must  be  a  recognition  of  the  Czecho-Slovak  and 
Jugo-Slav  "peoples"  as  "members  of  the  family  of  na- 
tions." 


164  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

So,  side  by  side,  coming  from  the  mouth  of  the  same  man, 
not  separated  by  time,  and  reflected  throughout  our  en- 
tire war  propaganda,  we  find  two  distinct  statements  of 
war  objectives  and  peace  terms,  absolutely  inconsistent  one 
with  the  other,  diametrically  opposed;  two  formulas  cover- 
ing both  the  terms  of  a  democratic  and  permanent  peace, 
and  the  means  for  attaining  it;  two  theories  utterly  irrecon- 
cilable. 

The  first  can  only  be  based  upon  the  assumption  of  the 
approximate  moral  equality  of  the  opposing  sides,  not 
merely  of  the  opposing  peoples,  but  of  the  opposing  govern- 
ments— on  the  assumption  that  the  character,  motives, 
aims,  ambitions,  purposes,  and  methods  of  the  opposing 
sides  were  never  essentially  different.  Necessarily,  it  re- 
jects the  theory  that  the  responsibility  for  the  war  lies 
wholly  in  any  one  quarter,  or  that  the  liberty  of  the  world 
is  or  was  particularly  imperiled  by  the  power  and  ambitions 
of  any  one  or  any  group.  It  rests,  instead,  upon  the  theory 
that  the  great  war  was  caused  by  things,  by  systems,  by 
methods  of  action  common  to  all;  specifically,  by  the  gen- 
eral practice  of  secret  diplomacy,  by  a  general  lack  of  re- 
spect for  the  sovereignty  of  weaker  peoples,  by  the  general 
practice  of  backing  up  private  investments  in  weaker  coun- 
tries with  armies  and  navies,  by  the  inadequacy  of  existing 
international  law,  by  the  general  practice  of  violating  in- 
ternational covenants  at  will,  by  the  common  jealousies  and 
hatreds  growing  out  of  former  peaces  from  victory,  by  the 
absence  of  an  effective  concert  of  power  to  prevent  war. 

The  second  is  based  upon  the  diametrically  opposite  as- 
sumption, that  the  character,  ambitions,  and  methods  of 
the  German  government  were  vitally  different  from  those 
of  her  enemies;  that  the  former  governments  of  Germany 
and  Austria  are  solely  responsible  for  the  great  war;  that 
the  Germans  literally  plotted  world  domination  by  might  of 


Peace  Without  Victory  165 

the  sword;  that  the  covenanted  word  of  the  enemies  of  the 
Kaiser  was  of  distinctly  greater  value  than  the  covenanted 
word  of  the  Kaiser;  that  the  German  world  peril  was  a 
fact;  that  world  conquest  by  Germany  was  reasonably  pos- 
sible; that  Germany  represented  the  principle  of  autocracy 
in  world  affairs,  and  that  her  enemies  represented  the  prin- 
ciple of  democracy. 

To  each  of  these  theories  the  President  pledged  alle- 
giance upon  alternate  occasions,  even  in  alternate  phrases. 
If  the  first  is  the  correct  one,  then  our  war  was  a  crime.  If 
the  second  is  the  correct  one,  then  our  neutrality  for  nearly 
three  years  was  a  crime.  Of  the  first  the  President  de- 
clared: 

I  feel  confident  that  I  have  said  what  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  wish  me  to  say.  .  .  .  These  are  American  princi- 
ples, American  policies. "  We  can  stand  for  no  others.  .  .  .  They 
are  the  principles  of  mankind  and  must  prevail.  ( Peace-without- 
victory  speech.) 

But  he  stood  for  the  other  theory  whenever  it  came  to 
action.  We  shall  now  examine  the  premises  upon  which 
that  theory  is  based. 


XXI 

THE  GERMAN  WORLD  PERIL  BUGABOO 

ALTHOUGH,  in  the  official  propaganda,  our  motives,  causes, 
and  objectives,  were  stated  in  forms  remarkably  numerous 
and  diverse,  no  theme  was  more  frequently  played  upon 
than  the  German  peril.  No  exhortation  to  patriotism  in 
the  years  1917  or  1918  was  complete  without  its  horrible 
picture  of  German  domination.  Every  invocation  to  per- 
sonal sacrifice,  to  loyalty,  to  courage,  to  hatred,  was  accom- 
panied by  an  appeal  to  fear.  Fear ! 

Was  the  fear  justified?  Did  the  youth  of  America  pour 
out  its  blood  in  a  fight  against  a  reality,  or  against  a  man 
of  straw? 

It  is  obvious  that  not  absolute,  but  relative,  depravity 
must  be  the  point  of  inquiry;  that  the  force  of  any  indict- 
ment of  a  government  or  a  nation  can  be  gauged  only  by 
comparing  it,  on  the  same  counts,  with  its  neighbors.  For 
it  must  be  apparent  that  if  the  character,  the  methods,  and 
the  aims  of  the  governments  with  which  we  associated  our- 
selves in  war,  do  not  stand  upon  a  distinctly  higher  plane 
than  the  character,  the  methods,  and  the  aims  of  the  gov- 
ernments they  opposed,  then  a  victory  of  the  former  and 
a  humiliation  of  the  latter  must  be  absolutely  futile.  The 
causes  of  world  war  will  not  be  abolished  or  abated.  Hu- 
manity will  not  be  benefited  in  any  respect  or  degree.  Civ- 
ilization will  go  on  exactly  as  it  has  gone  before,  serenely 
traversing  a  cycle  that  will  bring  it  inevitably  around  to 
another  vast  catastrophe  of  steel  and  blood. 

Insofar  as  they  relate  to  the  conduct  of  the  Kaiser's 

166 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    167 

government  toward  America,  the  accusations  of  special 
depravity  have  already  been  exploded.  If  the  German 
peril  was  ever  a  reality,  therefore,  it  must  have  been  so  only 
in  the  remote  sense — and  if  a  reality  in  the  remote  sense, 
the  evidence  of  the  fact  must  be  found  exclusively  in  those 
issues  which  the  President  himself,  up  to  the  delivery  of 
his  war  message,  had  a  hundred  times  assured  his  people 
did  not  concern  them. 

A  brief  but  sufficient  glance  will  now  be  given  these  is- 
sues. 

Democracy  versus  Autocracy. 

"We  stand,"  said  President  Wilson  to  President  Poin- 
care  (Apr.  8,  1917),  uas  partners  of  the  noble  democra- 
cies whose  acts  and  aims  make  for  the  perpetuation  of 
rights  and  freedom  of  man,  and  for  the  safeguarding  of 
the  true  principles  of  human  liberties." 

But  whether  we  and  our  "noble"  allies  are,  on  the  whole, 
more  democratic  than  were  our  enemies,  is  a  debatable  ques- 
tion. Whether  our  most  powerful  ally  is  more  democratic 
than  was  our  most  powerful  enemy,  even,  is  a  debatable 
question. 

If  to  possess  the  more  clearly  defined  leisure  class  be  the 
measure  of  democracy,  then  England  is  more  democratic 
than  was  the  Kaiser's  Germany. 

If  the  size  of  such  leisure  class — the  proportion  of  the 
population  that  never  does  any  useful  thing,  from  the  cradle 
to  the  grave,  but  draws  its  sustenance  wholly  from  others 
— be  the  measure  of  democracy,  then  England  is  the  most 
democratic  of  all  modern  nations. 

If  the  volume  of  unearned  income  drawn  from  overseas 
be  the  measure  of  the  democracy  of  a  country,  then  Eng- 
land is  the  most  democratic  country  in  the  world. 

If  the  control  and  exploitation  of  the  largest  number  of 


i68  <  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

subject  peoples  be  the  measure  of  democracy,  then  England 
is  the  most  democratic  nation  on  earth. 

If  to  have  fought  more  wars  of  spoliation;  to  have  taken 
by  conquest,  and  held  by  force,  the  largest  areas  of  the 
earth's  surface;  to  have  destroyed  or  overridden  the  larg- 
est number  of  small  nations;  to  have  interfered  in  the  af- 
fairs of  other  peoples,  great  and  small,  the  most  flagrantly 
and  the  largest  number  of  times;  to  have  broken  the  most 
treaties;  to  have  led  the  way  in  secret  diplomacy;  to  have 
claimed  the  seas  as  its  own;  to  have  asserted  its  God-given 
right  to  rule  the  world — if  any  of  these  be  the  measure  of 
democracy,  then  England  is  the  most  brilliant  example  of 
a  noble  democracy  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

The  government  of  England  was  slightly  more  demo- 
cratic in  some  respects — slightly,  very  slightly — at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  than  was  Germany's.  But  the  particular 
realm  in  which  it  excelled  is  of  secondary  importance. 
Governments  are  a  menace  to  the  peace  and  freedom  of  the 
world  only  as  they  are  autocratic  in  their  foreign  relations. 

Who — and  how  many — hold  in  their  hands  the  power 
to  choose  war  for  a  given  people?  That  is  the  pertinent 
question.  What  is  the  measure  of  the  given  government's 
responsibility  to  its  people  in  the  particular  affairs  which 
involve  nations  in  war  with  one  another?  In  this  vital 
respect  did  Germany  differ  distinctly  from  its  enemies? 

Responsibility  versus  Irresponsibility. 

We  frequently  pronounced  against  the  right  of  the  Ger- 
man "autocracy"  to  exist,  expressly  because  of  its  irrespon- 
sibility to  its  people  in  its  foreign  relations.  In  the  war 
message  we  find  these  words: 

We  act  ...  only  in  opposition  to  an  irresponsible  government. 
.  .  .  We  have  no  quarrel  with  the  German  people.  We  have  no 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    169 

feeling  toward  them  but  one  of  sympathy  and  friendship.  It  was 
not  upon  their  impulse  that  their  government  acted  in  entering  this 
war.  It  was  not  with  their  previous  knowledge  or  approval.  It 
was  a  war  determined  upon  as  wars  used  to  be  determined  upon  in 
the  old,  unhappy  days  when  peoples  were  nowhere  consulted  by 
their  rulers  and  wars  were  provoked  and  waged  in  the  interests  of 
dynasties  or  of  little  groups  of  ambitious  men  who  were  accustomed 
to  use  their  fellow-men  as  pawns  and  tools. 

At  Mt.  Vernon,  July  4,  1918,  President  Wilson  put  it 
this  way: 

These  are  the  ends  for  which  the  associated  peoples  of  the  world 
are  fighting,  and  which  must  be  conceded  them  before  there  can  be 
peace : 

I.  The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  anywhere  that  can 
separately,  secretly  and  of  its  single  choice  disturb  the  peace  of  the 
world;  or  if  it  cannot  be  presently  destroyed,  at  least  its  reduction 
to  virtual  impotence. 

The  President  presented  this  clause  to  Germany,  on 
October  14,  as  one  of  the  conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled 
contingent  on  the  granting  of  an  armistice.  And  when  the 
German  Foreign  Secretary,  in  reply,  outlined  the  constitu- 
tional reforms  then  being  initiated,  the  President  argued 
the  matter,  in  part,  as  follows : 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  heart  of  the  present  difficulty  has 
been  reached.  It  may  be  that  future  wars  have  been  brought  under 
the  control  of  the  German  people,  but  the  present  war  has  not  been. 
...  It  is  evident  .  .  .  that  the  determining  initiative  still  remains 
with  those  who  have  hitherto  been  the  masters  of  Germany.  (Note 
of  Oct.  23.) 

But  it  happens  that  the  responsibility  of  the  Kaiser's 
government  in  this  particular  realm  had,  at  all  times,  been 
greater,  in  law,  than  the  responsibility  of  its  most  powerful 


iyo  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

enemy,  and  fully  equal,  in  practice,  to  the  average  respon- 
sibility found  among  the  entire  body  of  its  enemies,  includ- 
ing the  United  States. 

While  the  assent  of  the  Reichstag  was  not  required  for 
a  declaration  of  war,  the  assent  of  the  Bundesrath  was. 
The  assent  of  Parliament  was  not  required;  no  check  ex- 
isted in  England  equal  to  the  Bundesrath. 

As  a  matter  of  practice,  all  the  belligerent  governments 
entered  war  without  any  adequate  consultation  of  the  will 
of  their  various  peoples.  Although  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  had  to  declare  war,  it  was  an  empty  formal- 
ity. As  has  been  shown,  America  was  legally  at  war,  by 
illegal  action  of  the  President,  and  Congress  was  practically 
forced  to  go  through  the  motions  of  legalizing  an  accom- 
plished fact.  In  electing  the  President,  the  American  peo- 
ple had  pronounced  against  war,  not  for  it,  and  the  Presi- 
dent was  able  to  arrive  at  war  only  through  a  series  of 
deceptions  and  usurpations,  in  which  his  "single  choice" 
was  pitted  against  the  choice  of  both  the  public  and  of 
Congress. 

Our  pronouncements  on  the  irresponsibility  of  the  Ger- 
man government  imply  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  op- 
posing governments.  There  was — and  is — no  such  re- 
sponsibility. 

Secret  Diplomacy. 

The  decisive  importance  of  secret  diplomacy  as  a  cause 
of  the  European  war  was  frequently  asserted  by  our  of- 
ficial spokesman.  In  an  address  before  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace,  May  27,  1916,  he  said: 

It  is  plain  that  this  war  could  have  only  come  as  it  did,  suddenly 
and  out  of  secret  counsels.  .  .  .  The  lesson  ...  is  that  the  peace 
of  the  world  must  henceforth  depend  upon  a  new  and  more  whole- 
some diplomacy. 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    171 

In  his  war  message  he  said: 

Plans  of  aggression  can  be  worked  out  and  kept  from  the  light  only 
within  the  privacy  of  courts,  or  behind  the  carefully  guarded  con- 
fidences of  a  narrow  and  privileged  class.  They  are  happily  impos- 
sible where  public  opinion  commands,  and  where  it  insists  upon  full 
information  concerning  all  the  nation's  affairs. 

But  was  the  secret  diplomacy  of  the  Kaiser  any  different 
from  that  of  his  enemies?  Legally,  ''democratic'1  England 
is  more  autocratic,  irresponsible,  and  secret  in  its  diplo- 
macy than  was  "autocratic"  Germany.  A  treaty  entered 
into  by  the  Kaiser  was  not  a  legal  document  until  ratified 
by  the  Reichstag.  But  in  England  the  most  vital  engage- 
ments may  be  undertaken  without  the  consent  of  any  legis- 
lative body,  and  these  engagements  are  binding  upon  suc- 
cessive governments.  Theoretically,  the  King  and  the 
Foreign  Secretary  make  these  international  contracts,  with 
the  consent  of  the  cabinet.  In  practice,  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary makes  them,  frequently  without  the  consent  or  even 
knowledge  of  the  cabinet. 

The  classic  example  in  modern  times  of  secret  diplo- 
macy being  carried  to  the  limit  of  its  possibilities — in  se- 
crecy, in  irresponsibility,  in  autocracy — was  furnished  by 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Viscount  Grey,  in  July  and 
August,  1914.  One  man  shaped  and  conducted  the  con- 
versations, correspondence,  and  negotiations  with  the  other 
powers,  wholly  uncontrolled  by  "democratic"  England, 
wholly  uncontrolled  by  Parliament,  uncontrolled  by  the 
cabinet  as  a  body,  and  in  secret.  He  not  only  withheld 
the  essential  facts  as  to  what  had  been  going  on,  and  what 
he  was  doing,  from  the  Parliament  and  England,  but,  as 
Neilson  has  shown  ("How  Diplomats  Make  War"),  he  de- 
ceived them  both,  as  well  as  a  part  of  the  cabinet.  The 
truth  became  known,  only  after  war  was  an  accomplished 


172  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

fact.  "Separately,"  "secretly,"  and  by  his  "single  choice," 
Foreign  Secretary  Grey  steered  his  country  into  war — as 
nearly  so  as  such  a  thing  is  conceivable  for  any  one  human 
being  to  do  in  modern  times. 

Secret  diplomacy,  as  a  means  for  achieving  autocracy  in 
foreign  affairs,  is  as  firmly  established  in  the  United  States 
as  elsewhere.  Treaties  are  not  binding  unless  ratified  by 
the  Senate,  but  the  part  which  the  Senate  plays  is  nearly 
always  perfunctory.  The  President  arrogates  to  himself 
full  power  to  conduct  negotiations  in  secret,  and,  through 
his  State  Department,  to  frame  treaties  in  secret.  As  in  all 
other  countries,  more  or  less  diplomatic  correspondence  is 
printed,  but  whenever  the  President  chooses  he  suppresses 
these  documents.  A  fraction  of  the  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence preceding  war  was  never  published  and  is  still  un- 
known outside  of  the  State  Department.  The  Senate  may 
ask  the  Executive  for  diplomatic  correspondence,  but  the 
latter  can — and  frequently  does — refuse  on  the  ground  that 
it  is  "incompatible  with  the  public  interest." 

While  pronouncing  for  open  diplomacy,  President  Wil- 
son employed  secret  diplomacy  in  precisely  the  same  manner 
as  our  allies  and  our  enemies  employed  it.  Many  of  the 
Wilson  diplomatic  moves  in  relation  to  Mexico  are  still 
shrouded  in  secrecy,  and  to  this  secrecy  is  partly  due  the 
almost  universal  misapprehension  as  to  the  true  nature  of 
his  Mexican  policy.  Who  knows  the  real  circumstances  of 
our  acquisition  of  the  Virgin  Islands  from  Denmark,  or  of 
our  military  operations  in  Nicaragua?  How  many  Ameri- 
cans were  afforded  an  inkling  of  the  real  motives  behind  the 
'Nicaraguan,  the  Haitian,  and  the  Santo  Domingan  conven- 
tions, and  the  means  by  which  these  conventions  were  im- 
posed upon  the  inhabitants  of  these  little  countries?  Did 
public  opinion  "command"  in  any  of  these  matters?  Did 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    173 

it  insist  upon  full  information?  Did  it  get  any  information 
from  Wilson  or  his  subordinates? 

The  acquisition  of  new  territory  is  a  matter  of  grave 
import  in  the  affairs  of  a  nation,  but  in  the  "purchase"  of 
the  Virgin  Islands,  President  Wilson  took  the  American 
public  into  his  confidence  exactly  to  the  extent  that  he  would 
have  taken  it  had  he  been  buying  a  corner  lot  for  a  grand- 
child— and  he  took  the  Senate  into  his  confidence  only  to 
the  extent  that  the  naked  forms  of  law  required  him  to 
do.^ 

The  very  existence  of  the  deal  was  unknown  to  the  Senate 
itself,  until  the  bill  of  sale  was  signed  and  in  the  hands  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  In  transmitting  the 
document,  the  State  Department  expressly  asked  that  its 
terms  be  kept  secret.  The  committee  considered  the  docu- 
ment in  secret,  and  the  Senate  ratified  it  in  secret.  Except 
for  the  bare  purchase  price,  the  only  disclosure  to  reach  the 
public  regarding  this  important  matter  reached  it  through 
the  "indiscretion"  of  a  Senator,  and  was  contained  in  a 
single  sentence  in  the  letter  of  transmissal,  viz:  "The  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  will  not  object  to  the  Danish 
government's  extending  its  political  and  economic  interests 
in  the  whole  of  Greenland." 

Except  for  these  simple  but  significant  words,  all  that 
ever  reached  the  American  people  on  the  true  inwardness 
of  their  real-estate  deal  in  the  West  Indies  is  contained 
in  admissions  which  members  of  the  Danish  cabinet  made 
at  the  time  to  the  Danish  parliamentary  houses.  (See 
Chapter  XXXIII.) 

Regarding  our  adventures  in  Nicaragua,  Haiti,  and 
Santo  Domingo,  we  have  for  public  consumption  three  brief 
documents  known  as  the  Nicaraguan,  Haitian,  and  Santo 
Domingan  conventions.  These  conventions  followed  a 
military  occupation  in  each  case;  they  did  not  precede  it. 


174  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  function  of  each  is  to  legalize  acts  of  war  and  civil  con- 
trol, in  each  instance  planned  and  initiated  by  the  Execu- 
tive Department  in  secret,  and  in  violation  of  the  clause 
of  the  Constitution  which  vests  in  Congress  the  war-making 
power. 

The  conventions  themselves  were  prepared  in  secret  by 
the  Executive  Department,  and  considered  in  secret  by  the 
Senate  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  and  ratified  altogether 
uon  faith"  by  the  Senate.  In  each  instance  the  Senate  com- 
mittee conducted  a  hearing,  in  secret,  in  which  it  examined 
witnesses.  In  the  case  of  Nicaragua,  the  testimony  was 
printed.  One  copy  of  this  testimony  was  allotted  each 
member  of  the  committee.  No  one  else  could  obtain  one, 
not  even  a  member  of  the  Senate.  In  the  cases  of  Haiti 
and  Santo  Domingo,  the  testimony  was  not  even  printed, 
but  remains  a  State  Department  secret.  Through  the  ma- 
chinery of  secret  diplomacy,  the  essential  facts  of  record 
regarding  the  circumstances  and  purposes  of  the  military 
occupations  of  Nicaragua,  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo,  were 
completely  withheld  from  the  American  people  and  their 
duly  elected  representatives. 

Sometimes  we  even  disdain  to  go  through  the  forms  of 
Senatorial  supervision,  inadequate  as  that  is,  A  formal 
treaty  with  Japan,  recognizing  the  special  interests  of 
Japan  in  China,  might  have  caused  unpleasant  discussion 
in  the  Senate  and  might  have  failed  of  ratification.  So  the 
President  circumvents  the  Constitution;  a  State  Depart- 
ment "agreement"  is  signed,  of  which  nothing  need  be 
known  until  a  version  of  it  is  ready  for  public  consumption. 

The  act  of  cooperating  with  the  Entente  governments  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  war  necessarily  involved  understand- 
ings on  war  and  peace  problems  of  vast  moment.  But  the 
President  snaps  his  fingers  at  the  Constitution,  ignores  the 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    175 

Senate,  and  achieves  absolute  secrecy  and  absolute  irrespon- 
sibility in  matters  of  unbounded  importance  to  America. 
In  the  realm  of  greatest  importance  to  the  public  welfare 
—in  the  realm  of  war  and  the  policies  that  lead  to  war — 
the  public  commands  as  little  here  as  in  Germany,  Austria, 
Turkey,  England,  or  Japan;  the  President  of  the  United 
States  is  as  irresponsible  an  autocrat  as  the  ruling  monarch 
of  the  German  Empire  could  ever  have  hoped  to  be. 

Militarism. 

At  one  time,  President  Wilson  defined  militarism  as  a 
monster  whose  essence  is  size,  at  another  time  as  a  mon- 
ster whose  essence  is  form,  at  still  another  time  as  a 
monster  whose  essence  is  purpose. 

Here  are  the  various  quotations: 

1.  Militarism  consists  in  this,  gentlemen:  it  consists  in  preparing 
a  great  machine  whose  only  use  is  for  war.     (Speech  at  New  York, 
Jan.  27,  1916.) 

2.  It  is  inconsistent  with  the  traditions  of  the  country  that  their 
[the  people's]  knowledge  of  arms  should  be  used  by  a  governmental 
organization  which  would  make  and  organize  a  great  army  subject 
to  orders  to  do  what  a  particular  group  of  men  might  at  the  time 
think  it  best  for  it  to  do.     That  is  the  militarism  of  Europe,  where  a 
few  persons  can  determine  what  an  armed  nation  is  to  do.     That  is 
what   I    understand   militarism   to   be.     (Statement   to   Committee 
from  American  Union  Against  Militarism,  White  House,  May  9, 
1916.) 

3.  Militarism  does  not  consist  in  the  existence  of  an  army,  nor 
even  in  the  existence  of  a  very  great  army.     Militarism  is  a  spirit. 
It  is  a  point  of  view.     It  is  a  system.     It  is  a  purpose.     The  pur- 
pose of  militarism  is  to  use  armies  for  aggression.      (Speech  at  West 
Point,  June  13,  1916.) 

But  in  size  the  Kaiser's  army  was  smaller  than  that  of 


176  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Russia,  and  smaller  in  proportion  to  population  than  that 
of  France.  His  navy  was  barely  over  half  the  size  of 
England's,  and  only  slightly  larger  than  that  of  France. 

In  form  the  Kaiser's  army  was,  in  1914,  in  every  respect 
except  one — conscription — the  same  as  all  modern  armies, 
and  in  every  respect  the  same  as  that  of  the  majority  of  its 
enemies.  Every  army  of  every  powerful  government  is 
organized  from  the  top  down,  not  from  the  bottom  up; 
every  one  is  a  perfect  autocracy.  All  are  now  based  upon 
conscription,  as  were  the  majority  when  the  war  began  in 
1914. 

The  system  of  discipline  is  the  same  in  all — military  law, 
courts-martial,  cruel  and  unusual  punishments.  Each  has 
its  officer  caste,  and  the  power  and  arrogance  of  the  officer 
caste  within  the  organization  itself  is  not  different  in  one 
country  from  another. 

Outside  the  military  establishment  itself,  the  influence 
of  the  officer  caste  is  invariably  towards  reaction,  and  the 
best  measure  of  that  influence  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
the  size  of  the  military  establishment.  In  "democratic" 
England  the  navy  has  always  been  a  power  for  reaction  in 
the  affairs  of  the  nation.  In  France  the  political  machina- 
tions of  the  officer  caste — as  exemplified  in  the  Dreyfus  af- 
fair— have  been  a  constant  threat  to  the  existence  of  the 
republic. 

The  essential  question  of  form — we  are  told — is  whether 
a  few  persons  can  determine  what  an  armed  nation  is  to  do. 
In  every  great  country  a  few  persons  can  determine  that 
thing,  and  during  the  late  war  a  few  persons  determined  it 
in  every  country,  including  the  United  States  of  America. 

If  German  militarism  was  actually  different  from  the  mil- 
itarism of  Germany's  enemies,  therefore,  the  difference 
must  be  found  in  its  purpose.  How  is  the  purpose  of  a 
military  establishment  revealed? 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    177 

"Prepared  for  Forty  Years." 

The  ultimate  purpose  of  every  military  establishment  is, 
of  course,  war,  either  of  defense  or  aggression.  The  pur- 
pose of  a  large  military  organization  in  times  of  peace  is 
to  be  ready  for  war,  either  of  defense  or  aggression. 
When  two  neighboring  countries  both  have  armies  of  large 
size,  both  built  on  the  same  model — when  both  are  spend- 
ing large  sums  in  order  to  be  ready  for  war — the  relative 
readiness  and  efficiency  of  one  can  hardly  be  taken  as  evi- 
dence of  a  relatively  aggressive  purpose.  It  is,  rather,  evi- 
dence of  graft,  incompetence,  or  laziness,  on  the  part  of  the 
one  that  is  less  ready  and  efficient. 

If  either  the  efficiency  of  a  great  fighting  machine,  or  the 
period  during  which  it  has  been  built  up  is  any  evidence,  in 
itself,  of  aggressive  purpose,  then  by  this  test  England 
stands  thrice  convicted  of  the  charge  that  is  made  against 
Germany.  In  size  and  effectiveness,  the  British  navy 
stands  so  far  ahead  of  the  other  navies  of  the  world  that 
the  relative  size  and  effectiveness  of  the  Kaiser's  army  is 
not  to  be  compared  with  it.  The  British  navy  reached  its 
commanding  position,  not  in  forty  years,  but  in  a  period 
covering  centuries;  and  not  alone  by  large  expenditures  and 
careful  training  at  home,  but  by  a  policy  of  opposing,  by 
threats  of  war,  the  growth  of  other  navies,  even  by  seeking 
out  and  destroying  in  war  all  other  navies  that  seemed  to 
threaten  its  supremacy. 

In  August,  1914,  the  German  war  machine  was  not  dis- 
tinct in  any  essential  from  the  war  machines  of  its  enemies. 
German  diplomacy  was  not  more  secret  than  any  other  di- 
plomacy. The  German  government  was  not  more  irre- 
sponsible to  its  people  in  the  conduct  of  international  rela- 
tions. It  was  no  more  autocratic  in  the  affairs  of  war  or 
the  policies  that  lead  to  war. 

In  other  words,  in  the  means  of  aggression  the  Kaiser 


178  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

stood  on  the  same  footing  as  his  enemies.  So  far  as  pos- 
session of  the  means  of  aggression  reveal  a  purpose  of  ag- 
gression, the  charge  of  special  depravity  against  Germany 
fails. 

Confessed  Ambition  to  Dominate  the  World. 

In  August,  1914,  the  American  public  for  the  first  time 
heard  of  a  retired  officer  of  the  German  army  named 
Bernhardi.  It  also  heard,  for  the  first  time,  of  a  German 
professor  named  Treitschke.  Nietzsche,  of  whom  it  had 
heard  before,  went  through  a  lightning  change,  to  be  intro- 
duced in  a  different  garb.  Before  us  were  paraded  all  the 
bombastic  sayings  to  which  the  Kaiser  had  ever  given  ex- 
pression, with  annotations  to  show  that  he  meant  something 
very,  very  sinister.  By  courtesy  of  the  British  propaganda 
machine  a  great  plot  was  suddenly  revealed  to  us — world 
dominion  by  might  of  the  sword,  long  planned,  secretly  pre- 
pared for,  timed  for  a  chosen  moment,  initiated  by  an  un- 
provoked attack  upon  unsuspecting,  unprepared,  peace-lov- 
ing, lamblike  neighbors,  keepers  of  the  holy  urn  of  democ- 
racy. 

President  Wilson,  at  the  beginning  and  for  a  long  time 
afterwards,  told  us,  in  effect,  that  it  was  all  a  hoax.  Only 
when  it  became  necessary  to  put  fear  into  the  hearts  of  the 
American  people,  as  a  means  to  accomplishing  his  own  pur- 
poses, did  he  embrace  this  doctrine. 

Now  how  did  we  suddenly  discover  that  the  German 
government  planned  to  dominate  the  world?  Was  it  be- 
cause the  Kaiser,  or  some  member  of  his  government,  hinted 
at  something  of  that  sort? 

It  is  doubtful  if  anyone  can  produce  a  single  avowal  of 
any  responsible  German  from  which  can  be  fairly  deduced 
a  dream,  even  on  the  part  of  that  individual,  of  the  sort  of 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    179 

world  domination  which  the  German-peril  theory  presup- 
poses as  a  dream  of  the  Kaiser,  of  all  of  his  sons,  all  of  his 
military  chiefs,  and  a  great  number  of  his  professors,  edi- 
tors, and  prominent  men  besides. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  extreme  result  hoped  for  even  by 
Bernhardi,  from  the  war  which  he  believed  England, 
France,  and  Russia  were  determined  to  force  upon  Ger- 
many, was  for  his  country  to  "attain  a  position  as  a  world 
power  by  the  side  of,  and  in  spite  of,  England"  ("Ger- 
many and  the  Next  War,"  p.  164.) 

Said  Bernhardi,  continuing  (p.  165),  "We  shall,  in  this 
struggle,  as  so  often  before,  represent  the  common  inter- 
ests of  the  world,  for  it  will  be  fought  not  only  to  win  recog- 
nition for  ourselves,  but  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas" 

Disgusting  as  is  the  worst  of  the  German  jingoistic  and 
chauvinistic  literature  of  the  Kaiser's  day,  it  cannot  be 
taken  as  evidence  of  especially  aggressive  purpose,  50  long 
as  it  is  matched  by  a  similar  literature  in  all  other  great 
countries. 

Before  August,  1914,  Americans  heard  a  great  deal  more 
of  this  sort  of  thing  from  England  than  from  Germany. 
"Germany  had  a  Bernhardi,"  declared  a  member  of  the 
British  Parliament  in  1915  (Francis  Neilson,  in  "How 
Diplomats  Make  War,"  p.  134),  "but  Britain  had  a  Bern- 
hardi class,  which  lived  and  moved  and  had  its  being  in  war. 
It  thought  of  nothing  else  but  war,  and  it  was  recruited 
from  all  sections  of  society." 

Every  vain  effusion  upon  German  destiny  can  be  matched 
by  similar  effusions  upon  British  destiny,  Russian  destiny, 
Italian  destiny,  French  destiny,  and  even  American  destiny. 
The  phrase  "Deutschland  uber  alles"  is  matched  by  "Rule, 
Britannia,  rule  the  waves."  German  naval  officers  drank 
to  "The  Day"  when  the  German  fleet  would  be  powerful 


i8o  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

enough  to  challenge  Britain's  mastership  of  the  seas.  Brit- 
ish naval  officers  drank  to  the  existing  mastership  and  to  its 
perpetuation  at  all  costs. 

Wlho  can  quote  anything  from  an  influential  German 
more  nearly  approaching  a  propaganda  for  world  domin- 
ion than  the  will  of  Cecil  Rhodes,  who  directed  that  his 
great  fortune  be  expended  for  the  establishment  of  a  se- 
cret society  whose  aim  "shall  be  the  extension  of  British 
rule  throughout  the  world  .  .  .  and  especially  the  occupa- 
tion by  British  settlers  of  the  entire  continent  of  Africa, 
the  Holy  Land,  the  Valley  of  the  Euphrates,  the  islands 
of  Cyprus  and  Candia,  the  whole  of  South  America,  the 
islands  of  the  Pacific  and  heretofore  possessed  by  Great 
Britain,  the  whole  of  the  Malay  archipelago,  the  seaboard 
of  China  and  Japan,  the  ultimate  recovery  of  the  United 
States  of  America  as  an  integral  part  of  the  British  Em- 
pire" ? 

When  Americans  were  kindly  told  by  Britons  that  the 
Germans  thought  themselves  superior  to  other  peoples,  we 
were  shocked  and  angered,  because  we  had  been  taught  that 
we  ourselves  were  superior  to  other  peoples.  Self-praise 
is  not  peculiar  to  any  people.  It  is  one  of  the  evidences 
of  national  egotism,  as  wide  as  the  world.  Has  any  Ger- 
man writer,  asks  Georg  Brandes  ("The  World  at  War/' 
p.  209)  gone  farther  in  this  kind  of  thing  than  one  Leon 
Bloy,  in  the  Mercure  de  France?  Brandes  then  quotes 
Monsieur  Bloy  as  follows: 

After  Israel,  who  were  called  God's  people  by  special  favor,  God 
has  loved  no  nation  on  earth  as  much  as  France.  Explain  it  who- 
ever can.  To  call  this  nation  the  most  noble  of  all  nations — which 
it  undoubtedly  is — serves  no  purpose,  since  such  divine  prerogatives 
are  the  reward  of  the  chosen  one.  .  .  .  France  is  so  far  ahead  of 
other  peoples  that,  no  matter  who  they  be,  they  should  feel  honored 
at  being  allowed  to  eat  crumbs  destined  for  her  dogs. 


The  German  World  Peril  Bugaboo    181 

We  ourselves  are  not  free  from  this  kind  of  talk.  We 
do  not  need  to  go  beyond  President  Wilson  himself  to  find 
out  that  we  are  extraordinarily  endowed,  strangely  unself- 
ish, singularly  righteous,  that  our  history  is  peculiarly  pure 
and  white,  that  we  are  especially  chosen  to  carry  the  torch 
of  civilization  and  democracy  to  the  world,  even  on  the 
point  of  the  sword.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  set  down 
half  a  dozen  quotations  of  this  sort: 

We  are  Trustees  of  World's  Morality. 

I  need  not  tell  my  fellow-citizens  that  we  have  not  held  off  from 
this  struggle  from  motives  of  self-interest,  unless  it  be  considered 
self-interest  to  maintain  our  position  as  trustees  of  the  moral  judg- 
ments of  the  world.  (Speech  at  Chicago,  Jan.  31,  1916.) 

We  Fight  the  First  Unselfish  War  in  History. 

The  glory  of  this  war,  my  fellow-citizens,  so  far  as  we  are  con- 
cerned, is  that  it  is,  perhaps  for  the  first  time  in  history,  an  unselfish 
war.  (Speech  at  New  York,  May  18,  1918.) 

Our  Fine  Example  has  Thrilled  Two  Continents. 

Do  you  never  stop  to  reflect  what  it  is  that  America  stands  for? 
...  It  is  for  the  sovereignty  of  self-governing  peoples,  and  her  ex- 
ample, her  assistance,  her  encouragement,  have  thrilled  two  conti- 
nents in  this  western  world.  (Speech  at  Pittsburgh,  Jan.  29,  1916.) 

Just  Think  of  Cuba! 

The  world  sneered  when  we  set  out  for  the  liberation  of  Cuba, 
but  the  world  does  not  sneer  any  longer.  The  world  knows  now 
what  it  was  then  loth  to  believe,  that  a  nation  can  sacrifice  its  own 
interests  and  its  own  blood  for  the  sake  of  the  liberty  and  happiness 
of  another  people.  (Speech  at  New  York,  Jan.  27,  1916.) 

We  are  the  Flower  of  Mankind. 

We  are  the  flower  of  mankind,  so  far  as  civilization  is  concerned. 
(Speech  at  Billings,  Sept.  u,  1919.) 

"Me  und  Gott." 

We  are  to  be  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  God  to  see  that  lib- 


182  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

erty  is  made  secure  for  mankind.     (Speech  at  Confederate  veter- 
ans' reunion,  June  5,  1917.) 

Our  aggressions  have  invariably  been  for  the  good  of 
the  victims.  In  this  we  are  not  different  from  our  powerful 
neighbors — if  you  take  the  word  of  their  statesmen  for  it. 

But  it  is  not  true  either  that  two  continents  have  been 
thrilled  by  our  disinterested  example,  or  that  the  world  has 
stopped  sneering  about  our  Cuban  pretensions.  The  truth 
is  that  the  menacing  picture  of  Pan-Germanism,  as  painted 
by  Wilson  in  his  Flag  Day  address,  is  a  counterpart  of  the 
menacing  picture  of  Pan-Americanism,  as  it  appears  to  a 
great  many  Latin  Americans. 

Why?  Partly  because  of  American  boasts  of  superior- 
ity and  declarations  of  purpose  to  bend  the  weaker  Ameri- 
can countries  to  our  will.  The  propaganda  for  German 
imperial  expansion,  at  its  worst,  is  not  one  whit  more  cold- 
blooded and  subversive  of  the  principles  for  which  we  pre- 
tended to  fight  Germany  than,  for  example,  the  propaganda 
that  has  been  carried  on  for  some  years  for  American 
domination  of  Mexico. 

Is  there  a  valid  basis  for  the  German-peril  theory,  then, 
in  the  acts  of  the  Kaiser's  government? 


XXII 

OUR  MYTH  OF  THE  WAR'S  BEGINNING 

IN  President  Wilson's  message  to  the  Pope  occurs  the  fol- 
lowing passage: 

The  object  of  this  war  is  to  deliver  the  free  peoples  of  the  world 
from  the  menace  and  the  actual  power  of  a  vast  military  establish- 
ment controlled  by  an  irresponsible  government,  which,  having  se- 
cretly planned  to  dominate  the  world,  proceeded  to  carry  the  plan 
out  without  regard  either  to  the  sacred  obligations  of  treaty,  or  the 
long-established  practices  and  long-cherished  principles  of  interna- 
tional action  and  honor;  which  chose  its  own  time  for  the  war;  de- 
livered its  blow  fiercely  and  suddenly;  stopped  at  no  barrier  either 
of  law  or  of  mercy;  swept  a  whole  continent  within  the  tide  of 
blood — not  the  blood  of  soldiers  only,  but  the  blood  of  innocent 
women  and  children  also  and  of  the  helpless  poor;  and  now  stands 
balked,  but  not  defeated,  the  enemy  of  four-fifths  of  the  world. 
This  power  is  not  the  German  people.  It  is  the  ruthless  master 
of  the  German  people. 

This  is  as  complete  an  endorsement  of  the  German-peril 
theory  as  can  well  be  expressed  in  a  few  words.  It  even 
lends  color  to  the  proposition  so  sedulously  disseminated  by 
the  Allied  war  propagandists  and  our  own,  that  Germany's 
"attack"  of  August,  1914,  was  timed  at  a  chosen  moment 
and  delivered  upon  unprepared,  unsuspecting,  and  lamb- 
like neighbors. 

That  Unsuspected  and  Premeditated  Attack. 

But  every  one  knows  that  a  war  between  the  Triple  Al- 
liance and  the  Triple  Entente,  or  between  members  thereof, 

183 


184  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

had  been  expected  for  years,  and  prepared  for  for  years; 
that  such  a  war  had  been  expected,  talked  about,  and  pre- 
pared for  no  less  in  France,  England,  and  Russia,  than  in 
Germany  and  Austria;  that  several  times,  within  a  period 
of  ten  years,  Europe  had  trembled  on  the  verge  of  a  gen- 
eral war. 

During  the  forty  years  in  which  Germany  was  accused 
of  preparing  for  a  war  of  aggression  upon  "heroic  France," 
the  "revanche"  cry — for  a  war  of  revenge  against  Germany 
— was  periodically  dinned  in  the  ears  of  the  French  people. 
In  England,  from  1905  to  1914,  the  respectable  press  car- 
ried on  an  almost  constant  propaganda  of  hatred  against 
Germany.  The  question  of  war  was  repeatedly  raised  in 
(Parliament.  Cabinet  officers  presented  exaggerated  figures 
as  to  German  naval  increases  in  order  to  obtain  even 
greater  appropriations  for  the  British  navy.  It  was  admit- 
tedly in  contemplation  of  war  with  Germany,  that  such 
leaders  of  the  empire  as  General  Lord  Roberts  devoted 
themselves  to  a  serious  campaign  to  commit  England  to 
peace-time  conscription.  Meanwhile,  the  Czar  was  spend- 
ing huge  sums  in  rebuilding  his  navy,  under  the  direction 
of  British  experts;  in  perfecting  his  army,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  French  officers;  and  in  constructing  a  system  of 
strategic  railways  to  the  German  border. 

Neilson  has  shown  ("How  Diplomats  Make  War,"  p. 
146),  that  the  German  appropriations  for  new  naval  con- 
struction were  lower  in  1912  than  in  1911,  lower  in  1913, 
than  in  1912,  lower  in  1914  than  in  1913;  that  the  British, 
French,  and  Russian  appropriations  for  new  naval  construc- 
tion were  all  higher  in  each  of  those  successive  years;  that 
the  1914  appropriation  of  each  was  higher  than  that  of 
Germany;  that  for  1914  the  combined  appropriations  for 
new  naval  construction  of  England,  France,  and  Russia 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning   185 

were  two  and  one-half  times  as  large  as  the  combined  ap- 
propriations of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy. 
I  Morel,  another  Englishman,  has  shown,  ("Truth  and 
the  War"),  that  the  expenditures  for  both  military  and 
naval  purposes  of  the  French-Russian  combination  were 
very  much  larger  than  the  expenditures  of  the  German-Aus- 
trian combination;  that  the  French-Russian  expenditures 
increased  much  more  rapidly  in  the  decade  preceding  1914 
than  the  German-Austrian  expenditures;  that  by  1913  the 
peace  strength  of  the  French-Russian  armies  was  nearly 
double  that  of  the  German-Austrian  armies. 

During  the  very  period  in  which  the  terrible  Bernhardi 
was  informing  his  readers  that,  for  England  "t'o  come  to 
terms  with  Germany ,  instead  of  fighting,  would  be  a  most 
desirable  course  for  us";  and  that  "we  cannot  contemplate 
attacking  England,  as  such  an  attack  would  be  hopeless" 
("Germany  and  the  Next  War,"  pp.  98  and  155),  General 
Lord  Roberts  himself,  the  greatest  military  hero  of  the 
times,  was  publicly  advocating  a  surprise  attack  upon  Ger- 
many. Lord  Fisher,  England's  First  Sea  Lord  in  those 
days,  boasts  in  his  "Memories"  that  he  also  had  recom- 
mended such  an  attack  as  far  back  as  1908,  as  a  drastic 
means  to  disposing  of  a  trade  rival. 

In  1912,  the  secret  understanding  for  French  and  Brit- 
ish cooperation  against  Germany,  for  six  years  a  subject  of 
conversation  between  the  general  staffs  of  the  two  countries, 
was  put  into  writing.  In  the  same  year  the  Franco-Rus- 
sian naval  convention  was  signed,  and,  as  the  Bolsheviki 
have  revealed  to  us  through  the  publication  of  the  secret 
treaties,  the  Czar  procured  a  definite  pledge  from  both  M. 
Poincare  and  Foreign  Secretary  Grey  of  French  and  Brit- 
ish support,  in  case  trouble  in  the  Balkans  should  involve 
Germany  on  the  side  of  Austria. 


1 86  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

As  the  year  1914  drew  on,  it  became  generally  known 
that  the  British  fleet  was  concentrated  in  the  North  Sea,  the 
French  in  the  Mediterranean.  As  Neilson  points  out,  if 
there  was  no  understanding  that  the  French  coasts  were  un- 
der the  protection  of  England,  and  British  Mediterranean 
interests  under  the  protection  of  France,  then  the  general 
staffs  of  the  two  countries,  under  military  law,  ought  to 
have  been  shot.  ("How  Diplomats  Make  War,"  p.  305.) 
At  about  this  time,  our  own  Admiral  Mahan  called  atten- 
tion to  the  fact,  in  an  article  in  the  Scientific  American,  that 
"Eighty-eight  per  cent,  of  England's  guns  are  pointed  at 
Germany."  March  10,  1914,  the  British  Minister  of  War 
told  the  House  of  Commons :  "We  stand  well  for  the  pur- 
pose of  immediate  war  on  any  basis  you  may  consider," 
while  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  announced  the  arm- 
ing of  forty  merchant  ships.  ("How  Diplomats  Make 
War,"  p.  228.)  In  our  own  White  Book  (vol.  Ill,  p. 
169),  appears  a  reference  to  a  notification  from  the  Brit- 
ish Admiralty,  dated  May  26,  1913,  of  the  arming  of  British 
merchant  vessels  at  the  expense  of  the  British  government. 

Finally,  the  opening  of  the  diplomatic  confab  of  the  last 
week  of  July,  1914,  found  the  British  fleet  completely  mo- 
bilized and  the  German  navy  all  but  bottled  up. 

Even  Belgium  was  not  surprised.  Whether  the  Belgian 
understanding  with  France  and  England  was — or  was  not 
— definite  enough  to  vitiate  her  position  as  a  neutral,  Neil- 
son  recalls  the  fact  that,  in  November,  1912,  a  month  full 
of  preparation  in  the  Entente  countries,  the  Belgian  Parlia- 
ment, after  a  secret  sitting,  increased  the  war  strength  of 
its  army  from  180,000  to  340,000  men — so  constructing 
a  stupendous  military  machine  for  a  country  the  size  of 
Belgium,  and  especially  for  one  which  professed  to  depend 
upon  ancient  neutrality  guarantees. 

The  German  "attack"  was  not  unsuspected  in  any  quar- 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning    187 

ter,  not  unprepared  for  in  any  quarter.  The  comparative 
tables  upon  preparedness  prove  that,  in  sheer  weight  of 
arms,  the  lambs  were  stronger  than  the  wolves,  and  were 
relatively  in  a  better  position  to  be  "attacked"  than  they 
had  ever  been  before.  They  were  also  better  prepared 
Diplomatically;  for  they  had  made  sure  of  at  least  the  neu- 
trality of  Italy. 

If  not  unsuspected  or  unprepared  for,  was  the  German 
"attack,"  nevertheless,  premeditated?  Did  the  German 
government  plan  and  plot  beforehand  to  precipitate  the 
long  expected  war  at  a  given  moment,  namely,  the  first  days 
of  August,  1914? 

Any  such  hypothesis  would  have  to  show  that  Germany 
not  only  had  made  the  same  military  preparations  that 
her  enemies  had  made,  but  that  she  had  made  other  far- 
reaching  preparations  which  any  country  would  make  with 
war  certain  in  a  given  period,  but  which  otherwise  would  be 
impracticable. 

The  German  lack  of  such  preparations  was  notorious. 
The  crisis  of  the  summer  of  1914  found  German  shipping 
in  all  parts  of  the  world,  including  the  harbors  of  her  ene- 
mies. On  July  28,  the  North  German  Lloyd  steamship 
"Kronprinzessin  Cecile"  sailed  from  New  York  with 
$10,000,000  gold  on  board,  consigned  one-half  to  London 
and  one-half  to  Paris.  Halted  by  a  wireless  in  mid-ocean, 
she  made  a  sensational  race  back  to  port  to  avoid  capture 
by  British  cruisers.  Had  the  Kaiser's  irresponsible  govern- 
ment, even  as  late  as  July  28,  "chosen  its  own  time  for  the 
war,"  had  it  determined  to  deliver  its  "sudden  blow"  within 
half  a  week,  the  great  German  liner  would  hardly  have 
been  permitted  to  sail  out  of  a  safe  port. 

The  more  one  examines  the  circumstances  of  the  German 
"attack"  the  more  clearly  it  appears  that,  for  the  Triple 
Entente,  it  could  not  have  been  better  timed  had  the  En- 


1 88  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

tente  chosen  the  date  itself.     Leading  Britons  have,  on  oc- 
casion, gleefully  proclaimed  this  very  fact. 

Morel  points  out — although  not,  in  his  case,  gleefully 
— that  had  the  Kaiser  long  plotted  to  "subjugate  Europe," 
and  had  he  bided  his  time  for  the  most  favorable  moment  to 
do  so,  he  would  have  chosen  any  other  moment  than  the 
summer  of  1914: 

How  comes  it  that  Germany  did  not  wage  war  upon  her  neighbors 
when  she  could  have  done  so  with  every  guarantee  of  military  suc- 
cess? She  could  have  smashed  France  easily  in  1887,  and  our  offi- 
cial classes,  judging  from  statements  in  such  papers  as  the  Standard 
and  the  Spectator,  would  have  been  rather  pleased  than  otherwise. 
.  .  .  Germany  could  have  smashed  France  with  equal  ease  when 
Russia,  exhausted  by  the  Japanese  war,  was  incapable  of  stirring 
a  finger  against  her.  Germany  could  have  smashed  France  with 
equal  ease  when  we  were  engaged  in  annexing  the  South  African 
republics.  .  .  .  Why,  if  Germany  desired  to  'subjugate  Europe,'  did 
she  wait  until  August,  1914,  when  her  military  supremacy,  as  I 
shall  show  later  on,  was  less  assured  than  at  any  period  during  the 
previous  thirty  years?  ("Truth  and  the  War,"  p.  64). 

Morel  also  points  out  that  even  before  the  adoption  of 
the  Three  Years  Military  Service  Law  in  1913,  France  had 
become  more  militarized  than  Germany  or  any  of  the  other 
great  powers.  ("Truth  and  the  War,"  p.  148.)  He  also 
adduces  evidence  to  prove  that  the  adoption  of  that  law 
forced  the  French  government  to  make  an  early  choice  be- 
tween foreign  war  and  revolution  at  home. 

In  a  speech  at  New  York,  February  12,  1920,  our  Ad- 
miral Sims  said: 

In  December,  1910,  I  submitted  a  report  to  the  admiral  command- 
ing my  division,  which  stated  that,  having  discussed  the  subject  with 
military  men  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  consensus  of  opinion 
was  that  war  would  come  within  four  years. 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning    189 

By  whose  choice?  French  jingoistic  glee  over  coming 
events  is  typified  in  the  following  from  the  Nouvelle  Re- 
vue, in  1912,  and  reproduced  in  Neilson's  book  (p.  206)  : 

We  intend  to  have  war.  After  forty  years  of  a  heavily  armed 
peace,  we  can  at  last  utter  this  opinion.  .  .  .  France  is  ready  to 
strike  and  to  conquer,  as  she  was  not  ready  forty  years  ago,  and  as 
she  will  not  be  in  four  or  five  years,  owing  to  the  annual  divergent 
numbers  of  the  birth  rate  in  each  country.  .  .  .  We,  the  attacking 
party,  will  have  arranged  with  England  that  their  fleet  .  .  .  will 
have  followed  .  .  .  the  remains  of  the  whole  German  navy  into 
German  waters. 

Another  confession  of  British  Sea  Lord  Fisher,  set  down 
in  his  "Memories,"  is  that  as  far  back  as  1905  he  also 
prophesied  war  with  Germany,  in  the  very  month  of  Aug- 
ust, 


Turn  to  the  immediate  circumstances  of  the  outbreak. 

"The  war  was  begun  by  the  military  masters  of  Ger- 
many," asserted  President  Wilson,  in  his  Flag  Day  address. 
But  eight  months  previously  (at  Cincinnati,  Oct.  26,  1916) 
he  had  said: 

Have  you  ever  heard  what  started  the  present  war?  If  you 
have,  I  wish  you  would  publish  it,  because  nobody  else  has.  So  far 
as  I  can  gather,  nothing  in  particular  started  it,  but  everything  in 
general.  There  had  been  growing  up  in  Europe  a  mutual  suspicion, 
an  interchange  of  conjectures  about  what  this  government  or  that 
government  was  going  to  do,  an  interlacing  of  alliances  and  under- 
standings, a  complex  web  of  intrigue  and  spying,  that  presently  was 
sure  to  entangle  the  whole  family  of  mankind  in  its  meshes. 

Some  millions  of  words  have  been  printed  to  prove  that 
the  immediate  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of  1914  rests 
in  this  or  that  quarter.  The  arguments  seem  to  resolve 


190  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

themselves  largely  into  two  questions:  first,  the  extent  to 
which  evidence  unfavorable  to  a  given  government  has  been 
suppressed  or  mutilated  by  it;  second,  the  relative  value  of 
the  professions  of  a  will  to  peace,  for  which  all  the  govern- 
ments claimed  to  be  working. 

If  you  begin  by  crediting  one  side  with  honesty  and  the 
other  with  dishonesty,  it  will  be  easy  enough  to  prove  the 
responsibility  as  you  wish  to  prove  it.  But  if  you  begin 
with  an  equal  measure  of  confidence  in  all — or  an  equal 
lack  of  confidence — then  the  case  assumes  a  different  aspect. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  grapple  with  the  mass  of  conflicting 
evidence  of  the  "war  guilt"  controversialists;  for  it  hap- 
pens that,  even  among  the  most  violent  partisans,  there  is 
sufficient  agreement  on  questions  of  fact  to  make  it  appear 
quite  plain  that  not  one  of  the  great  powers  immediately 
concerned  can  escape  a  share  of  the  responsibility. 

If  you  date  your  survey,  say,  from  July  28,  you  find  that 
Austria  was  determined  to  chastise  Serbia;  that  Russia  was 
determined  to  interfere  with  Austria;  that  Germany  was 
determined  that  Austria  should  not  be  interfered  with;  that 
France  stood  ready  to  fight  Germany  if  Germany  struck 
Russia;  that  England,  though  involved  with  France  and 
Russia,  was  professing  to  be  free,  and  was  playing  the  role 
of  peaceful,  neutral  mediator. 

All  professed  to  wish  to  avoid  a  general  war,  but  all  ex- 
cept England  were  frankly  willing  to  go  into  such  a  war 
under  certain  circumstances. 

For  the  moment,  Austria  stood  in  the  position  of  an 
aggressor  toward  Serbia;  Russia  as  aggressor  toward  Aus- 
tria; Germany  as  aggressor  toward  Russia;  France  as  ag- 
gressor toward  Germany ;  England  as  an  uncertain  quantity. 

Each  of  these  great  countries  was  in  a  position  to  pre- 
vent a  general  war,  provided  it  cared  sufficiently  to  do  so. 
Austria  could  have  prevented  war  by  backing  down  on 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning    191 

Serbia,  Russia  by  letting  Austria  go  ahead,  Germany  by 
abandoning  Austria,  France  by  abandoning  Russia,  Eng- 
land by  declaring  her  solidarity  with  France  and  Russia. 

Although  any  of  the  four  countries,  Austria,  Germany, 
Russia,  or  France,  could  have  dispelled  the  crisis,  it  would 
have  been  at  the  cost  of  backing  down.  There  was  just 
one  country  that  had  the  power  to  disperse  the  war-cloud 
by  not  backing  down — England.  A  preponderance  of 
force  was  the  only  thing  that  would  induce  any  of  the  others 
to  back  down — and  England  was  in  a  position  to  wield  that 
force.  One  Edward  Grey  knew  where  England's  force 
was  going  to  be  exerted.  France  and  Russia  knew.  Ger- 
many and  Austria  did  not  know.  It  is  universally  admitted 
that  this  was  a  determining  factor  in  the  incidents  of  the 
summer  of  1914. 

The  German  government  tried  hard  to  find  out  whether 
England  would  intervene.  The  German  ambassador 
asked  Grey  whether,  in  the  event  of  war  between  Germany 
and  Austria  and  France  and  Russia,  England  would  remain 
neutral  provided  Germany  would  not  violate  Belgium. 
Grey's  refusal,  alone,  would  be  enough  to  dispose  of  the 
self-righteous  claim  the  British  government  proceeded  to 
make  to  its  people,  that  the  violation  of  Belgium  was  the 
sole  cause  of  British  belligerency. 

The  German  ambassador  inquired  whether  England 
would  remain  neutral,  provided  the  integrity  of  both  France 
and  her  colonies  was  guaranteed.  Grey  refused  to  tell 
him.  Grey  declined  to  state  the  conditions  under  which 
England  would  remain  neutral;  declined  to  state  whether 
or  not,  in  any  event,  England  would  remain  neutral;  at  the 
same  time  declining  to  say  that  England  would  stand  with 
France  and  Russia,  but  leading  Germany  on  to  hope  that 
she  would  not.  Meanwhile,  the  war  web  was  spinning- 
fast.  The  knowledge  that  England  was  bound  to  the  n 


192  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

stiffened  the  backs  of  France  and  Russia;  the  hope  that 
England  would  stay  out  stiffened  the  backs  of  Germany  and 
Austria.  When  at  last  Grey  did  let  the  German  ambassa- 
dor know  the  truth,  the  latter's  government  took  the  first 
steps  toward  backing  down,  forcing  Austria  to  reconsider 
her  decision  not  to  negotiate  with  Russia  over  the  Serbian 
dispute.  Too  late — the  Russian  mobilization  was  already 
under  way,  and  the  Czar  refused  to  halt  it.  Germany  then 
sent  the  twelve-hour  ultimatum  to  Russia.  The  Czar  paid 
no  heed;  Germany  declared  war  upon  Russia  and  the  huge 
armies  of  Europe  began  to  move. 

The  Czar,  it  is  true,  assured  the  Kaiser  that  mobiliza- 
tion did  not  necessarily  mean  war,  but  the  post-war  revela- 
tions of  the  Bolsheviki  show  this  to  have  been  a  falsehood. 
Even  had  Russian  mobilization  not  meant  war,  it  would 
have  meant  Russian  dictation  of  the  matter  in  hand.  For 
Russia  had  the  numbers,  and  for  Germany  to  have  waited 
would  have  been  for  Germany  to  invite  humiliation.  Un- 
der the  circumstances,  the  dates  of  the  various  declarations 
of  war  tell  nothing.  Nor  do  actual  troop  movements. 
Since  France  was  bound  to  fight  the  Czar's  battles,  no  mat- 
ter on  which  front  the  fighting  began,  it  was  only  a  question 
of  speed  as  to  whether  German  armies  would  first  reach 
French  soil  or  French  armies  would  first  reach  German 
soil. 

If  the  peruser  of  white,  orange,  and  yellow  books  starts 
with  July  30,  Russia  is  seen  as  the  original  aggressor.  But 
if  he  starts  a  week  earlier  he  decides  that  Austria  was  the 
original  aggressor.  But  were  hostility,  intrigue,  and  aggres- 
sion born  into  the  world  as  late  as  July  23,  1914?  Why 
was  Austria  determined  to  chastise  Serbia?  Was  Serbia 
entirely  blameless?  Why  was  the  Czar  determined  that 
Serbia  should  not  be  chastised?  Was  it  because  he  felt 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning    193 

himself  appointed  by  God  to  defend  democracy  throughout 
the  world? 

Why,  above  all,  did  Foreign  Secretary  Grey  conceal  his 
intentions  from  Germany?  Was  Germany  "lured  to  at- 
tack," as  Bernard  Shaw  declared? 

Even  Britons,  who  approved  of  the  action  of  their  gov- 
ernment, have  cheerfully  held,  with  Shaw,  that  it  was 
Grey — none  other — that  chose  the  fatal  hour.  President 
Wilson  repeatedly  expressed  what  is,  in  effect,  the  same 
opinion.  For  example,  in  his  Columbus  speech  (Sept.  4, 
1919) ,  he  said:  "I  did  not  meet  a  single  public  man  who  did 
not  admit  these  things,  that  Germany  would  not  have  gone 
into  this  war  if  she  had  thought  Great  Britain  was  going 


into  it." 


This  amounts  to  an  abandonment  of  the  theory  that 
Germany  "chose  its  own  time"  for  the  war,  and  is  a  virtual 
admission  that  England  chose  its  own  time. 

If  Grey  could  have  prevented  war  by  letting  Germany 
fknow  that  England  would  intervene,  why  did  he  not  let 
Germany  knowj? 

What  other  motive  could  he  have  had  for  leading  Ger- 
many on  except  that  he  had  decided  that  the  summer  of 
1914  was  a  propitious  time  to  "have  it  out"  with  the  Cen- 
tral Powers? 

The  action  of  Grey,  indeed,  was  openly  excused  on  the 
theory  that  the  war  was  bound  to  come  anyhow  some  day, 
by  the  choice  of  the  Kaiser,  that  Britain  chose  the  time 
righteously,  since  the  wicked  mad-dog  of  Europe  had  run 
amuck  long  enough,  and  the  hour  had  struck  for  the  "free 
peoples"  of  the  world  to  unite  and  scotch  it. 

Why,  then,  mention  the  incidents  of  July  and  August? 
Why  continue  to  picture  Germany  leaping  upon  its  adver- 
saries from  behind? 


194  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Where,  also,  had  the  Kaiser  run  amuck? 

If  the  view  expressed  at  Columbus  be  correct — and  few 
will  now  dispute  it — it  is  sufficient  answer  to  the  millions 
of  words  that  have  been  printed  to  prove  the  "war  guilt" 
of  the  Central  Powers  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence 
and  incidents  of  the  summer  of  1914. 

Hang  the  plot  theory  on  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  if  you 
will,  and  the  answer  still  is  that  England  was  always  in  a 
position  to  frustrate  such  a  plot  by  the  simple  act  of 
speaking  out. 

The  "German  plot"  of  1914,  so  far  as  it  was  a  reality, 
was  simply  a  determination  of  Austria,  with  the  knowledge 
and  approval  of  Germany,  to  chastise  Serbia,  even  at  the 
risk  of  war  with  Russia  and  her  allies.  The  motive  for 
this  determination,  far  from  insane  dreams  of  world  con- 
quest, is  easily  discernible  in  the  previous  relations  between 
Serbia  and  Austria. 

The  assassination  of  the  Austrian  archduke,  stated  as 
baldly  as  it  usually  is,  would  not  seem  to  excuse  a  humilia- 
tion of  Serbia.  But  supposing  that  this  assassination, 
whether  perpetrated  with  or  without  the  knowledge  of  re- 
sponsible Serbian  officials,  was  the  logical  outcome  of  an 
agitation,  encouraged  and  assisted  by  the  Serbian  govern- 
ment, to  acquire  new  territory  for  the  kingdom  of  Serbia 
through  the  dismemberment  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Em- 
pire by  means  of  revolution  within  that  empire? 

We  were  once  informed  by  President  Wilson — just  at  a 
time  when  we  were  all  being  adjured  to  stand  behind  him 
— that  it  was  the  duty  of  every  government  to  see  to  it 
'•that  all  influences  proceeding  from  its  own  citizens  meant 
to  encourage  or  assist  revolution  in  other  states  should  be 
sternly  and  effectually  suppressed  and  prevented."  (Inau- 
gural address,  1917.)  According  to  this  view,  Austria 
had  a  bona  fide  grievance  against  Serbia.  If  you  begin 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning    195 

looking  for  the  original  aggressor  of  the  world  war  any 
time  within  a  twelve-month  before  June,  1914,  you  are 
as  likely  to  lay  your  finger  upon  "poor  little  Serbia"  as  any 
other.  l 

Go  back  several  years,  and  Serbia  and  Austria  are  found 
to  be  on  friendly  terms.  That  situation  obtained  until  the 
Serbian  king  and  queen  were  murdered  in  their  palace,  at 
the  instigation — so  it  was  generally  believed — of  the  Rus- 
sian legation  at  the  Serbian  capital.  Anyhow,  the  king  who 
acquired  the  Serbian  throne,  as  a  result  of  the  murder, 
proved  to  be  pro-Czar  and  anti-Josef.  From  that  time,  the 
friction  between  Serbia  and  Austria  began.  Start  with 
the  murder  of  the  Serbian  king  and  queen,  and  perhaps 
you  will  decide  that  Russia  was  the  original  aggressor. 

Very  early,  after  gaining  her  independence  from  Turkey, 
the  reactionary  little  kingdom  of  Serbia  had  developed 
"legitimate  ambitions"  to  acquire  the  territory  of  her  neigh- 
bors. While  under  the  influence  of  Austria,  she  had  signed 
a  secret  treaty  agreeing  not  to  plot  to  acquire  Austrian 
territory,  or  even  Bosnia  or  Herzegovina,  nominally  Tur- 
kish but  under  the  control  of  Austria  since  1878.  But 
immediately  Serbia  fell  under  the  influence  of  the  Czar,  this 
treaty  became  a  "scrap  of  paper";  the  "manifest  destiny" 
of  Serbia  was  directed,  in  a  large  measure,  toward  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina.  When,  in  1908,  Francis  Josef  annexed 
these  provinces,  to  prevent  their  recovery  by  Turkey, 
the  Serbian  king  was  peeved,  but  only  because  he  wanted 
them  for  himself.  He  appealed  to  the  Czar,  and  one  of 
the  periodical  European  crises  resulted. 

Austria  succeeded  in  retaining  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
but  the  "manifest  destiny"  of  Serbia  continued  to  find  its 
outlet  in  the  so-called  Pan-Serb  propaganda,  the  chief  aim 

1  It  now  appears,  according  to  information  published  in  the  London  Na- 
tion, June  21,  1919,  that  the  Sarajevo  murderers  have  been  acknowledged 
as  Serbian  officers. 


196  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

of  which  was  to  break  up  the  Austrian  Empire  for  the 
benefit  of  a  greater  Serbia.  Trace  the  quarrels  of  Austria 
and  Serbia  through  two  Balkan  wars,  down  to  1914,  and 
you  will  have  to  agree  that  the  July  ultimatum,  peremptory 
and  violent  though  it  be,  was  only  the  logical  and  almost 
certain  result  of  what  had  gone  on  in  the  years  before. 

To  hold  that  Austria  should  not  have  resisted  the  Ser- 
bian-Russian conspiracy  would  be  to  hold  that  the  United 
States  should  not  resist  a  conspiracy  of  Canada  to  acquire 
New  York  with  the  assistance  of  Japan.  The  Serbian  ex- 
cuse was  that  the  peoples  of  the  territories  which  it  coveted 
were  of  the  same  race  and  spoke  a  similar  language,  but 
Serbia  went  after  territory  to  which  this  consideration  did 
not  apply.  Moreover,  the  blood  of  the  Balkan  peoples 
is  bewilderingly  mixed.  To  hold  it  desirable  that  all  peo- 
ples closely  akin  in  race  and  language  should  be  under  a 
single  flag  is  one  thing;  to  determine  under  what  flag  they 
shall  be,  and  how  they  shall  arrive  there,  is  another  thing. 
The  principle  which  Serbia  pretended  to  be  guided  by,  if 
applied  equally  by  Russia,  would  perhaps  have  resulted  in 
the  gobbling  up  of  Serbia  by  Russia.  If  applied  equally  by 
all  countries,  it  would  at  once  set  the  whole  world  at  war. 
It  would  do  so  to-day. 

There  was  no  clear-cut  issue  of  purity  versus  depravity 
in  the  relations  between  Serbia  and  Austria,  nor  any  issue 
that  would  justify  America  in  taking  sides.  The  folly  of 
going  to  war  for  another  country's  irredentism  was  thrice 
demonstrated  by  the  world  war;  it  was  plain  enough  be- 
fore that.  Nor  is  the  verdict  different  if  the  Serbian- 
Austrian  struggle  be  viewed  as  a  Russian-German  struggle. 
The  Czar,  for  the  time  being,  played  the  role  of  protector 
of  Serbia,  prompted  by  the  same  motive  that  had  been  the 
motive  of  Russian  czars  for  generations — to  push  south- 
ward, and  ultimately  acquire  Constantinople  and  the  Straits, 


Our  Myth  of  the  War's  Beginning    197 

and  to  extend  their  hegemony  over  the  entire  Balkan  pen- 
insula. Credit  Austria  and  Germany  with  the  same  ambi- 
tion. It  becomes  a  conflict  between  "manifest  destinies" 
— Pan-Slavism  versus  Pan-Germanism.  Which  was  more 
inimical  to  the  interests  of  civilization?  Until  1907,  when 
the  British  bread  was  buttered  on  the  Pan-Slav  side,  there 
was  no  doubt  about  the  answer  among  our  British  cousins. 
"Before  the  Entente  of  1907,"  says  Bullard,  uthe  British 
newspapers  were  horrified  at  the  Russian  intrigues  in  the 
Balkans.  Since  that  date  they  have  denpunced  the  activity 
of  the  Austrians."  ("Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War,"  p. 
138.) 

If  you  are  still  looking  for  the  original  responsibility  for 
the  great  war  in  or  near  the  Balkan  peninsula,  you  will  find 
it,  not  in  any  one  country,  but  in  the  general  situation  in  the 
Balkans.  If  you  would  name  as  the  original  aggressor  the 
government  most  responsible  for  the  general  situation  in 
the  Balkans,  you  would  perhaps  again  lay  your  finger  upon 
England.  For  generations,  the  keynote  of  British  foreign 
policy  was  to  protect  the  Turk  from  Russia.  For  this  pur- 
pose England  fought  the  Crimean  War,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose England,  backed  by  Austria,  intervened  in  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war  of  '77,  and  through  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  es- 
tablished that  general  situation  in  the  Balkans;  that  status 
quo,  which  all  swore  to  uphold;  which  not  one,  probably,  in- 
tended to  uphold;  which,  in  fact,  took  so  scantily  into  con- 
sideration any  principle  of  international  equity  that  it  was 
not  worthy  of  upholding;  which  nearly  all  proceeded  to  try 
to  change  in  their  favor;  which  carried  the  seeds  of  a  great 
war — out  of  which  grew  the  particular  dispute  which  oc- 
casioned the  firing  of  the  first  gun  of  1914- 

It  happens  that  there  is  no  clear-cut  issue  of  purity  ver- 
sus depravity  anywhere  in  that  quarter  of  the  world.  It  is 
clear  that  our  allies  and  our  enemies  were  equally  engaged 


198  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

in  a  despicable,  cowardly,  selfish  business;  that  the  official 
Allied  and  American  version  of  the  origin  of  the  world 
war  is  a  myth ;  that  whoever  goes  to  the  official  white,  yel- 
low, and  orange  books,  expecting  there  to  find  the  real  re- 
sponsibility, knows  nothing  of  what  was  going  on  in  the 
world  previously  to  1914;  that  these  government  books 
merely  tell  the  story  of  the  feinting  before  the  final  grapple; 
that  if  one  government  or  group  is  more  responsible  than 
another,  the  fact  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  perpetration  of 
any  one  act,  but  in  many  acts  perpetrated  in  pursuance  of 
a  policy;  that  if  the  German  world  peril  was  a  reality,  its 
reality  will  have  to  be  established  by  a  general  record  of 
conduct,  policy,  and  motive,  on  the  part  of  the  Kaiser's 
government,  distinctly  and  radically  different  from  the  rec- 
ord of  the  governments  which  took  up  the  sword  against 
Germany. 

So  we  pass  to  the  question  of  relative  depravity  as  re- 
vealed by  such  international  outlawry  as  treaty-breaking, 
atrocities,  aggressions  upon  weaker  peoples,  and  general 
imperialistic  activities. 


XXIII 

THE   NOBLE   DEMOCRACIES SCRAPS  OF  PAPER;  ATROCITIES 

THE  German  violation  of  Belgium  was  from  the  first  the 
leading  topic  in  the  fear-propaganda  of  ourselves  and  our 
allies.  The  lesson  sought  to  be  drawn  from  it  was  that 
the  Kaiser's  government  was  particularly  untrustworthy  and 
dishonorable,  and  that  the  Germans — either  the  German 
people,  the  German  government,  or  the  German  military 
clique — were  particularly  savage,  ruthless,  and  inhuman. 
By  its  breach  of  the  Treaty  of  1839,  the  Kaiser's  govern- 
ment had  proved  that  its  word  could  never  be  trusted.  By 
the  atrocities  incident  to  the  military  occupation,  the  Ger- 
man had  proved  himself  a  Hun.  Therefore,  those  govern- 
ments that  were  incapable  of  profaning  their  pledged  word, 
those  nations  whose  military  forces  were  incapable  of  out- 
rage upon  civil  populations,  those  great  powers  which  were 
incapable  of  transgressing  the  sovereignty  of  their  weaker 
neighbors,  must,  for  their  own  ultimate  safety — but  especi- 
ally for  the  sake  of  humanity — band  themselves  into  a 
League  of  Honor  to  crush  the  offending  government  and 
to  humiliate,  punish,  and  reform  the  offending  people. 

But  where  is  the  nation  that  has  proven  itself  morally  fit 
to  reform  the  Hun?  Where  is  the  League  of  Honor? 
Where  is  the  material  for  any  such  league?  Where  is  the 
government  so  without  sin  that  it  can  claim  the  right  to 
cast  the  first  stone? 

To  some  it  may  seem  superfluous  to  discuss  the  point 
farther.  But  the  peace  settlement  is  based  upon  the  purity- 
versus-depravity  theory,  and  is  defensible  only  under  it. 

199 


200  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Moreover,  notwithstanding  admissions  as  to  the  imperfec- 
tions of  the  peace  settlement,  every  effort  has  been  put 
forth  to  perpetuate  the  purity-versus-depravity  theory  in 
the  popular  mind  as  an  axiom,  never  to  be  questioned  or 
reexamined.  So  intensive  was  the  work  of  the  fear-prop- 
agandists that,  after  every  other  excuse  for  America's  war 
has  lost  its  force,  there  is  danger  that  millions  of  Amer- 
icans may  still  remain  under  the  misapprehension  that  we 
saved  America  and  humanity  from  a  power  of  singular 
wickedness,  which  actually  entertained  a  scheme  of  world 
conquest  and  stood  in  a  fair  way  to  realize  it. 

England,  Prussia,  and  other  countries  united  in  a  treaty 
guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Prussia  violated 
the  treaty  and  England  declared  war,  claiming  to  do  so 
purely  on  principle,  in  defense  of  the  sacredness  of  treaties 
and  the  rights  of  weak  nations.  But  England,  France, 
Russia,  and  Japan  united  in  treaties  guaranteeing  the  neu- 
trality of  Korea.  Japan  invaded  Korea,  as  Germany  in- 
vaded Belgium,  compelled  Korea  to  declare  war  on  Russia, 
and  afterwards  made  Korea  a  permanent  dependency  of 
Japan.  The  king  of  Korea  objected,  appealed  to  both 
England  and  France — and,  for  that  matter,  to  one  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt,  then  President  of  the  United  States — to 
intervene  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  Korea.  Not  one  of 
the  three  gave  any  help  to  Korea.  The  principle  was 
exactly  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  Belgium.  Why,  then, 
did  England  not  go  to  war  on  principle  against  Japan? 

England,  France,  and  other  countries  united  in  a  treaty 
guaranteeing  the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  Turkish 
Empire.  But  England  invaded  Egypt,  an  integral  part  of 
the  Turkish  Empire,  against  the  wishes  of  the  Turkish  gov- 
ernment, conquered  Egypt,  and  ultimately  annexed  it,  brib- 
ing France  with  Morocco  to  keep  still  about  the  matter. 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          201 

During  the  Boer  War,  the  British  government  insisted 
on  violating  the  neutrality  of  Portugal,  by  marching  troops 
across  Portuguese  East  Africa,  over  the  protest  of  the  Port- 
uguese government,  in  precisely  the  same  way  that  Ger- 
many violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  in  1914. 

England,  France,  America,  Germany,  and  other  coun- 
tries united  in  a  treaty,  in  1906,  known  as  the  Act  of  Al- 
geciras,  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  and  integrity  of  the 
empire  of  Morocco.  Meanwhile,  England,  France,  and 
Spain,  had  entered  into  secret  agreements  for  the  partition 
of  Morocco  between  France  and  Spain.  In  1907,  France 
sent  an  army  into  Morocco,  which  was  never  withdrawn. 
France  destroyed  the  neutrality  and  integrity  of  Morocco 
by  armed  force,  ultimately  dividing  the  country  with  Spain. 
Instead  of  declaring  war  on  France  and  Spain,  England 
gave  them  her  support  and  protection.  Nor  did  America 
protest  against  the  tearing  up  of  the  Moroccan  scrap 
of  paper.  The  only  government  to  protest  was  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Kaiser,  whose  word,  President  Wilson  solemnly 
informed  us,  "we  cannot  take  as  ...  a  guarantee  of  any- 
thing that  is  to  endure,"  because,  forsooth,  "They  observe 
no  covenants!" 

England  and  Russia,  in  the  Entente  of  1907,  united  to 
guarantee  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Persia.  At  the 
same  time,  they  secretly  bargained  to  divide  Persia  between 
them.  With  the  consent  and  support  of  England,  Russia 
sent  an  army  into  Persia,  overturned  the  existing  govern- 
ment, destroyed  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Persia, 
and  was  still  in  control  of  Persia  by  means  of  an  army  of 
occupation  when  noble  England  declared  war  upon  Germany 
for  violating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

America  and  England,  in  1850,  united  in  a  treaty — the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty — agreeing  never,  either  of  them, 
to  "assume  or  exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa 


202  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America!' 
But  England  violated  this  treaty  at  the  beginning,  by  refus- 
ing to  give  up  her  protectorate  over  the  Mosquito  Coast. 
This  was  also  in  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Two 
years  later,  England  again  violated  both  the  treaty  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  as  well  as  the  sovereignty  of  the  republic 
of  Honduras,  by  declaring  the  Bay  Islands  a  British  colony, 
after  a  military  occupation  of  those  islands.  Later,  Eng- 
land again  violated  both  the  treaty  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine by  asserting  sovereignty  over  British  Honduras,  which 
was  formally  made  a  British  colony  in  1862.  In  1859, 
England  relinquished  control  over  the  Mosquito  Coast 
and  the  Bay  Islands,  but  the  retention  of  British  Honduras 
remains  a  permanent  violation  both  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  and  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  due  course, 
America  also  violated  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  by  the  as- 
sumption and  exercise  of  dominion  over  Panama,  the  per- 
manent occupation  of  Nicaragua,  the  control  of  its  govern- 
ment, and  the  acquisition  from  Nicaragua  of  the  Corn  Is- 
lands. 

Even  Belgium — irony  of  history! — has  a  scrap  of  paper 
in  its  closet.  In  1885,  England,  France,  Germany,  and 
other  countries,  united  in  a  treaty,  known  as  the  Berlin  Act, 
guaranteeing  the  neutrality  and  integrity  of  the  Congo  Free 
State.  The  kingdom  of  Belgium  also  promised  to  observe 
this  treaty.  But  in  1908,  Belgium  formally  annexed  the 
Congo  Free  State,  without  the  consent  of  any  of  the  signa- 
tory powers,  and  over  the  protest  of  some  of  them.  Why 
did  not  the  British  government  declare  war  upon  Belgium  in 
defense  of  the  sacredness  of  treaties? 

The  same  righteous  government  which,  in  1914,  told  the 
world  it  declared  war  against  Germany  "solely"  on  princi- 
ple, because  Germany  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  1839,  was  in 
power  in  England  in  1908,  when  Belgium  tore  up  the  Treaty 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          203 

of  1885 — the  same  party,  the  same  cabinet,  largely,  the 
same  Foreign  Secretary.  It  was  also  in  power  in  England 
when  France  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  1906,  when  England  and 
Russia  together  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  1907,  and  when  the 
British  government  completed  the  mutilation  of  the  Treaty 
of  1878  by  the  formal  annexation  of  Egypt. 

Every  powerful  government  which,  at  one  time  or 
another,  virtuously  proclaimed  its  duty  to  assist  in  crushing 
Germany  because  of  the  German  scrap  of  paper,  had  its 
own  scraps  of  paper,  not  one,  but  many,  and  at  least  one 
scrap  of  paper  paralleling  in  all  essentials  the  German  scrap 
of  paper.  Every  one,  even,  acquired  scraps  of  paper  during 
the  very  war  whose  purpose,  in  part,  was  asserted  to  be  to 
mete  out  punishment  for  the  German  scrap  of  paper. 

International  law,  as  it  was  known  at  the  beginning  of 
1914,  had,  in  toto,  either  been  fabricated  in  treaties  or  ac- 
knowledged in  treaties.  In  large  part,  these  treaties  were 
thrown  overboard  by  the  belligerents,  not  merely  as  they 
applied  to  enemies  but  as  they  applied  to  neutrals.  Be- 
tween 1914  and  1918,  every  belligerent  assisted  in  tearing 
up  international  law  and  the  treaties  acknowledging  inter- 
national law.  The  accumulation  of  this  great  collection  of 
paper  scraps  did  not  in  every  case  involve,  as  in  Belgium, 
violation  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  a  neutral.  But  in  at 
least  three  notable  cases  it  did,  those  of  China,  Greece  and 
Russia. 

The  territory  of  every  country  on  earth,  strong  or  weak, 
is  guaranteed  by  some  treaty,  convention,  or  paper,  to  which 
every  great  government  associated  in  the  war  against  Ger- 
many has  put  its  signature.  An  article  that  was  generally 
adopted  at  the  second  Hague  Conference,  for  example, 
reads:  "The  territory  of  neutral  powers  is  inviolable." 
Another  reads:  "Belligerents  are  forbidden  to  move  troops 
or  convoys  of  either  munitions  of  war  or  supplies  across 


204  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  territory  of  a  neutral  power."  These  had  already  be- 
come commonplaces  of  international  law.  Every  nation  on 
earth  not  at  war  with  China,  Greece  and  Russia  was,  there- 
fore, under  precisely  the  same  obligation  to  respect  the  terri- 
tory of  China,  Greece,  and  Russia  as  Germany  was,  to  re- 
spect the  territory  of  Belgium. 

But  Japan  violated  the  territory  of  China,  over  the  pro- 
test of  the  Chinese  government,  marching  its  forces  through 
China  in  order  to  get  at  the  German  dependency  of  Kiao- 
Chau,  exactly  as  Germany  violated  the  territory  of  Belgium 
in  order  to  get  at  France.  England,  France,  Russia  and 
Italy  violated  the  territory  of  Greece,  over  the  protest  of 
the  Greek  government,  and  by  a  series  of  military  and  naval 
aggressions,  overturned  the  Greek  government,  and  in- 
stalled a  new  government,  forcing  Greece  to  declare  war 
against  Germany.  And,  after  Russia  became  a  neutral, 
England,  France,  Japan  and  the  United  States  violated  the 
territory  of  Russia,  over  the  protest  of  the  Russian  govern- 
ment, made  war  on  the  Russian  government,  and  attempted 
to  assist  to  power  in  Russia  a  political  aggregation  more 
favorable  to  the  Allied  cause. 

Much  was  made  of  the  fact  that  the  German  govern- 
ment, when  about  to  violate  Belgium,  admitted  to  the  world 
that  it  was  about  to  commit  a  wrong.  We  commit  exactly 
the  same  wrong,  but  pretend  that  we  are  doing  right.  We 
double  our  own  crime  by  hypocrisy. 

Atrocities. 

By  the  very  nature  of  things,  nothing  is  more  certain  of 
embellishment,  from  their  source  to  their  final  appearance  in 
the  form  of  hate-propaganda,  than  stories  of  war  atrocities. 
The  high  state  of  excitement  of  the  victims,  their  passion, 
fear,  and  resentment,  render  exaggeration  inevitable,  even 
though  it  may  be  unconscious.  Passion  and  self-interest, 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          205 

with  the  certainty  that  disproof  is  next  to  impossible,  furnish 
the  most  powerful  conceivable  incentive  to  outright  fabrica- 
tion. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  suggesting  that  there 
were  no  atrocities  whatever  in  Belgium.  I  do  wish  to  be 
understood  as  holding  that  nothing  occurred  revealing  singu- 
lar depravity  on  the  part  of  the  Germans.  The  history  of 
our  allies,  recent  and  remote,  is  burdened  with  atrocities. 

British  historians  frequently  refer  to  the  practice  of  bind- 
ing Sepoys  to  the  mouths  of  cannon  and  blowing  them  to 
fragments,  indulged  in  by  British  officers  in  the  early  days 
of  the  subjugation  of  India.  Mass  murder,  wholesale  hang- 
ings, extermination  of  entire  communities,  starvation  on  a 
large  scale — these  were  but  commonplaces  in  the  conquest 
of  India,  which  is  not  yet  completed. 

Much  of  the  same  can  be  said  of  Egypt.  The  bombard- 
ment of  Alexandria,  in  1882,  like  the  bombardment  of 
Canton,  China,  in  1885,  was  a  cold-blooded  atrocity  perpe- 
trated upon  an  unoffending  and  practically  defenseless  peo- 
ple. The  British  control  is  studded  with  British  atrocities, 
which  continue  to  this  writing. 

In  Bloemfontein,  South  Africa,  the  subjugated  Boers 
erected  a  monument  in  memory  of  26,663  women  and  chil- 
dren who  died  in  British  concentration  camps  in  the  two 
years  of  the  Boer  War — murdered  by  deliberate  starvation 
and  neglect.  The  British  in  South  Africa  could  not  urge 
the  extenuating  circumstances  which  existed  in  the  occupied 
zone  of  France,  where  non-combatants  were  underfed  by 
the  Germans;  they  were  not  themselves  subject  to  a  starva- 
tion blockade. 

In  1907,  in  the  sovereign  state  of  Morocco,  the  population 
of  the  town  of  Casablanca  resisted  the  efforts  of  a  French- 
Spanish  syndicate  to  build  a  railroad  line  through  the  local 
cemetery.  A  collision  occurred  between  the  population  and 


206  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  workmen,  and  the  latter  were  driven  away.  Whereupon 
French  troops  bombarded  the  defenseless  town  with  artil- 
lery, killing  thousands  of  men,  women,  and  children.  This 
outrage  served  the  French  purpose  to  penetrate  farther  and 
farther  into  Morocco,  under  the  pretense  of  "protecting 
French  lives  and  property,"  with  the  ultimate  view  of  annex- 
ing the  country. 

Even  Belgium  had  its  own  particular  and  special  Belgium. 
Under  the  Belgian  rule  in  the  Congo  Free  State,  according 
to  a  report  published  in  1904  by  the  British  Foreign  Office, 
in  one  district  the  population  was  reduced  in  six  years  from 
five  thousand  to  six  hundred.  "In  six  months  on  the  Mom- 
boya  River  the  lowest  estimate  of  people  killed  or  mutilated 
by  having  their  right  hand  cut  off  was  six  thousand,  and 
this  did  not  include  the  women  and  children,  whom  the  sol- 
diers were  instructed  to  kill  with  the  butt  of  their  rifles  so 
as  not  to  waste  cartridges."  ("The  New  Map  of  Africa," 
by  Herbert  Adams  Gibbons,  p.  152.) 

Interested  Belgians,  at  the  time,  held  that  the  various 
investigations  of  the  Congo  atrocities  were  either  conducted 
or  inspired  by  the  British  government,  as  a  means  to  pre- 
paring the  way  for  taking  over  the  Congo  Free  State,  and 
its  rich  rubber  resources,  for  the  benefit  of  British  gentle- 
men. The  aforementioned  official  British  report  was  pub- 
lished with  an  air  of  great  sanctity.  Eight  years  later  the 
world  learned,  from  other  and  equally  reliable  reports,  that 
Britons  were  employing  similar  methods  in  the  rubber  har- 
vests of  Putamayo,  Peru. 

Concurrently,  similar  atrocities  were  being  perpetrated  by 
Frenchmen  in  the  French  Congo.  The  same  author  re- 
counts an  incident  related  by  a  French  investigation  com- 
mission: 

At  Bangui,  the  commission  found  that  the  foremen  of  the  com- 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          207 

panics  exercised  pressure  upon  the  blacks  to  bring  in  rubber  by  seiz- 
ing their  women  and  children,  and  holding  them  as  hostages  until 
the  allotted  quota  was  brought  to  the  company's  compound.  In 
1904,  at  Bangui,  one  concessions  company,  which  made  a  practice  of 
this  barbarous  hostage  system,  shut  up  in  a  small  hut  sixty-eight 
women  and  children,  without  air  and  water  and  food  enough  to 
keep  them  alive.  The  crime  happened  to  be  discovered  by  a  young* 
French  physician.  He  demanded  their  release.  Forty-five  women 
and  two  children  were  found  dead.  Only  thirteen  women  and  eight 
children  were  still  alive.  Some  of  them  died  in  spite  of  all  the 
exertions  of  their  liberator.  The  case  could  not  have  been  unique.  It 
was  discovered  only  because  it  happened  to  be  on  the  path  of  travelers. 

In  none  of  these  cases  did  the  government  of  the  "noble 
democracy"  concerned  take  action  against  the  perpetrators 
of  these  deeds. 

We  also  have  our  black  pages  of  atrocity.  How  many 
Americans  remember  that  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea  was 
for  the  avowed  purpose  of  starving  the  Confederacy,  includ- 
ing the  civil  population?  In  the  Philippines  we  at  times 
wiped  out  whole  villages,  without  regard  to  age  or  sex.  As 
late  as  1913,  it  was  reported  that,  in  the  campaign  against 
the  Moros,  General  Pershing's  soldiers  killed  196  women 
and  340  children  in  one  day's!  fighting.  In  1920  we  learned 
from  official  sources  that,  in  Haiti,  our  marines  had  killed 
3,250  natives,  while  losing  only  thirteen  of  their  number. 
The  figures  justify  the  term  "indiscriminate  killings,"  em- 
ployed by  an  American  major  general.  This  is  not  war, 
but  massacre. 

Not  only  were  opponents  of  the  American  occupation 
hunted  down  and  killed,  but  scores  were  murdered  after 
being  taken  prisoner.  Scores  of  Haitians  who  had  not  re- 
sisted the  occupation  in  a  military  way  were  killed  by  our 
marines  for  trying  to  escape  from  enforced  labor  upon  the 
public  roads.  Gatherings  of  Haitians  were  bombed  from 


208  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

airplanes,  and  Haitian  and  Santo  Domingan  prisoners  were 
subjected  to  tortures  of  the  most  savage  and  revolting  na- 
ture, according  to  testimony  given  to  a  Senate  committee 
in  the  fall  of  1921. 

As  for  Nicaragua,  the  "Confidential  Hearing  before  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States  Sen- 
ate, 63rd  Congress,  Second  Session,"  reveals  a  number  of 
atrocities  which,  if  generally  known,  ought  to  shame  into 
whispers  any  mention  we  may  need  to  make  of  unpleasant 
events  in  Belgium. 

October  3,  1912,  Colonel  J.  H.  Pendlcton,  U.  S.  N., 
in  command  of  2,000  marines,  stormed  the  heights  of 
Coyotepe,  killing  fifty  Nicaraguan  Liberals  under  command 
of  General  Benjamin  F.  Zeledon.  Having  reduced  by  this 
assault  the  defenses  of  the  city  of  Masaya,  Colonel  Pendle- 
ton  stood  by  while  the  Diaz  contingent,  for  whom  he  was 
fighting,  proceeded  to  execute  Zeledon  and  then  to  stage  a 
massacre  in  the  undefended  city.  This  massacre  of  un- 
armed men,  women  and  children,  which  Pendleton  per- 
mitted and  for  which  the  great  government  of  the  United 
States  must  forever  stand  responsible,  is  described  by  an 
eye-witness,  page  420,  of  the  secret  government  document, 
as  follows: 

I  took  a  photograph  of  Colonel  Pendleton  standing  on  top  of  the 
hill  iwith  his  men.  When  this  happened  the  Nicaraguan  soldiers, 
\vho  had  been  standing  by  ...  sailed  into  the  town  of  Masaya, 
which  lies  under  the  brow  of  the  hill.  They  massacred  everybody 
they  could  lay  their  hands  on,  and  the  women  and  children  of  the 
town  fled  into  the  church  of  Masaya,  and  these  Nicaraguans,  or 
government  soldiers,  brought  up  a  field  piece,  and  they  fired  the 
door  of  the  church  down,  and  they  brought  up  two  machine  guns 
and  fired  into  these  people.  There  must  have  been  300  or  400  peo- 
ple all  crowded  into  that  church.  .  .  .  They  killed  about  250  peo- 
ple right  there  in  the  church.  They  simply  mowed  them  down 
with  the  machine  gun.  Then  they  fell  upon  the  rest  of  the  inhabi- 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          209 

tants.  They  looted  everything  there,  and  they  simply  tore  that 
town  to  pieces.  It  was  the  worst  looking  horrible  wreck  I  ever 
saw,  and  the  dead  were  littered  all  over  it. 

The  Belgians,  at  least,  had  formal  warning  of  the  Ger- 
man invasion.  But  the  population  of  Vera  Cruz,  Mexico, 
had  no  warning  whatever.  The  government  of  the  United 
States  had  not  declared  war  on  Mexico,  nor  upon  the  city 
of  Vera  Cruz.  In  Europe  a  desperate  struggle  of  nations 
was  going  on.  But  on  April  21,  1914,  the  United  States 
was  in  no  danger  of  attack.  The  life  of  no  American  was 
at  stake.  Nevertheless,  we  made  an  aggressive  war  upon  a 
practically  defenseless  city,  and  entirely  without  warning  to 
the  population  thereof.  Not  a  civilian  in  Vera  Cruz  had 
any  idea  that  the  Americans  were  going  to  attack.  When 
the  booming  of  the  guns  began,  the  children  were  let  out  of 
school,  and  ran  panic-stricken  for  their  homes.  By  that 
time  the  invaders  were  running  amuck  through  the  city.  At 
least  ten  children  and  six  women  were  shot  to  death  in  the 
streets  by  our  gallant  lads. 

The  Mexicans  consider  our  attack  upon,  and  occupation 
of,  Vera  Cruz  an  American  "Lusitania"  and  an  American 
Belgium  rolled  into  one.  Our  punitive  expedition  they  re- 
member with  little  less  horror.  During  that  expedition, 
according  to  our  own  official  reports  and  our  own  news- 
paper correspondents,  our  heroic  soldiers,  on  one  occasion, 
"surprised,"  and  massacred  sixty  Mexicans,  without  giving 
them  an  opportunity  to  surrender.  On  another  occasion 
they  surprised,  and  massacred,  forty  unarmed  Mexicans, 
some  of  whom  were  asleep  and  some  of  whom  were  naked, 
swimming  in  a  pool.  On  a  third  occasion,  they  fired  into 
a  civilian  mob,  killing  forty. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  American  side  of  the  line,  unoffending 
and  defenseless  Mexicans  were  murdered  by  border  rang- 
ers, local  police  officers,  or  others  intent  upon  "making  the 


210  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Mexicans  pay  for  Villa's  raid,"  or  "making  this  a  white 
man's  country."  According  to  a  report 1  of  an  investigator 
appointed  by  Colonel  H.  J.  Slocum,  U.  S.  A.,  rendered  Feb- 
ruary 12,  1918,  "the  number  of  victims  thus  sacrificed  in 
southwest  Texas  by  such  peace  of/icers  assuming  the  powers 
of  a  court  of  justice  will  probably  never  be  known,  though  I 
understand  that  attorney  F.  C.  Pierce  holds  a  list  of  names 
of  nearly  three  hundred" 

Coming  down  to  the  great  war,  the  absence  of  Allied 
atrocities  upon  a  civilian  population  upon  the  western  front 
is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Allies  had  no  enemy  popu- 
lation to  deal  with.  Atrocities  upon  enemy  combatants 
were  perpetrated  on  both  sides.  On  returning  from  Eu- 
rope, Herbert  L.  Pratt,  vice-president  of  the  Standard  Oil 
Company  and  a  Y.  M.  C.  A.  worker,  declared  in  a  pub- 
lished interview  (June  2,  1918)  that:  "The  Americans  no 
longer  are  bringing  in  prisoners  in  small  groups.  They 
rre  shooting  the  Germans  down  like  rats." 

Atrocities  of  this  kind  were  defended  on  the  ground  that 
the  Germans  had  committed  atrocities  quite  as  bad.  The 
hate-propaganda  was  necessary  not  only  at  home,  but  on 
the  battle  front  also.  We  had  to  sermonize  our  soldiers 
on  hatred  before  they  entered  the  trenches,  for  fear  they 
might  consider  the  Germans  fellow  creatures — for  fear 
they  might  not  take  sufficient  pleasure  in  mutilating  the  Ger- 
mans. We  had  to  put  our  own  brave  boys  in  the  savage 
state  that  we  told  them  the  Germans  were  in.  We  had  to 
repeat  to  them  the  old  lie  that  is  told  in  all  wars,  that  the 
enemy  take  no  prisoners. 

Upon  the  battlefield,  stories  of  mutilation  and  outrage 
were  readily  believed  and  held  to  justify  any  outrage.  We 
excused  our  poisoned  gas  and  our  air  raids  on  open  towns 

1  This  report  is  printed  in  full  in  the  April,  1918,  Mexican  Review, 
published  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          211 

only  on  the  ground  that  our  enemies  had  employed  such 
means  of  warfare  first.  But  British  aviators  bombed  non- 
combatants  both  of  India  and  Afghanistan,  where  no  pre- 
tense of  retaliation  could  be  offered, and  this  after  German 
''savagery"  had  been  crushed.2 

For  Germans  to  rejoice  over  the  sinking  of  the  "Lusi- 
tania,"  of  greater  value  to  Britain  than  any  warship,  was 
savagery,  but  for  Britons  to  rejoice  at  the  stunting  of  Ger- 
man babies,  of  no  use  whatever  in  that  particular  war,  was 
patriotism.  In  an  interview  published  in  the  Chicago  Trib- 
une, February  14,  1917,  Sir  Gilbert  Parker  was  reported 
as  saying:  "German  boys  and  girls  of  to-day,  who  are  to 
be  the  future  manhood  and  womanhood  of  Germany,  are 
being  deprived  of  those  foods  necessary  to  proper  growth 
and  sustenance.  And  I  am  glad  of  it." 

In  speaking  to  the  House  of  Commons,  December  20, 
1917,  Lloyd  George  exulted  thus: 

We  must  not  imagine  that  the  enemy  has  not  had  his  difficulties. 
We  had  proof  of  that  the  other  day,  when  facts  were  given  to  us 
as  to  the  deteriorated  physical  quality  of  the  German  workers  as  a 
result  of  the  blockade  imposed  by  the  British  navy.  The  German 
workers  have  so  deteriorated  that  the  output  of  Germany  per  man 
has  gone  down  by  something  like  thirty-three  per  cent.,  compared 
with  the  first  year  of  the  war. 

In  an  interview  with  the  Associated  Press,  May  i,  1919, 
Professor  Abderhalden,  a  noted  physiologist  who  had  been 
making  an  investigation  of  German  health  conditions,  as- 
serted that  to  date  a  million  persons,  chiefly  children,  were 
dead  as  a  result  of  the  Allied  hunger  blockade,  and  that 
the  survivors  averaged  a  loss  of  twenty  per  cent,  in  weight. 

Our  hunger  blockade,  even  while  the  war  went  on,  was 

2  The  Glasgow  Forward  seems  to  have  proven  that  the  Entente  Allies  were 
first  both  in  the  use  of  poison  gas  and  in  bombing  civilian  populations 
from  the  sky. 


212  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

an  atrocity  against  our  enemies  beside  which  the  "sub- 
marine atrocity'*  is  not  to  be  mentioned.  How  much 
greater  an  atrocity  it  was  after  our  enemies  were  no  longer 
resisting  us!  And  how  much  greater  an  atrocity  against 
neutrals,  who  never  wished  to  fight  us.  First,  our  noble  al- 
lies starved  Greece — the  entire  population,  civil  and  mili- 
tary, old  and  young,  male  and  female — as  a  means  to  com- 
pelling that  country  to  abandon  neutrality  and  assist  them 
in  the  war.  Afterwards  we  starved  Russia  and  Hungary. 

We  starved  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Russians,  especially 
women  and  children,  and  for  no  other  reason  than  that 
our  government  did  not  approve  of  the  Soviet  Government. 
We  had  expressed  horror  at  the  enforced  labor  of  Belgians 
behind  the  Allied  lines,  but  at  Archangel  we  forced  unwill- 
ing Russians  to  labor  behind  the  Allied  lines.  More  than 
that,  we  conscripted  them  for  service  against  their  own 
people,  and,  on  occasion,  murdered  them  in  cold  blood  when 
they  refused  to  fight. 

The  effect  of  our  starvation  blockade  was  even  more 
disastrous  upon  the  population  of  Hungary.  Testifying 
before  the  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee,  January 
15,  1920,  Secretary  of  War  Baker  presented  a  summary  of 
infantile  death  rates  per  thousand  in  the  city  of  Budapest, 
for  the  first  six  months  of  1919,  as  follows:  January,  812; 
February,  966;  March,  784;  April,  577;  May,  567;  June, 
635.  For  this  mass  murder  of  babies  we  share  responsi- 
bility with  our  allies. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  military  heroism,  war  also 
brings  out  the  worst  in  human  nature,  which  is  everywhere 
approximately  the  same.  But  even  in  peace  times,  atroci- 
ties are  constantly  occurring  in  every  large  community. 
America  lynched  67  persons  in  1918,  of  whom  four  were 
white  men  and  five  colored  women,  and  in  1919  this  record 
was  surpassed.  If  all  the  brutal  assaults,  arsons,  murders, 


Scraps  of  Paper;  Atrocities          213 

rapes,  unlawful  imprisonments,  and  tortures,  perpetrated 
upon  defenseless  persons  in  the  United  States  of  America, 
by  men  in  the  uniform  of  the  United  States,  by  State  militia- 
men, by  the  police,  and  others  wearing  the  badge  of  author- 
ity, by  private  detectives,  by  corporation  gunmen,  and  by 
individuals,  during  the  same  period  in  which  Germany  oc- 
cupied Belgium — if  all  these  were  brought  together  and  set 
forth  in  their  most  revolting  details,  it  may  be  that  they 
would  fill  a  book  upon  American  atrocities  in  peace  time, 
not  so  vastly  different  from  our  books  upon  German  atroci- 
ties in  war  time. 

The  only  atrocity  alleged  against  the  Germans  that  is 
not  equalled  or  surpassed  by  the  atrocities  of  ourselves  and 
our  allies  is  found  in  the  "rape  squad"  stories,  which  depict 
the  violation  of  womanhood  as  an  official  part  of  the  Ger- 
man warfare.  But  Sir  Philip  Gibbs,  the  celebrated  British 
correspondent  ("Now  It  Can  Be  Told,"  p.  456),  says: 

On  the  whole  it  seemed  that  they  [the  Germans]  had  not  mis- 
used the  women.  I  heard  no  tales  of  actual  atrocity,  though  some 
of  brutal  passion.  But  many  women  shrugged  their  shoulders  when 
I  questioned  them  about  this  and  said :  'They  [the  Germans]  had  no 
need  to  use  violence  in  their  way  of  love-making.  There  were  many 
volunteers.' 

With  many  Americans  the  "rape  squad"  stories  have  no 
doubt  long  since  gone  into  the  same  class  as  our  official 
"expose"  of  Lenin  as  an  agent  of  the  German  autocracy, 
and  our  yarn  about  the  nationalization  of  women  by  the 
Soviet  Government.  To  those  who  are  still  inclined  to 
credit  them  there  is  just  one  thing  to  say :  //  our  official  prop- 
agandists, beginning  with  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  State,  had  the  effrontery  to  put  forward  deliberate,  mali- 
cious, monstrous,  and  easily  provable  distortions — such  as 
the  story  of  Germany's  "broken  submarine  promises,"  the 


214  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

tale  of  a  "German-Mexican  plot  to  attack  America"  the  al- 
legation of  "our  right  under  international  law"  to  confiscate 
the  Dutch  ships — to  what  extent  can  we  credit  the  dictum 
of  these  gentlemen  upon  matters  which  are  largely  inca- 
pable of  proof  or  disproof? 

When  the  armistice  was  signed,  a  good  many  Americans 
expressed  disappointment.  Several  million  Germans  had 
been  killed,  but  that  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  them. 
Rather  than  give  immediate  peace  to  a  people  that  was 
seeking  peace  on  our  terms,  they  were  willing  to  sacrifice  a 
few  thousand  more  Americans,  for  the  sake  of  a  final  mas- 
sacre of  Germans.  The  lesson  of  the  war's  atrocities  is 
that  war  makes  savages  of  men  of  whatever  blood  or  na- 
tion, and  of  whatever  degree  of  culture.  The  lesson  is 
that  war  atrocities  cannot  be  banished  from  the  earth  by 
exterminating  or  punishing  Germans,  but  only  by  banishing 
war  itself. 


XXIV 

THE  NOBLE  DEMOCRACIES  AND  SMALL  NATIONS 

BELGIUM  was  the  most  vulnerable  spot  in  Germany's  moral 
armor,  and  the  enemies  of  Germany  were  quick  to  take 
full  advantage  of  it.  In  Belgium  the  British  government 
found  the  casus  belli  that  it  was  bound  to  find  somewhere, 
and  around  Belgium  was  built  its  entire  scheme  of  war  prop- 
aganda. The  scrap  of  paper  incident  involved  not  only 
the  principle  of  the  sacredness  of  treaties,  but  the  more 
fundamental  principle  of  the  equal  and  absolute  sovereignty 
of  all  nations.  So  England,  in  entering  the  arena  profes- 
sedly in  defense  of  the  sacredness  of  treaties,  also  pro- 
claimed itself  the  world's  heavyweight  champion  of  weak 
nations.  The  psychological  step  to  the  issue  of  democracy 
versus  autocracy  was  short.  Soon,  every  government  as- 
sociated in  the  war  against  Germany,  with  the  possible  ex- 
ception of  that  of  the  Czar — even  Rumania,  the  most 
feudal  country  in  Europe;  evefn  Japan — was  informing 
the  world  in  thunderous  tones  that  it  had  unsheathed  the 
sword  in  defense  of  world  democracy,  and  the  rights  of 
weak  nations. 

In  due  course,  our  own  government,  as  soon  as  it  had 
succeeded  in  bringing  us  to  the  certainty  of  war  on  the  sub- 
marine issue,  raised  the  cry  quite  as  loudly  as  any  of  its 
allies.  In  the  war  message,  the  President  announced  that 
we  would  fight  "for  the  privilege  of  men  everywhere  to 
choose  their  own  way  of  life  and  obedience  .  .  .  for  democ- 
racy .  .  .  for  the  rights  and  liberties  of  small  nations." 
And  thereafter  a  large  share  of  our  own  propaganda  was 

215 


2i6,  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

devoted  to  inculcating  the  notion  that  the  only  way  to  do 
this  was  to  destroy  the  existing  government  of  Germany; 
that  we  had  thrown  in  our  lot  with  England,  France,  Italy, 
and  Japan,  because  they,  like  ourselves,  were  protectors  of 
small  nations;  that  our  "League  of  Honor"  actually  repre- 
sented "the  privilege  of  men  everywhere  to  choose  their 
own  way  of  life  and  obedience,"  while  Germany  repre- 
sented aggression,  conquest,  and  exploitation  in  the  world's 
affairs. 

"By  their  works  ye  shall  know  them."  In  works  our 
League  of  Honor  was  a  distinctly  greater  offender  against 
the  principles  which  it  professed  to  champion  than  was  the 
government  that  it  destroyed,  even  during  the  war  itself,  as 
has  been  pointed  out,  while  before  the  war  the  preponder- 
ance of  its  offenses  against  world  democracy  is  overwhelm- 
ing. 

The  supremacy  of  our  most  powerful  ally  in  the  world's 
affairs  is  based  upon  supremacy  in  sea  ^power.  That  suprem- 
acy was  attained  only  after  a  long  series  of  aggressive 
wars  extending  over  a  century  and  a  half,  in  which  the 
Spanish,  Dutch,  and  French  navies  were  swept  from  the 
seas.  To  these,  in  1807,  the  Danish  navy  was  added  in  a 
single  stroke.  On  a  mere  suspicion  that  Denmark  intended 
to  join  with  France  and  Russia  against  England  and  Swe- 
den, the  British  fleet  was  sent  into  the  Baltic  Sea,  under 
specific  assurance  that  it  was  not  intended  as  a  menace  to 
Denmark.  Once  there,  the  British  government  suddenly 
demanded  the  surrender  of  the  entire  Danish  fleet.  On  re- 
ceipt of  a  refusal,  a  British  force  was  landed,  Copenhagen 
was  bombarded  and  burned,  and  the  Danish  fleet  became 
by  conquest  the  property  of  Great  Britain. 

The  boast  that  the  sun  never  sets  on  the  British  flag  is 
as  true  as  the  other  boast  that  Britannia  rules  the  waves. 
The  British  Empire,  even  before  its  latest  vast  acquisitions, 


Noble  Democracies  and  Small  Nations    217 

embraced  nearly  one-fourth  of  the  land  surface  of  the  earth, 
fully  one-fourth  of  its  productive  surface,  the  best  harbors 
overseas,  and  the  most  commanding  positions,  commer- 
cially and  strategically.  Nearly  all  of  this  vast  empire  was 
acquired  by  war,  either  upon  England's  European  neigh- 
bors, or  upon  the  native  peoples,  or  upon  both. 

The  Portuguese  and  the  Dutch  were  the  first  Europeans 
in  India.  England  acquired  India  by  war,  first  upon  the 
Dutch,  second  upon  the  French,  third  upon  the  native 
peoples. 

The  Dutch  were  first  in  South  Africa.  England  took 
Cape  Colony  in  war  from  Holland,  abolished  by  force  the 
republic  of  Natal,  and  completed  the  conquest  in  the  twen- 
tieth century  by  cutting  down  those  two  small  nations;  the 
republics  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State. 

France  colonized  Canada.  Holland  colonized  New 
York.  Both  fell  to  England  as  spoils  of  war.  Later, 
France  sold  its  Louisiana  territory  to  the  young  republic 
of  the  United  States  to  prevent  it  from  being  taken  in  war 
by  Britain.  The  large  island  of  Malta  was  taken  from 
the  French.  Gibraltar,  Spain,  was  taken  and  kept  simply 
because  the  British  liked  its  commanding  position.  Ja- 
maica was  wrested  from  Spain.  Other  British  possessions 
in  the  western  hemisphere  were  either  taken,  by  conquest, 
from  Spain  or  held  in  defiance  of  the  claims  of  the  Ameri- 
can republics. 

The  foundations  of  British  world  empire  were  laid,  in 
other  centuries,  upon  aggression.  But  in  the  enlightened 
twentieth  century,  "democratic"  England  has  been  quite  as 
ready  to  increase  her  dominion  by  war  as  in  what  we  are 
wont  to  pretend  was  a  more  immoral  age. 

In  building  up  the  myth  that  England  represents  the 
principle  of  democracy,  great  emphasis  was  laid  upon  the 
degree  of  self-government  existing  in  certain  British  colo- 


218  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

nies,  such  as  Canada  and  Australia.  But  this  sort  of  self- 
government  is  enjoyed  by  less  than  five  per  cent,  of  the  peo- 
ple living  under  the  British  flag  outside  of  the  British  Isles. 
The  other  ninety-five  per  cent,  are  governed  by  an  official 
bureaucracy  that  imposes  its  will  everywhere  by  force. 
More  than  300,000,000  British  subjects  enjoy  no  self- 
government  worthy  of  the  name,  and  are  kept  under  the 
British  flag  only  by  the  constant  exercise  of  military  power. 

The  British  ruling  class  has  as  little  regard  for  democ- 
racy, self-determination,  the  rights  of  small  nations,  the 
sovereignty  of  weak  peoples,  without  the  British  Empire 
as  within.  Where  England  has  appeared  to  champion  a 
small  nation  against  a  larger,  a  selfish  British  purpose  has 
almost  invariably  been  evident,  usually  the  purpose  to  save 
the  victim  for  ultimate  British  consumption,  or  to  be  par- 
celed out  among  other  consumers  of  small  nations  at  some 
later  date  for  favors  rendered. 

This  is  exemplified  in  England's  dealings  with  Turkey  and 
Russia.  The  British  imagination  created  the  German  peril. 
The  British  have  always  had  a  bugaboo.  When  the 
French  bugaboo  was  laid,  early  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
Russia  became  the  British  bugaboo.  As  the  main  feature 
of  British  foreign  policy  in  the  twentieth  century  was  to 
isolate  Germany,  so  the  main  feature  of  British  foreign 
policy  throughout  most  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  to 
curb  Russia.  Any  enlargement  of  Russian  power  was  an 
affront  to  England.  Any  Russian  ambition  for  expansion 
was  an  ambition  of  autocracy  to  conquer  the  world.  Brit- 
ish opposition  to  Russian  expansion  was  unselfish  champion- 
ship of  world  democracy  and  the  rights  of  small  nations. 
It  was  Britain's  duty,  as  the  world's  trustee  of  liberty,  to 
thwart  the  Russian  desire  for  a  warm  seaport,  even  to  re- 
sist Russian  expansion  in  the  direction  of  such  a  seaport. 


Noble  Democracies  and  Small  Nations    219 

If  war  resulted,  very  well,  the  Czar  would  be  the  aggressor; 
England  would  be  fighting  in  self-defense. 

So  immaculate  England  became  the  protector  of  the 
Turk.  In  relation  to  Russia,  Turkey  was  a  small  nation; 
England  was  championing  a  small  nation.  But  in  relation 
to  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  Armenia,  and  the  other  Christian  peo- 
ples, struggling  for  independence  from  Moslem  rule,  were 
small  nations.  In  championing  Turkey,  England  effectively 
stood  between  these  subject  peoples  and  independence. 
''Democratic"  England  became  a  cooppressor  with  the  Turk 
of  the  most  oppressed  peoples  in  Europe,  a  responsible 
party  to  the  periodical  massacres  in  Turkey's  Christian 
provinces.  At  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  it  was  the  British 
government  that  insisted  that  two-thirds  of  "bleeding  Bul- 
garia" be  handed  back  to  Moslem  oppression. 

As  the  price  of  protecting  the  Turk,  England  took  the 
island  of  Cyprus.  Had  racial  demands  been  considered, 
Cyprus  would  have  gone  to  Greece.  England  was  now 
ready  to  begin  the  acquisition  of  Egypt  also.  In  the  3o's 
Egypt  had  won  its  independence  from  the  Sultan  and  estab- 
lished sovereignty  over  Syria  besides.  But  in  accordance 
with  its  policy  of  protecting  the  Turk,  England  had  driven 
the  Egyptian  forces  out  of  Syria  and  compelled  Egypt  to 
acknowledge  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan  and  pay  the  lat- 
ter an  annual  tribute.  In  1875,  DY  a  species  of  treachery, 
we  find  England  nosing  France  out  of  control  of  the  Suez 
Canal.  After  this,  England  shouldered  France  out  of  the 
way  and  into  Egypt. 

British  control  over  both  entrances  to  the  Mediterranean 
being  doubly  secured  by  the  occupation  of  Egypt,  "democ- 
racy" no  longer  so  pressingly  required  either  that  the  Turk 
be  protected  or  that  the  Czar  be  curbed.  England's  ally 
in  the  east,  Japan,  beat  Russia  in  a  quarrel  over  Manchuria, 


220  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

and  the  Czar  turned  about  to  face  a  revolution  at  home.  It 
was  a  promising  day  for  democracy.  The  world's  greatest 
autocracy  was  tottering.  The  Russian  world  peril,  so  far 
as  it  was  a  reality,  was  about  to  be  laid  in  the  only  way  that 
perils  of  the  sort  can  be  permanently  laid — by  fundamental 
reforms  brought  about  from  within. 

But,  unfortunately,  England  had  meanwhile  forgotten 
the  Russian  peril  and  discovered  the  German  peril.  So, 
over  the  frantic  appeals  of  the  revolutionary  leaders,  Eng- 
land and  France  loaned  the  Czar  the  cash  which  alone  ena- 
bled him  to  stamp  out  the  revolution.  Thus  was  the  Rus- 
sian autocracy  kept  alive  long  enough  to  assist  England  and 
France  in  the  great  war  that  was  even  then  preparing — the 
war  "for  the  privilege  of  men  everywhere  to  choose  their 
own  way  of  life  and  obedience!" 

While  protecting  the  Turk,  England  had  also  stood  forth 
as  protector  of  the  small  nation,  Persia.  But  suddenly 
(in  1907),  world  democracy  of  the  British  flavor  no  longer 
required  that  Persia  have  rights  or  even  existence.  The 
time  had  arrived  for  another  good  British  bargain.  So 
Persia  went  upon  the  block,  and  with  Persia  another  small 
nation  which  England  had  been  protecting  against  Russia, 
Afghanistan.  Foreign  Secretary  Grey  divided  Persia  with 
his  good  friend,  the  Czar,  giving  the  Czar  the  larger  por- 
tion, while  the  latter  acknowledged  England's  "right"  to 
"choose  the  way  of  life  and  obedience"  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Afghanistan. 

When  the  Czar  was  trying  to  work  his  way  south  in  the 
7o's,  England  and  Austria  had  stood  together  against  him. 
England  and  Austria  were  comrades  in  the  good  cause  of 
democracy.  Even  as  late  as  October  8,  1912,  in  spite  of 
waning  friendship  for  the  Turk,  and  warming  friendship  for 
the  Czar,  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish  Empire  was  of  more 
importance  to  England  than  self-determination  of  Turkey's 


Noble  Democracies  and  Small  Nations    221 

subject  peoples.  On  that  date  a  note,  signed  by  all  the 
powers,  but  emanating  from  the  British  Foreign  Office,  was 
delivered  to  the  various  members  of  the  Balkan  alliance, 
warning  them  against  a  war  with  Turkey,  declaring  that: 

If,  in  spite  of  this  note,  war  does  break  out  between  the  Balkan 
states  and  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  powers  will  not  admit,  at  the 
end  of  the  conflict,  any  modification  of  the  territorial  status  quo  in 
European  Turkey. 

But,  by  1914,  the  rights  of  the  small  nation,  Serbia, 
had  suddenly  become  of  vast  importance  to  "democracy." 
British  treachery  had  driven  Turkey  into  the  arms  of  Ger- 
many. Wherefore,  "democracy"  not  only  no  longer  re- 
quired the  protection  of  the  Turk,  but  was  ready  to  look 
on  complacently  while  the  Czar  proceeded  on  his  way  to 
Constantinople.  So  it  happened  that,  while  virtuous  Eng- 
land found  her  casus  belli  in  the  scrapping  of  the  Treaty 
of  1839,  she  agreed  to  the  final  pulverization  of  the  Treaty 
of  1878;  Constantinople  was  promised  the  Russian  autoc- 
racy as  its  share  of  the  spoils  in  the  great  world  struggle 
for  the  rights  of  weak  nations  and  the  sacredness  of  treaties! 

Africa,  the  second  largest  continent,  has  been  divided  up 
like  a  great  English  plum  pudding,  most  of  it  since  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  division  was  ac- 
complished by  the  tearing  up  of  treaties,  by  the  profana- 
tion of  official  pledges,  by  deliberate  deception  of  home 
electorates,  by  mass  murder,  and  by  assassination  of  small 
nations  upon  their  own  doorsteps. 

By  the  year  1914,  but  two  small  nations  had  survived 
the  cannibal  invasion  from  Europe;  insignificant  Liberia, 
greatly  shrunken,  not  really  independent,  but  an  unacknowl- 
edged protectorate  of  the  United  States;  Abyssinia,  which 
had  successfully  resisted  Italy,  and  whose  continued  exist- 


222  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ence  was  due  to  mutual  jealousies  among  her  would-be- 
butcherers.  Between  them  Liberia  and  Abyssinia  held  less 
than  three  and  one-half  per  cent,  of  the  area  and  but  two 
'and  one-half  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  the  great  conti- 
nent of  Africa. 

England,  France,  Italy,  Spain,  and  to  a  lesser  degree, 
Germany,  had  all  engaged  in  wars  of  conquest,  sometimes 
very  bloody  and  prolonged,  upon  the  weak  nations  of  Af- 
rica. Among  these  European  aggressors  there  had  been 
disputes  innumerable.  Italy  had  fought  another  European 
power,  Turkey.  There  had  been  bad  blood  all  around. 
At  least  once,  England  and  France  were  on  the  verge  of 
war  with  one  another.  At  least  twice,  a  crisis  between 
England  and  France,  on  one  side,  and  Germany  on  the 
other,  brought  all  Europe  to  the  verge  of  war. 

In  the  division  of  the  African  plum  pudding,  England 
received  one-third,  France  one-fourth.  England  got  the 
best  and  juiciest  plums,  France  the  second  best.  Italy  was 
blessed  with  the  third  best  portion.  Spain  got  a  plum  or 
two.  Germany  was  served  some  underdone  portions,  with 
the  plums  carefully  removed.  In  the  spilling  of  human 
blood,  democratic  France  divided  honors  with  England. 
Italy  was  third,  Spain  fourth.  "The  Hun"  killed  least  of 
all. 

Over  a  longer  period,  a  similar  division  to  that  of  Africa 
has  been  going  on  in  the  largest  continent,  Asia,  although 
it  is  not  yet  as  nearly  completed.  Here,  as  in  Africa,  Eng- 
land acquired  the  choicest  plums.  Not  far  behind  England 
are  Russia  and  Japan,  though  "democratic"  France  is  not 
without  her  Asiatic  tidbits.  The  partition  of  Asia  has 
been  going  on  more  rapidly  in  the  twentieth  century  than 
ever  before.  At  China,  the  great  powers  have  been  pick- 
ing like  vultures.  The  year  1914  found  England  dominant 
in  Asia,  as  in  Africa — supreme  in  the  middle  east,  joining 


Noble  Democracies  and  Small  Nations    223 

control  with  Japan  in  the  far  east,  partner  with  the  Czar  in 
the  near  east,  disputing  German  entrance  into  affairs  in 
that  quarter. 

The  garroting  of  small  nations  by  large  ones  has  pro- 
ceeded more  rapidly  during  the  past  quarter  of  a  century 
than  at  any  previous  period  in  the  world's  history.  Within 
a  single  generation,  England,  France,  Russia,  Italy,  Ger- 
many, and  Japan  acquired  new  territory  aggregating  more 
than  both  the  North  and  South  American  continents.  Ac- 
cording to  Rear-Admiral  French  E.  Chadwick,  U.  S.  N., 
retired,  (Speech  before  Lawyers'  Club  of  New  York, 
February,  1917),  in  that  period  Great  Britain  expanded  to 
the  extent  of  6,750,000  miles;  France,  3,500,000;  Russia, 
2,000,000;  Germany,  1,000,000.  Every  mile  of  this 
13,250,000  was  acquired  by  some  form  of  aggression. 

In  the  forty-four  years  previous  to  1914 — throughout 
the  entire  period  of  the  activity  and  influence  of  the  men 
who,  we  were  told,  plotted  world  conquest  by  war — Ger- 
many engaged  in  war  less  than  any  of  the  other  countries 
named,  including  our  own. 

Do,  then,  the  German  aggressions  reveal  a  more  de- 
praved purpose  than  the  aggressions  of  her  enemies? 
What  is  the  purpose  of  aggression  in  modern  times? 


XXV 

WHAT   REALLY   STARTED   IT 

IN  1840-1,  England  fought  what  has  since  become  known 
as  the  Opium  War,  to  break  down  the  barriers  of  China 
against  the  importation  of  opium  from  British  India. 
China,  defeated,  was  compelled  not  only  to  open  five  har- 
bors to  the  British  trade,  but  to  pay  $22,500,000  to  cover 
the  cost  of  the  war,  $6,250,000  for  opium  seized  and 
burned  on  Chinese  soil,  and  to  hand  over  Hong  Kong  to 
England  for  good  measure. 

England's  Opium  War  is  a  classic  in  its  clear  simplicity 
as  a  war  for  business.  But  every  war  fought  by  England 
within  the  present  generation,  as  well  as  by  every  other 
great  power,  although  not  always  as  plainly  so  on  the 
surface,  was  also  a  war  for  business. 

Most  modern  wars  for  business,  however,  unlike  the 
Opium  War,  are  not  motived  upon  a  desire  to  crowd  trade 
down  the  throat  of  an  unwilling  people.  The  mere  ex- 
change of  goods  is  a  secondary  consideration.  Nor  is  con- 
quest in  the  present  day  carried  on  for  so  legitimate  a  pur- 
pose as  that  of  providing  homes  for  surplus  populations. 
European  powers  make  no  serious  effort  to  colonize  their 
African  and  Asiatic  possessions,  as  a  rule.  France,  the 
world's  second  greatest  grabber  of  new  territory,  has  a 
stationary  population. 

What  is  sought  is  access  to  the  natural  resources  of  the 
weak  nation  in  question,  opportunity  to  exploit  these  re- 
sources with  cheap  labor  and  without  any  adequate  return 
for  the  privilege,  and  favorable  concessions  for  railroads 

224 


What  Really  Started  It  225 

with  which  to  get  away  with  the  loot.  The  usual  process 
is  to  get  a  "stake"  in  the  country,  concessions  for  mines, 
lumber,  or  oil,  often  through  bribery,  and  then  to  begin 
coercion,  leading  usually  to  armed  intervention,  on  behalf 
of  the  particular  interest  involved. 

This  process  has  been  termed  "the  new  imperialism."  It 
was  first  enunciated  as  a  policy  in  the  year  1850  by  the 
British  government,  and  the  first  example  of  its  practice  on 
a  large  scale  is  furnished  by  Egypt.  Intervention  on  be- 
half of  investments  is  a  denial  of  the  equality  of  nations, 
and  the  grossest  possible  violation  of  international  law. 
Nevertheless,  France,  Germany,  Russia,  Italy,  and  Japan, 
followed  the  example  of  England,  and  intervention  on  be- 
half of  investments  became  the  most  serviceable  maneuver 
in  the  partition  of  Africa  and  Asia.  It  is  not  always  neces- 
sary to  resort  to  actual  war  to  accomplish  the  end  sought,  or 
even  to  hoist  the  flag  over  the  coveted  spoils.  Threats, 
more  or  less  veiled,  often  accomplish  the  desired  result. 
China  furnishes  one  example.  Spheres  of  influence  fly  the 
flag  of  the  exploited,  not  the  exploiter,  though  control  by 
the  latter  is  no  less  effective  for  his  purpose. 

Where  the  business  motive  of  a  given  war  is  not  evident 
at  the  beginning,  it  invariably  appears  later,  in  the  condi- 
tions imposed  upon  the  beaten  nation.  Having  persuaded 
the  Boers  by  cannon-shot  to  yield  to  British  mine-owners 
what  they  wanted,  England  conceded  to  South  Africa  a 
measure  of  self-government  approaching  that  of  Canada 
and  Australia.  Because  the  spirit  of  the  Boers  could  not 
be  completely  broken,  it  happened  to  be  good  business  to 
do  so.  But  nowhere  else  in  the  British  dominion  in  Africa 
or  Asia  is  Home  Rule  in  operation.  Throughout  these 
vast  dominions,  government  is  by  and  for  British  bondhold- 
ers, British  concessionaires,  and  British  officeholders. 

A  result  of  British  imperialism  is  that  the  inhabitants 


226  Shull  It  Be  Again? 

of  the  richest  spots  of  the  earth  live  and  die  in  the  most 
abject  poverty.  The  famines  of  India  have  been  shown  to 
be  due,  not  so  much  to  overpopulation  or  failures  of  crops, 
as  to  appropriation  of  crops  by  British  gentlemen.  The 
voracious  demands  of  British  bondholders  and  concession- 
aires, made  good  by  British  bayonets,  are  responsible  for 
wholesale  starvation  of  Egyptians  in  past  decades,  ami  for 
the  present  misery  of  the  Egyptian  population. 

Such  is  the  result,  on  the  one  hand,  of  British  imperialism. 
The  result,  on  the  other,  is  that  England  has  a  leisure  class 
larger  in  proportion  to  population  than  any  other  country 
— and  at  the  bottom  of  the  social  scale  a  most  pronounced 
destitution.  By  virtue  of  her  uglorious"  empire,  England 
lives  more  largely  upon  forced  tribute  from  "weak  nations" 
than  any  other  power.  By  virtue  of  aggression,  treaty- 
breaking,  atrocity,  and  conquest,  London  became  the  finan- 
cial centre  of  the  world,  England  the  "world's  banker." 

No  fact  is  more  significant  than  that  the  British  nation 
does  not  share,  in  any  degree,  in  British  imperial  pros- 
perity. The  standard  of  living  of  the  masses  in  England 
is  no  higher  than  that  in  neighboring  countries  that  possess 
no  empire.  The  wage  of  the  British  trade  unionist  de- 
pends, not  one  iota  upon  the  bursting  banks  of  London,  the 
expanse  of  the  empire,  or  the  supremacy  of  the  fleet,  but 
solely  upon  the  strength  of  his  union.  The  British  common 
laborer  is  no  better  paid  than  the  Dutch,  the  Belgian,  the 
Norwegian,  or  the  Dane.  The  British  slums  are  the  most 
notorious  in  the  world.  This  could  not  be  true  were  "dem- 
ocratic" England  a  real  democracy.  It  is  true  because 
the  empire,  and  all  it  means,  is  for  the  upper  classes. 

More  space  is  devoted  here  to  British  imperialism  than 
to  French,  German,  Italian,  Russian,  or  Japanese  imperial- 
ism, only  because  Britain  led  the  way,  set  the  styles,  has 
profited  most — and  is  supreme.  France  is  the  world's  sec- 


What  Really  Started  It  227 

ond  greatest  imperial  power.  We  have  heard  much  of 
French  democracy,  but  French  "democracy"  is  of  little 
value  to  the  world  so  long  as  democracy  does  not  extend 
to  France's  foreign  relations.  The  bankers  of  Paris  wield 
the  same  measure  of  control  over  the  French  Foreign 
Office  as  the  London  bankers  enjoy  over  theirs,  while  the 
control  of  the  French  press  by  the  Paris  bankers  is  reputed 
to  be  even  more  complete  than  similar  control  exercised  in 
England.  While  the  French  army  was  gradually  extend- 
ing dominion  over  Morocco,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  re- 
peatedly adopted  resolutions  reaffirming  the  adherence  of 
France  to  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  promising  that  the  army 
would  be  withdrawn.  These  resolutions  were  probably 
sincere.  But  the  French  bankers  had  their  way.  As  the 
great  war  drew  on,  the  desire  of  the  French  people  was 
unquestionably  pacific,  as  was  the  desire  of  the  peoples  of 
all  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  same  factors  were  domi- 
nant in  France  as  in  Germany,  Russia,  Austria,  and  Eng- 
land, and  they  worked  the  same  way. 

German  militarism  existed  for  several  decades  before  it 
was  discovered  by  British  gentlemen.  German  militarism 
and  the  German  peril  were  discovered  only  when  Germany 
began  to  compete  for  foreign  trade,  to  look  for  colonies, 
and  to  build  a  navy.  Imperial  Germany's  crime  against 
democracy  was  to  imitate  imperial  England,  and  to  do  it 
with  disturbing  energy  and  efficiency. 

Britons  informed  us  that  the  Kaiser's  speech  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  to  the  effect  that  Germany  would  now  have 
her  place  in  the  sun,  meant  that  Germany  would  now  pro- 
ceed to  conquer  the  world.  There  is  no  ground  whatever 
for  such  an  interpretation.  The  term,  "places  in  the  sun," 
had  long  been  employed  to  mean  rich  tropical  colonies. 
What  the  Kaiser  literally  meant  was  that  he  intended  to 


228  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

acquire  some  new  colonies  in  the  war.  This  is  a  brazen 
confession  of  depravity — until  one  remembers  that  all  the 
great  governments  that  took  up  the  sword  against  the 
Kaiser,  had  been  doing  the  very  thing  the  Kaiser  confessed 
he  intended  to  do. 

All  had  been  acquiring  colonies  by  war.  Not  by  a 
world  war;  but  they  were  not  far  behind  the  Kaiser  in 
letting  it  be  known  that  they,  also,  intended  to  acquire  new 
territory  in  the  world  war  itself. 

The  world  war,  indeed,  was  the  logical  and  almost  in- 
evitable outcome  of  the  rivalries  and  enmities  of  the  pre- 
ceding years,  which  were  kept  alive,  sharpened,  and  ren- 
dered malignant  by  the  competition  for  "places  in  the  sun." 
While  contributing  causes  can  be  found  which  run  back  to 
the  very  beginnings  of  some  of  the  nations  involved,  the 
preponderating  and  decisive  cause  was  the  clash  of  rival 
imperialisms  within  the  previous  ten  years. 

While,  for  example,  the  German  acquisition  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  a  persistent  factor  in  French  enmity  against 
Germany,  it  would  never  of  itself  have  caused  another  war. 
French  and  British  enmity  had  been  more  bitter  and  of 
longer  standing,  British  humiliation  of  France  more  recent. 
Britain  was  the  "traditional  enemy."  Yet  for  imperialistic 
reasons,  France  joined  forces  with  Britain,  who  in  former 
decades  had  scarcely  known  a  dispute  with  Germany,  and 
the  latter  became  the  common  foe. 

Partly  because  the  Kaiser  had  come  late  into  the  field  of 
spoliation,  and  partly  because  when  he  came  the  other  de- 
spoilers  united  and  bargained  to  keep  him  out,  the  German 
acquisitions  of  "places  in  the  sun"  were  meagre.  They 
not  only  bargained  and  divided  among  themselves,  and 
conspjred  to  keep  out  the  Kaiser,  but  on  occasion  they  made 
it  plain  that  they  were  determined  to  keep  him  out,  even 
at  the  cost  of  war. 


What  Really  Started  It  229 

The  threat  of  armed  force  was  a  constant  and  decisive 
factor  in  the  competition  of  the  great  powers  for  "places 
in  the  sun."  England,  possessing  the  greatest  force,  every- 
where took  the  lion's  share.  But  England's  force  was 
never  great  enough  to  take  all.  To  make  sure  of  the  lion's 
share,  England  not  only  had  to  threaten,  but  to  bargain,  to 
divide,  to  throw  sops.  By  occasional  exercise  of  force,  and, 
more  frequently,  displays  of  force,  England  brought  Rus- 
sia, France,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  world  to  accept  the 
fact  of  British  supremacy,  to  be  content  with  the  crumbs 
that  fell  from  the  British  table.  Germany  remained  the  one 
likely  challenge  to  British  supremacy.  So  Germany  became 
the  world  peril. 

Says  H.  N.  Brailsford,  an  Englishman  ("War  of  Steel 
and  Gold,"  pp.  42-3)  : 

The  difficulty  between  Britain  and  Germany  was  not  so  much 
Bagdad  or  even  Morocco,  as  the  general  sense  that  a  powerful  dip- 
lomatic combination  and  a  naval  preponderance  were  being  used  to 
frustrate  German  purposes  and  to  exclude  her  from  'places  in  the 
sun'.  .  .  .  First,  we  excluded  Germany  from  Morocco,  and  then 
we  constructed  a  general  league  which  hemmed  her  in  on  all  sides. 
We  'debauched'  her  ally,  Italy,  we  brought  Spain  into  our  'or- 
bit'. .  .  .  The  'balance  of  power'  had  been  violently  adjusted  in 
our  favor,  and  in  Prince  von  Buelow's  phrase,  Germany  felt  herself 
'penned  in'.  ...  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that,  for  some  years  at 
least,  the  Triple  Entente  was  really  inspired  by  the  aims  which  Ger- 
man alarm  ascribed  to  it.  Its  real  architects  were  M.  Delcasse  and 
King  Edward,  and  the  former,  at  least,  made  no  secret  of  his  ambitions. 

Look  at  a  political  map  of  Africa  in  1914,  and  you  find 
seven-tenths  of  this  great  continent  in  the  hands  of  British 
and  French — the  best  and  most  productive  seven-tenths. 
Germany  is  credited  with  several  colonies,  mostly  jungle. 
Where  this  jungle  abuts  upon  the  sea,  we  discover  the  har- 
bor to  be  in  the  hands  of  some  other  power,  usually  Eng- 


230  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

land.  In  Togoland,  points  out  Herbert  Adams  Gibbons, 
an  American  ("New  Map  of  Africa,"  p.  276),  uas  else- 
where in  Africa,  the  Germans  are  shut  off  from  a  logical 
and  natural  portion  of  their  coast  line  by  a  projection  of 
British  territory."  Also  (p.  232)  : 

Zanzibar  stands  to  German  East  Africa  as  Walfish  Bay  to  Ger- 
man Southwest  Africa,  the  mouth  of  the  Volta  and  Cape  St.  Paul 
to  Togoland,  and  the  Niger  Delta  to  Kamerun,  an  everlasting  com- 
mand— Thou  shalt  not! 

Says  Frederic  C.  Howe,  an  American  ("Why  War?", 
p.  240-1)  : 

The  Mediterranean  is,  in  effect,  a  British  sea.  This  is  secured 
through  the  command  of  the  western  and  eastern  entrances  at 
Gibraltar  and  the  Suez  Canal.  The  fortresses  at  Gibraltar  are  im- 
pregnable. The  great  guns  command  the  narrow  straits  through 
which  all  commerce  to  and  from  the  Atlantic  must  pass,  as  com- 
pletely as  the  entrance  to  a  harbor.  This,  with  the  Suez  Canal, 
gives  Great  Britain  control  of  the  Mediterranean,  which  is  the 
Igreatest  trade  route  of  the  world.  It  enables  her  to  menace  the 
commerce  of  all  European  countries  and  to  close  the  door  at  will 
upon  all  ships  passing  through  it  to  the  outside  world.  By  reason 
of  this  fact,  all  the  Mediterranean  states  are  under  the  potential  con- 
trol of  Great  Britain.  This  is  one  of  Germany's  complaints,  for 
so  long  as  Great  Britain  controls  the  gateways  and  trade  routes  to 
the  Orient,  the  commerce  of  other  nations  is  not  really  free. 

Neutral,  American,  and  even  British  writers  agree  that 
German  imperialism  turned  its  eyes  toward  Turkey  be- 
cause of  the  success  of  the  policy  of  isolation  elsewhere.  In 
time,  no  doubt,  the  sword  would  have  been  employed  to 
insure  German  control  and  exploitation  of  the  Turks.  It 
happens  that  German  imperialism  in  Turkey  never  progres- 
sed beyond  the  stage  of  persuasion  and  peaceful  bargain- 
ing. Germany's  best  argument  with  the  Turks  was  the 


What  Really  Started  It  231 

record  of  her  competitors.  To  Turkey,  the  British  peril 
was  a  reality.  To  Germany,  the  Bagdad  Railway  was  a 
means  for  extending  power  and  influence  without  war  with 
her  powerful  neighbors. 

The  German  scheme  happened,  however,  to  conflict  with 
British  ambitions  to  acquire  control  of  the  same  territory. 
A  much  talked  of  British  plan  was  to  colonize  southern 
Mesopotamia  with  Egyptian  peasants,  then  grab  it  as  Egypt 
was  grabbed,  penetrate  into  southern  Arabia  as  the  Sudan 
was  penetrated,  connect  Persia  with  Egypt,  and  so  complete 
the  encirclement  of  Germany. 

In  pursuance  of  this  purpose,  the  British  press  was  in- 
spired to  raise  the  cry  of  a  German  peril  to  India  and 
Egypt.  German  peaceful  penetration  of  Turkey  must  be 
halted  at  all  costs.  The  Bagdad  Railway  as  a  German  pro- 
ject must  be  smashed;  by  diplomacy,  if  possible;  by  war,  if 
diplomacy  would  not  do  the  trick. 

In  the  end  it  was  smashed.  Throughout,  it  is  a  story 
of  sordid  intrigue.  The  governments  of  France  and  Eng- 
land disputed  every  mile  of  the  road  in  some  way.  The 
knockout  was  finally  delivered  by  England.  The  Sheik  of 
Koweit  was  persuaded  to  disavow  the  rule  of  the  Sultan  and 
accept  the  protection  of  the  King  of  England.  So  the  Gulf 
of  Koweit,  the  sea  terminus  of  the  road,  fell  into  British 
hands.  So,  to  complete  the  Bagdad  Railway  as  a  German 
project,  it  would  have  been  necessary  for  Germany  to  back 
the  Sultan  in  subduing  the  Sheik  of  Koweit.  That  would 
have  meant  war  with  England.  As  the  German  govern- 
ment had  backed  down  in  Morocco,  so  again  it  backed 
down  in  Turkey.  In  "agreements"  signed  with  England, 
France,  and  Russia,  German  imperialism  yielded  up  control 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway  to  Entente  imperialism.  When  the 
Germans  were  slow  to  back  down  still  again — in  the  Serbian 
crisis — the  world  war  began. 


232  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

President  Wilson  boldly  held  up  the  German  activities 
in  Turkey  as  a  cause  for  war  by  the  United  States  upon  the 
Imperial  German  Government.  "Government  after  gov- 
ernment," said  he  (to  Russia,  May  26,  1917),  had  "with- 
out open  conquest  of  territory,  been  linked  together  in  a  net 
of  intrigue."  The  governments  were  those  of  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  There  was  none 
other. 

This  horrible  net  of  intrigue,  spread  by  four  governments 
which  had  voluntarily  associated  themselves  together,  was 
directed  "against  nothing  less  than  the  peace  and  liberty 
of  the  world,"  said  Wilson.  But  when  he  begins  to  go  into 
details,  we  discover  that  the  intrigue  is,  rather,  against 
a  collection  of  states  which  happened  to  have  been  linked 
together  with  "open  conquest  of  territory,"  and  at  the  time 
were  held  together  only  by  iron  links  of  force.  The  star- 
tled phrases  of  Wilson  name  India,  Egypt,  and  Persia,  as 
objects  of  German  ambition! 

Supposing  there  were  lurking  ambitions  ultimately  to 
free  these  states  from  British  rule — even  to  impose  upon 
them  German  rule — of  what  concern  was  that  to  America? 
Supposing  there  were  an  immediate  possibility  of  the  success 
of  such  designs,  what  difference  could  it  make  to  democracy^? 

The  President,  for  that  matter,  admitted  that  the  imme- 
diate hopes  of  German  imperialism  did  not  fly  as  far  as 
Egypt,  India,  or  Persia.  To  Russia  he  asserted  that  Ger- 
many was  suing  for  peace  "only  to  preserve"  the  very  ques- 
tionable advantages  already  gained  (May  26,  1917). 
It  was  after  this  that  the  American  sacrifices  were  made  1 

A  year  later  he  declared  the  German  purpose  to  be 
merely  to  erect  "an  empire  that  will  ultimately  master  Per- 
sia, India,  and  the  peoples  of  the  Far  East."  (Apr.  6, 
1918.) 


What  Really  Started  It  233 

Ultimately ! 

A  stronger  Germany,  the  President  told  us,  indulging 
in  prophecy  (same  speech)  would  "overawe"  Europe,  and 
— after  a  while — America  would  somehow  be  threatened. 

Supposing  Germany  were  placed  in  a  position  to  "over- 
awe" Europe,  what  then? 

We  have  to  go  back  only  a  few  years  to  find  the  "Hun"  in 
the  very  position  so  darkly  painted.  Brailsford  tells  us 
("War  of  Steel  and  Gold,"  p.  34)  : 

Europe  had  a  long  experience  of  German  'hegemony'  during  the 
quarter  of  a  century  which  elapsed  between  the  fall  of  the  French 
Empire  and  the  creation  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance.  Nothing 
disastrous  happened.  No  little  states  were  overrun,  no  neighbors' 
landmarks  removed,  no  thrones  overturned,  no  national  or  religious 
liberties  menaced.  Not  even  if  the  Kaiser  wielded  a  military  power 
as  great  as  that  of  Louis  XIV  can  we  conceive  of  his  acting  as  the 
Grand  Monarch  acted. 

This  from  an  Englishman. 

Why  spend  one  hundred  thousand  American  lives  and 
fifty  billion  American  dollars  to  place  France  and  England 
in  a  position  to  "overawe  Europe,"  instead  of  leaving  them 
to  fight  it  out  with  Germany?  Where  is  the  special  Ger- 
man depravity  that  called  for  the  American  sacrifice? 

Is  it  to  be  found  in  the  blood  of  the  Germans?  But 
racially  the  English  are  nearer  the  Germans  than  the 
French,  the  Italians,  or  the  Japanese;  and  as  for  the  Kaiser, 
that  gentleman  was  blessed  with  a  British  mother. 

Supposing  we  permit  the  peril  theory  to  stand  or  fall  on 
the  sole  test  of  capacity.  No  country  could  imperil  the 
world,  much  less  conquer  it,  without  first  conquering  the 
seas.  In  dominant  sea  power  alone  resides  the  possibility 
of  world  aggression.  If  Germany  ever  exhibited  the  remot- 
est capacity  to  wrest  the  control  of  the  seas  from  England, 


234  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

then  the  naval  experts  of  the  Entente  lied  and  lied  again. 
Here  is  a  typical  declaration  of  a  British  statesman: 

If  Germany  had  never  built  a  dreadnought,  or  if  all  the  German 
dreadnoughts  had  been  sunk,  the  control  and  authority  of  the  Brit- 
ish navy  could  not  have  been  more  effective  [than  now].  (Winston 
Spencer  Churchill,  Collier's  Weekly,  Sept.  30,  1916.) 

And  here  is  a  typical  statement  from  one  of  England's 
foremost  naval  writers : 

Great  Britain's  seas  command  has  not  been  less,  but  infinitely 
greater,  than  in  any  previous  human  experience.  And  the  result  is 
that  a  German  victory  has  been  made  impossible.  (Arthur  Pollen, 
in  Metropolitlan  Magazine  f  May  1917.) 

"Look  at  the  picture,"  said  Wilson  himself  (at  New 
York,  May  18,  1918);  "in  the  centre  of  the  picture  four 
nations,  .  .  .  and  against  them  twenty-three  governments, 
representing  the  greater  part  of  the  population  of  the 
world."  Isn't  it  a  bit  ridiculous — not  to  say  cowardly — 
to  draw  this  picture,  and  then,  in  the  next  breath,  to  pre- 
tend that  the  twenty-three  are  actually  in  danger  of  being 
conquered  and  governed  by  the  four? 

What  supermen  the  seventy  million  Germans  would  have 
to  be,  if  they  were  reasonably  to  be  feared  by  two  billion 
others !  And  how  fired  would  each  and  every  one  of  them 
have  to  be  with  the  worst  ambitions  imputed  to  their  former 
rulers ! 

Of  course,  the  enemies  of  the  Germans  will  be  the  last 
to  contend  that  they  are  supermen,  while  no  one  will  seri- 
ously claim  that  the  German  people  were  entirely  passive 
tools  of  the  Kaiser.  In  the  war  message,  the  President 
himself  absolved  the  German  masses  from  complicity  in  the 
schemes  of  German  imperialism.  This  view  he  reiterated 
from  time  to  time  during  the  period  of  the  fighting,  and 
even  after  his  treaty  had  been  signed.  In  spite  of  the 


What  Really  Started  It  235 

execrations  heaped  upon  the  German  socialists,  they  were  a 
constant  embarrassment  to  the  Kaiser,  and  in  July,  1917, 
they  were  strong  enough  to  pledge  the  Reichstag  against 
"forced  acquisitions  of  territory,  and  political,  economic, 
and  financial  violations" ;  against  "economic  .blockades  and 
the  stirring  up  of  enmity  of  the  peoples  after  the  war" ;  for 
the  freedom  of  the  seas;  for  "international  juridical  organi- 
zations"; for  "an  economic  peace,"  for  "mutual  understand- 
ing and  lasting  reconciliation  among  the  nations." 

No  pronouncement  from  the  British  government,  or  any 
branch  of  it,  or  from  any  branch  of  any  of  the  Allied  gov- 
ernments, so  nearly  endorsed  in  the  concrete  the  very  prin- 
ciples for  which  Wilson  professed  to  be  fighting. 

So  far  as  threatening  the  nationality  of  others  is  con- 
cerned, the  Kaiser  never  went  as  far  as  his  enemies,  even 
at  the  height  of  his  successes.  No  responsible  spokesman 
of  the  German  government  ever  announced  that  Lloyd 
George,  or  the  House  of  Lords,  or  the  King,  or  President 
Wilson,  must  be  overthrown  as  a  condition  of  peace,  as 
Wilson  announced  that  the  Kaiser  and  his  Junkers  must  be 
overthrown.  The  determination  to  conquer  was  far  more 
evident  on  our  side  than  on  the  side  of  our  enemies. 

Even  had  the  Kaiser  by  some  means  succeeded  in  wrest- 
ing control  of  the  seas  from  England,  or  even  in  capturing 
the  entire  British  fleet,  there  is  no  tenable  ground  for  the 
belief  that  he  would  have  abused  the  power  any  more  than 
the  British  government  has  abused  its  power.  The  Wilson 
exposition  of  the  German  peril  is  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  a  paraphrase  of  the  nursery  tale  that  the  British  press 
and  the  French  press  had  been  telling  the  British  and 
French  people  for  the  past  decade — for  a  purpose. 

The  German  peril  to  the  other  great  powers,  so  far  as 
it  was  a  reality,  was  simply  a  threat  to  rival  imperialisms, 
exactly  as  the  rival  imperialisms  were  a  threat  to  German 


236  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

imperialism.  The  German  "threat  to  the  world"  was  noth- 
ing more  nor  less  than  a  danger  that  Germany  might  suc- 
ceed in  compelling  England  and  France  to  make  a  re-divi- 
sion, on  more  equal  terms,  of  "places  in  the  sun."  Impe- 
rialism is  the  only  real  peril,  but  it  is  not  a  peril  to  great 
states  except  insofar  as  they  themselves  choose  to  play  the 
game.  It  is  a  real  peril,  however,  to  weak  states  that  hap- 
pen to  be  rich  in  undeveloped  resources. 

World  conquest  for  any  nation  has  so  far  been  an  impos- 
sibility and  is  likely  to  remain  so.  Wars  of  conquest  are 
never  profitable  to  a  nation  as  a  whole.  When  undertaken 
on  a  gigantic  scale,  the  cost  is  so  severe  that  domestic  un- 
rest invariably  undermines  the  strength  of  the  offending 
government.  The  impulse  of  all  peoples  is  toward  peace. 
The  British  Empire  has  traveled  farther  toward  world  con- 
quest, probably,  than  any  other  country  can  ever  go  again. 

There  was  nothing  in  the  history  of  the  Central  Powers, 
in  their  form  of  government,  in  their  political  leadership, 
or  in  their  people,  that  justified  our  striking  at  them  rather 
than  at  their  enemies.  There  was  no  reason  to  believe  that 
a  victory  of  Germany  over  England,  if  that  had  been  pos- 
sible, would  have  been  worse  for  America  or  the  world  than 
a  victory  of  England  over  Germany.  There  was  no  defen- 
sible reason  why  we  should  not  have  continued  as  good 
friends  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  as  of  the 
French  bourgeois  republic  or  King  George. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  interest  of  the  American  people 
called  for  a  peace  without  victory.  The  safety  of  the 
weak  nations  would  have  been  best  subserved  by  an  indeci- 
sive contest.  Democracy  within  what  President  Wilson 
termed  "the  great  fighting  nations"  would  have  had  a  bet- 
ter chance  if  none  of  them  had  been  victor.  American 
participation  in  the  European  war  was  a  crime  against  de- 
mocracy and  permanent  peace. 


XXVI 

PROMISE  AND  PERFORMANCE 

IF  there  remained  any  doubt  of  the  soundness  of  the  con- 
clusions of  the  previous  chapters,  it  would  be  dissipated  by 
a  cold  review  of  the  "peace"  that  was  actually  framed  and 
sought  to  be  imposed. 

First,  a  peace  without  victory  was  in  sight  in  1917. 
Wilson  frustrated  it  by  dragging  America  into  the  war. 

The  notion  that  America  saved  the  Entente  from  deci- 
sive defeat  has  been  carefully  fostered  in  this  country.  But 
before  America  entered  the  war,  Allied  statesmen  and 
publicists  had,  a  thousand  times,  proved  to  their  own  satis- 
faction that  an  ultimate  German  victory  was  impossible. 
At  no  time  did  there  exist  a  reasonable  probability  of  the 
submarine  blockade's  becoming  sufficiently  effective  to  score 
a  knockout.  Germany  might  have  gained  effective  land 
victories,  but  that  would  have  placed  her  in  a  position  only 
to  negotiate,  not  to  dictate. 

The  best  evidence  on  this  point  is  found  in  the  German 
peace  overtures  themselves.  No  one  will  accuse  the  Kaiser 
of  preferring  an  indecisive  peace  to  a  victorious  peace. 
Why,  then,  did  he  seek  an  indecisive  peace  before  the  end 
of  1916?  It  could  only  have  been  because  he  shared  the 
judgment  of  his  enemies  as  to  his  own  incapacity  for  victory. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  German  overtures  were 
invariably  denounced  as  wicked  insincerities,  upeace  of- 
fensives," war  maneuvers;  that  all  peace  talk  was  decried 
in  America  and  in  the  Allied  countries,  on  the  ground  that 
immediate  peace  would  mean  a  "German  peace,"  which 

237 


238  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

implied  German  victory  and  conquest.  The  fact  remains 
that  the  German  proposals  were  taken  by  Allied  statesmen 
as  an  offer  to  return  to  the  status  quo  ante,  and  they  were 
so  taken  by  Wilson  himself.  In  his  reply  to  the  Pope  ap- 
pear the  following  words : 

Of  course,  the  Imperial  German  Government  and  those  whom  it 
is  using  for  their  own  undoing  are  seeking  to  obtain  pledges  that 
the  war  will  end  in  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo  ante. 

The  Allied  statesmen,  of  course,  did  not  want  a  peace 
without  victory.  They  rejected  the  German  overtures. 
But,  by  the  middle  of  1917,  they  were  virtually  confessing 
to  us  that  they  would  have  been  constrained  to  look  favor- 
ably upon  such  a  peace,  had  America  not  come  to  their  as- 
sistance. 

Which  means  that  America,  at  the  beginning  of  1917, 
stood  in  a  position  seldom  vouchsafed  to  a  neutral  nation  in 
any  war.  It  stood  in  a  position  to  bring  about  an  imme- 
diate peace,  not  by  going  to  war,  not  by  abandoning  neutral- 
ity, but  by  withholding  its  hand,  by  smoothing  the  way. 

It  is  too  much  to  say  that  America  stood  in  a  position  to 
impose  in  full  the  peace  programme  which  it  had  just  an- 
nounced as  its  own.  But  it  stood  in  a  position  to  see  the 
acceptance  of  the  primary  principle  of  that  programme,  and 
in  an  infinitely  better  position  to  urge  the  remainder  of  the 
programme  than  it  could  possibly  stand  by  taking  sides. 

The  opportunity  to  compel  the  acceptance  of  the  details 
of  the  peace-without-victory  formula — through  the  opera- 
tion, if  necessary,  of  justifiable  economic  pressure,  and  en- 
couragement to  the  democratic  forces  working  in  all  coun- 
tries for  the  overthrow  of  imperialism — probably  will 
never  again  be  paralleled  in  the  world's  history. 

But,  having  pronounced  for  a  peace  without  victory  in 


Promise  and  Performance  239 

January,  Wilson  went  to  war  in  April  to  destroy  the  oppor- 
tunity for  such  a  peace,  and  to  postpone  for  two  years 
the  realization  of  a  peace  of  any  kind. 

Although  America  did  not  save  the  Entente  from  defeat, 
it  dfd  determine  the  Entente  victory.  Upon  America  must 
fall  the  weight  of  the  responsibility  for  the  continuation  of 
the  world  travail  after  1917,  as  well  as  a  large  share  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  character  of  the  "peace"  that  was  ulti- 
mately imposed. 

A  favorite  theory  of  apologists  for  Wilson  is  that  the 
President  hoped  and  expected  to  procure  a  democratic 
peace  by  going  to  war,  and  that  his  failure  to  realize  the 
promised  formula  was  because  he  was  deceived  and  finally 
"beaten"  at  Paris  by  the  Entente  statesmen. 

But  Wilson  had  the  past  records  of  the  Entente  govern- 
ments before  him.  His  arguments  for  neutrality  in  1916, 
1915,  and  1914  indicate  that  he  was  fully  aware  that  de- 
mocracy could  not  be  served  by  America's  joining  what  he 
termed  "this  chaos  of  hostile  and  competing  ambitions." 

And  if  the  previous  record  of  the  Entente  governments 
was  not  enough,  Wilson  had  before  him,  also,  ample  evi- 
dence of  the  aims  of  the  very  Entente  statesmen  with  whom 
he  was  about  to  ally  himself. 

Although  the  secret  treaties  had  not  yet  been  published, 
the  concrete  aims  of  the  Entente  had  been  sufficiently  ac- 
knowledged to  make  it  quite  clear  that  they  were  as  far  as 
possible  from  the  peace-without-victory  formula.  The 
British  Colonial  Secretary  and  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minis- 
ter had  both  announced  that  the  German  colonies  would 
not  be  returned.  The  Entente  reply  to  the  German  over- 
tures, dated  December  30,  1916,  had  declared  for  general 
reparation.  At  the  Paris  Economic  Conference,  the  En- 
tente governments  had  agreed  to  prosecute  a  relentless 
trade  war  after  the  war  was  ended.  In  his  speech  reply- 


240,  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ing  to  Wilson's  December  peace  note,  Lloyd  George  had 
told  Parliament:  "We  have  to  exact  damages."  Finally, 
in  the  joint  Allied  notes  replying  to  the  Wilson  note,  the 
Entente  had  acknowledged  a  purpose  not  only  to  exact 
damages  from  the  enemy  countries,  but  to  dismember  them 
— to  wrest  territory  from  Germany,  from  Austria  and  from 
Turkey. 

Wilson  could  not  have  been  deceived.  He  must  have 
known,  furthermore,  that  once  he  threw  in  his  lot  with  the 
Entente  Allies,  he  placed  himself  in  a  less  strategic  position 
effectively  to  persuade  or  compel  them  to  adopt  the  pro- 
gramme to  which  he  had  proclaimed  allegiance. 

Did  Wilson,  indeed,  ever  attempt  to  persuade  or  compel 
his  allies  to  adopt  that  programme?  On  the  contrary,  the 
"Wilson  principles,"  in  the  hands  of  Wilson,  became  a 
strikingly  serviceable  instrument  for  assisting  the  Entente 
to  realize  to  the  full  its  programme  of  conquest  and  spolia- 
tion through  a  dictated  and  crushing  peace — and  the  more 
closely  we  examine  the  Wilson  maneuvers,  the  more  we  are 
forced  to  conclude  that  this  was  their  sole  purpose. 

They  served  to  deceive  the  American  public,  and,  to  a 
considerable  extent,  the  democratic  elements  in  the  Allied 
countries,  as  to  the  character  of  the  peace  that  was  intended, 
and  so  contributed  vitally  to  the  ability  of  our  coalition  to 
carry  forward  the  war  to  a  victorious  conclusion.  They 
served  also  to  deceive  the  public  of  the  enemy  countries, 
and  to  some  extent,  the  enemy  statesmen,  and  so  persuaded 
them  ultimately  to  place  themselves  in  our  hands. 

What  caused  the  Germans  to  sue  for  an  immediate  peace 
in  October,  1918?  Military  reverses,  in  part,  but  only  in 
part.  The  immediately  decisive  factor  was  the  German 
revolution.  And  a  decisive  cause  of  the  German  revolu- 
tion unquestionably  was  a  faith  of  the  German  people  that 


Promise  and  Performance  241 

the  expulsion  of  the  Kaiser  and  his  party  would  open  the 
way  for  an  immediate  peace  on  a  tolerable  basis. 

The  Germans  did  not  appeal  to  any  of  the  Allied  govern- 
ments for  peace.  Nor  did  the  Austrians.  And  they  made 
clear  the  reason  why — that  the  Entente  terms,  so  far  as 
they  were  revealed,  were  unacceptable.  They  appealed  to 
Wilson,  in  the  name  of  the  "Wilson  principles,"  as  voiced 
not  merely  in  the  peace-without-victory  address,  but  in  the 
war  message,  and  on  numerous  occasions,  down  to  only 
eight  days  before  the  German  offer.  They  specified  the 
Wilson  terms  laid  down  on  January  8,  and  in  subsequent 
addresses,  offering  to  conclude  an  immediate  peace  on  those 
terms  and  no  others.  They  quit  fighting  only  when  Wilson 
and  the  Allied  governments  had  expressly  accepted  the  offer 
to  conclude  peace  on  the  specified  terms,  subject  only  to  two 
amendments;  first,  a  reservation  upon  the  point  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas;  second,  a  qualification  that  Germany  should 
make  compensation  for  damage  done  to  the  civilian  popula- 
tion of  the  Allies. 

We  have  seen  how  Wilson,  in  laying  down  the  general 
armistice  terms,  violated  his  promises  to  the  Germans,  of 
equality  in  the  field  and  at  the  peace  table,  provided  only 
they  would  reform  their  government.  Under  the  most 
solemn  assurances,  however,  that  the  actual  settlement 
would  be  as  agreed  upon,  the  Germans  accepted  the  armis- 
tice conditions,  surrendered  their  fleet,  gave  up  their  rolling 
stock,  and  bowed  to  other  conditions  which  placed  them 
in  a  position  where  they  had  to  depend  upon  our  good  faith 
and  our  plighted  word. 

Can  any  circumstances  be  imagined  that  would  carry 
a  weightier  moral  obligation  to  hold  to  a  stipulated  bar- 
gain? 

Under   these   circumstances,   every  departure   from   the 


242  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Fourteen  Points,  or  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  subse- 
quent addresses — subject  only  to  the  amendments  referred 
to — would  seem  to  constitute  a  breach  of  international 
faith  at  least  as  obliquitous  as  the  German  violation  of  the 
Treaty  of  1839. 

Indeed,  the  Belgian  scrap  of  paper  would  appear  in- 
significant in  comparision,  inasmuch  as  in  the  present  case 
was  involved  not  merely  a  compact  with  a  given  nation,  but 
a  pledge  to  all  the  world,  including  the  peoples  of  the  En- 
tente countries,  including  ourselves — a  pledge  to  apply  cer- 
tain principles  to  the  conclusion  of  a  certain  peace,  not 
merely  as  a  matter  of  justice  to  an  enemy  nation,  but  pri- 
marily in  order  that  the  peace  of  all  peoples  might  be  made 
secure,  and  a  lasting  service  rendered  to  the  cause  of  democ- 
racy. 

It  may  be  that  the  two  amendments,  and  especially  the 
second  one,  were  inserted  intentionally  to  provide  a  loop- 
hole for  repudiating  the  entire  "Wilson  programme,"  but 
nothing  of  the  sort  was  suggested  at  the  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  Wilson  himself,  on  a  number  of 
occasions,  expressly  held  that  they  did  not  vitiate  it.  In 
announcing  the  armistice  terms  to  Congress,  he  said:  "The 
Allied  governments  have  accepted  the  bases  of  peace  which 
I  outlined  to  Congress  on  the  8th  of  January  last,  as  the 
Central  Empires  also  have."  And  in  his  Christmas  speech 
to  the  American  expeditionary  forces:  "It  happened  that  it 
was  the  privilege  of  America  to  present  the  chart  for  peace, 
and  now  the  process  of  settlement  has  been  rendered  com- 
paratively simple  by  the  fact  that  all  nations  concerned  have 
accepted  that  chart." 

Under  these  circumstances,  was  not  Wilson  obligated,  by 
every  consideration  of  personal  and  national  honor,  to  hold 
to  the  specified  "chart,"  even  if  his  allies  went  back  on  it, 
to  make  a  separate  peace,  if  need  be;  and  if  he  were  tricked, 


Promise  and  Performance  243 

deceived,  or  beaten,  by  the  Entente  statesmen,  not  to  make  a 
secret  of  it,  but  to  proclaim  the  fact  to  all  the  world? 
Could  he  do  less  and  keep  the  faith? 

No  one,  having  read  the  secret  treaties,  will  maintain 
that  the  Entente  governments  ever  intended  to  carry  out 
their  agreement  to  make  peace  on  the  "Wilson  terms."  It 
happens  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  Wilson  had  any  more 
intention  of  keeping  the  faith  in  this  matter  than  did  they. 
A  number  of  the  secret  treaties  were  published  a  year  be- 
fore the  armistice  was  signed.  Though  he  continued  his 
pledges  of  a  peace  of  equality,  Wilson  did  not  require  their 
repudiation.  The  salient  fact  of  the  whole  matter  is  that, 
having  lured  the  Germans  into  the  net  with  the  "Wilson 
terms,"  Wilson  promptly  threw  the  "Wilson  terms"  into 
the  wastebasket,  forgot  every  promise  he  had  made  of 
equality  to  the  German  people  provided  they  should  reform 
their  government,  agreed  to  a  peace  based  on  the  secret 
treaties,  placed  his  hand  and  seal  upon  almost  the  entire 
Entente  programme  of  murder  and  robbery,  and  in  the  end 
defended  this  course  to  his  own  people  as  an  act  of  justice 
and  of  honor.  (See  Chapter  XXXVI.) 

No  one  else  could  have  done  the  thing  except  Wilson, 
for  no  one  else  had  so  wormed  his  way  into  the  confidence 
of  the  peoples  of  the  earth.  Wilson's  work  at  Paris  and 
Versailles  must  go  down  in  history  as  a  gigantic  treachery, 
not  only  to  the  German,  Austro-Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  and 
Turkish  governments,  and  the  peoples  under  them,  but  to 
all  the  rest  of  us;  treachery  to  all  the  subject  peoples  under 
the  heel  of  the  Entente,  to  whom  he  had  promised  self-de- 
termination; treachery  to  all  the  independent  small  states  of 
the  world,  to  whom  he  had  promised  freedom  from  fears  of 
aggression;  treachery  to  the  American  people  and  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Entente  countries,  to  whom  he  had  promised  de- 
liverance from  future  wars  and  preparations  for  war. 


244  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

How  vast  the  betrayal  can  be  realized  only  by  glancing 
again  at  the  "Wilson  terms"  and  comparing  them  with  the 
terms  written  into  the  treaty. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  Fourteen  Points  do  not  harmon- 
ize in  every  respect  with  the  original  Wilson  formula  as 
to  the  terms  of  a  democratic  and  permanent  peace. 
(Chapter  XX.)  There  are  several  variations  in  concrete 
detail,  in  the  direction  of  a  peace  of  conquest.  Yet  if 
honestly  applied,  in  the  light  of  the  principles  laid  down  in 
the  subsequent  addresses,  they  would  have  realized,  at  least, 
a  share  of  the  Wilson  promises.  They  would  have  given 
Germany  and  the  other  enemy  countries  a  tolerable  peace. 
They  would  have  gone  a  long  way  toward  finding  the  per- 
manent and  democratic  peace  which  all  the  peoples  of  the 
world  had  been  led  to  hope  for  from  the  Messiah,  Wilson, 
and  which  all  governments  of  the  world  professed  to 
desire. 

Of  the  Fourteen  Points,  only  two  were  genuinely  embod- 
ied in  the  peace  arrangements,  the  one  providing  for  the 
restoration  of  Belgium,  the  other  for  an  independent  Po- 
land. If  the  reference  to  Alsace-Lorraine  be  taken  as  re- 
quiring unconditional  cession  of  this  territory  to  France, 
then  it  can  be  said  that  three  of  the  Fourteen  Points  were 
embodied  in  the  settlement. 

The  first  point,  providing  for  the  abolition  of  secret  di- 
plomacy, was  made  a  huge  mockery  throughout  the  confer- 
ence, and  continues  so.  The  second  point,  providing  for 
the  freedom  of  the  seas,  was  abandoned  before  Wilson's 
ship  touched  a  European  port.  The  third  point,  provid- 
ing for  the  removal  of  all  economic  barriers  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions,  was  reversed. 
Trade  handicaps  were  placed  upon  Germany,  and  elaborate 
provisions  were  made  to  hold  that  country  in  economic 
subjection  to  the  governments  dictating  the  peace. 


Promise  and  Performance  245 

The  fourth  point,  promising  a  reduction  of  armaments, 
was  flouted.  The  defeated  governments  were  compelled 
to  agree  to  arbitrary  reduction  of  armaments,  while  the  vic- 
tors were  left  free.  Article  8  of  the  so-called  covenant, 
which  purports  to  cover  this  point,  does  not  provide  for 
compulsory  reduction  of  armaments,  or  limitations  thereon, 
either  immediately  or  at  any  time. 

The  fifth  point,  relating  to  the  adjustment  of  colonial 
claims,  would  require  all  colonies,  by  whomever  claimed, 
to  be  disposed  of  either  by  plebiscites  or  restoration  to 
their  former  uowners."  No  action  of  any  kind  was  taken 
on  behalf  of  the  colonies  "owned"  by  the  enemies  of  Ger- 
many, while  the  German  colonies  were  parceled  out,  more 
or  less  unequally,  among  the  governments  dictating  the 
peace. 

The  sixth  point,  providing  for  the  evacuation  of  all  Rus- 
sian territory  and  "the  independent  determination  of  her 
own  political  development  and  national  policy,"  and  "a  sin- 
cere welcome  into  the  society  of  free  nations  under  institu- 
tions of  her  own  choosing"  was  not  adopted  on  paper,  and 
was  reversed  in  action.  The  governments  dictating  the 
peace  invaded  Russian  territory  in  larger  numbers  and  made 
war  on  the  existing  Russian  government,  seeking  to  set  up 
another  government  not  of  the  choosing  of  the  Russian 
people.  They  did  not  invite  Russia  to  join  their  league. 
They  parceled  out  bits  of  Russian  territory  among  their 
proteges. 

The  ninth  point,  providing  for  a  readjustment  of  the 
frontiers  of  Italy  "along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  na- 
tionality" was  violated  insofar  as  Italy's  new  frontiers  took 
in  Germans,  Slavs,  or  other  nationalities. 

The  tenth  point,  promising  to  safeguard  the  place  of 
Austria-Hungary  among  the  nations,  was  abandoned. 
Austria-Hungary  was  dismembered,  in  accordance  with  the 


246  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

secret  treaties,  and  to  the  advantage  of  the  governments 
dictating  the  peace  and  their  smaller  proteges. 

The  eleventh  point,  promising  that  the  relations  of  the 
several  Balkan  states  to  one  another  should  be  "deter- 
mined by  friendly  counsel  along  historically  established  lines 
of  allegiance  and  nationality,"  was  not  complied  with. 
The  relations  between  these  states  were  determined,  in- 
stead, by  the  selfish  interests  of  the  governments  dictating 
the  peace,  and  the  bribes  secretly  promised  to  Greece  and 
Rumania  for  participation  on  the  side  of  the  Entente. 

The  twelfth  point,  providing  that  "the  Turkish  portions 
of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure 
sovereignty,"  was  reversed.  Thd  victors  proceeded  to 
launch  one  new  war  after  another  in  an  effort  to  conquer 
and  divide  the  Turkish  provinces. 

The  fourteenth  point,  holding  out  a  promise  of  a  genuine 
league  of  nations,  was  not  fulfilled.  No  "general  associa- 
tion of  nations"  was  formed,  and  no  effort  was  made  to 
form  one.  Article  10,  of  the  so-called  covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  purporting  to  guarantee  members 
thereof  against  aggression,  does  not  meet  the  implied  prom- 
ise for  a  mutual  guarantee  for  all  states  against  aggression. 

That  the  Fourteen  Points  were  not  to  be  interpreted  a,« 
justifying,  in  any  respect,  a  departure  from  the  pledge  to 
Germany  of  justice  through  equality,  provided  only  that 
country  should  be  brought  under  the  control  of  a  parlia- 
mentary government,  is  seen  in  these  words  from  the  ad- 
dress of  the  Fourteen  Points: 

We  have  no  jealousy  of  German  greatness,  and  there  is  nothing 
in  this  programme  that  impairs  it.  We  grudge  her  no  achievement 
or  distinction  of  learning,  or  of  pacific  enterprise  such  as  have  made 
her  record  very  bright  and  enviable.  We  do  not  wish  to  injure 
her  or  to  block  in  any  way  her  legitimate  influence  or  power.  We 
do  not  wish  to  fight  her,  either  with  arms  or  with  hostile  arrange- 


Promise  and  Performance  247 

ments  of  trade,  if  she  is  willing  to  associate  herself  with  us  and  the 
other  peace-loving  nations  of  the  world  in  covenants  of  justice  and 
law  and  fair  dealing. 

We  wish  her  only  to  accept  a  place  of  equality  among  the  peo- 
ples of  the  world — the  new  world  in  which  we  now  live,  instead  of 
a  place  of  mastery. 

Neither  do  we  presume  to  suggest  to  her  any  alteration  or  modifi- 
cation of  her  institutions.  But  it  is  necessary,  we  must  frankly  say, 
and  necessary  as  a  preliminary  to  any  intelligent  dealing  with  her  on 
our  part,  that  we  should  know  whom  her  spokesmen  speak  for  when 
they  speak  to  us,  whether  for  the  Reichstag  majority  or  for  the 
military  party  and  the  men  whose  creed  is  imperial  domination. 

In  the  message  to  Congress  the  previous  December,  after 
the  most  sweeping  promises  of  a  peace  without  victory 
to  our  enemies,  provided  only  they  should  effect  internal 
reforms,  the  President  declared  that  the  very  "worst  thing 
that  can  happen  to  the  detriment  of  the  German  people," 
provided  they  should  not  effect  internal  reforms,  was  exclu- 
sion from  the  League  of  Nations,  and  a  peaceful  boycott. 
In  the  speech  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  referring  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  equality,  he  declared  that  "unless  this  principle  be 
made  its  foundation,  [the  foundation  of  the  peace]  no  part 
of  the  structure  of  international  justice  can  stand"  To 
the  vindication  of  this  principle,  said  he,  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  (<are  ready  to  devote  their  lives,  their  honor, 
and  everything  they  possess"  Finally,  in  the  speech  of 
September  27,  he  assured  us  that,  "No  peace  shall  be  ob- 
tained by  any  kind  of  compromise  or  abatement  of  the 
principles  we  have  avowed  as  the  principles  for  which  we 
are  fighting" 

Yet  the  settlement  the  world  was  asked  to  approve, 
instead  of  being  "to  the  exclusion  of  selfish  advantage  even 
on  the  part  of  the  victors,"  turned  out  to  be  to  the  exclusion 
of  everything  except  the  selfish  advantage  of  the  victors. 


248  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  victors  realized  every  item  of  material  gain  that  their 
might  made  possible.  The  vanquished  were  condemned  to 
pay  "to  the  full  limit  of  their  capacity." 

What  other  "peace"  in  the  history  of  civilization  was  so 
contemptuously  and  imperiously  dictated?  Where  before 
was  a  nation  commanded  to  agree  to  pay  indefinite  sums, 
and  to  abide  by  treaties,  arrangements,  and  territorial 
changes,  to  be  determined  by  the  victors  in  the  future? 
Where  was  a  great  people  in  modern  times  compelled  to 
agree  to  a  protracted  supervision  of  its  affairs  so  broad  as 
practically  to  amount  to  an  abolition  of  sovereignty?  How 
could  the  terms  have  been  made  harsher  without  reacting 
to  the  financial  disadvantage  of  the  victors? 

On  the  contrary,  the  terms  were  found  so  to  react  upon 
the  victors  that  they  were  impelled  almost  immediately  to 
begin  revising  them.  The  victors  were  placed  in  the  ridicu- 
lous position  of  having  spent  the  blood  and  the  treasure  of 
their  people  in  order  to  prostrate  a  business  rival,  only  to 
find  that,  for  selfish  reasons  purely,  they  had  to  set  him  up 
in  business  again,  loan  him  money,  and  start  him  once  more 
toward  the  position  that  he  had  held  before.1 

In  the  face  of  the  immediate  scrapping  of  all  prescribed 
conditions  of  a  permanent  and  democratic  peace,  the  so- 
called  'League  of  Nations  was  brought  forward  as  promis- 
ing to  realize  such  conditions  at  some  future  time. 

But  the  Wilson  league  failed  as  signally  to  meet  the  Wil- 
son specifications  of  a  genuine  peace  league  as  his  actual 
terms  fell  below  his  promised  terms. 

Any  bona  fide  peace  league,  the  President  made  it  plain 

1  Years  ago  Norman  Angell  informed  us,  in  "The  Great  Illusion,"  that 
this  is  what  would  happen.  The  minority  in  each  country  who  were  respon- 
sible for  the  war  were  well  aware  that  the  masses,  even  of  the  victor  na- 
tions, could  never  profit  by  it.  The  point  that  Angell  did  not  bring  out  in 
''The  Great  Illusion"  is  that  war  is  profitable  to  a  powerful  few,  and  it  is 
to  serve  this  few,  regardless  of  the  many,  that  modern  governments  go  to 
war. 


Promise  and  Performance  249 

at  every  turn,  must  be  a  league  of  all  nations  from  the  start; 
a  league  of  equals,  a  pure  democracy.  Since  inner  circles 
are  a  contradiction  of  equality,  inner  circles  are  expressly 
barred.  As  a  guarantee  against  clandestine  inner  circles, 
all  secrecy  is  barred.  For  America,  a  pledge  is  offered  in 
advance  that  it  shall  be  a  party  to  no  inner  circle,  whether 
open  or  secret.  As  to  the  obligations,  one  stands  out  above 
all  others:  "Mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence 
and  territorial  integrity";  not  for  some  states,  but  for  all. 
There  is  to  be  an  absence  of  special  privilege  upon  the  seas, 
and  no  trade  hostilities.  Finally,  as  a  guarantee  against 
the  violent  upset  of  our  genuine  peace  league,  or  any  of  its 
fundamentals,  by  a  minority,  every  state,  however  virtuous, 
must  render  itself  physically  incapable  of  aggression. 

But  the  association  which  Wilson  actually  offered  us  ex- 
cludes all  former  enemies  and  many  neutrals.  Even  within 
itself,  it  is  a  league  of  unequals.  It  has  an  inner  circle, 
the  Council;  an  inner  circle  within  the  Council,  the  Big 
Five;  an  inner  circle  within  the  Big  Five,  England-France- 
America;  probably  other  inner  circles.  No  outside  state 
is  guaranteed  against  aggression.  Economic  hostilities  are 
a  part  of  its  bone  and  sinew.  Not  one  of  the  fundamental 
requirements  is  complied  with. 

Time,  we  were  told,  would  correct  all  shortcomings. 
But  the  five  old  gentlemen  who  framed  the  League  in 
secret,  and  who  determined  upon  the  charter  members,  took 
every  precaution  against  time's  correcting  anything.  The 
covenant  cannot  be  amended  without  the  unanimous  con- 
sent of  the  Council.  The  Assembly  can  never  overrule  the 
Council.  New  members  are  to  be  received,  not  on  general 
terms  open  to  all  applicants,  but  on  special  terms  laid  down 
to  a  given  applicant.  It  turns  out  that  nobody  may  have 
anything  to  say  in  the  affairs  of  any  of  the  Big  Five.  They 
even  protect  themselves  from  one  another.  For  this  rea- 


250  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

son,  the  "safeguards,"  of  which  we  heard  so  much  from 
Wilson's  political  opponents,  are  not  of  as  great  importance 
as  asserted.  It  turns  out  that  practically  nothing  can  be 
done  without  unanimous  consent  of  the  Council.  Which 
means  that  any  contemplated  undertaking  can  be  blocked 
forever  by  a  single  member.  Which  also  means  that  the 
League  will  be  forever  at  the  mercy  of  the  most  reactionary 
member.  The  covenant  of  the  Wilson  League  of  Nations 
would  make  it  safe  from  democracy. 

For  the  Wilson  peace  of  victory  and  his  league  of  victors 
there  is  only  one  conceivable  defense,  the  official  defense 
— purity  versus  depravity.  Nothing  is  defensible  except 
on  the  theory  of  the  utter  righteousness  of  the  Big  Five,  the 
utter  depravity  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  the  inferiority 
of  the  other  governments  and  peoples  of  the  world. 
Everything  that  the  Big  Five  did  or  could  do  is  defensible 
under  this  theory.  It  is  a  convenient  theory.  Purity  can 
do  no  wrong — no  wrong  can  be  done  to  depravity. 

"The  object  of  the  war  is  attained,"  Wilson  told  Con- 
gress, November  n,  1918,  "and  attained  with  a  sweeping 
completeness  which  even  now  we  do  not  realize.  Armed 
imperialism  .  .  .  is  at  an  end,  its  illicit  ambitions  engulfed 
in  black  disaster.  .  .  .  The  arbitrary  power  of  the  military 
caste  of  Germany  is  discredited  and  destroyed." 

Yet  in  a  speech  before  the  French  Senate,  January  20, 
1919,  he  mentioned  the  German  peril  as  still  existent,  say- 
ing: "It  [the  awakened  world]  knows  that  not  only  France 
must  organize  against  this  peril,  but  that  the  world  must  or- 
ganize against  it." 

Did  our  President  profess  to  believe  still  in  the  German 
peril  only  because  he  was  even  then  planning  a  settlement 
defensible  under  no  other  theory? 


Promise  and  Performance  251 

The  practical  value  of  the  German-peril  theory  can  be 
appreciated  only  when  it  is  seen  how  it  is  applied  to  the 
details  of  the  great  settlement. 

The  victor  wishes  to  strip  the  vanquished  naked,  appro- 
priate his  possessions,  and  chain  him  to  a  rock-pile.  But 
sentence  to  fine  and  hard  labor  is  defensible  only  if  imposed 
upon  the  guilty  by  and  for  the  righteous.  So  the  Kaiser 
must  be  tried  by  an  impartial  jury  of  his  virtuous  enemies, 
who  have  already  determined  upon  a  settlement  indefensi- 
ble except  on  the  theory  of  his  utter  guilt ! 

But  the  Kaiser  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to  pay.  The 
German  people  can  pay.  So  the  distinction  between  the 
German  people  and  the  Kaiser  is  set  aside.  The  delegates 
of  the  reformed  German  government,  recalling  the  Wilson 
pledges,  protest  against  being  forced  to  pay  for  offenses 
formerly  imputed  only  to  the  Kaiser.  Clemenceau  replies 
that  the  German  people  must  be  regarded  as  the  accompli- 
ces of  the  German  government.  Wilson  acquiesces.  The 
victors  must  have  their  pay ! 

Even  the  German  people  are  unable  to  satisfy  the  vic- 
tors' lust  for  pay.  So  the  other  defeated  states,  for  whose 
emancipation  from  the  German  power  we  professed  to 
fight,  must  pay  also.  Even  the  oppressed  peoples  whom 
we  liberated  from  these  states,  and  who  are  now  to  form 
small  states  under  our  tutelage,  must  pay — all  to  the  limit 
of  their  capacity. 

The  victors  want  pay,  not  in  money  alone,  in  goods,  and 
in  ships,  but  in  land  and  its  resources.  Where  self-deter- 
mination or  nationality  can  be  pleaded  as  an  excuse  for 
taking  this  kind  of  pay,  self-determination  or  nationality  is 
duly  pleaded.  Where  these  principles  are  notoriously  vio- 
lated, some  other  principle  is  invoked.  Where  all  prin- 
ciples are  violated,  there  is  always  the  peril  theory  to  fall 


252  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

back  upon.  "Precautions"  must  be  taken  against  the  beast, 
even  though  he  has  already  submitted  to  the  removal  of 
his  claws. 

The  victors  want  the  German  colonies.  Purity  adminis- 
ters colonies  for  the  benefit  of  the  inhabitants.  The  Ger- 
mans, having  exploited  their  colonies,  have  abused  a  sacred 
trust  of  civilization.  The  victors  unselfishly  assume  the 
burden — haggling  a  good  deal  about  the  matter.  In  order 
to  make  it  doubly  clear  that  there  is  nothing  sordid  in  the 
transaction,  the  burdens  are  assumed  under  the  name  of 
"mandatories."  The  "mandatory"  theory  serves  another 
purpose  still;  it  saves  the  value  of  the  colonies  from  being 
charged  on  the  credit  side  of  the  indemnity.  Self-determi- 
nation is  a  sacred  principle,  but  it  is  not  for  "inferior"  peo- 
ples. Dictatorships  of  the  pure  must  be  imposed  upon  the 
weak  to  "assist"  them  "until  such  a  time  as  they  shall  be 
able  to  stand  alone." 

Was  it  an  oversight  that  certain  neutral  nations  were 
not  invited  to  join  the  Wilson  league — that  universal  self- 
determination  was  nowhere  mentioned — that  the  freedom 
of  the  seas  was  forgotten — and  all  other  essentials  of  a 
genuine  peace  league  were  lacking? 

The  answer  is  found  in  another  line  of  questions :  Would 
Lloyd  George  have  been  willing  for  his  League  of  Nations 
to  guarantee  Persia  against  aggression  by  England? — 
Orlando  for  his  league  to  guarantee  Abyssinia  against  ag- 
gression by  Italy? — Makino  for  his  league  to  guarantee 
Siberia  against  aggression  by  Japan?  Would  Wilson 
himself  have  been  willing  for  his  league  to  guarantee  Mex- 
ico against  aggression  by  the  United  States? 

Who  is  simple  enough  to  imagine  that  Wilson  ever  ex- 
pected to  persuade  England  to  grant  self-determination  to 
India,  or  Egypt;  Japan  to  Korea;  France  to  Morocco; 


Promise  and  Performance  253 

Italy  to  Tripoli?  Or  that  Wilson  himself  intended 
to  grant  self-determination  to  Santo  Domingo  or  Nicara- 
gua? At  a  time  when  the  largest  number  of  subject  peo- 
ples were  actually  in  revolution  to  realize  the  freedom 
which  Wilson  had  promised  them,  at  a  time  when  a  greater 
number  of  subject  peoples  under  one  flag,  the  British  flag, 
were  fighting  for  self-determination  than  ever  before  in  the 
world's  history,  Wilson  not  only  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  these 
subject  peoples,  but  he  approved  of  a  "peace"  handing  over 
a  large  number  of  new  subject  populations  to  England,  her 
allies  and  proteges. 

As  late  as  February  3,  1919,  Wilson  announced: 

The  nations  of  the  world  are  about  to  consummate  a  brotherhood 
which  will  make  it  unnecessary  in  the  future  to  maintain  those 
crushing  armaments  which  make  the  peoples  suffer  almost  as  much 
in  peace  as  they  suffered  in  war.  (Speech  before  French  Chamber 
of  Deputies.) 

Yet,  just  before  sailing  for  France,  Wilson  had  urged 
upon  Congress  "the  uninterrupted  pursuit"  of  the  policy 
of  "adhering  to  a  definite  method  of  development  for  the 
navy" 

It  is  plain  enough  why  Wilson  did  not  insist  that  the 
"Wilson  terms"  be  put  into  practice.  They  were  never  in- 
tended for  anything  except  propaganda. 

The  original  Wilson  theory,  that  victory  could  not  bring 
peace  out  of  the  European  mess,  is  supported  not  only  by 
past  realities,  but  by  the  immediate  results  of  the  victory 
that  was  gained.  Seven  months  after  the  signing  of  the 
armistice,  a  British  cabinet  member  informed  us  that  twenty- 
three  separate  and  distinct  wars  were  then  raging  in  Europe. 
We  won  victory,  but  not  peace  nor  the  probability  of  peace. 
It  is  because  we  fought  not  for  peace  but  for  the  spoils  of 


254  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

war.  We  continued  fighting  only  in  order  to  collect  the 
spoils  of  war. 

After  they  were  under  our  heel,  we  heard  a  great  deal 
about  the  unrepentance  of  our  enemies.  Nothing  could 
more  emphatically  demonstrate  the  unrepentance  of  our 
allies  than  our  settlement  and  the  secret  treaties  upon  which 
it  was  based.  These  treaties  reveal  the  considerations  that 
caused  our  allies  to  bind  themselves  to  fight  on  to  victory, 
to  fight  until  the  enemy  was  crushed,  no  matter  how  repen- 
tant he  might  become,  no  matter  what  the  cost  to  their  own 
people. 

By  the  beginning  of  1917  our  enemies  had  repented,  suf- 
ficiently, at  least,  to  sue  for  a  peace  of  equality.  But  our 
allies  did  not  repent;  they  fought  on  for  purely  business 
considerations. 

It  is  no  accident  that  our  peace  settlement  realizes  for  the 
bankers  of  London  and  Paris  the  ambitions  with  which  they 
approached  war,  and  upon  which  their  patriotism  rested, 
that  it  realizes  the  wildest  dreams  of  Entente  imperialists 
during  the  past  decade.  An  efficient  business  competitor  is 
now  eliminated.  The  encirclement  of  Germany  is  now  com- 
plete. The  victors  now  divide  the  "places  in  the  sun"  that 
had  been  held  by  Germany,  and  the  other  "places  in  the 
sun"  which  the  balance  of  power  had  saved  from  them. 
Wilson  himself  let  the  cat  out  of  the  bag  in  his  speech  at 
Helena  (Sept.  n,  1919)  when  he  said: 

The  merchants  and  manufacturers  and  bankers  of  Germany  were 
making  conquest  of  the  world.  All  they  had  to  do  was  to  wait  a 
little  while  longer,  and  long  German  fingers  would  have  been 
stretched  all  through  that  country  which  never  could  have  been  with- 
drawn. The  war  spoiled  the  game. 

But  one  game  of  this  sort  only  leads  to  another. 
Hence,  all  of  us  begin  to  prepare  for  a  new  conflict. 


Promise  and  Performance  255 

The  final  reason  why  wars  for  democracy  are  imprac- 
ticable in  the  present  day  is  that  no  existing  government  of 
the  first  class  is  pure  enough  to  serve  democracy  in  any 
war.  Not  one  is  as  much  a  democracy  as  an  autocracy. 
Not  one  is  capable  of  fighting  for  democracy.  Armed  im- 
perialism is  not  at  an  end.  In  the  victorious  treaties,  it 
registered  its  greatest  triumph. 

The  severity  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  has  been  de- 
fended on  the  ground  that  Germany,  if  able,  would  have 
imposed  conditions  quite  as  severe.  That  is  no  doubt  true. 
But  we  professed  to  go  to  war  to  prevent  that  kind  of  a 
peace  from  being  imposed  by  anybody;  while,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  our  intervention  was  the  one  thing  that  made  such  a 
peace  possible. 

Assertions  of  his  distinguished  apologists  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding,  no  part  of  "Wilson  idealism"  went  into 
the  League  covenant  or  any  other  part  of  the  settlement. 
The  only  impression  that  Wilson  gave  to  that  settlement 
was  its  stamp  of  Pharisaism.  To  the  scheme  of  Imperial 
England,  Imperial  Japan,  and  imperialistic  France  was  at- 
tached the  phraseology  of  Pharisee  Wilson.  The  ideal  of 
a  world  peace  league,  in  the  hands  of  Wilson,  became  a 
blind  for  an  alliance  of  victors  for  the  purpose  of  guarantee- 
ing the  material  fruits  of  victory  and  asserting  a  world 
supremacy  for  themselves.  The  Wilson-Clemenceau-Lloyd 
George  league  turned  out  to  be  an  imperialistic  trust,  mas- 
querading as  a  company  of  angels;  a  modern  Holy  Alliance 
for  the  suppression  of  democracy  at  home  and  abroad,  and 
the  prosecution  of  more  wars  for  business. 

For  our  own  autocrat  in  the  White  House,  American 
lives  were  not  a  consideration;  international  law  was  not  a 
consideration;  democracy  was  not  a  consideration;  Ameri- 
can honor  was  not  a  consideration.  All  were  sacrificed. 
Why,  then,  did  we  fight? 


OUR  WAR  AND  BUSINESS 
XXVII 

PATRIOTISM  OF   THE    PROFIT-MAKERS 

To  what  extent  was  America's  war  a  war  for  business? 

Did  Woodrow  Wilson  lead  America  into  war  in  order 
to  serve  the  selfish  interests  of  the  few? 

The  answer  is  determined  by  looking  into  the  essential 
facts.  In  the  first  place,  Wall  Street  wanted  war. 

Not  a  single  recognized  spokesman  of  our  greatest  finan- 
cial and  industrial  interests,  anywhere  in  public  life,  expres- 
sed opposition  to  war  during  the  critical  weeks  of  February 
and  March,  1917.  On  the  contrary,  our  leading  financiers 
themselves,  who  up  to  that  period  had  seldom  been  quoted 
on  political  questions,  personally  endorsed  the  proposition 
of  belligerency. 

April  4,  the  New  York  Times  said:  "Not  since  Woodrow 
Wilson  became  President  has  any  utterance  of  his  met  with 
such  instant  and  hearty  approval  by  leaders  in  the  financial 
district  as  his  war  address  to  Congress."  This  conclusion 
was  backed  by  a  column  of  quotations.  "It  [the  war  mes- 
sage] was  .  .  .  exactly  right,"  said  Judge  Gary,  head  of 
the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation.  "It  was  100  per  cent. 
American,"  said  Frank  Vanderlip,  moving  genius  of  the 
American  International  Corporation  and  head  of  the  Na- 
tional City  Bank.  "The  President's  address  was  magnifi- 
cent," said  James  Wallace,  head  of  the  Guaranty  Trust 
Company.  "It  was  well  worth  waiting  for,"  said  A.  Bar- 
ton Hepburn,  another  of  our  leading  bankers.  "The 
speech  breathes  the  true  spirit  of  the  American  people," 

256 
iik'.*  k 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       257 


said  Martin  Carey,  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company.  These 
opinions  of  the  President's  address,  said  the  Times,  "were 
echoed  in  one  form  or  another  by  bankers,  brokers,  and 
executives  in  large  number." 

Nor  can  this  attitude  on  the  eve  of  war  be  taken  as  an 
eleventh-hour  move  to  uget  on  the  right  side";  for  the 
spokesmen  of  our  large  business  interests  openly  favored 
war  at  a  time  when  to  "stand  behind  the  President,"  was 
supposed  to  mean  not  belligerency,  but  pacifism.  During 
the  "armed  neutrality"  period,  the  Wall  Street  correspond- 
ent of  the  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger  diagnosed  financial 
sentiment  (Mar.  22)  as  follows: 

Briefly  stated,  Wall  Street  believes  that  war  is  just  one  move 
ahead.  And  Wall  Street  is  glad  that  it  is  so.  The  financial  district 
here  is  unqualifiedly  for  war  as  soon  as  it  can  be  declared.  'It  is  a 
good  thing  for  the  country,'  one  trust  president  declared.  .  .  .  This 
is  the  way  Wall  Street  feels  about  the  prospects  of  war.  Only  a 
few  of  the  men  thus  interviewed  were  willing  to  have  their  names 
mentioned;  their  enthusiasm  for  war,  however,  was  too  real  to  be 
misunderstood. 

Going  back  to  the  breaking  of  diplomatic  relations, 
within  five  minutes  after  the  news  reached  the  financial  dis- 
trict, according  to  the  Times:  "Wall  Street  was  bright  with 
the  Stars  and  Stripes  floating  from  banks  and  brokerage  of- 
fices. Figuratively,  the  street  gave  a  concerted  sigh  of  re- 
lief "  On  the  Produce  Exchange,  300  brokers  sang  "The 
Star  Spangled  Banner." 

February  20,  the  New  York  Merchants'Association  held 
what  the  Herald  declared  was  "the  greatest  demonstration 
in  the  history  of  that  organization."  The  organization 
drank  to  the  President.  During  this  period,  the  State  and 
local  Councils  of  Defense,  upon  which  business  leaders 
everywhere  shone,  were  constituted.  Business  organiza- 
tions besieged  the  President  and  Congress  with  petitions 


258  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

for  vigorous  action.  The  directors  of  the  National  Safety 
Council,  claiming  to  represent  2,814  American  corporations 
employing  3,000,000  workmen,  adopted  resolutions  "pledg- 
ing to  the  President  of  the  United  States  the  loyal  support 
of  this  organization  in  whatever  measures  may  be  neces- 
sary to  defend  the  national  honor  and  to  protect  the  lives 
and  property  of  Americans." 

As  early  as  December,  Mr.  Schwab  had  offered  his  vast 
plants  to  the  government,  in  case  of  war,  "at  the  govern- 
ment's price."  This  example  was  followed  in  February 
and  March  by  many  great  corporations. 

March  26,  at  the  solicitation  of  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  the  United  States,  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.  loaned 
the  government  $1,000,000  without  interest  and  without 
security,  for  the  purchase  of  supplies  immediately  desired 
in  anticipation  of  war. 

During  March,  J.  P.  Morgan,  Mrs.  E.  H.  Harriman, 
George  Baker,  Jr.,  Vincent  Astor,  and  others  of  their  class 
offered  their  private  yachts  for  service  as  submarine  chasers 
in  the  event  of  war.  At  the  same  time,  Wall  Street  was 
giving  the  President  the  fullest  assurances  that  it  was  ready 
to  cooperate  also  in  the  matter  of  loans.  March  23,  we 
find  Thomas  W.  Lamont  delivering  a  patriotic  address  en- 
titled "America  Financially  Prepared,"  in  which  he  prom- 
ised: "If  the  Treasurer  should  decide  to  issue  a  govern- 
ment obligation  to-morrow  for  a  billion  dollars,  the  whole 
sum  would  be  waiting  for  it." 

One  of  the  most  effective  things  that  big  business  did,  in 
those  critical  weeks,  in  working  its  will  for  war,  was  to 
demand  naval  guns  and  crews  for  its  ships  and  to  tie  up 
transportation  and  commerce  until  that  demand  was  satis- 
fied. 

Immediately  after  the  breaking  of  diplomatic  relations, 
the  International  Mercantile  Marine  Company — a  Brit- 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       259 

ish-controlled  corporation,  in  which,  however,  America's 
rnpst  powerful  financiers  are  interested — began  holding  its 
ships  in  port.  February  12,  its  president  made  formal  ap- 
plication for  naval  guns  and  crews.  At  the  same  time  the 
railroads,  which  are  under  the  control  of  the  same  Ameri- 
can financiers  who  are  interested  in  the  International  Mer- 
cantile Marine  Company,  began  to  refuse  shipments  be- 
cause of  alleged  congestion  due  to  the  ships'  being  held  in 
port.  This  tying  up  of  American  domestic  commerce  "by 
Germany"  was  played  upon  with  great  effect  by  the 
press.  When,  on  February  26,  President  Wilson  appeared 
before  Congress  asking  for  authority  to  arm  merchant 
ships,  he  was  able  to  offer  the  argument  that  "our  own 
commerce  has  suffered,  is  suffering  .  .  .  rather  because  so 
many  of  our  ships  are  timidly  keeping  to  their  home  ports 
than  because  American  ships  have  been  sunk.1' 

Had  there  been  any  good  reason  to  believe  that  the 
means  of  "protection,"  which  the  International  Mercantile 
Marine  demanded,  would  in  fact  protect,  its  demand  for 
such  means  might  be  taken  as  sincere.  But  for  many 
months,  ships  flying  the  British  flag  had  been  trying  pre- 
cisely the  same  means  of  "protection,"  and  it  had  been 
proven  that  these  means  did  not  protect.  Five  weeks  later, 
the  President  himself  admitted  that  such  protective  meas- 
ures were  futile,  although  meanwhile  no  new  incidents  had 
happened  to  render  that  truth  any  clearer  than  before. 
(See  Chapter  VI.) 

We  may  well  take  the  President's  word  for  this,  espe- 
cially as  no  one — much  less  the  officials  of  the  International 
Mercantile  Marine — disputed  it.  Since  this  truth  was  as 
clear  on  February  26  as  on  April  2,  the  tying  up  of  Ameri- 
can shipping  by  big  business  in  February  and  March  can- 
not be  explained  in  any  other  way  except  as  a  conspiracy 
to  promote  war  sentiment. 


260  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Not  only  was  Wall  Street  enthusiastically  for  war  be- 
tween February  3  and  the  declaration,  but  big  business  was 
a  most  powerful  influence  within  the  country  working  to- 
ward war  previously  to  that  period.  The  organs  of  public- 
ity that  were  loudest  in  their  calls  to  "stand  behind  the 
President"  after  February  3  were  the  same  that  previously 
had  been  most  insistent  on  an  unyielding  policy  toward  Ger- 
many, and  most  tolerant  of  concessions  to  the  Entente. 
The  National  Security  League,  and  the  Navy  League, 
which  carried  on  the  intensive  preparedness  agitation 
throughout  1916,  enjoyed  the  financial  support  of  our  rich- 
est millionaires.  In  that  year,  the  United  States  Chamber 
of  Commerce  held  a  referendum  of  the  750  Chambers  of 
Commerce  throughout  the  country  on  the  question  of  pre- 
paredness; ninety-five  per  cent,  of  them  voted  in  favor  of 
preparedness.  The  staging  of  the  great  preparedness  pa- 
rades, also  in  1916,  involved  the  expenditure  of  huge  sums 
of  money.  Aside  from  any  consideration  of  mere  ex- 
penses, however,  those  parades  would  have  been  impossible 
without  the  hearty  cooperation  of  the  largest  employers  of 
labor  and  the  most  outstanding  business  leaders. 

In  February,  1917,  Representative  Calloway,  on  the 
floor  of  Congress,  charged  the  Morgan  interests  with  hav- 
ing, in  March,  1915,  organized  and  financed  a  huge  prop- 
aganda machine  embracing  twelve  influential  publishers 
and  179  selected  newspapers,  for  the  purpose  of  manufac- 
turing sentiment  favorable  to  American  participation  in  the 
war.  These  charges  were  renewed  in  May,  1921,  by  Rep- 
resentative Michelson  of  Illinois.  The  latter  called  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that,  in  his  history  of  the  war,  Gabriel 
Hanotaux  tells  of  a  conference  with  the  late  Robert  Bacon, 
then  a  member  of  the  Morgan  firm,  in  1914,  in  which  he 
and  Bacon  drew  up  plans  and  specifications  for  a  great  scare 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       261 

campaign  in  this  country.  Hanotaux  also  suggests  that 
France  was  ready  to  make  peace  in  1914,  but  was  dissuaded 
by  Bacon  and  other  American  politicians,  who  gave  assur- 
ances that  they  could  ultimately  bring  America  into  the 
war  on  the  side  of  France. 

These  charges  are  worth  recording,  but  they  are  impor- 
tant only  when  taken  in  connection  with  other  evidence. 
As  a  means  to  establishing  the  wish  of  our  great  financial 
interests  for  war,  at  least  for  some  time  before  it  was  de- 
clared, they  do  not  need  to  be  proven.  For,  aside  from  the 
circumstantial  evidence  here  given,  any  one  who  has  read 
the  Pujo  Committee  report  on  the  Money  Trust,  showing 
the  concentration  of  credit  in  the  hands  of  three  great 
banks,  and  the  control  of  small  banks  by  the  big  ones — and 
any  one  who  appreciates  the  dependence  of  the  more  pow- 
erful organs  of  the  press  upon  the  dominant  business  inter- 
ests of  the  communities  which  they  serve,  and  especially 
upon  the  banks — will  understand  that  the  propaganda 
storm  of  the  months  preceding  our  entrance  into  the  war 
would  have  been  impossible  without  the  approval  and  in- 
stigation of  Wall  Street. 

As  Wall  Street  wanted  war  before  it  came,  so,  after  it 
came,  Wall  Street  promoted  the  war. 

"The  first  vigorous  and  effectual  response  to  the  call  to 
arms  came  precisely  from  Wall  Street,"  said  the  Saturday 
Evening  Post  editorially,  July  7.  This  journal  then  pro- 
ceeded to  prove  the  proposition  in  a  series  of  articles. 

It  cannot  be  denied.  While  the  Conscription  Bill  was 
pending,  great  industrial  corporations,  milling  firms,  and 
banks,  spent  huge  sums  of  their  own  money  in  the  campaign 
for  recruits.  Merchant  princes  offered  their  stores  for 
recruiting  depots,  and  their  employees  for  any  capacity  in 


262  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

which  the  government  might  wish  to  use  them.  Financiers 
went  about  the  country  making  speeches  on  democracy.  In 
opposing  the  Conscription  Bill  in  Congress,  Representa- 
tive Huddleston  offered  a  formidable  list  of  multimillion- 
aires who  favored  conscription.  Among  them  was  John 
D.  Rockefeller,  Jr.,  who  came  out  for  conscription  as  the 
one  means  of  "substituting  real  democracy  for  existing 
class  distinctions"  in  America. 

Mr.  Harding,  governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board, 
predicted,  in  an  address,  May  7,  that  the  European  war 
would  be  won  by  American  bankers.  By  the  middle  of 
May,  John  D.  Rockefeller,  Jr.  and  Daniel  Guggenheim  had 
their  feet  under  the  table  with  Sam  Gompers,  arranging 
for  brotherly  cooperation  between  capital  and  labor  for 
the  period  of  the  war.  No  American  corporations  had 
been  more  violent  or  successful  foes  of  organized  labor 
than  the  corporations  under  the  tutelage  of  these  gentlemen. 

Five  days  after  war  was  declared,  America's  great  rail- 
roads voluntarily  combined  under  one  board  for  the  pur- 
pose of  cooperating  with  the  government.  The  first  de- 
tachments of  Americans  to  go  to  France  included  the  best 
engineering  talent  of  these  roads,  cheerfully  loaned  by  the 
management  to  the  government.  "Never  in  the  history 
of  the  world,"  said  Carl  Vrooman,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Agriculture,  May  n,  "have  business  men  shown  as  much 
patriotism  and  unselfishness  as  have  been  manifested,  since 
the  war  began,  by  the  business  men  of  America."  Said 
Samuel  G.  Blythe  in  the  Saturday  Evening  Post  (Jan.  12, 
1918): 

It  is  the  mere  truth  to  say  that  we  could  not  fight  this  war  a  min- 
ute, if  the  men  with  money  in  the  United  States  refused  to  loan 
that  money  to  the  government.  We  never  could  have  begun  it,  to 
say  nothing  of  continuing  it  as  far  as  we  have  continued  it.  ...  No 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       263 

system  of  taxation  that  could  be  devised  would  have  secured  enough 
money  for  the  war,  or  a  tenth  of  enough  money  for  the  war.  No 
system  of  levy  that  could  have  been  put  in  operation,  save  confisca- 
tion, could  do  this. 

Very  true.  Our  men  with  money  not  only  loaned  that 
money  in  huge  sums,  but  they  procured  the  money  of  their 
customers,  their  employees,  and  the  general  public.  To 
this  end  they  devoted  their  personal  time  and  energy,  with- 
out limit,  loaned  their  clerks  and  salesmen,  donated  their 
office  facilities,  and  expended  millions  of  dollars  of  their 
own  money  in  advertising. 

A  list  of  America's  most  conspicuous  boosters  for  the 
Liberty  Loans  would  coincide  with  a  list  of  America's 
most  prominent  financiers.  Just  to  get  the  first  loan  well 
started,  aside  from  the  far  larger  subscriptions  made  by 
their  corporations,  about  fifty  of  America's  richest  men 
were  reported  as  making  personal  subscriptions  of  from 
one  to  twenty  million  dollars  each. 

The  war  work  of  the  Red  Cross  began  with  Henry  P. 
Davison,  of  the  Morgan  firm,  as  its  head,  with  the  title  of 
Chairman  of  the  War  Council.  Robert  S.  Lovett,  one  of 
the  world's  greatest  railroad  directors,  became  Chairman 
of  the  Red  Cross  Coordinating  Committee.  When  the 
(President  reorganized  the  Red  Cross  on  a  military  basis,  he 
honored  Davison  with  the  title  of  Major  General,  while 
five  other  Red  Cross  officials  from  the  banking  world  were 
commissioned  Brigadier  Generals. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  war,  several  of  our  first  families, 
iled  by  the  W.  K.  Vanderbilts,  offered  their  country  villas 
for  use  as  Red  Cross  hospitals.  When  New  York,  like 
other  cities,  was  divided  into  districts  for  solicitation,  the 
soliciting  teams  were  led  by  members  of  America's  richest 
families.  Special  dividends  were  declared  by  our  largest 


264  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

corporations,  to  be  paid,  not  to  the  stockholders,  but  on 
behalf  of  the  stockholders  to  the  Red  Cross.  Contribu- 
tions to  the  Red  Cross,  either  direct  or  in  the  form  of  div- 
idends, from  such  corporations  or  their  heads,  ranged 
from  half  a  million  to  two  million  dollars,  during  1917 
alone.  In  the  first  ten  months  of  the  war  the  personal 
contributions  of  John  D.  Rockefeller  to  all  war  activities 
were  reported  as  totaling  $70,000,000. 

In  September  it  was  announced  that  Frank  A.  Vanderlip 
had  turned  over  his  great  affairs  to  subordinates,  to  devote 
his  entire  time,  as  chairman  of  the  War  Savings  Certificate 
Commission,  to  floating  the  two  billion  dollar  War  Savings 
Certificate  Issue  authorized  by  Congress. 

Of  inestimable  importance  in  the  promotion  of  the  war 
were  the  many  unofficial  patriotic  organizations,  to  which 
the  leading  business  men  of  every  community  gave  their 
support,  and  particularly  the  work  of  the  great  newspapers, 
news  associations,  and  magazines.  From  the  declaration 
of  war  until  the  Germans  quit,  not  one  of  the  great  vehicles 
of  publicity  breathed  a  suggestion  that  our  war  was  a  mis- 
take, or  that  the  official  war  propaganda  was  unsound,  or 
that  the  government  should  attempt  to  arrange  its  differ- 
ences with  the  enemy  by  agreement.  In  the  demand  for 
victory  and  a  dictated  peace,  there  was  not  a  dissenting 
voice.  Unlimited  news  space  was  devoted  to  the  official 
propaganda.  Millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  advertising 
space  was  donated  outright.  It  is  almost  literally  true  to 
say  that,  as  a  whole,  the  American  press  gave  as  loyal  serv- 
ice as  if  it  had  been  founded  for  the  sole  purpose  of  war 
promotion  and  had  been  edited  by  Mr.  Creel  himself. 
Anything  like  this  would  have  been  unthinkable,  without 
an  almost  absolute  unanimity  for  the  war  on  the  part  of 
big  business. 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       265 

Not  only  did  Wall  Street  promote  the  war,  but  Wall 
Street  directed  the  war,  in  nearly  all  its  phases  outside  the 
purely  military  and  naval  operations. 

The  President,  of  course,  was  supreme  in  every  realm. 
But  the  details  were  attended  to  by  officials  of  America's 
banks,  railroads,  manufacturing,  mining,  and  shipping  cor- 
porations, who,  while  acting  for  the  government,  were  paid 
by  these  corporations. 

Never  in  the  history  of  America,  probably  never  in  the 
history  of  any  country,  had  there  been  such  open  and  direct 
control  of  governmental  activities  by  the  very  rich.  Theo- 
retically and  legally,  the  ultimate  control  rested  in  Congress. 
In  practice,  the  power  of  a  Senator  or  Representative  was 
less  than  that  of  a  doorkeeper  in  the  office  of  any  of  the 
money  kings  whom  the  President  appointed  to  direct  the 
course  of  America,  domestically,  in  the  war  "to  make  the 
world  safe  for  democracy." 

Two  of  the  most  important  organizations  to  function  as 
special  war  bodies  were  provided  for  by  law,  and  even 
constituted  before  war  was  declared;  indeed,  at  a  time  when 
the  President  was  still  promising  to  "keep  us  out  of  war." 
They  were  the  Shipping  Board  and  the  Council  of  National 
Defense. 

As  originally  constituted,  the  Shipping  Board  consisted 
of  an  attorney  for  large  Pacific  Coast  lumber  interests,  a 
multimillionaire  lumberman  and  exporter,  a  railroad  mana- 
ger, and  two  shipping  magnates. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  with  its  numerous  subsidiary  committees,  emerged 
as  the  general  clearing  house  of  war  activities,  not  only  of 
those  activities  halving  to  do  with  the  "education"  and 
repression  of  the  public,  but  of  those  concerned  with  indus- 
try. The  Council  of  National  Defense,  proper,  is  com- 


266  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

posed  of  six  members  of  the  President's  cabinet.  The  real 
working  body  of  the  Council  turned  out  to  be  the  Advisory 
Commission.  The  Advisory  Commission,  as  originally  ap- 
pointed by  the  President,  consisted  of  seven  members,  four 
of  them  conspicuous  business  men.  The  chairman  was 
Daniel  Willard,  president  of  a  great  railroad.  The  other 
three  business  members  were  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  a  noted 
Wall  Street  speculator;  Julius  Rosenwald,  president  of 
America's  greatest  mail-order  house  and  closely  identi- 
fied with  large  industrial  corporations;  and  Howard  E. 
Coffin,  vice-president  of  the  Hudson  Motor  Corporation. 
The  minority  consisted  of  a  labor  leader,  a  president  of  a 
college,  and  a  medical  man.  It  was  these  seven  men  who, 
secretly  and  illegally,  according  to  Representative  Graham, 
chairman  of  the  Select  Committee  on  Expenditures  in  the 
War  Department  (Report  of  July  7,  1919)  worked  out  the 
details  of  the  President's  war  programme  months  before 
the  declaration  of  war. 

So  far  as  matters  of  business  were  concerned,  the  func- 
tion of  the  Advisory  Commission  was  to  advise  the  Council 
proper  what  to  buy  for  the  war,  where  to  buy,  how  much 
to  pay,  how  to  "encourage  production,"  how,  in  a  word,  to 
deal  with  the  business  interests.  In  practice  this  gave  the 
decision,  in  nearly  every  instance,  to  the  Advisory  Commis- 
sion. 

In  practice  it  gave  the  decision,  not  to  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission as  a  whole,  but  because  of  the  allotment  of  work 
within  that  body,  to  the  four  business  members  thereof. 
They  divided  the  field  among  them,  and  each  in  turn  di- 
vided his  special  field  into  smaller  fields  to  be  handled  by 
sub-committees  under  his  control.  A  month  before  the  dec- 
laration of  war,  the  functionless  nature  of  the  Council 
proper  was  made  more  clear  by  the  appointment  of  a  direc- 
tor, to  whom  was  turned  over  the  details  of  such  work  as 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       267 

the  Council  proper  was  supposed  to  do.  This  director  was 
another  official  of  a  great  corporation,  W.  S.  Gifford,  of 
the  American  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Company.  Mr. 
Gifford  later  became  comptroller  of  the  telephone  monopoly 
when  it  was  taken  over  by  the  government. 

As  the  sub-committees  of  the  four  business  members  of 
the  Advisory  Commission  were  composed  of  men  selected 
from  corporations  dominating  the  particular  field  in  which 
it  was  appointed  to  function,  we  have  the  remarkable  sit- 
uation of  the  government's  handing  over  to  the  corporations 
of  the  country  the  decision  as  to  what  the  government 
should  pay  them  for  their  products  and  how  in  general  it 
should  deal  with  them. 

The  Steel  and  Steel  Products  Committee  was  headed  by 
Elbert  H.  Gary,  chairman  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation; 
James  A.  Farrell,  president  of  the  same  concern;  and 
Charles  M.  Schwab,  president  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Com- 
pany. The  function  of  these  gentlemen  as  government  of- 
ficials was  to  meet  with  the  representatives  of  the  steel 
industry — meaning  their  own  immediate  subordinates  in 
their  own  private  business — to  make  provision  for  "co- 
operation" in  the  procurement  of  supplies,  and  to  arrange 
prices  "by  voluntary  agreement" ! 

The  Copper  Committee  was  headed  by  John  D.  Ryan, 
president  of  the  Anaconda  Copper  Company — the  succes- 
sor of  the  Amalgamated,  of  Thomas  Lawson  fame — and 
the  presidents  of  the  Calumet  &  Hecla  and  the  Utah  Cop- 
per companies. 

The  Locomotives  Committee  was  headed  by  the  vice- 
presidents  of  the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Company  and  the 
American  Locomotive  Company.  The  Express  Committee 
was  composed  of  the  vice-presidents  of  the  four  great  ex- 
press companies.  A.  C.  Bedford,  president  of  the  Stand- 
ard Oil  Company,  headed  the  Oil  Committee.  P.  A.  S. 


268  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Franklin,  president  of  the  International  Mercantile  Ma- 
rine Company,  headed  the  Shipping  Committee. 

The  Brass  Committee  was  headed  by  the  president  of 
the  American  Brass  Company,  the  Nickel  Committee  by 
the  president  of  the  International  Nickel  Company,  the 
Sulphur  Committee  by  the  president  of  the  Union  Sulphur 
Company,  the  Lumber  Committee  by  the  president  of  the 
National  Lumbermen's  Association,  etc.,  etc.,  etc. — all  gov- 
ernment officials. 

The  function  of  these  gentlemen  was  to  divide  up  the 
government's  business — among  themselves;  to  recommend, 
practically  to  fix,  a  price  to  be  paid  by  the  government — 
to  themselves. 

As  the  months  went  by,  this  scheme  underwent  various 
alterations,  usually  with  a  view  to  concentrating  vast  deci- 
sions into  fewer  hands.  On  the  whole,  the  alterations  did 
not  lessen  the  directing  power  of  Wall  Street,  but  only 
vested  such  power  in  the  hands  of  fewer  and  more  con- 
spicuous personages. 

The  War  Industries  Board,  at  the  beginning,  was  headed 
by  a  manufacturer  of  munitions,  Frank  A.  Scott,  who  was 
also  chairman  of  the  General  Munitions  Board.  The  Cen- 
tral Purchasing  Commission  consisted  of  four  millionaire 
business  men:  Mr.  Baruch,  of  Wall  Street;  Judge  Lovett, 
the  railroad  magnate;  Robert  S.  Brookings,  and  Herbert 
Hoover.  Later  Daniel  Willard,  the  railroad  president, 
served  as  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  to  be 
succeeded  a  little  later  by  Mr.  Baruch. 

Meanwhile,  the  Food  Administration  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  great  corporations  most  conspicuous  in  the  manu- 
facture and  distribution  of  foods.  The  headquarters  of 
the  Food  Administration  in  New  York  were  the  offices  of 
the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company,  known  as  the  Sugar 
Trust. 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       269 

The  president  of  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company 
acted  as  chairman  of  the  International  Sugar  Committee, 
while  the  manager  of  the  California-Hawaii  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Company  acted  as  head  of  the  sugar  division  of  the 
Food  Administration.  The  sugar  division,  almost  through- 
out, was  officered  by  men  taken  directly  from  the  offices  of 
the  Sugar  Trust,  which  paid  their  salaries,  following  the 
system  in  general  practice  elsewhere. 

We  find  a  similar  situation  in  the  meat  and  livestock,  and 
other  divisions,  of  the  Food  Administration.  Joseph  Cot- 
ton, an  attorney  for  Wilson  &  Co.,  one  of  the  Big  Five 
packing  firms,  acted  as  head  of  the  meat  and  livestock  divi- 
sion. Other  important  positions  in  this  division  were  held 
by  employees  of  Swift  &  Co.  and  the  other  packers.  Ed- 
ward Chambers,  vice-president  of  the  Santa  Fe  Railroad, 
acted  as  head  of  the  transportation  division.  F.  S.  Brooks, 
of  Swift  &  Co.  acted  as  Chambers'  chief  assistant.  A.  C. 
Loring,  head  of  the  great  Minneapolis  milling  firm,  the 
Pillsbury  Flour  Mills  Company,  acted  as  northwestern  rep- 
resentative of  the  Food  Administration  in  regard  to  flour 
and  feed  prices.  To  head  the  government's  Grain  Corpo- 
ration the  President  selected  a  well-known  speculator  from 
the  Chicago  wheat  pit. 

In  the  Fuel  Administration  we  find  the  same  scheme  as 
elsewhere.  A  coal  operator  in  private  life  acted  as  the 
government's  director  of  bituminous  coal  distribution. 
An  oil  operator  in  private  life  acted  as  the  government's 
oil  administrator.  The  subordinates  of  these  and  other 
Fuel  Administration  officials  were  selected  from  the  large 
coal  and  oil  corporations. 

When  the  government  formally  took  over  the  railroads, 
the  details  of  administration  were  dictated  and  carried  out 
by  a  group  of  railroad  presidents  headed  by  A.  H.  Smith, 
president  of  the  New  York  Central,  and  Judge  Lovett,  head 


270  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

of  the  Harriman  lines.  When  Director  General  McAdoo 
resigned,  he  was  succeeded  by  a  railroad  official,  Walker 
D.  Hines,  chairman,  general  counsel,  and  director  of  the 
Santa  Fe  Company. 

Eleven  months  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  country 
was  divided  into  ten  munitions  districts.  Over  each  dis- 
trict was  placed  a  district  chief  of  the  production  division 
of  the  Ordnance  Department,  a  government  official.  In 
every  instance  the  district  chief  was  a  captain  of  industry. 
Overseeing  the  district  chiefs  generally,  as  head  of  the 
procurement  division  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  was 
'Samuel  MicRoberts,  vice-president  of  the  National  City 
Bank.  Guy  E.  Tripp,  president  of  the  Westinghouse 
Electric  Company,  was  chief  of  the  production  division  of 
the  same  department.  Mr.  McRoberts  and  Mr.  Tripp, 
like  numerous  others  holding  similar  positions,  were  given 
military  titles  by  the  President. 

Charles  Ml  Schwab,  the  greatest  steel  maker  in  the 
world — and  incidentally,  at  the  same  time,  the  greatest  ship- 
builder— became  director  general  of  the  Emergency  Fleet 
Corporation.  The  position  of  general  manager  of  the  Fleet 
Corporation  was  abolished  in  order  to  give  Schwab  "com- 
plete supervision  and  direction  of  the  work  of  shipbuilding" 
— including  that  going  on  in  his  own  yards.  Edward  N. 
Hurley,  a  millionaire  captain  of  industry,  remained  chair- 
man of  the  Shipping  Board  and  president  of  the  Fleet  Cor- 
poration. 

P.  A.  S.  Franklin,  president  of  the  International  Mercan- 
tile Marine  Company,  was  given  direct  control  of  the  rout- 
ing of  all  merchant  and  passenger  vessels  leaving  Ameri- 
can ports.  John  D.  ^Ryan,  president  of  the  Anaconda  Cop- 
per Company,  the  world's  greatest  copper  producer,  owner 
of  other  copper-producing  corporations,  became  director 


Patriotism  of  the  Profit-Makers       271 

of  aircraft  production,  exercising  powers  analogous  to 
those  of  Schwab  in  the  field  of  ocean  ships. 

D.  C.  Jackling,  another  large  copper  producer,  was  placed 
in  charge  of  the  production  of  T.  N.  T.,  as  well  as  of  con- 
struction of  government  plants  to  increase  the  output  of 
this  explosive. 

Edward  R.  Stettinius,  one  of  the  twelve  Morgan  part- 
ners, became  director  of  purchases  and  supplies  for  the 
War  Department,  superseding  the  War  Industries  Board 
in  the  purchase  of  billions  of  dollars'  worth  of  merchandise. 
Mr.  Stettinius  also  became  a  member  of  the  War  Council, 
and  when  this  body  was  abolished,  he  was  named  an  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  War,  with  the  same  functions  as  be- 
fore. 

Meanwhile,  in  Paris,  Paul  Cravath,  chief  counsel  of 
Schwab's  private  steel  company,  was  sitting  upon  the  Inter- 
allied War  Council,  representative  of  the  American  democ- 
racy. A  little  later  we  find  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  one  of 
the  Morgan  partners,  acting  as  official  representative  of 
the  Treasury  Department  in  the  peace  conferences. 

When  the  British  Foreign  Mission  arrived  in  America 
in  April,  1917,  Mr.  Balfour,  its  leader,  received  President 
Wilson,  held  a  conference  with  J.  P.  Morgan,  and  dined 
with  Mr.  Stettinius,  all  in  the  same  day.  The  incident  is 
symbolic  of  the  merging  of  Wall  Street  and  the  government 
for  war  purposes. 

If  unanimity  for  war,  both  before  and  after,  and  active 
voluntary  service,  without  direct  compensation,  be  the  meas- 
ure of  patriotism,  then  the  enthusiastic  declaration  of  a 
Liberty  Loan  orator,  that  Wall  Street  is  not  only  the  cen- 
tre of  American  finance,  but  is  also  the  fount  of  American 
patriotism,  will  have  to  go  down  in  history  as  gospel  truth. 


XXVIII 

THE  PROFITS  OF  PATRIOTISM 

WHY  the  patriotism  of  Wall  Street? 

Can  Wall  Street,  which  had  never  before  pretended  to 
be  the  home  of  altruism,  which  had  always  acknowledged 
that  its  beginning  and  end  was  profit,  be  readily  accepted 
in  its  war-time  role  of  unselfish  and  resplendent  champion 
of  the  common  good? 

If  it  appears  that  Wall  Street  expected  to  profit  by  our 
war,  did  profit,  and  stands  to  profit  still  more,  what  be- 
comes of  its  professions  of  patriotism? 

It  is  easy  to  understand  how  any  one  expecting  to  make 
money  out  of  war,  with  all  its  horrors,  would  incline  to 
caution  in  admitting  the  fact.  The  opponents  of  war,  all 
along,  had  been  charging  that  Wall  Street  wanted  war  be- 
cause there  would  be  money  in  it  for  Wall  Street.  Never- 
theless, evidence  of  gleeful  anticipation  is  not  lacking. 

An  article  by  B.  C.  Forbes,  printed  in  the  May  number 
of  Hearst's  Magazine  (1917),  and  evidently  written  in 
March,  was  based  on  the  question  put  to  business  leaders: 
"What  will  war  do  to  America)?"  There  were  no  pessi- 
mistic answers.  C.  A.  Stone,  of  the  firm  of  Stone  &  Web- 
ster, president  of  the  American  International  Corporation, 
and  head  of  the  Water  Power  Trust,  said  that  "on  the 
whole,  the  new  turn  of  events  can  be  accepted  with  fortitude 
from  the  strictly  business  point  of  view."  George  M.  Rey- 
nolds, president  of  the  Continental  and  Commercial  Na- 
tional Bank,  pointed  out  that  "it  must  be  remembered  that 
a  rich  nation  at  war,  or  preparing  for  war,  spends  cnor- 

272 


The  Profits  of  Patriotism  273 

mous  sum*  of  money,  and  sets  all  forms  of  industry  in  mo- 
tion." 

Reporting  the  receipt  in  Wall  Street  of  the  news  of  the 
breaking  of  diplomatic  relations,  the  New  York  Times  said, 
February  4: 

In  many  brokerage  offices,  the  assembled  customers  stayed  long 
after  the  half  day's  work  was  done,  discussing  market  and  banking 
prospects  in  a  more  optimistic  frame  of  mind  than  in  many  weeks. 

The  financial  columns  of  the  American,  referring  to  the 
same  incident  (Feb.  19),  said  that  it  had  "converted  some 
of  the  most  obstinate  pessimists  to  the  view  that  better 
times  are  coming  in  the  stock  market."  Looking  forward 
to  war,  the  National  City  Bank  said,  in  its  statement  of 
March  I,  that  "there  is  no  reason  to  anticipate  that  a 
declaration  of  war  would  have  any  effect  upon  the  imme- 
diate business  situation  other  than  that  resulting  from  added 
stimulus."  One  month  later,  this  bank  was  able  to  say 
that  its  prophecy  was  already  beginning  to  be  fulfilled: 
"The  whole  industrial  situation  has  tightened  up,  for  be- 
sides the  capacity  taken  up  by  government  orders,  the  im- 
minence of  government  orders  has  given  a  spur  to  other 
business." 

Once  war  had  been  safely  declared,  we  find  Frank  A. 
Vanderlip,  president  of  the  same  great  financial  institu- 
tion, in  a  patriotic  speech,  May  17,  enthusiastically  proph- 
esying that,  as  a  result  of  the  war,  "a  million  new  springs 
of  wealth  will  be  developed" 

In  registering  pleasant  anticipation,  as  each  new  step  was 
taken  toward  war,  the  voice  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  which 
expresses  the  composite  sentiment  of  the  financial  world, 
was  less  cautious  than  the  voices  of  individual  financiers. 

Said  the  Times,  February  4: 


274  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Stocks  rebounded  sharply  yesterday  on  receipt  of  definite  news 
from  Washington  that  the  break  with  Germany  had  occurred.  .  .  . 
Bethlehem  Steel  rose  30  points,  and  the  new  Bethlehem  B.  shares 
gained  10%  ...  So  eager  were  buyers  for  certain  steel  and  cop- 
per stocks  that  2  points  or  more  frequently  existed  between  a  pur- 
chase price  and  the  next  bid  price. 

Said  the  Tribune,  March  6: 

On  Saturday  it  was  generally  believed  that  the  bill  providing  for 
the  arming  of  merchant  ships  would  be  passed,  and  stocks  gained 
considerably  as  a  result. 

For  the  next  period  we  quote  the  American,  March  12: 

Wall  Street  has  accepted  the  arming  of  ships  and  the  special  ses- 
sion of  Congress  as  the  second  step  along  the  road  that  leads  to  war 
with  Germany,  and  on  that  theory  has  bought  stocks.  .  .  .  Stocks 
have  been  purchased  on  the  theory  that  war  means  a  boom  for  a 
time  .  .  .  Wall  Street  is  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  war  is 
inevitable. 

Finally,  the  war  message  sent  stocks  soaring.  "United 
States  Steel  was  up  2j^  points  on  first  sales.  .  .  .  Beth- 
lehem jumped  up  to  142,  up  i%.  Marine  preferred 
opened  at  86,  up  i%,"  etc. 

Were  these  rosy  anticipations  fulfilled?     They  were. 

To  appreciate  how  much  American  intervention  meant 
to  the  Wall  Street  pocketbook,  one  must  first  realize  the 
unprecedented  state  of  prosperity  at  the  beginning  of  1917, 
as  well  as  the  shaky  conditions  upon  which  it  rested  and 
the  imminence  of  its  decline. 

The  year  1916  had  been  by  far  the  most  prosperous  in 
the  history  of  American  industry  and  finance.  This  pros- 
perity was  directly  due  to  the  European  war.  Between  Au- 
gust, 1914,  and  February,  1917,  more  than  10,500,000,000 


The  Profits  of  Patriotism  275 

dollars'  worth  of  goods  were  shipped  out  of  America,  an 
excess  over  imports  of  five  and  one-half  billion  dollars. 
In  exchange  for  food,  munitions,  and  other  supplies,  sold 
to  the  Entente  countries,  American  capitalists  had  increased 
their  stocks  of  gold  by  nearly  a  billion  dollars,  had  bought 
back  two  billion  dollars'  worth  of  securities  in  American 
railways  and  other  corporations  owned  in  Europe,  and  had 
loaned  something  like  two  billion  dollars  to  the  Entente 
governments  besides.  They  had  also  inherited  a  large 
share  of  the  neutral  trade  of  the  belligerents,  and  out  of 
the  war  gains  had  loaned  several  hundred  millions  to  neu- 
tral countries  in  Latin  America  and  elsewhere. 

But  the  profits  represented  by  such  huge  transactions  were 
only  a  minor  fraction  of  the  immediate  war  profits.  The 
greatest  harvest  was  gathered  in  at  home.  The  demand 
for  supplies  abroad  made  it  possible  to  run  up  domestic 
prices  to  unprecedented  levels.  With  all  the  inflation  of 
foreign  trade,  for  every  dollar's  worth  of  food  and  other 
supplies  sold  abroad,  twenty-five  dollars'  worth  was  sold  at 
home.  The  increase  in  domestic  prices  was  only  partially 
offset  by  increases  in  returns  to  the  farmer  and  in  wages. 
The  American  public  in  peace  was  paying  greater  war  prof- 
its to  Wall  Street  than  were  the  warring  nations  them- 
selves. 

The  total  winnings  in  that  hectic  period,  of  the  few  men 
who  control  the  banking,  the  shipping,  the  manufacturing, 
the  mining,  and  the  transportation  of  the  country  will  prob- 
ably never  be  revealed.  It  was  frequently  stated  that  the 
young  J.  P.  Morgan  made  more  money  in  two  years  than 
the  senior  Morgan  had  made  in  all  the  days  of  his  life. 
There  is  evidence  a-plenty  that,  whatever  the  ultimate  fig- 
ures, the  war  profits  were  such  as  to  drive  their  possessors 
quite  mad  with  the  reality,  and  even  more  with  the  possibil- 
ity of  future  winnings. 


276  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

But  there  were  certain  flaws  in  this  happy  situation.  In 
the  first  place,  it  could  not  go  on  indefinitely.  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  a  part  of  what  had  been  gained  was  not  yet 
wholly  secure. 

The  war  profits  could  not  go  on  indefinitely,  first,  be- 
cause the  war  could  not  go  on  indefinitely.  And  by  the 
beginning  of  1917,  it  was  evident  that  the  war  profits  could 
not  go  on  even  if  the  war  went  on — in  the  same  way  in 
which  the  war  was  then  going;  also  that  a  great  part  of 
what  had  been  gained  might  be  lost. 

When  the  war  trade  was  in  its  first  phases,  Wall  Street 
was  afraid  of  nothing  more  terrible  than  the  cessation  of 
the  conflict.  When  the  German  government  first  began 
making  peace  overtures,  before  the  end  of  1915,  American 
munitions  shares  fell  from  5  to  40  per  cent.  This  was 
simply  an  expression  of  a  fear  that  peace  would  put  an 
end  to  the  boom.  Later,  the  periodical  German  overtures 
depressed  the  stock  market  in  each  case  in  proportion  to 
the  probability  that  such  overtures  would  bring  results. 
As  late  as  December,  1916,  the  peace  parleys  sent  Ameri- 
can stocks  down  15  to  20  per  cent.  But  by  the  beginning 
of  1917,  Wall  Street  had  come  to  fear,  even  more  than 
the  cessation  of  the  conflict,  the  continuation  of  the  war  to 
an  indecisive  end. 

Wall  Street  would  have  been  still  more  afraid  of  a  Ger- 
man victory,  had  a  decisive  German  victory  been  at  any 
time  within  the  realm  of  probability.  But  Wall  Street  was 
really  never  afraid  of  a  German  victory.1  Nevertheless, 
the  beginning  of  1917  found  Wall  Street  facing  a  crisis. 

That  crisis  was  due  to  the  approaching  exhaustion  of 
Entente  credit  in  America,  coupled  with  the  inability  of  the 

1  We  have  the  word  of  Alexander  Dana  Noyes,  financial  editor  of  the 
New  York  Times,  in  "Financial  Chapters  of  the  War,"  that  Wall  Street 
picked  the  Entente  Allies  to  win  at  the  beginning,  and  never  wavered  from 
this  judgment  during  those  early  years. 


The  Profits  of  Patriotism  277 

Entente  to  deliver  the  knockout  blow.  The  war  trade  was 
based  on  gold  imports,  security  purchases,  and  credits.  As 
the  supply  of  gold  and  securities  was  drawn  upon,  the  trade 
came  to  depend  more  and  more  upon  credit.  Some  of  the 
vast  loans  which  Wall  Street  made  to  the  Entente,  to  keep 
up  the  war  trade,  were  secured,  in  part,  by  collateral  which 
might  not  be  greatly  affected  by  the  outcpme  of  the  war, 
such  as  American  securities.  But  a  fraction  of  the  collat- 
eral, such  as  British  securities,  depended  for  its  value  upon 
the  future  stability  of  the  British  Empire.  Some  of  the 
loans,  indeed,  were  wholly  unsecured,  and  the  repayment 
rested  solely  upon  the  continued  solvency  of  the  Entente 
governments.  Of  this  class  were  the  original  loan  of 
$500,000,000,  known  as  the  Anglo-French  loan,  and  the 
loans  to  French  municipalities. 

When  Henry  P.  Davison  returned  from  abroad  about  the 
first  of  November,  1916,  he  had  announced  that  the  next 
Allied  loan  would  have  to  be  unsecured.  But  American 
bankers  were  already  so  overloaded  with  Allied  loans,  un- 
secured or  inadequately  secured,  that  they  were  loth  to 
take  more. 

In  December,  a  marked  decline  in  actual  Entente  pur- 
chases was  reported.  In  the  same  month,  England  an- 
nounced its  decision  to  manufacture  all  its  own  shells  as 
soon  as  existing  contracts  in  America  should  expire.  This 
would  hit  all  the  great  steel  and  munitions  companies.  The 
decision  was  declared  to  be  due  to  enlargement  of  Entente 
manufacturing  facilities,  but  it  is  probable  that  the  ability  of 
England  and  France  to  fill  their  own  munitions  needs  was 
purposely  exaggerated,  as  a  maneuver  to  persuade  America 
to  go  on  accepting  their  depreciated  credit.  In  January,  a 
British  manufacturer  spectacularly  entered  the  American 
field  and  secured  a  contract  to  furnish  shells  for  the  Ameri- 
can navy.  This  was  no  doubt  another  maneuver. 


278  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

That  future  war  orders  depended,  not  upon  enlarged  En- 
tente facilities  but  upon  further  extensions  of  credit,  indeed, 
was  admitted  by  Mr.  Davison  in  a -published  interview, 
November  3  :  "For  a  time  Europe  was  forced  to  place  their 
orders  in  America,  but  now,  unless  they  make-  favorable 
terms,  France  and  England  will  make  their  own  munitions." 
"Favorable  terms"  meant  nothing  more  nor  less  than  inade- 
quately secured  credits,  which  Mr.  Davison  and  Mr.  Mor- 
gan were  finding  more  and  more  trouble  in  placing  among 
their  associates  in  America. 

So,  at  the  beginning  of  1917,  Wall  Street  was  faced  with 
two  contingencies :  first,  the  end  of  the  war  boom — due  to 
the  exhaustion  of  Allied  credit;  second,  the  possible  loss  of 
a  large  part  of  $2,000,000,000  in  loans,  principal  and  in- 
terest— due  to  the  inability  of  the  Entente  to  score  a  deci- 
sive victory. 

While  a  German  victory  was  out  of  the  question — at 
least  so  far  as  England  was  concerned — no  one  could  fore- 
see the  internal  political  results  of  an  indecisive  war,  espe- 
cially if  the  struggle  went  on  for  years  to  economic  as  well 
as  military  exhaustion.  No  one  could  guarantee  that  there 
would  not  be  far-reaching  social  upheavals.  Repudiation 
of  debts  was  always  possible.  Repudiation  aside,  British 
and  French  bonds  would  be  worth  much  less  in  the  event  of 
a  compromise  peace  than  in  the  event  of  victory.  Each 
changing  aspect  of  the  military  situation  already  affected 
the  price  of  these  bonds. 

In  a  word,  not  only  future  war  profits  stood  in  jeopardy, 
but  past  war  profits  also.  Wall  Street  had  bet  its  money 
on  the  Entente  horse.  Wall  Street  had  backed  its  choice  so 
heavily  that  the  interests  of  the  Entente  governments  had 
become  the  interests  of  Wall  Street.  To  the  Wall  Street 
pocketbook,  a  peace  without  victory  was  unthinkable.  And 
it  was  becoming  more  and  more  apparent  that  a  decisive 


The  Profits  of  Patriotism  279 

victory  was  possible  only  by  means  of  American  interven- 
tion on  the  side  of  the  Entente. 

At  the  beginning  of  1917,  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente 
was  the  one  thing  that  would  solve  all  problems.  First, 
it  would  insure  another  long  period  of  war  orders.  Sec- 
ond, it  would  insure  Allied  credit.  Third,  it  might  be 
so  manipulated  as  to  serve  in  the  attainment  of  certain  other 
advantages  of  a  permanent  nature,  toward  which  Wall 
Street  had  been  hungrily  looking.  (See  Chapter  XXXI.) 
Considering  any  of  these  three  advantages,  American  par- 
ticipation in  the  war  against  Germany  would  constitute  the 
most  tremendous  and  profitable  coup  in  the  history  of 
American  finance. 

So  it  came  to  pass.  The  harvest  upon  American  belliger- 
ency began  to  be  gathered,  even  before  the  declaration  of 
war,  in  what  may  be  termed  the  profits  of  expectation. 
The  crisis  found  our  "big  men"  loaded  heavily  with  stocks 
and  profiting  by  the  rise.  Said  the  New  York  Sun's  finan- 
cial column,  April  9: 

Sentiment  among  bankers  is  patriotic  and  it  is  bullish  .  .  .  To 
many  persons,  long  on  stocks,  war  apparently  merely  spells  another 
long  period  of  abnormal  profits  for  our  corporations  .  .  .  The  big 
men  hold  stocks. 

The  declaration  of  war  found  the  "big  men"  long  on 
commodities,  as  well  as  stocks,  and  the  profits  of  expecta- 
tion include  the  returns  from  soaring  prices  of  food  and 
other  articles.  In  May,  wheat  reached  $3.25  a  bushel. 
No  farmer  profited  by  this.  The  American  farmer  had 
long  since  parted  with  the  last  of  his  crop  at  around  $1.30. 
In  August,  cotton  touched  its  highest  mark  for  45  years. 
It  meant  nothing  to  the  grower;  the  middleman  had  long 
since  acquired  his  product.  The  same  is  true  of  other  staples. 


280  Shall  It  Be  Again?, 

The  food  profiteers  of  the  spring  of  1917  were  de- 
nounced as  "food  hogs,"  "sharks,"  "traitors."  An  effort 
was  made  to  create  the  impression  that  only  a  few  irre- 
sponsible, low  persons  had  brought  about  the  situation. 
We  were  told  that  representative  American  business  men 
were  too  patriotic  to  boost  prices  in  the  face  of  war.  But 
such  a  general  rise  in  prices  could  result  only  from 
the  concerted  action  of  the  rich  and  powerful  combina- 
tions which  control  the  distribution  and  price  of  American 
commodities.  Although  wholesalers  and  retailers  took 
profits  where  they  could,  if  the  word  "traitor"  applies  to 
the  parties  responsible  for  the  food  riots  of  1917,  it  must 
fall  first  upon  men  who  were  so  soon  to  become  conspicuous 
government  officials  at  one  dollar  a  year,  or  who  paid  the 
salaries  of  employees  who  acted  as  government  officials. 

After  the  profits  of  expectation,  followed  the  profits  of 
realization.  Allied  credit  was  not  only  insured;  it  was 
guaranteed.  Allied  trade,  which,  in  the  words  of  a  finan- 
cial circular,  had  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  "pinchbeck," 
again  became  "the  genuine  article."  The  boom  was  pro- 
longed. It  became  possible  to  advance  wholesale  prices  in 
April  on  an  average  of  two  per  cent,  over  March,  making 
the  total  since  the  beginning  of  the  European  war  57  per 
j  cent.  This  was  only  a  beginning.  By  the  middle  of  May, 
the  Times  was  able  to  say:  "Business  is  still  feeling  the  mo- 
mentum imparted  by  the  vast  buying  demand  opened  up 
when  the  United  States  declared  war."  This  momentum 
rose,  instead  of  falling — rose  steadily  for  eighteen  months, 
until  the  German  collapse. 

Of  the  profits  of  realization,  the  statements  of  the  great 
corporations  themselves  tell  the  least  of  the  story.  In  its 
efforts  to  dispel  suspicion  that  Wall  Street  provoked  the 
war  for  business  reasons,  the  daily,  weekly  and  monthly 
press  sought  to  lead  the  public  to  believe  that  profits  were 


The  Profits  of  Patriotism  281 

less  in  1917  than  in  1916.  The  approved  method  was  to 
flash  the  figures  of  one  or  two  corporations,  and  to  make  all 
deductions  from  them.  For  reasons  that  have  been  made 
clear,  even  were  all  immediate  profits  of  all  American  cor- 
porations less  in  1917  than  in  1916,  that  would  not  change 
the  fact  that  Wall  Street  greatly  profited  from  American 
belligerency. 

But  the  profits  of  a  very  large  number  of  the  richest  cor- 
porations show  an  increase,  even  by  their  own  statements. 
In  other  cases,  where  net  gains  are  reported  as  less,  it  is 
often  evident  that  the  reported  decrease  is  not  real.  In  its 
report  on  profiteering,  and  in  other  reports,  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  exposed  many  tricks  of  bookkeeping 
resorted  to  by  the  great  corporations  to  conceal  the  extent 
of  their  gains  from  war  contracts.  Costs  were  fictitiously 
enhanced  by  account  juggling.  Officers'  salaries  were  in- 
creased. The  item  of  depreciation  was  padded.  Inter- 
est on  investment  was  included  in  cost.  Fictitious  valuation 
of  raw  material  was  resorted  to.  Inventories  were  manip- 
ulated. 

Such  practices  are  not  flattering  to  the  patriotism  of  our 
great  financiers,  but  they  were  general.  Indeed,  minimiza- 
tion of  profits  is  often  evident  to  the  eye  of  the  casual 
reader,  in  the  abbreviated  reports  of  corporation  state- 
ments as  printed  in  the  newspapers. 

The  earnings  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation  for  1917 
exceeded,  by  many  millions,  the  face  value  of  its  common 
stock,  a  greater  part  of  which  is  water.  The  figures  were 
$528,757,615,  as  against  $333»574»i?8  for  1916.  They 
exceeded  by  $70,000,000  the  combined  earnings  of  the  three 
years  1911,  1912  and  1913.  After  the  deduction  of  in- 
come  and  excess  profits  taxes,  depreciation,  etc.,  the  sum  set 
aside  for  dividends  was  smaller  than  in  1916  by  about 
twenty  per  cent.  But  the  capital  outlay  for  new  plants, 


282  Shall  It  Be  Again?; 

etc.,  was  more  than  double,  while  the  total  cash  in  bank,  in 
demand  loans,  Liberty  Bonds,  Treasury  certificates,  etc., 
was  $44^,369,597,  or  more  than  twice  as  great  as  at  the 
end  of  1916. 

The  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation  likewise  reported  a 
smaller  total,  after  income  and  excess  profit  taxes,  inter- 
est charges,  and  greatly  increased  sums  for  depreciation 
were  set  aside.  But,  as  acknowledged,  the  final  net  in- 
come was  equal  to  $44.20  per  share  on  the  liberally  watered 
common  stock,  after  providing  for  the  preferred  share  div- 
idends. Net  earnings  in  1916  had  been  almost  three  times 
as  great  as  in  1915,  and  at  the  beginning  of  1917  the  com- 
pany had  indulged  in  a  "melon  cutting,"  in  the  form  of  a 
stock  dividend  of  200  per  cent. 

Midvale  Steel  and  Ordnance  Co.,  and  Republic  Iron  and 
Steel  both  acknowledged  net  profits,  after  all  tax  and  other 
deductions,  as  higher  than  in  1916.  In  its  report  on  profit- 
eering, the  Federal  Trade  Commission  gave  a  list  of  ten 
other  steel  companies  whose  1917  profits  ranged  from  52 
to  109  per  cent,  on  the  investment. 

Some  of  the  big  copper  companies  reported  smaller  net 
earnings  in  1917  than  in  1916.  But  the  U.  S.  Geological 
Survey  reported  that  the  1917  production,  although 
38,000,000  les,s  in  pounds,  sold  for  $35,0001,000  more. 
Profits  of  1916  had  greatly  exceeded  all  previous  records. 
The  Anaconda,  Mr.  Ryan's  company,  made  three  times  as 
much  in  1916  as  in  any  previous  year.  In  1917,  after  all 
juggling  was  completed,  the  balance  set  aside  for  dividends 
by  the  American  Smelting  and  Refining,  Daniel  Guggen- 
heim's company,  amounted  to  twenty-two  and  one-half  per 
cent,  of  the  common  stock.  After  setting  aside  large  sums 
for  alterations,  replacements,  taxes,  and  other  items,  Utah 
Copper,  Mr.  Jackling's  company,  reported  a  balance  for 
dividends  of  $28,695,495. 


The  Profits  of  Patriotism  283 

The  American  Sugar  Refining  Company  reported  1917  as 
the  best  year  in  its  history.  The  Big  Five  packing  com- 
panies confessed  to  greater  returns  in  1917  than  ever  be- 
fore. In  1916  they  netted  $60,759,000,  more  than  three 
times  as  much  as  in  1913.  But  in  1917,  after  all  tax  de- 
ductions, they  netted  $95,639,000,  or  nearly  60  per  cent, 
more  than  in  1916.  Morris  &  Co.'s  net  profits  were  267.7 
per  cent,  of  capital  stock.  Armour's  would  have  been 
135.5  Per  cent,  were  it  not  for  a  400  per  cent,  stock  divi- 
dend declared  that  year. 

The  Federal  Trade  Commission  found  that  48  leading 
lumber  companies  in  the  southern  states  netted  more  than 
three  times  as  much  in  1917  as  in  1916. 

In  six  years  ending  May,  1917,  Standard  Oil  firms  distrib- 
uted dividends  in  excess  of  six  times  the  par  value  of  their  - 
capital  stock,  or  $629,000,000.     But  Standard  Oil  profits 
continued  to  increase  through  1917. 

After  war  tax  deductions,  the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Com- 
pany reported  net  profits  500  per  cent,  greater  than  in 
1916;  the  American  Locomotive  Company,  30  per  cent, 
greater;  the  American  Woolen  Company  30  per  cent, 
greater;  the  Railway  Steel  Spring  Company,  175  per  cent.  , 
greater;  the  American  Can  Company,  70  per  cent,  greater; 
Lackawanna  Steel,  30  per  cent,  greater;  U.  S.  Industrial 
Alcohol,  150  per  cent,  greater.  The  Corn  Products  Re- 
fining Company,  another  Standard  Oil  subsidiary,  which 
had  been  running  along  happily  on  about  $3,400,000  a  year 
net,  gathered  in  $16,852,793  in  1917,  about  250  per  cent, 
more  than  the  previous  year. 

Between  May  i  and  June  20,  1917,  the  resources  of  the 
fifty  National  Banks  in  New  York  City  increased 
$98,341,499.  Between  February  28  and  June  20,  of  the 
same  year,  the  resources  of  the  trust  companies  of  New 
York  State  increased  more  than  three  billion  dollars.  The 


284  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

earnings  of  the  National  Banks  of  the  country  for  the  fiscal 
year  were  reported  as  $667,406,000,  the  greatest  in  their 
history,  and  13^  per  cent,  greater  than  in  the  previous 
year.  Net  earnings  on  capital  stock  figured  out  as  18  per 
cent. 

In  1915,  a  new  high  record  in  foreign  trade  had  been 
established.  In  1916  another  high  record  had  been  estab- 
lished. But  the  figures  of  1917  exceeded  those  of  1916  by 
$1,225,000,000. 

These  few  figures  will  hardly  convey  an  adequate  con- 
ception of  the  immediate  advantages  accruing  to  Wall 
Street  from  American  participation  in  the  European  war. 
They  are  set  down  only  that  there  may  be  no  doubt  that 
there  were  great  gains.  Either  the  reports  of  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  or  of  the  corporations  themselves  are 
sufficient  proof  of  this,  though  they  tell  only  a  part  of  the 
story.  Finally,  the  profits  from  financial  transactions,  as 
distinct  from  industrial,  were  greatest  of  all,  and  these  were 
most  successfully  hidden.  Even  the  figures  of  the  U.  S. 
Treasury  Department  (given  to  the  public  Apr.  18,  1920) 
show,  in  spite  of  all  concealments  and  evasions,  that  the 
war  created  21,000  new  American  millionaires,  and  that, 
during  the  war  period,  69,000  men  made  more  than  three 
billion  dollars  over  and  above  their  normal  income. 


XXIX 

PROFIT-SEEKER    AND    PROFIT-SERVER 

IT  was  universally  assumed  during  the  fighting,  and  count- 
less times  asserted,  that  it  was  the  policy  of  the  War  Ad- 
ministration not  merely  that  big  business  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  make  money  out  of  the  tragedy  of  war,  but  that 
it  should  be  required  to  feel  the  burden  equally  with  the 
common  people.  This  idea  no  doubt  received  its  impetus 
from  a  pronouncement  on  the  incompatibility  of  war  prof- 
its and  patriotism  found  in  President  Wilson's  "Appeal 
to  the  Business  Interests,"  July  n,  1917: 

Patriotism  leaves  profits  out  of  the  question.  In  these  days  .  .  . 
when  we  are  sending  hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  young  men  across 
the  seas  ...  no  true  patriot  will  permit  himself  to  take  toll  of  their 
heroism  in  money  or  seek  to  grow  rich  by  the  shedding  of  their  blood. 

How,  then,  did  it  come  about  that  Wall  Street  profits 
walked  so  pleasantly  hand  in  hand  with  Wall  Street  patriot- 
ism? 

In  the  appeal  of  July  n,  the  President  also  set  forth  the 
actual  course  he  intended  to  pursue,  in  the  following  words: 

A  just  price  must,  of  course,  be  paid  for  everything  the  government 
buys.  By  a  just  price  I  mean  a  price  which  will  sustain  the  indus- 
tries concerned  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  provide  a  living  for  those 
who  conduct  them,  enable  them  to  pay  good  wages,  and  make  possible 
the  expansion  of  their  enterprises. 

This  statement  of  policy  is,  on  its  face,  open  to  several 
interpretations.  It  might  be  interpreted  as  licensing  our 
financial  patriots  to  indulge  in  a  profit  orgy  unparalleled  in 

285 


286  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  annals  of  civilization.  Whether  or  not  it  was  so  inter- 
preted by  our  War  Administration  and  our  financiers  must 
be  determined  by  the  actual  application  of  the  policy.  As 
has  already  been  seen,  the  system  of  cooperation  between 
government  and  business  was  one  perfectly  calculated  to 
produce  the  highest  possible  profits  consistent  with  safety 
and  success. 

Our  great  financiers,  having  advised,  urged,  and  pro- 
moted the  war,  now  advised  as  to  its  policies,  directed,  exe- 
cuted. The  government  accepted  their  advice,  commis- 
sioned them  to  act,  backed  them  with  its  authority — and 
footed  the  bills.  Is  it  a  coincidence  that  the  result  was 
extremely  pleasing  from  a  strictly  financial  point  of  view? 

On  the  first  of  April,  1917,  nothing  could  have  been 
more  financially  delightful  to  our  international  bankers 
than  that  America  not  only  should  declare  war  against  Ger- 
many, and  so  greatly  strengthen  Allied  credit,  but  that  the 
government  should  absolutely  guarantee  that  credit  with  its 
own  treasure. 

We  find  the  President  emphasizing  this  very  proposal  in 
the  war  message. 

The  Bond  Issue  Bill,  rushed  from  the  White  House  to 
the  Capitol,  authorized  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to 
purchase  from  the  Entente  governments  three  billion  dol- 
lars' worth  of  paper  promises  to  pay.  It  was  brought  out 
in  the  Congressional  debates  that  this  alone  meant  an  item 
of  $60,000,000  in  commissions  to  one  banking  firm — owing 
to  a  contract  under  which  the  Entente  governments  agreed 
to  pay,  as  a  commission,  two  per  cent,  of  all  loans  floated  in 
America,  whether  negotiated  through  that  firm  or  not. 

Second,  a  condition  of  the  loan  was  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  should  purchase  the  Allied  paper, 
not  at  its  market  value,  but  at  par.  This  was  several  per 
cent,  more  than  Wall  Street  had  ever  paid  for  the  best  se- 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        287 

cured  Allied  paper.  It  not  only  made  Wall  Street  paper 
good,  but  it  immediately  gave  that  paper  a  higher  value 
than  it  had  ever  had  before. 

The  difference  between  what  the  United  States  govern- 
ment paid  for  Allied  government  bonds  and  the  market 
rate  previously  prevailing,  represented  a  clear  gift,  total- 
ing  many  millions.  This  gift  went  to  the  Allied  govern- 
ments, on  future  purchases  only.  On  all  outstanding  obli- 
gations, it  was  a  direct  gift  to  the  holders  of  Allied  credit 
paper — meaning  our  great  banking  and  munitions  firms. 

The  day  following  the  war  message,  Anglo-French  bonds, 
which  had  been  rising  in  anticipation  of  war,  jumped  two 
points  on  the  Stock  Exchange,  which  meant  a  gain  of 
$10,000,000  in  a  single  day  to  the  holders  of  these  bonds. 
All  other  Allied  paper  registered  advances.  On  the  floor 
of  Congress,  April  13,  1917,  it  was  brought  out  that  the 
market  value  of  one  thousand  ruble  Russian  bonds  was 
$273,  and  that  in  paying  $510,  the  par  value,  the  govern- 
ment would  make  a  donation  of  $237,  giving  almost  two 
dollars  for  one. 

Still  another  condition  of  the  Allied  loans  was  that  the 
money  should  be  expended  in  America,  which  simply  meant 
that  it  should  be  used  to  liquidate  the  debts  owed  our  inter- 
national bankers  and  our  captains  of  industry,  and  to  trans- 
act future  business  with  them. 

As  a  result  of  the  President's  proposal  to  guarantee  Al- 
lied credit,  the  Bank  of  England  was  able  immediately  to 
reduce  its  discount  rate,  which  had  become  an  obstacle  to 
business  in  this  country.  The  three  billion  dollar  fund  it- 
self— like  the  billions  later  appropriated  for  the  same  pur- 
pose— was  not  shipped  to  Europe,  any  part  of  it,  but  was 
deposited  in  installments  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  to  the 
credit  of  the  Allied  governments,  red-tape  being  cut  to  get 
the  first  installments  there  in  a  hurry.  Allied  agents  then 


288,  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

drew  checks  upon  it,  and  turned  the  checks  directly  over  to 
the  corporations  of  Mr.  Schwab,  Mr.  Ryan,  Judge  Gary, 
Mr.  Davison,  Mr.  Stettinius,  Mr.  Farrell,  Mr.  Vanderlip, 
Mr.  Morgan,  and  other  multimillionaires  who  were  so 
soon  to  figure  as  shining  patriots,  all  of  whom  were  inter- 
ested in  Allied  trade  and  involved  in  Allied  credit  opera- 
tions. 

In  order  to  loan  billions  of  dollars  to  the  Entente  govern- 
ments, it  was  necessary  to  procure  the  money  from  the 
American  public,  and  this  was  done  through  the  so-called 
Liberty  Loans,  which  were  also  the  source  of  the  major 
share  of  the  money  that  the  government  itself  spent  with 
Morgan  and  his  associates. 

While  acting  as  England's  financial  and  munitions  repre- 
sentative in  America,  J.  P.  Morgan  also  sat  upon  the  advi- 
sory council  of  our  Federal  Reserve  banking  system.  At 
che  same  time  he  was  playing  a  third  role  of  private  busi- 
ness man,  banker,  munitions  maker,  railroad  director,  coal 
baron,  etc.  etc.  The  reader  may  conjecture  for  himself 
in  which  of  these  capacities  it  was  that  America's  leading 
financier  advised  the  Liberty  Loan  issues  and  the  conditions 
thereof. 

Three  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  following  a  con- 
ference with  Secretary  McAdoo  in  Washington,  we  were 
told  that  "Mr.  Morgan  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  plan 
to  issue  $5,000,000,000  in  bonds,  with  the  understanding 
that  $3,000,000,000  of  the  amount  thus  raised  should  be 
employed  to  buy  war  bonds  of  the  ally  countries."  (New 
York  Times.) 

As  business  men  purely,  our  international  bankers  had 
cause  for  satisfaction  not  only  in  the  features  of  the  Bond 
Issue  Law  relating  to  Allied  credit,  but  in  many  others. 
They  had  cause  for  several  kinds  of  purely  financial  satis- 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        £89 

faction  in  every  Liberty  Loan  dollar  raised  by  the  govern- 
ment.  This  satisfaction  was  not  always  concealed. 
Charles  H.  Sabin,  president  of  the  Guaranty  Trust  Com- 
pany, the  biggest  institution  of  its  class  in  America,  exulted 
as  follows: 

The  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  Liberty  Bonds  will  be  expended  in 
this  country  by  our  government  and  by  the  Allied  governments.  .  .  . 
The  money  will  remain  in  this  country  and  will  not  involve  any  loss 
of  gold  or  any  loss  of  values.  It  is  obvious  that  the  more  money 
that  is  spent  in  this  country,  the  greater  will  be  our  prosperity.  (New 
York  Times,  Sept.  25,  1917.) 

Speaking  the  same  kind  of  satisfaction  for  Wall  Street 
in  general,  L.  L.  Winkleman  &  Co.,  specialists  in  Standard 
Oil,  copper  and  steel  stocks,  and  closely  connected  with 
some  of  the  biggest  mining  and  munitions  firms,  uttered 
the  following  shriek  of  ghoulish  glee  on  the  day  war  was 
declared: 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  at  the  instigation  of  the  President, 
has  asked  for  an  appropriation  for  the  army  and  navy  alone  of  $3,- 
400,000,000,  while  simultaneously,  members  of  the  National  Council 
of  Defense,  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  and  Treasury  officials,  give 
assurance  that  $2,000,000,000  at  an  interest  rate  not  to  exceed  three 
and  one-half  per  cent,  will  be  almost  immediately  available.  This 
and  many  multiples  more  of  wealth  will  find  its  way  continuously 
and  unsparingly  into  all  the  units  of  the  country's  many-sided  indus- 
tries. Any  one  viewing  this  formidable  array  of  strength  would  be 
a  pitiable  pessimist  indeed  if  he  looked  to  the  future  with  any  feeling 
of  trepidation  or  foreboding. 

If  the  record  of  the  country's  coming  achievements  carries  a 
tinge  of  scarlet,  the  golden  lustre  will  be  undimmed.  (Financial 
Circular.) 

The  New  York  Times,  a  first  class  barometer  of  big 
business  sentiment,  remarked  editorially:  uThe  loan  is  a 
means  of  making  patriotism  profitable."  (May  4,  1917.) 


290  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

And  again:  "The  Liberty  Loan  is  not  only  a  means  of  mak- 
ing democracy  safe.  It  is  a  means  of  benefiting  the  money 
market."  (May  17) 

In  the  early  days  of  the  first  bond  drive,  Mr.  McAdoo 
announced  that  "to  avoid  any  disturbance  of  the  money 
market,"  the  government  would  not  take  away  from  the 
banks  the  sums  subscribed  by  them  or  obtained  from  their 
customers,  but  would  place  such  sums  on  deposit  in  the  re- 
spective banks  to  the  credit  of  the  United  States. 

Still  another  source  of  Wall  Street  satisfaction  in  the 
Bond  Issue  Law  was  the  tax  exemption  feature.  Said  the 
New  York  Times  financial  editor: 

The  war-financing  bill  to  authorize  a  total  issue  of  $5,000,000,000 
of  bonds  and  $2,000,000,000  of  Treasury  certificates  met  with  instant 
approval  throughout  the  financial  district.  .  .  .  Lawyers  familiar  with 
such  matters  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  conditions  of  issue  and 
redemption  were  not  such  as  to  attract  men  of  small  means.  They 
were  termed  rich  men's  bonds,  because  the  bonds  would  be  exempt 
from  the  income  tax  and  the  amount  invested  in  them  need  not  be 
reported.  (Apr.  12) 

Our  multimillionaires  went  about  the  country  telling 
what  a  sound  and  profitable  investment  the  bonds  were  for 
anyone.  The  fact  was  not  always  hidden  that  the  terms 
were  especially  calculated  to  please  these  particular  patriots. 
Daniel  Guggenheim  confessed:  "For  millionaires  they 
[Liberty  Bonds]  are  an  exceptional  opportunity."  (New 
York  Times,  Jan.  7,  1918.) 

Comparing  the  advantages  to  rich  and  poor,  the  financial 
writer,  Albert  W.  Atwood,  explained : 

The  first  Liberty  Loan  paid  only  three  and  one-half  per  cent,  in- 
terest, but  it  was  made  free  from  all  taxes,  including  the  enormous 
super-toll  on  large  incomes.  Thus  it  would  come  about  that  a  very 
rich  man  .  .  .  would  be  receiving  the  equivalent  of  perhaps  ten  per 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        291 

cent,  on  an  investment  that  pays  the  poor  hardly  more  than  one  third 
as  much.      (Saturday  Evening  Post,  Oct.  13,  1917.) 

The  expenditure  of  the  proceeds  of  the  Liberty  Loans 
gave  cause  for  even  deeper  thrills  of  satisfaction  to  our 
business  leaders.  We  have  already  had  a  glimpse  of  the 
methods  of  disbursing  these  billions,  and  an  inkling  of  the 
profit-taking  that  resulted.  A  correct  appreciation  of  both 
the  generosity  of  the  War  Administration  and  the  patrio- 
tism of  Wall  Street  requires  that  we  have  another  glimpse. 

Glance  again  at  steel. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  recall  the  frenzied  profit-taking  of 
1915  and  1916.  From  pre-war  values  Bethlehem  stock 
mounted  more  than  twelve  hundred  per  cent,  in  a  little 
over  a  year.  Nevertheless,  America's  appearance  in  the 
role  of  champion  of  world  democracy  was  a  signal  for  a 
higher  boost  in  prices.  By  June,  iron  prices  were  above 
those  of  Civil  War  times.  There  was  no  expectation  of 
placing  large  contracts  at  the  highest  figures  reached  on 
paper,  but  these  paper  prices  served  a  wonderful  purpose; 
when  reduced  slightly,  patriotism  could  be  claimed  as  the 
motive.  Government  and  operators  promptly  and  conven- 
iently forgot  the  promises  of  the  latter  to  forego  war  prof- 
its. The  prices,  when  fixed  by  the  government,  evoked  nu- 
merous expressions  of  pleasure.  The  Iron  &  Steel  Insti- 
tute met  at  Pittsburgh.  After  expressing  satisfaction  with 
the  price  of  steel,  the  assemblage  sang  ('The  Star  Spangled 
Banner."  Judge  Gary,  chairman,  made  a  speech: 

We  have  no  reason  to  complain  of  the  action  and  attitude  of  the 
government.  To  win  the  war  the  government  must  have  steel  and 
more  steel.  There  is  no  room  for  disloyalty  in  America.  (New 
York  Times,  Oct.  27.) 

Notwithstanding  the  satisfaction  of  the  steel  operators, 


292  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  government  raised  the  price  of  steel  from  time  to  time. 
In  due  course  we  find  Judge  Gary  expressing  further  satis- 
faction. Here  is  an  excerpt  from  his  report  at  the  annual 
meeting  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation: 

It  is  fortunate  that  the  government  has  fixed  prices  which  permit 
us  to  make  fair  profits  and  pay  large  dividends.  We  feel  that  we  are 
living  up  to  the  policy  outlined  by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
when  he  said  that  prices  should  be  large  enough  to  pay  living  wages 
to  the  workers,  fair  salaries  to  officials,  and  provide  for  necessary 
plant  additions  for  war  work.  (Apr.  18,  1918.) 

Two  days  after  the  armistice  was  signed,  the  War  In- 
dustries Board  met  with  the  general  committee  of  the 
Iron  &  Steel  Institute.  Among  those  representing  the  lat- 
ter, were  Judge  Gary,  Mr.  Farrell,  and  Mr.  Grace,  act- 
ing head  of  the  Schwab  corporations.  Among  those  repre- 
senting the  former,  were  associates  and  underlings  of  Gary, 
Farrell,  and  Grace  in  the  steel  industry.  Mr.  Gary,  Mr. 
Farrell,  and  Mr.  Grace  were  so  satisfied  with  the  "govern- 
mental supervision"  of  their  business  that  they  urged  its 
continuation  "for  the  present"  as  "highly  desirable."  (Of- 
ficial Report  of  Mr.  Baruch,  Nov.  14.) 

Glance  again  at  copper. 

In  March,  1917,  the  big  producers,  represented  by  Mr. 
Ryan  and  Mr.  Guggenheim,  agreed  to  furnish  45,510,000 
pounds  of  copper  during  the  next  twelve  months  to  the  gov- 
ernment for  1 6%  cents  a  pound.  This  figure,  they  said, 
was  the  average  selling  price  of  their  product  during  the 
previous  ten  years,  although  elsewhere  it  was  asserted  that 
the  figure  was  nearer  twelve  cents.  But,  however  this  may 
be,  some  of  America's  largest  fortunes  were  built  upon  cop- 
per. In  a  report  to  its  stockholders,  quoted  by  Champ 
Clark  (Congressional  Record,  May  24,  1917),  the  Utah 
Copper  Company,  of  which  Daniel  C.  Jackling  was  manag- 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        293 

ing  director,  had  recently  declared  that  it  could  put  copper 
free  on  board  cars  for  5%  cents  per  pound. 

But  Mr.  Baruch,  on  behalf  of  the  government,  chose  to 
heap  fulsome  praise  on  the  copper  magnates  for  their  pa- 
triotism. Ryan,  Jackling,  Guggenheim,  et  al.,  also  received 
unlimited  press  notices  from  the  newspapers.  The  fact 
was  overlooked  that  the  government  could  have  fixed  the 
price  at  16%  cents  in  spite  of  these  gentlemen,  and  that  if 
it  had  wished  to  follow  a  policy  of  taking  the  profit  out  of 
war,  it  would  have  seen  that  the  price  was  far  below  that 
figure. 

We  were  told  that  copper  had  "gone  up"  to  thirty 
cents.  The  truth  is  that  the  copper  operators  had  not  been 
selling  copper  at  thirty  cents.  They  simply  put  the  price 
up  on  paper,  then  to  pose  as  shining  patriots  for  "agree- 
ing" to  a  reduction. 

Furthermore,  the  copper  magnates  did  not  fulfill  their 
contract  to  furnish  the  government  at  the  "patriotic  price" 
—nor  did  the  government  attempt  to  hold  them  to  it. 
Thirty  thousand  pounds,  not  forty-five  million,  were  re- 
ported as  having  been  actually  delivered  at  16%  cents. 
Then,  "by  agreement,"  the  price  was  fixed  at  23%  cents. 

On  receipt  of  the  news,  copper  stocks  soared.  Mr.  Ryan 
announced: 

All  the  producers  are  satisfied.  The  price  is  fair  and  should  be 
good  both  for  the  producers  and  the  country.  (New  York  Times, 
Sept.  25,  1917.) 

How  good  it  was  for  the  producers  was  pointed  out  by 
the  Times,  in  its  review  of  the  effects  of  the  government 
policy  upon  business  for  the  year  1917  : 

The  past  year  was  prosperous  for  the  copper  miners  [producers]. 
They  kept  their  mines  operating  to  capacity  and  enjoyed  the  highest 
prices  for  the  metal  which  have  ruled  for  50  years.  .  .  .  The  United 


294  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

States  and  Great  Britain  fixed  the  price  of  copper  at  23^  cents  a 
pound,  in  order  to  prevent  a  runaway  market.  This  measure  has 
greatly  benefited  copper  miners.  Had  the  price  not  been  fixed,  there 
would  have  been  price  fluctuations,  which  would  have  led  to  irreg- 
ular demands  for  the  metal.  The  average  production  cost  before 
the  war  was  around  eight  cents  a  pound.  Some  mines  produced  at 
around  5-J  cents.  The  cost  now  is  about  ten  cents,  with  many  of 
the  larger  mines  producing  at  7j  cents.  (Jan.  6,  1918.) 

From  which  it  appears  that  the  government  was  giving 
to  Mr.  Ryan,  Mr.  Jackling,  Mr.  Guggenheim,  Mr.  Rocke- 
feller, Mr.  Morgan,  Mr.  Bedford,  Mr.  Dodge,  and  others 
interested  in  copper,  three  perfectly  good  Liberty  Loan 
dollars  for  every  dollar's  worth  of  goods  passed  over  the 
counter. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  middle  of  1918,  the  government 
price  for  copper  was  raised  to  26  cents  a  pound. 

Glance  again  at  railroads. 

When  war  was  declared,  the  physical  condition  of  the 
railroads  was  at  its  worst.  The  service  both  in  freight  and 
passenger  traffic  had  become  a  national  scandal.  Unable 
decently  to  meet  the  requirements  of  peace,  the  great  trans- 
portation  systems  practically  collapsed  in  the  face  of  the 
war  emergency.  The  coal  famine,  at  the  end  of  1917, 
which  caused  the  loss  of  so  many  millions  in  wages  and  re- 
turns to  capital,  as  well  as  so  much  actual  suffering,  was  due 
chiefly  to  the  railroad  breakdown.  High  prices  of  stock 
feed,  resulting  in  great  losses  to  farmers,  high  living  costs, 
and  many  other  unfortunate  circumstances,  were  attributed, 
in  part,  to  the  same  cause. 

For  their  delinquency  the  companies  pleaded  lack  of 
money,  and  attempted  to  lay  the  blame  upon  the  nation, 
for  not  having  responded  to  their  frantic  appeals  for  higher 
rates.  As  a  matter  of  record,  the  rates  had  been  several 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        295 

times  raised  under  the  Wilson  regime,  and,  according  to 
their  own  figures,  in  1915  and  1916  the  companies  had  col- 
lected higher  earnings  and  netted  greater  profits  than  ever 
before.  From  the  income  of  1916,  the  railroads  had  dis- 
bursed more  in  dividends  than  in  any  previous  year,  besides 
financing  the  most  expensive  campaign  of  "public  educa- 
tion" ever  undertaken  by  a  business  coalition  in  American 
history.  At  the  same  time,  their  poverty  was  so  terrible 
that  they  could  afford  hardly  a  dollar  for  repairs  and  im- 
provements 1 

The  explanation  of  the  railroad  spokesmen  themselves 
was  that  dividends  had  to  be  paid,  improvements  or  no  im- 
provements, that  improvements  could  only  be  financed  with 
new  stock  and  bond  issues,  and  that,  owing  to  the  gorgeous 
returns  from  munitions  making,  "investors"  were  unwill- 
ing to  put  their  money  in  railroad  issues,  and  would  remain 
unwilling  until  such  a  time  as  railroading  became  as  profita- 
ble as  catering  to  the  war  monster. 

So,  in  effect,  the  public  was  asked  to  pay  a  fine  of  a  bil- 
lion or  more  a  year  to  the  railroads  because  the  munitions 
business  was  making  money.  This  wonderful  scheme  had 
already  been  put  into  operation  in  other  lines  in  which  it 
was  not  necessary  to  ask  government  permission  before 
boosting  prices. 

The  "problem"  of  the  railroads  could  have  been  solved 
by  a  government  policy  that  would  have  taken  excessive 
profits  out  of  the  war  trade.  But  nobody  thought  of  that. 
In  any  event,  the  problem  was  not  one  that  had  to  be  solved 
by  higher  rates.  For  the  men  who  owned  the  controlling 
interest  in  the  great  transportation  systems  were  the  same 
men  who  owned  the  munitions  business.  These  men  had 
been  making  more  money  than  ever  before  in  their  lives. 
They  were  at  that  very  time  conducting  a  vigorous  campaign 
for  preparedness,  pressing  upon  the  government  for  a  more 


296  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

uncompromising  attitude  toward  Germany.  They  were 
aware  that,  with  their  approval  and  at  their  instigation, 
America  was  moving  toward  war.  They  knew  that  their 
railroads  would  be  a  vital  factor  in  the  prompt  and  efficient 
prosecution  of  the  war  when  it  came.  But  instead  of  put- 
ting their  properties  in  a  condition  to  meet  the  emergency, 
they  brought  them  to  the  verge  of  collapse  in  a  deliberate 
effort  to  coerce  the  country  into  consenting  to  a  raise  in 
rates. 

Very  well,  the  situation  in  1917  had  to  be  met  by  govern- 
ment control.  But,  instead  of  conscripting  a  part  of  the 
bloated  fortunes  of  the  railroad  magnates,  or  taking  divi- 
dends to  pay  for  improvements  that  had  to  be  made,  the 
War  Administration  gave  to  the  corporations  everything 
that  they  had  ever  had  the  temerity  to  ask  for — and  a  great 
deal  more. 

The  President's  announcement  of  policy  in  taking  over 
the  railroads  is  a  reaffirmation  and  amplification  of  the 
original  announcement  of  his  war  policy  toward  business. 
After  a  few  well  chosen  words  expressing  solicitude  for  rail- 
road earnings,  declaring  that  the  roads  should  not  be  re- 
quired to  suffer  from  war  conditions,  even  acknowledging 
that  a  primary  object  in  taking  over  the  roads  was  to  pro- 
vide them  with  more  money,  the  President  uttered  the  fol- 
lowing definite  assurances: 

Investors  in  railway  securities  may  rest  assured  that  their  rights 
and  interests  will  be  as  scrupulously  looked  after  by  the  government 
as  they  could  be  by  the  directors  of  the  several  railway  systems. 

Immediately  upon  the  reassembling  of  Congress,  I  shall  recommend 
that  these  definite  guarantees  be  given: 

First,  of  course,  that  the  railway  properties  will  be  maintained 
during  the  period  of  Federal  control  in  as  good  repair  and  as  complete 
equipment  as  when  taken  over  by  the  government,  and 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        297 

Second,  that  the  roads  shall  receive  a  net  operating  income  equal 
in  each  case  to  the  average  net  income  of  the  three  years  preceding 
June  30,  1917. 

The  President  specified  the  three  years  ending  June  30, 
instead  of  the  three  years  ending  December  31.  Earnings 
had  declined  since  June  30.  The  three  years  selected  were 
the  most  prosperous  thirty-six  consecutive  months  in  rail- 
road history. 

Ten  days  later  the  President  pleaded  the  cause  of  the 
railroad  kings  to  Congress,  declaring: 

One  of  the  strong  arguments  for  assuming  control  of  the  railroads 
at  this  time  is  the  financial  argument.  ...  It  is  an  obligation  of 
public  conscience  and  of  public  honor,  that  the  private  interests  we 
disturb  should  be  kept  safe  from  unjust  injury. 

The  President's  recommendations,  as  more  fully  set 
forth  in  the  Administration  Railroad  Bill,  turned  out  to  be 
even  more  generous  than  were  the  President's  promises. 
The  guaranteed  net  income  figured  out  to  be  about 
$945,000,000.  The  law  even  permitted  larger  compensa- 
tion in  "abnormal  cases,"  at  the  discretion  of  the  President. 
Another  favor  was  the  payment  to  the  railroads  concur- 
rently of  their  own  estimates  of  depreciation  of  equipment, 
the  sums  to  be  charged  off  to  operating  expenses.  The 
President  was  authorized  to  raise  rates  at  his  own  discre- 
tion. He  was  also  authorized!  to  permit  the  companies 
to  issue  securities,  and  then  to  purchase  the  same  from  them 
with  the  people's  money.  Half  a  billion  dollars  were  im- 
mediately provided  as  a  "revolving  fund"  out  of  which  to 
make  improvements.  Another  provision  obliged  the  gov- 
ernment to  return  the  roads  to  private  hands  within  a  def- 
inite period  after  the  end  of  the  war. 

How  did  the  railroad  presidents  take  all  this?  They 
took  it — patriotically.  The  interviews  which  appeared  in 


298  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  newspapers  the  day  following  the  President's  proclama- 
tion show  that  they  took  it  as  a  Christmas  present.  The 
present  had,  in  fact,  been  solicited. 

As  to  the  little  matter  of  financial  satisfaction,  the  im- 
mediate effect  upon  the  stock  market  was  set  forth  as  fol- 
lows: 

The  net  recovery  [of  railroad  securities]  after  this  momentous 
event  [the  taking  over  of  the  roads]  ran  from  seven  to  more  than 
twenty  points  among  the  major  railroad  stocks.  .  .  .  The  forward 
leap  of  many  railroad  bonds,  along  with  the  stocks,  made  manifest 
the  relief  which  investors  in  railroad  securities  felt  over  the  govern- 
ment's action.  (New  York  Times  financial  review  of  1917,  Jan. 
6,  1918.) 

When  the  year  was  done  the  report  was: 

After  an  auspicious  beginning,  with  the  railroad  issues  reflecting 
the  relief  occasioned  at  the  end  of  1917  by  the  government's  assump- 
tion of  transportation  control,  the  price  trend  was  consistently  up- 
ward through  the  year,  with  the  railroad  shares  providing  a  strength 
and  a  backbone  of  sufficient  rigidity  for  the  majority  of  the  industrial 
issues  to  move  higher  on  a  restricted  volume  of  business.  (New 
York  Times,  Jan.  5,  1919.) 

Glance  again  at  shipbuilding. 

Space  does  not  permit  mention  of  the  many  scandals,  of 
great  and  small  degree,  that  marked  the  Administration 
shipbuilding  programme.  For  the  financial  compensations 
of  shipbuilding  for  patriotic  purposes,  Hog  Island  alone 
furnishes  sufficient  illumination. 

The  Hog  Island  contract  was  obtained  by  the  American 
International  Corporation.  A  majority  of  the  stock  of 
this  concern  is  owned  by  stockholders  of  the  National  City 
Bank,  who,  by  stock  ownership  or  control,  or  affiliation  with 
other  banks,  exert  a  dominating  influence  upon  every  great 
field  of  business  enterprise  in  America.  Our  richest  and 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        299 

most  conspicuous  "super-patriots"  are  discovered  to  be  the 
very  same  who  divided  the  Hog  Island  proceeds  among 
themselves. 

The  whole  truth  of  the  Hog  Island  steal  will  probably 
never  be  known.  The  most  astonishing  stories  have  been 
told  by  apparently  reputable  persons.  A  public  inquiry, 
begun  in  February,  1918,  by  the  Senate  Committee  on  Com- 
merce, was  opposed  and  finally  throttled  by  the  President, 
who  substituted  a  private  investigation  by  the  Attorney- 
General.  The  statements  herein  are  based  upon  the  abor- 
tive Senate  hearing,  and  to  a  lesser  degree,  upon  the 
brief  "whitewashing"  report  of  the  Attorney-General  to 
the  President. 

The  Hog  Island  contract  was  let  by  the  Emergency 
Fleet  Corporation,  September  13,  1917.  It  required  the 
government  to  furnish  every  dollar  of  expense,  including 
salaries,  office  expenses,  and  every  other  outlay  appertain- 
ing to  the  job — and  every  risk — except  that  required  to 
purchase  the  land,  which  was  to  be  used  at  an  annual  rental 
of  six  per  cent,  of  the  alleged  cost,  with  the  privilege  of 
subsequent  purchase  by  the  government.  The  company 
was  to  build  shipyards  and  ships  with  the  people's  money. 
Estimates  of  costs,  figured  by  Stone  &  Webster,  America's 
greatest  engineering  firm,  and  interlocked  with  the  Ameri- 
can International  Corporation,  were  made  and  entered  in 
the  contracts,  but  no  limit  to  costs  was  set.  Compensa- 
tion nominated  in  the  bond  was  not  patriotism,  but  a  per- 
centage of  the  money  expended.  Compensation  was  fixed 
at  five  per  cent,  of  cost. 

Stone  &  Webster's  original  estimate  of  the  cost  of 
the  yard  was  $19,000,000.  This  was  soon  raised  to 
$2 1 ,000,000.  A  little  later  it  was  $27,000,000.  By  March, 
1918,  it  was  between  $35,000,000  and  $40,000,000.  In 
December,  the  yard  was  not  yet  completed.  Fifty-eight 


300  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

million  dollars  of  the  people's  money  had  been  spent  on 
it,  and  (Dec.  18)  general-manager  Piez  of  the  Fleet  Cor- 
poration estimated  that  the  cost  would  reach  $63,500,000. 
It  went  far  higher  than  that. 

•Contracts  were  let  for  180  ships.  The  original  estimate 
of  the  cost  of  these  ships  was  $256,000,000.  In  December, 
1918,  Mr.  Piez  admitted  that  the  cost  would  be  as  much 
as  $225  a  ton.  By  the  time  the  armistice  was  signed,  the 
contractors  had  contrived  to  involve  the  government  in  ex- 
penses on  the  Hog  Island  job  to  an  amount  exceeding  the 
cost  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel"  Charles  N.  Black,  one  of  the  rich 
gentlemen  whom  the  President  honored  with  military  titles, 
described  as  "a  volunteer  worker  in  the  Ordnance 
Department,"  had  been  part  owner  of  the  846  acres  which 
the  American  International  Terminal  Corporation,  a  sub- 
sidiary, had  ''bought"  for  $2,000  an  acre,  and  was  renting 
to  the  government  for  $102,360  a  year.  Black  appeared 
before  the  Senate  committee  in  defense  of  the  corpora- 
tion. 

"I  sold  the  land  because  it  was  represented  to  me  as  a 
duty,"  testified  "Colonel"  Black. 

But  it  was  proven  that  the  land  had  been  a  stretch  of 
inaccessible  swamp,  assessed  by  the  State  at  $100  an  acre, 
and  that  the  highest  price  ever  paid  anywhere  for  land  in 
the  vicinity  was  $500  an  acre. 

Dwight  P.  Robinson,  president  of  the  American  Inter- 
national Shipbuilding  Corporation,  the  subsidiary  in  direct 
charge  of  the  work,  testified:  "We  have  undertaken  the 
work  as  a  patriotic  duty." 

But  it  was  shown  that  the  salary  of  Mr.  Robinson's  gen- 
eral manager  of  construction  was  more  than  doubled  as 
soon  as  he  went  from  the  corporation  payroll  to  the  gov- 
ernment payroll,  and  that  salaries  of  the  corporation  ex- 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        301 

perts  and  officials  generally  were  more  than  doubled;  even 
that  more  than  one  salary,  thus  bloated,  was  paid  to  one 
person,  in  some  instances.  The  government  not  only  paid 
these  bloated  salaries,  but  the  corporation  collected  five  per 
cent,  of  the  amounts  from  the  government  as  profit — in  ac- 
cordance with  the  contract. 

George  D.  Baldwin,  chairman  of  the  American  Inter- 
national Corporation,  and  a  member  of  the  firm  of  Stone 
&  Webster,  assured  the  committee : 

We  are  loyal  American  citizens,  who  cannot  afford  to  have  our 
loyalty  questioned.  .  .  .  We  have  the  incentive  of  patriotism.  We 
are  not  in  this  for  money. 

But  when  Baldwin  was  asked  why,  then,  he  and  his  as- 
sociates were  accepting  such  large  sums  of  money,  he  re- 
plied: 

A  corporation  cannot  live  on  patriotism.  .  .  .  Our  stockholders 
must  have  their  dividends. 

The  "normal  fee"  for  ship  construction  alone,  based 
on  the  original  estimates  of  cost,  was  $11,675,000.  The 
chief  official  excuse  for  that  item  was  the  participation  of 
the  firm  of  Stone  &  Webster,  which  "knew  how"  to  do  the 
thing  that  was  wanted.  But  it  was  brought  out  that,  while 
the  American  International  Corporation  was  being  paid 
"know  how"  profits,  Stone  &  Webster  were  being  paid 
"sub-know  how"  profits — as  were  other  corporations  af- 
filiated or  subsidiary  to  the  American  International  Cor- 
poration. 

In  other  words,  a  group  of  patriotic  financiers  contracted 
to  collect  eleven  million  simply  for  passing  contracts  along 
to  themselves — dividing  them  among  themselves.  The 
same  men  then  collected  a  second  fee  based  on  costs.  This 
pyramiding  of  contracts — and  fees — was  carried  even 
farther. 


302  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  "sub-know  how"  fee  was  also  five  per  cent. — on  pa- 
per. Profits  in  hard  cash  were  higher.  It  was  shown  that 
Stone  &  Webster  cleared  one-third  of  a  million  on  one  sub- 
contract of  less  than  a  million. 

H.  D.  Connick,  vice-president  of  the  corporation,  was 
another  who  swore  to  the  patriotic  nature  of  the  venture. 

"You  didn't  propose  to  invest  one  penny  of  your  own 
money,  though,"  taunted  a  Senator. 

"We  were  going  to  invest  our  reputations,"  answered 
Connick. 

It  developed  that  the  precious  reputations,  once  "in- 
vested," were  handsomely  defended  with  the  people's 
money.  One  press  agent  was  paid  a  salary  of  $20,000  a 
year.  Press  agents'  salaries  and  other  publicity  costs- 
outlays  to  convince  the  public  that  Hog  Island  was  what  it 
was  not — were  charged  to  the  government,  which  also  paid 
an  added  charge  of  five  per  cent.,  as  profit  to  the  Ameri- 
can International  Corporation. 

Throughout  the  Senate  hearing,  officials  of  the  Fleet 
Corporation,  and  other  government  officials,  shielded  the 
grafters.  Both  government  officials  and  officers  of  the 
American  International  Corporation  were  forced  to  admit 
extravagance,  waste,  and  exorbitant  costs.  These  things 
were  defended  on  the  ground  of  speed.  But  the  only  speed 
visible  at  Hog  Island  was  the  speed  with  which  the  con- 
tractors made  away  with  the  people's  money.  America 
had  been  at  war  sixteen  months  before  the  first  ship  was 
launched,  and  no  Hog  Island  ship  got  into  commission  in 
time  to  be  of  service  against  Germany. 

The  Corporation's  general  defense,  when  investigated  by 
the  Department  of  Justice,  was  that  officials  of  the  Fleet 
Corporation  knew  and  approved  everything  it  did.  It 
happens  that  the  officials  of  the  Fleet  Corporation,  in  pri- 
vate life,  were  associates  or  employees  of  the  men  who 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        303 

were  profiting  by  the  job.  These  officials  did  not  satisfac- 
torily explain  why  they  permitted  the  contractors  to  adopt 
a  system  of  bookkeeping  perfectly  calculated  to  conceal 
thievery;  nor  how  it  was  that  bills  for  material  to  the  ex- 
tent of  over  ten  million  dollars  in  value  had  been  prepaid 
and  no  effort  made  to  discover  (in  the  words  of  the  De- 
partment of  Justice  report)  "whether  the  prepaid  bills  were 
in  fact  followed  by  the  actual  receipt  of  the  material  paid 
for." 

On  a  number  of  occasions  after  the  fighting  was  over, 
Mr.  Schwab  publicly  declared  that  "at  least  two  billion  of 
the  three  billion  dollar  cost"  of  government  shipbuilding 
"ought  to  be  charged  of  as  war  cost."  In  other  words, 
the  two  billion,  or  most  of  it,  was  stolen  or  wasted  under 
cover  of  the  war  emergency.  Albert  D.  Lasker,  who  be- 
came chairman  of  the  Shipping  Board  under  President 
Harding,  went  even  farther.  July  16,  1921,  Lasker  de- 
clared that  the  government's  "loss"  on  the  building,  opera- 
tion, and  leasing  of  ships  would  total  $4,000,000,000. 

After  a  peep  at  Hog  Island  patriotism,  one  may  perhaps 
appreciate,  slightly,  Mr.  Vanderlip's  enthusiastic  predic- 
tion, made  in  an  address  to  business  men:  "A  million  new 
springs  of  wealth  will  be  developed" 

Hog  Island  patriotism  is  not  different  from  any  other 
Wall  Street  patriotism,  so  soon  as  the  latter  is  subject  to 
scrutiny.  Nor  is  the  War  Administration  elsewhere  less 
generous  with  its  profits,  less  willing  to  satisfy,  to  the  full, 
financial  appetites  already  gorged  with  money.  Every- 
where we  find  captains  of  industry  pleased  with  large  re- 
turns— avidly  seeking  them.  Everywhere  we  find  the  gov- 
ernment seeking  to  satisfy  them — satisfying  them. 

The  average  price  for  bituminous  coal  at  the  mine,  for 
the  entire  United  States,  in  1915,  was  $1.13  a  ton.  Large 


304  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

deliveries  were  made  in  1916  at  $1.25  a  ton.  The  Ameri- 
can Federation  of  Labor  reported  that  labor  costs  had  in- 
creased but  13  cents  a  ton  in  three  years.  Yet  in  August, 
1917,  the  President  fixed  prices  from  $2  upward  at  the 
mine.  Under  this  arrangement,  according  to  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission,  margins  of  profit  were  much  higher 
than  in  previous  years.  Nevertheless,  before  the  end  of 
1917  the  President  granted  the  coal  corporations  another 
increase  of  45  cents  a  ton.  Under  this  arrangement,  coal 
profits  ran  as  high  as  7,856  per  cent.  (Senate  Document, 
No.  259.) 

Numerous  official  investigations  established  the  fact  that 
the  unprecedented  profits  of  the  Big  Five  packers  were  due 
to  the  special  care  and  protection  of  Hoover — that  it  was 
the  policy  of  the  Food  Administration  that  such  corpora- 
tions should  profit  enormously  at  the  expense  of  both  the 
farmer  and  the  public.  The  public  was  officially  informed 
that  packer  profits  were  limited  to  five  per  cent.  But 
Hoover  gave  his  approval  to  an  additional  four  per  cent, 
profit,  which  was  kept  secret.  On  borrowed  money — 
money  "borrowed"  from  their  own  banks — the  packers 
were  allowed  to  collect  an  income  not  only  to  cover  inter- 
est, but  a  profit  also.  When  the  Federal  Trade  Commis- 
sion recommended  to  the  President  that  this  additional 
profit  be  abolished,  Hoover  opposed  the  plan,  and  through 
his  influence  the  report  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission 
was  withheld  for  nearly  a  year  after  the  armistice. 

The  segregation  of  nearly  a  billion  dollars'  worth  of 
stocks  and  bonds,  industrial  plants,  and  other  business  hold- 
ings, owned  by  Germans,  might  be  defended  as  a  war  meas- 
ure. But  the  sale  of  such  properties,  privately,  as  a  rule, 
and  at  prices  far  below  their  real  value,  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand except  as  a  means  of  bearing  gifts  to  Wall  Street. 

The  government  put  an  excess  profits  tax  in  the  revenue 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        305 

bill  at  the  beginning.  This  is  not  an  evidence  that  Wall 
Street  did  not  make  money  out  of  the  war,  but  only  official 
acknowledgement  that  it  did.  Private  profits  from  the 
blood  of  our  young  men  and  the  privation  of  our  people 
were  an  integral  part  of  the  war  policy,  acknowledged  and 
defined  in  the  war  revenue  bills. 

In  preparing  the  schedules,  the  government  estimate  of 
visible  war  profits  to  be  harvested  by  American  corpora- 
tions in  1917 — collectable  net  gains  over  and  above  esti- 
mated gains  of  peace  times — was  four  billion. 

In  subjecting  these  billions  to  taxation,  the  Administra- 
tion pretended  that  it  was  compelling  big  business  to  as- 
sume its  proportionate  share  of  the  war  burdens.  But 
while  the  war  taxes  weighed  heavily  upon  the  middle  clas- 
ses, the  tax  laws  were  so  framed,  and  their  application  so 
manipulated,  that  our  money  kings  and  our  captains  of 
industry  went  scot  free. 

Their  influence  caused  the  striking  out  of  the  retroactive 
tax,  intended  to  take  a  part  of  the  1916  profits.  In  1916 
there  had  been  a  special  tax  on  the  manufacture  of  muni- 
tions; it  was  removed.  Tariff  schedules  were  revised  up- 
ward, throwing  a  great  weight  upon  the  poor.  Evasion 
was  made  easy  by  the  Administration's  policy  of  keeping 
tax  statements  secret,  and  its  policy  of  combining  profits 
taxes  and  income  taxes  in  a  single  item.  Corporations  were 
permitted  to  make  arbitrary  deductions  for  war  taxes  to  be 
subsequently  paid,  a  procedure  not  contemplated  by  the  law. 
They  were  even  permitted  to  deduct  stock  dividends  from 
statements  of  profit,  and  by  this  maneuver  to  wipe  the  item 
of  war  taxes  completely  from  their  books. 

The  Administration  even  adopted  the  policy  of  paying 
the  war  taxes  of  favored  corporations,  either  by  taking  the 
taxes  into  consideration  in  figuring  prices  on  government 
contracts,  or  by  engaging  to  pay  such  taxes  itself,  whatever 


306  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

they  might  come  to.  The  government  agreed,  in  writing, 
to  pay  all  increases  of  taxation  appertaining  to  the  Hog 
Island  job.  The  nine  hundred  million  odd  a  year  "rental" 
paid  by  the  government  to  the  Transportation  Trust,  was 
not  subject  to  a  dollar  of  war  tax. 

The  upshot  of  the  Administration's  war  policy  toward 
business  was  that  every  dollar  of  taxes  that  seemed  to  be 
laid  upon  steel,  copper,  coal,  and  the  other  great  industries 
of  Morgan,  Schwab,  Vanderlip,  Ryan,  Lovett,  et  al.,  was 
passed  along  finally  to  the  general  public. 

In  his  appeal  to  business  interests  (July  n,  1917),  the 
President  spoke  of  the  contribution  of  our  business  men  to 
the  winning  of  the  war  as  "a  contribution  that  costs  you 
neither  a  drop  of  blood  nor  a  tear."  He  might  have  added : 
"Nor  a  dollar."  For  if  the  great  corporations  were  given 
greater  net  profits,  after  all  war  tax  payments,  than  they 
could  have  realized  had  the  country  remained  at  peace,  it 
is  obvious  that  they  were  permitted  to  escape  absolutely  any 
share  whatever  of  the  war  burden. 

When  it  was  over,  the  Administration  was  not  above 
boasting  that  big  business  had  been  protected,  aided,  and 
strengthened  by  the  war  policies.  (1918  reports  of  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  and  the  Controller  of  the  Currency.) 
The  picture  is  well  drawn  in  Latrobe's  Weekly  Market  Re- 
view, May  16,  1918: 

The  most  remarkable  situation  that  has  ever  existed  in  the  United 
States  since  the  prosperous  days  of  President  McKinley  has  developed 
as  a  result  of  the  war.  .  .  .  The  leaders  of  industry  and  finance  are 
working  hand  in  hand  with  the  government,  the  steel  companies 
are  becoming  partners  of  the  government,  and  the  railroads  are  ob- 
taining favors  of  which  they  never  dreamed,  with  guaranteed  earn- 
ings and  very  high  rates  for  transportation.  The  War  Finance 
Corporation  is  attending  to  finance  requirements.  .  .  .  There  is  every 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        307 

indication  that  the  shipbuilding  plans  of  the  government  will  be 
expanded  and  rushed  at  a  great  pace  under  Mr.  Charles  M.  Schwab 
of  Bethlehem  Steel,  and  one  of  the  first  moves  he  made  was  to  cancel 
the  original  Submarine  Boat  contract  and  arrange  for  a  new  one  for 
1 60  ships  on  terms  which  admit  of  much  larger  profits. 

Finally,  the  Administration  served  as  protector  and  press 
agent  for  the  super-patriots  while  they  got  away  with  the 
people's  money. 

It  was  the  policy  of  the  President  to  prevent  public  in- 
vestigations of  profits,  profiteering,  and  graft,  by  Congress, 
and,  when  the  pressure  for  investigation  was  especially 
strong,  to  substitute  therefor  secret  inquiries  by  the  execu- 
tive departments.  Such  inquiries  never  passed  beyond  the 
control  of  the  President.  The  evidence  was  never  pub- 
lished; reports  could  be  framed  to  suit  the  policy  of  the 
President,  and  publication  even  of  reports  was  delayed  at 
the  will  of  the  President.  The  President  opposed  all  in- 
vestigations of  the  sort  begun  by  either  House,  declared 
that  "nothing  helpful"  was  likely  to  come  out  of  them, 
charged  them  with  causing  udelay  and  confusion,"  and  in 
the  end  succeeded  in  suppressing  all  of  them. 

Yet  had  it  not  been  for  these  abortive  hearings,  the  pub- 
lic might  never  have  heard  of  the  Hog  Island  steal,  the 
shoe  and  clothing  grafts,  or  sugar  profiteering.  It  would 
have  heard  less  of  packer  thievery,  still  less  of  the  aircraft 
scandal,  and  perhaps  nothing  at  all  of  a  hundred  other 
things  reflecting  upon  the  patriotism  and  the  common  hon- 
esty not  only  of  business  patriots,  but  of  army  and  navy 
officers,  and  even  of  members  of  the  President's  cabinet. 

The  policy  of  hush  illustrates  one  of  the  uses  of  autocracy 
in  war.  The  policy  could  not  have  been  carried  out  suc- 
cessfully without  far-reaching  usurpations  on  the  part  of 
the  Executive.  The  looting  of  the  Treasury  mentioned 
herein  is  only  a  hint  of  what  actually  occurred.  Unless  the 


308  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

government  should  continue  as  completely  under  the  con- 
trol of  high  finance  as  during  the  war,  we  may  expect  to  be 
regaled  with  scandals  for  years  to  come.1 

As  a  part  of  the  policy  of  hush,  criminal  prosecution  of 
our  financial  leaders  was  taboo.  The  entire  system  of  han- 
dling government  contracts  was  in  gross  violation  of  the 
common  law  and  of  the  statutes.  Honest  enforcement  of 
the  law  would  probably  have  required  wholesale  prosecu- 
tions not  only  of  dollar-a-year  men,  but  also  of  government 
officials  who  gave  the  system  their  sanction.  When  the 
criminal  nature  of  these  transactions  was  mentioned  to  the 
Attorney-General,  he  placed  his  stamp  of  approval  upon 
them,  declaring  them  "matters  of  national  policy  rather 
than  a  legal  question."  (Report  of  Chairman  Graham,  of 
the  House  Committee  on  War  Department  Expenditures, 
July  7,  1919-) 

Federal  police  protection  of  captains  of  industry  was 
carried  so  far  as  to  require  the  postponement  of  prosecu- 
tions pending  when  war  was  declared.  Newspapers  of 

1  Although  the  Harding  Administration  attempted  no  general  expose  of 
war-time  thievery,  the  veil  was  lifted  slightly,  now  and  then,  in  response  td 
political  expediency.  For  example,  in  a  letter  boasting  of  the  accomplish- 
ments of  Republican  rule,  August  29,  1921,  President  Harding  said  in  part: 
"Our  government  .  .  .  expended  between  five  and  six  billion  dollars  for  the 
manufacture  of  aircraft,  artillery  and  artillery  ammunition.  To  show  for 
this  expenditure,  it  has  been  officially  testified  that  less  than  200  American- 
made  airplanes  or  200  American-made  cannon  ever  went  into  action  on 
the  fighting  front  of  the  war,  while  not  more  than  one  per  cent,  of  the  am- 
munition expended  by  American  artillery  was,  according  to  the  same  testi- 
mony, of  American  manufacture.  Approximately  $3,500,000,000  has  been 
poured  out  under  the  direction  of  the  Shipping  Board,  yet  I  have  from  the 
War  Department  the  curious  bit  of  information  that  only  one  vessel  built  by 
the  Shipping  Board  ever  carried  any  American  troops  to  fight  in  Europe. 
This  was  a  cargo  boat,  the  'Liberty,'  which,  according  to  War  Depart- 
ment records,  in  October,  1917,  carried  approximately  fifty  soldiers  to  Eu- 
rope. These  were  the  only  soldiers,  according  to  the  record,  that  were 
transported  to  Europe  before  the  armistice  in  a  vessel  built  by  the  Ship- 
ping Board.  According  to  the  most  conservative  estimate  which  has  come 
to  me,  the  Railroad  Administration  has  cost  the  government  between  one 
and  a  quarter  and  one  and  a  half  billion  dollars,  and  the  end  is  not 
yet." 


Profit-Seeker  and  Profit-Server        309 

January  3,  1918,  carried  a  dispatch  from  Washington  read- 
ing, in  part: 

Attorney-General  Gregory  to-day  asked  the  Supreme  Court  to  de- 
fer argument  on  the  seven  large  anti-trust  suits  pending.  This  action, 
Solicitor-General  Davis  explained,  was  taken  because  the  government 
wants  cooperation  from  the  business  interests  of  the  country.  The 
suits  postponed  are  those  against  the  United  Shoe  Machinery  Com- 
pany, the  American  Can  Company,  the  International  Harvester 
Company,  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation,  the  Eastman  Kodak  Com- 
pany, the  Quaker  Oats  Company,  and  the  Corn  Products  Refining 
Company. 

To  this  dispatch  the  Times  appended  a  local  news  note 
saying  that,  upon  the  information's  reaching  Wall  Street, 
U.  S.  Steel  Common  shot  upward,  closing  the  day  with  a 
net  advance  of  five  points,  while  industrial  stocks  generally 
were  in  increased  demand. 

Meanwhile,  to  the  government  press  agency,  embellish- 
ing the  fame  of  the  "super-patriots"  as  model  citizens, 
were  frequently  added  the  voices  of  members  of  the  Presi- 
dent's official  family,  and  at  times  the  voice  of  the  Presi- 
dent. But  this  was  not  enough.  Hand  in  hand  with  the 
policy  of  praise  went  the  policy  of  repression.  Mr.  Burle- 
son  laid  down,  as  a  condition  for  the  enjoyment  of  second- 
class  mailing  privileges,  that  "Papers  must  not  say  that  the 
government  is  controlled  by  Wall  Street."  (Oct.  9, 
1917.)  At  the  same  time,  the  Attorney-General  was  plead- 
ing for  more  repressive  legislation,  hinting  that  it  was  not 
sufficiently  easy  to  imprison  persons  for  calling  attention  to 
the  peculiar  relations  between  big  business  and  the  govern- 
ment. 

It  was  the  President's  policy  that  it  should  be  illegal  to 
impugn  the  motives  of  the  men  among  whom  the  govern- 
ment was  distributing  our  billions.  It  was  the  President's 
policy  that  it  should  be  illegal  to  say  that  ours  was  a  busi- 


3io  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ness  man's  war,  provided  you  were  against  the  war.  At 
the  same  time  it  was  the  President's  policy  that  it  should 
be  perfectly  legal  to  make  exactly  the  same  statement,  pro- 
vided you  favored  the  war.  "The  business  plea  to  business 
men"  was  an  approved  and  respectable  part  of  the  patriotic 
propaganda.  It  was  voiced,  at  times,  even  by  the  Presi- 
dent himself:  "And  every  man  in  every  business  must  know 
by  this  time  that  his  whole  future  fortune  lies  in  the  bal- 
ance." (Urbana,  Jan.  31,  1918.) 


XXX 

SECRET  OF  THE  WAR  PROFITS 

ALTHOUGH  the  announcement  of  President  Wilson's  war 
policy  toward  business  was  in  practice  construed  as  per- 
mitting the  greatest  profits  in  the  history  of  the  country, 
it  was  capable  of  being  construed  as  permitting  no  profits 
at  all.  Had  the  generosity  of  the  War  Administration 
been,  in  fact,  confined  strictly  to  satisfying  the  four  consid- 
erations mentioned, — wages,  upkeep,  management,  and 
necessary  expansions  for  war  purposes — then  its  war  policy 
toward  business  might  not  be  open  to  criticism.  But  a 
very  large  share  of  the  money  abstracted  from  the  Treas- 
ury was  not  devoted  to  any  of  these  specified  purposes,  but 
was  diverted  into  an  entirely  different  channel. 

Not  one  dollar  of  the  nine  hundred  million  odd  net, 
which  the  government  guaranteed  the  railroad  corpora- 
tions, was  devoted,  or  intended  to  be  devoted,  either  to  sus- 
taining the  efficiency  of  the  railroad  industry,  providing  a 
living  for  those  who  conducted  the  railroads,  paying  wages, 
or  expanding  the  railroad  properties.  Salaries  and  wages 
were  paid  out  of  the  operating  income,  and  were  covered 
by  rate  increases  to  the  public.  Maintenance  and  expan- 
sion were  attended  to  with  the  half  billion  dollar  "revolv- 
ing fund,"  and  the  funds  of  the  War  Finance  Corporation, 
both  appropriated  by  Congress.  The  $945,000,000  was 
an  entirely  different  item,  for  an  entirely  different  purpose. 
It  was  net  profit.  The  part  of  this  guaranteed  net  income 
over  and  above  the  sum  that  would  have  been  available  for 
dividends  had  America  remained  at  peace — several  hun- 


312  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

dred  million  dollars — must  be  set  down  as  riches  coined  by 
the  shedding  of  America's  young  blood  upon  European  bat- 
tlefields. 

What  is  said  of  the  railroad  industry  applies  with  equal 
force  to  steel,  copper,  coal,  oil,  shipping,  and  every  other 
like  enterprise.  In  each  instance,  the  War  Administra- 
tion provided  the  money  not  only  for  four  items,  sala- 
ries, wages,  maintenance,  and  expansion,  but  for  a  fifth 
item,  profit. 

The  necessity  of  satisfying  the  first  four  items,  as  a  con- 
dition for  the  successful  conduct  of  the  military  operations, 
may  be  cheerfully  conceded — provided  the  fourth  item,  ex- 
pansion, were  satisfied  by  loans  exclusively.  But  what  is 
the  secret  of  the  fifth  item? 

"They  are  giving  their  lives;  will  you  not  give  your 
money?"  This  famous  appeal  was  shouted  at  us  by  the 
"super-patriots"  themselves.  But  it  is  obvious  that  no 
American  who  possessed  more  money  at  the  end  of  the  war 
than  at  the  beginning  can  be  said  to  have  contributed  one 
penny  to  it.  The  fact  cannot  be  evaded  that  our  leaders 
of  industry  and  finance  were  richer  at  the  end  of  the  war 
than  at  the  beginning,  and  that  they  became  so  through  the 
operation  of  a  policy  unswervingly  followed  by  the  War 
Administration — the  policy  of  paying  them  prices  that  per- 
mitted them,  after  every  war  exigency  was  met,  to  add  bil- 
lions of  dollars  to  their  permanent  fortunes. 

Why  was  it  the  policy  of  President  Wilson  that  Wall 
Street  should  make  a  lot  of  money  out  of  the  war?  Huge 
profits  in  war  time  have  apparently  been  accepted  by  a 
great  many  persons  as  a  normal,  necessary,  and  innocent 
phenomenon.  But  it  would  seem  that  if  American  finance 
and  industry  had  been  mobilized  and  utilized  with  a  view  to 
its  most  effective  use  in  war  no  dividends  whatever  would 
have  been  allowed,  no  piling  up  of  great  fortunes,  no  in- 


Secret  of  the  War  Profits  313 

crease  in  anybody's  wealth,  least  of  all  the  wealth  of  those 
who  already  possessed  the  most. 

It  is  true  that  the  influence  of  our  captains  of  industry 
was  continually  exerted  in  favor  of  higher  prices — and  of 
other  special  favors  to  themselves — and  that  the  copper 
and  coal  producers  particularly  were  accused  of  conspiring 
to  limit  production  as  a  means  to  gouging  more  money  out 
of  the  government. 

But  evidence  of  the  power  of  these  gentlemen  to  compel 
the  Administration  to  meet  their  wishes  is  lacking.  If  the 
War  Administration  was  physically  powerful  enough  to 
conscript  an  army  for  the  trenches,  surely  it  was  physically 
powerful  enough  to  conscript  industry  and  finance,  includ- 
ing the  personal  services  of  managers  and  directors,  and  to 
pay  to  industry  and  finance — as  to  the  men  in  the  trenches — 
the  money  necessary  to  make  them  most  efficient  for  war 
purposes,  and  no  more. 

The  most  plausible  excuse  for  exorbitant  profits  paid 
to  the  large  mining  and  industrial  corporations  was  that, 
in  order  to  attain  the  maximum  production  possible,  it  was 
necessary  to  bring  every  available  plant  into  operation,  high- 
cost  plants  as  well  as  low-cost  plants,  and  that  prices  paid 
by  the  government  had,  therefore,  to  be  based  on  costs  in 
the  highest-cost  plants.  Thus  the  owners  of  the  low-cost 
plants — who  were  none  other  than  our  richest  citizens — 
came  into  huge  profits  as  if  by  accident. 

But  why  was  this  pretty  scheme  adopted?  Would  it 
not  have  been  possible  to  put  into  effect,  instead,  a  system 
r>l?cing  all  plants,  whether  of  high  or  low  cost,  on  a  basis 
of  all  efficiency  and  no  profit? 

If  every  man  conscripted  for  the  trenches  had  been  paid 
twenty  dollars  per  day  net  for  his  services,  he  would  still 
not  have  been  treated  relatively  so  well  as  the  possessors 
of  America's  largest  fortunes. 


\ 
314  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  secret  of  our  magnificent  generosity  to  Wall  Street 
during  the  war — and  the  secret  of  the  war  itself — is  to  be 
found,  not  in  any  special  war  conditions,  but  in  a  govern- 
mental policy  pursued  from  the  beginning.  It  had  always 
been  the  policy  of  President  Wilson  to  serve  the  special 
interests  of  Wall  Street,  regardless  of  the  general  welfare. 

No  American  President  ever  more  frankly  confessed  him- 
self a  servant  of  business  than  Wilson.  No  American  Pres- 
ident ever  more  completely  met  the  wishes  of  big  business 
than  Wilson. 

Although  Wilson  went  to  the  White  House  in  the  role  of 
a  radical,  solemnly  pledged  to  a  great  programme  of  re- 
form and  attack  upon  special  privilege,  he  did  not  carry  out 
that  programme  in  any  important  particular.  A  part  of 
the  programme  intended  to  protect  the  public  against  the 
extortions  of  monopoly,  he  repudiated;  another  part  he  put 
through  in  such  form  that  it  turned  out  to  be  a  service  to 
monopoly,  instead  of  a  check  upon  it. 

Although  the  Baltimore  platform,  upon  which  Woodrow 
Wilson  became  President  of  the  United  States,  pronounced 
for  "the  vigorous  enforcement  of  the  criminal  as  well  as 
the  civil  law  against  trusts  and  trust  officials,"  and  "the 
enactment  of  such  additional  legislation  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  make  it  impossible  for  a  private  monopoly  to  ex- 
ist" ;  and  although  Wilson  endorsed  this  proposition  both 
before  and  after  election;  neither  his  new  "anti-trust"  legis- 
lation nor  his  "enforcement"  of  the  old,  put  an  end  to  any 
monopoly.  On  the  other  hand,  President  Wilson,  after 
prolonged  efforts,  procured  the  passage  of  laws,  exempting 
corporations  engaged  in  foreign  commerce  from  all  re- 
strictions provided  by  the  anti-trust  laws. 

Although  the  transportation  monopoly  was  especially 
singled  out  for  discipline  by  the  Democratic  party  and  its 
candidate,  and  although  candidate  Wilson  pronounced  in 


Secret  of  the  War  Profits  315 

favor  of  lower  rates,  from  one  year  after  taking  office 
President  Wilson  was  almost  constantly  working  for,  and 
openly  urging,  higher  rates.  After  having  been  responsi- 
ble for  one  rate  increase,  the  President  twice  urged  upon 
Congress  "explicit  approval,  by  the  Congress,  of  the  con- 
sideration of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  of  an 
increase  in  freight  rates."  (Words  of  the  message  of  Dec. 
191.6.)  As  early  as  November,  1914,  the  Wall  Street 
Journal  acknowledged:  "So  far  as  he  properly  could,  he 
[President  Wilson]  has  assisted  the  railroads." 

Although,  in  the  programme  of  reform  upon  which 
Wilson  rode  into  office,  the  high  Republican  tariff  was  de- 
nounced as  "the  principal  cause  of  the  unequal  distribu- 
tion of  wealth,"  and  as  "a  system  of  taxation  which  makes 
the  rich  richer  and  the  poor  poorer" ;  and  although  an  im- 
mediate revision  downward,  such  as  would  reduce  the  cost 
of  living,  was  promised;  under  Wilson  the  revision  was  ac- 
complished in  such  a  way  as  to  reduce  neither  the  cost  of 
living  nor  the  profits  of  protected  industries.  Moreover, 
guided  by  Wilson,  the  Democratic  party  enacted  an  "anti- 
dumping law,"  which,  in  effect,  built  a  barbed  wire  fence 
around  the  top  of  the  tariff  wall;  and  under  cover  of  the 
war  emergency,  it  enacted,  to  employ  the  words  of  Con- 
gressman Kitchin,  "the  highest  tariff  ever  written  on  the 
books." 

Although  the  Baltimore  platform  carried  a  promise  of 
currency  reform  guaranteeing  "absolute  security  to  the  pub- 
lic" and  "complete  protection"  from  "the  misuse  of  the 
power  that  wealth  gives  to  those  who  possess  it,"  the  Wil- 
son Federal  Reserve  Act  only  made  more  secure  the  monop- 
olistic control  of  the  country's  credit  that  is  so  well  de- 
scribed in  the  Pujo  Committee  report  on  the  Money  Trust. 
Currency  inflation,  made  easy  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
scheme,  greatly  facilitated  the  war-time  looting  of  the  coun- 


3i6  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

try,  and  became  one  of  the  causes  of  famine  prices.  The 
first  claim  for  this  law  was  that  it  would  give  us  an  "elastic 
currency."  The  Federal  Reserve  currency  proved  elastic 
enough  in  the  stretching,  but  when  the  day  arrived  for 
deflation,  the  "unstretching"  was  not  so  easy  a  process. 

Although  the  Baltimore  platform  pledged  candidate 
Wilson  to  conservation,  promising  "such  additional  legis- 
lation as  may  be  necessary"  to  prevent  the  country's  natural 
resources  from  "being  wasted  or  absorbed  by  special  or 
privileged  interests,"  under  Wilson  no  bona  fide  conserva- 
tion laws  were  enacted.  On  the  other  hand,  President 
Wilson  conducted  a  long  fight  for  the  so-called  Shields  and 
Water  Power  bills,  and  the  oil  and  mineral  lands-leasing 
bills,  designed  to  open  up  the  last  of  such  resources  to  a 
raid  of  the  great  exploiting  concerns,  on  terms  violating 
every  accepted  principle  of  conservation. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  here  to  go  far  into  President  Wil- 
son's peace-time  record,  nor  even  to  enumerate  all  the 
pledges  of  the  Baltimore  platform  that  became  "scraps  of 
paper"  in  his  hands.  Passed  over  is  the  pledge  not  to 
stand  for  a  second  term,  the  pledge  not  to  encroach  upon 
either  of  the  other  two  branches  of  government,  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  tolls  reversal,  the  pledge  to  suppress  gambling 
in  agricultural  products,  the  pledge  for  an  adequate  system 
of  rural  credits.  Only  enough  of  this  record  is  recalled 
to  make  it  quite  clear  that  the  war-time  favors  to  Wall 
Street  embodied  no  new  policy. 

Wilson's  own  testimony  on  this  point  may  be  of  interest. 

As  early  as  January  20,  1914,  President  Wilson  an- 
nounced to  his  Congress:  "The  antagonism  between  busi- 
ness and  government  is  over."  On  signing  the  Federal 
Reserve  Act,  he  said: 

I  myself  have  always  felt,  when  the  Democratic  party  was  criti- 
cized, as  not  knowing  how  to  serve  the  business  interests  of  the 


Secret  of  the  War  Profits  317 

country,  that  there  was  no  use  in  replying  to  that  in  words.  The 
only  satisfactory  reply  was  in  action.  We  have  written  the  first 
chapter  of  that  reply. 

June  25,  1914,  in  a  speech  before  the  Virginia  Editorial 
Association,  the  President  sketched  his  entire  legislative 
programme  as  one  of  "beneficence"  to  business,  carried  out 
"under  the  advice"  of  business  men.  "When  the  pro- 
gramme is  finished,"  he  promised,  "there  will  be  a  boom 
in  business  in  this  country  such  as  we  have  never  witnessed 
in  the  United  States.  .  .  .  Business  can  get  and  will  get 
what  it  can  get  in  no  other  way." 

On  the  December  8  following,  the  President  informed  his 
Congress  that  the  above  promises  had  been  fulfilled. 
"The  road  at  last  lies  clear  before  business,"  said  he.  "It 
is  tHc  road  to  ungrudged,  unclouded  success." 

Again,  January  29,  1915,  the  President  was  voicing  the 
following  happy  assurances:  "Nobody  is  going  to  be  afraid 
of  or  suspicious  of  any  business  merely  because  it  is  big." 
Accordingly,  in  the  St.  Louis  platform  appeared  a  number 
of  strange  paragraphs,  the  like  of  which  had  never  before 
been  seen  in  a  Democratic  platform.  One  such  paragraph 
reads : 

We  must  now  remove,  so  far  as  possible,  every  remaining  element 
of  unrest  and  uncertainty  from  the  path  of  the  business  men  of 
America,  and  secure  for  them  a  continued  period  of  quiet,  assured, 
and  confident  prosperity. 

Promises  of  this  character  notwithstanding,  Democratic 
spellbinders  followed  their  time-worn  practice  of  telling 
the  people  that  Wall  Street  was  lined  up  against  their  can- 
didate. Evidence  of  this  is  lacking.  Wall  Street  looked 
on  with  singular  complacence.  The  reason  was  disclosed 
by  the  Wall  Street  Investment  and  Mining  News,  in  its 
June  issue: 


3i8  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  Presidential  nominations  are  most  satisfactory  from  a  financial 
standpoint.  No  matter  what  a  man's  political  preference  may  be,  he 
should  be  satisfied  with  the  choice  as  far  as  business  is  concerned. 
Wall  Street  responded  nobly. 

In  the  campaign,  indeed,  President  Wilson  repeatedly 
pointed  to  his  record  as  an  argument  that  the  business  vote 
should  fall  to  him.  In  his  speech  of  acceptance,  for  exam- 
ple: 

The  tariff  has  been  revised,  not  on  the  principle  of  repelling  foreign 
trade,  but  upon  the  principle  of  encouraging  it.  ...  The  laws 
against  trusts  have  been  clarified  by  definition,  with  a  view  to  mak- 
ing it  plain  that  they  were  not  directed  against  big  business,  .  .  .  and 
a  Trade  Commission  has  been  created  with  powers  of  guidance  and 
accommodation,  which  have  relieved  business  men  of  unfounded  fears 
and  set  them  upon  the  road  of  hopeful  and  confident  enterprise.  .  .  . 
Effective  measures  have  been  taken  for  the  recreation  of  an  American 
merchant  marine.  ...  So  much  have  we  done  for  business.  What 
other  party  has  understood  the  task  so  well  or  executed  it  so  intelli- 
gently and  energetically? 


XXXI 

WILSON  IMPERIALISM 

JUST  as  it  is  necessary,  in  seeking  the  true  causes  of  the 
European  quarrel,  to  go  back  a  space  in  the  history  of  the 
contending  countries,  so,  in  order  to  determine  the  real 
motives  for  our  own  participation,  we  must  devote  some 
attention  to  the  nature  of  American  governmental  policies 
even  before  the  European  war  began. 

Attention  has  been  drawn  to  governmental  service  to 
domestic  business.  We  now  turn  to  foreign  business.  All 
foreign  business  of  American  citizens  has  come  to  be  spoken 
of  as  "foreign  trade,"  especially  by  persons  interested  in 
promoting  it — perhaps  because  the  term  has  an  innocent 
sound. 

What  has  Wall  Street  wanted  most  of  America,  on  be- 
half of  its  foreign  "trade?" 

First,  a  great  merchant  marine;  second,  a  greater  navy 
and  army;  third,  legislation  especially  framed  to  "encour- 
age" and  "protect"  foreign  business;  fourth,  an  Executive 
committed  to  aggressive  support  of  foreign  business;  fifth, 
a  "disciplined"  nation. 

These  are  what  may  well  be  termed  the  permanent,  as 
distinct  from  the  immediate,  advantages  accruing  from 
American  belligerency.  They  are  the  instrumentalities  of 
imperialistic  exploitation. 

Agitation  for  government  subsidies,  as  a  means  to  creat- 
ing a  large  merchant  marine  under  the  American  flag,  had 
been  carried  on  for  several  decades  without  results.  The 
Japanese  peril  had  been  raised  annually,  in  an  effort  to 

319 


320  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

bring  about  substantial  increases  in  the  army  and  navy.  In 
the  year  1902,  the  Navy  League  was  founded  by  a  group 
of  millionaires  interested  in  contracts  for  armor  plate,  pow- 
der, munitions,  and  foreign  financing.  It  carried  on  an  un- 
ceasing propaganda  for  a  huge  navy  and  for  a  govern- 
ment policy  of  employing  the  navy  to  back  up  the  under- 
takings of  American  financiers  abroad.  In  the  year  of  the 
European  outbreak,  the  National  ^Foreign  Trades  Council 
was  organized  by  the  heads  of  large  banks  and  industrial  cor- 
porations, many  of  whom  were  already  prominent  as  foun- 
ders of,  directors  of,  or  contributors  to,  ,the  Navy  League. 

The  "publicity"  of  such  organizations  found  its  way  into 
the  news  and  editorial  columns  of  the  newspapers,  into  the 
speeches  of  Senators  and  Congressmen,  into  university 
classrooms,  into  the  pulpit,  into  the  popular  magazines, 
into  the  book  world.  Due  to  such  influence,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  given  a  more  and  more  aggressive  interpreta- 
tion, inimical  to  the  sovereignty  of  our  Latin  American 
neighbors. 

The  circumstances  of  the  European  war  rendered  these 
purposes  a  hundred  times  more  desirable — as  well  as  ap- 
parently capable  of  realization  in  the  fullest  measure.  By 
the  end  of  1915,  Wall  Street  had  seized  a  goodly  share  of 
the  foreign  trade  of  belligerents,  particularly  of  Germany. 
How  was  that  trade  to  be  retained  and  extended?  New 
York  was  in  a  fair  way  to  supplant  London  as  the  world's 
financial  centre.  How  was  that  position  to  be  secured  and 
made  permanent?  The  billions  of  war  profits,  dazzling 
in  themselves,  also  opened  up  a  dazzling  future.  To-day 
they  were  bursting  American  banks.  What  should  be  done 
with  them  to-morrow? 

The  answer  came  from  the  Navy  League,  from  the  For- 
eign Trade  Council,  from  the  American  Manufacturers' 
Export  Association,  and  the  other  organizations  formed  to 


Wilson  Imperialism  321 

take  advantage  of  the  situation.  The  answer  was  that 
there  are  no  profits  equal  to  the  profits  of  imperialism;  that 
to-morrow  American  dollars  must  be  competing  abroad 
with  sovereigns  and  francs ;  that  tp-morrow  America  would 
be  sharing  "places  in  the  sun"  with  the  great  imperial  pow- 
ers— provided  political  America  would  do  its  part. 

In  announcing  the  launching  of  the  American  Interna- 
tional Corporation,  Chairman  Vanderlip  urged  upon  his  as- 
sociates the  necessity  of  "arousing  the  interest  and  securing 
the  cooperation  of  the  entire  country."  It  was  necessary, 
explained  Vanderlip,  "to  make  it  [the  business  of  interna- 
tional finance]  a  national  undertaking,  and  to  appeal  to  the 
confidence,  the  enterprise,  and  the  patriotism  of  the  Ameri- 
can people."  President  Farrell  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corpor- 
ation seconded  the  motion.  The  public  must  be  taught,  he 
said,  "that  foreign  trade  is  a  vital  element  in  domestic  pros- 
perity." 

The  European  war,  which  brought  inconceivable  suf- 
fering to  so  many  millions  of  human  beings,  presented  it- 
self to  Wall  Street  as  a  financial  opportunity,  infinitely  be- 
yond its  wildest  dreams  of  former  days.  Said  Mr.  Vander- 
lip to  a  Chicago  audience  of  bankers  (Dec.  16,  1916) 

Never  since  the  beginning  of  time  was  there  such  an  opportunity. 
Never  did  a  people  have  before  them  a  choice  of  two  roads  that  led 
to  such  different  destinations.  Never  did  a  nation  have  flung  at  it 
so  many  gifts  of  opportunity — a  flood  tide  of  wealth,  of  opportunity, 
which,  added  to  our  resources,  puts  upon  the  people  of  this  country 
a  responsibility  of  trusteeship  of  the  world.  .  .  .  We  have 
suddenly  by  a  world  tragedy  been  made  heir  to  the  greatest  estate  of 
opportunity  that  imagination  ever  pictured.  The  last  twenty  years 
have  seen  a  fivefold  development.  I  would  hesitate  to  suggest  what 
the  next  twenty  years  may  see,  if  we  rightly  manage  this  heritage. 

"Our  future  for  many  years  to  come,"  said  Vanderlip, 
in  the  same  speech,  "will  be  governed  by  the  soundness  of 


322  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  public  mind  and  governmental  actions  in  the  next  score 
of  months." 

This  sort  of  propaganda  raged  throughout  the  year 
1916,  and  reached  its  climax  in  the  final  weeks  before 
America  declared  war.  Following  the  Paris  Economic 
Conference  in  June,  1916,  the  press  was  filled  with  horri- 
ble forebodings  lest  our  rosy  destiny  might  not  be  realized. 
The  uwar  after  the  war"  was  presented  as  a  peril  hardly  less 
sinister  than  the  German  invasion  peril  paraded  before  us 
a  year  later.  Oh  woe!  What  should  be  done? 

Wall  Street  told  us  what  should  be  done,  not  too  impetu- 
ously at  first,  but  feeling  its  way.  Even  the  National  Se- 
curity League  did  not  at  once  tell  us  that  the  solution  was 
to  declare  war  on  Germany.  At  the  luncheon  discussions 
of  the  war  after  the  war,  held  by  bankers,  manufacturers, 
and  merchants,  daily  throughout  the  country,  exhortations 
to  prepare  for  our  great  opportunities  overseas,  advocacy 
of  compulsory  military  training,  the  beauties  of  a  merchant 
marine  under  the  American  flag,  demands  for  sterner  meas- 
ures in  Mexico,  rhetorical  flights  upon  American  destiny, 
and  praise  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  were  inextricably 
mixed — and  equally  applauded. 

Finally,  military  alliance  with  the  Entente  came  to  be 
mentioned  in  the  same  breath  with  financial  alliance.  Evi- 
dence that  our  allies-to-be  intended  to  wage  commercial  war 
on  us,  after  the  war,  was  used,  more  or  less  openly,  as  an 
argument  to  ally  ourselves  with  them  in  order  to  get  on  the 
band-wagon.  The  last  step  was  to  bellow  for  the  vindica- 
tion of  American  honor,  hoist  the  German  peril,  and  call 
for  war. 

After  war  was  safely  declared,  the  purpose  to  obtain, 
through  the  circumstances  of  the  war,  the  imperialistic  ad- 
vantages long  sought  by  Wall  Street,  was  frequently  ac- 
knowledged. We  find  W.  S.  Kies,  vice-president  of  the 


Wilson  Imperialism  323 

National  City  Bank,  and  one  of  Vanderlip's  right-hand  pro- 
pagandists, assuring  friends  (The  Americas,  Apr.,  1917)  : 

The  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war,  and  our  definite  align- 
ment with  the  Allies  will  undoubtedly  be  of  influence  in  obtaining  for 
us  preferential  treatment  [in  the  economic  struggle  after  the  war]. 

We  find  such  men  as  James  A.  Farrell,  president  of  the 
U.  S.  Steel  Corporation,  saying: 

As  we  have  willingly  devoted  our  lives  and  our  fortunes  to  the 
cause  of  the  Allies  ...  it  would  be  a  natural  corollary  to  this  joint 
enterprise  that  there  should  evolve  at  the  end  of  the  war  a  definite 
plan  of  international  cooperation  in  the  financing  of  foreign  enter- 
prises. (Foreign  Trades  Council  Convention,  Apr.,  1918.) 

Also,  same  speech: 

The  gigantic  task  confronting  the  United  States  means  not  only 
that  the  Allies  must  be  protected  against  defeat,  .  .  .  but  that  .  .  . 
our  great  resources  should  be  fully  utilized  for  the  restoration  of  the 
decadent  industry  of  shipbuilding. 

Our  war  "for  the  right  of  nations,  great  and  small,  to 
choose  their  own  way  of  life  and  obedience,"  did  not  see 
the  end  of  the  plot  to  choose  Mexico's  way  of  life  and 
obedience  for  her,  but  only  brought  that  plot  nearer  to  ma- 
turity. 

Now  glance  at  the  government's  share  in  this  business. 

From  the  beginning  President  Wilson  was  a  propagan- 
dist for  foreign  trade.  In  his  first  inaugural  address,  we 
find  the  words:  "Our  domestic  markets  no  longer  suffice. 
We  need  foreign  markets."  And  in  his  first  message  to 
Congress:  "We  must  build  up  trade,  especially  foreign 
trade."  His  public  advocacy  of  government  aid,  in  the 
building  of  a  huge  merchant  marine,  dates  from  the  first 
months  of  his  tenure.  His  first  shipping  bill  having  failed, 


324  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

we  find  him,  the  following  year,  urging  a  similar  pro- 
gramme upon  Congress.  (Dec.  7,  1915.)  Here  is  the 
plan  and  argument,  in  part: 

The  task  of  building  up  an  adequate  merchant  marine  for  America, 
private  capital  must  ultimately  undertake  .  .  .  and  it  seems  to  me 
a  manifest  dictate  of  wisdom  that  we  should  promptly  remove  every 
legal  obstacle  that  may  stand  in  the  way.  .  .  .  But  .  .  .  something 
must  be  done  at  once  .  .  .  and  it  is  evident  that  only  the  govern- 
ment can  undertake  such  beginnings  and  assume  the  initial  risks. 
When  the  risk  has  passed  .  .  .  the  government  may  withdraw.  But 
it  cannot  omit  to  begin.  It  should  take  the  first  steps,  and  take  them 
at  once.  .  .  .  With  a  view  to  meeting  these  present  necessities  of 
our  commerce,  and  availing  ourselves  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment of  the  present  unparalleled  opportunity  of  linking  the  two 
Americas  together  in  bonds  of  mutual  interest  and  service — an  op- 
portunity which  may  never  return  if  we  miss  it  now — proposals  will 
be  made  to  the  present  Congress,  for  the  purchase  or  construction  of 
ships  to  be  owned  and  directed  by  the  government,  similar  to  those 
made  to  the  last  Congress. 

The  President's  bill,  introduced  forthwith,  embodied  the 
policy  ultimately  carried  out,  that  the  government  should 
pay  for  the  ships  and  afterwards  turn  them  over  to  private 
enterprise,  either  through  lease  or  sale. 

The  President  succeeded  finally  in  putting  through  his 
shipping  legislation,  but  only  as  a  part  of  the  preparedness 
programme  of  1916.  The  policy  itself  was  realized  only  as 
a  part  of  the  war  programme,  when,  in  the  words  of  Far- 
rell,  "our  great  resources"  were,  in  fact,  "fully  utilized  for 
the  restoration  of  the  decadent  industry  of  shipbuilding." 

In  a  speech  before  the  U.  S.  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
February  3,  1915,  President  Wilson  said: 

The  anti-trust  laws  of  the  United  States  apparently  make  it  il- 
legal for  merchants  in  the  United  States  to  form  combinations  for 


Wilson  Imperialism  325 

the  purpose  of  strengthening  themselves  in  taking  advantage  of  the 
opportunities  of  foreign  competition.  That  is  a  very  serious  matter. 
...  I  want  to  know  how  these  cooperative  methods  can  be  adopted 
for  the  benefit  of  everybody  who  wants  to  use  them,  and  I  say 
frankly,  if  I  can  be  shown  that,  I  am  for  them. 

The  Webb  Bill — exempting  combinations  engaged  in 
foreign  trade  from  the  operation  of  the  anti-trust  laws — 
was  accordingly  introduced,  and  in  every  subsequent  session 
of  Congress  it  was  personally  urged  by  the  President  in 
messages  or  public  statements.  It  failed  repeatedly,  due 
to  opposition  to  it  as  class  legislation  for  the  very  rich. 
The  President  was  finally  able  to  put  it  through  only  under 
cover  of  the  war.  Meanwhile,  so  impatient  was  the  Execu- 
tive in  this  matter  that  he  put  the  provisions  of  the  bill 
into  operation  by  fiat,  more  than  a  year  before  it  passed 
Congress. 

Many  other  bits  of  legislation  designed  to  promote  for- 
eign trade  were  enacted  at  the  instigation  of  President 
Wilson,  as  we  approached  war,  and  during  the  fighting  it- 
self. In  urging  the  Water  Power  Bill,  one  of  the  Adminis- 
tration's arguments,  signed  by  Secretaries  Baker,  Lane, 
and  Houston  (Mar.  3,  1918),  ran  thus:  "There  is  also 
need  of  legislation,  in  order  that  time  may  be  given  to  pre- 
pare for  the  developments  that  must  take  place  after  the 
close  of  the  war,  if  the  United  States  is  to  maintain  its 
proper  place  in  world  trade." 

Under  the  guidance  of  Wilson,  the  Democratic  party, 
in  the  1916  platform,  pledged  itself  to  the  essential  prin- 
ciple of  imperialism  in  the  following  words: 

We  favor  ...  a  fixed  policy  for  the  continuous  development  of 
a  navy  worthy  to  support  the  great  naval  traditions  of  the  United 
States,  and  fully  equal  to  the  international  tasks  which  the  United 
States  hopes  and  expects  to  take  part  in  performing.  .  .  .  The  cir- 
cumstances of  the  last  two  years  have  revealed  necessities  for  inter- 


326  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

national  action  which  no  former  generation  can  have  foreseen.  We 
hold  it  to  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  use  its  power,  not  only 
to  make  itself  safe  at  home,  but  also  to  make  secure  its  just  interests 
throughout  the  world.  .  .  .  The  American  government  should  pro- 
tect American  citizens  in  their  rights  not  only  at  home,  but  abroad, 
and  any  country  having  a  government  should  be  held  to  strict  ac- 
countability for  any  wrongs  done  them,  either  to  person  or  property. 

In  spite  of  this,  during  the  campaign,  President  Wilson 
charged  his  opponents  with  desiring  to  get  in  control  of  the 
government  in  order  "to  put  the  army  and  navy  of  the  Uni- 
ted States  back  of  their  financial  enterprises  in  Mexico  and 
throughout  the  world."  (Oct.  16,  1916.)  During  his 
preparedness-tour  addresses,  as  has  been  seen,  the  Presi- 
dent had  made  it  a  question  of  national  honor  to  put  the 
army  and  navy  back  of  the  business  enterprises  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  abroad. 

Said  Wilson  at  Shadow  Lawn,  on  the  eve  of  the  election 
(Nov.  4)  : 

The  United  States  will  never  again  be  what  it  has  been.  The 
United  States  was  once  in  the  enjoyment  of  what  we  used  to  call 
'splendid  isolation.'  .  .  .  Now  ...  we  have  become  not  the  debt- 
ors but  the  creditors  of  the  world,  and  in  what  other  nations  used  to 
play  in  promoting  industries  which  extended  as  wide  as  the  world 
itself,  we  are  playing  the  leading  part.  We  can  determine  to  a 
large  extent  who  is  to  be  financed  and  who  is  not  to  be  financed. 
...  So  it  does  not  suffice  to  look  back,  as  some  gentlemen  are  look- 
ing, back  over  their  shoulders  .  .  .  for  now  we  are  in  the  great 
drift  of  humanity  which  is  to  determine  the  politics  of  every  coun- 
try in  the  world.  With  this  outlook,  is  it  worth  while  to  stop  to 
think  of  party  advantage? 

Such  quotations  help  to  explain  why  our  international 
bankers  were  not  in  the  least  alarmed,  in  1916,  when  our 
pacifists  and  Liberals  united  to  reelect  Wilson  because  uhe 
kept  us  out  of  war." 


Wilson  Imperialism  327 

Further  explanation  is  found  in  the  course  which  the 
President  was  then  actually  pursuing,  not  merely  in  the 
diplomatic  disputes  with  belligerent  countries,  and  in  the 
matter  of  preparation  for  war,  but  in  his  dealings  with  our 
neighbors,  near  and  far.  The  anti-imperialist  can  find  a 
complete  vindication  of  his  position,  in  the  speeches  and 
state  papers  of  Wilson,  but  the  imperialist  finds  equal  com- 
fort for  his  views  in  the  same  quarter.  The  record  of 
action  will  determine  the  real  nature  of  his  foreign  policy. 
Imperialism  is  not  imperialism  unless  it  has  teeth — the 
teeth  of  armed  public  forces  behind  the  smile  of  diplomacy. 
Did  Wilson's  policy  in  action  differ  in  any  essential  from 
the  policy  of  Imperial  England,  Imperial  Germany,  and 
imperialistic  France? 

It  differed  on  but  two  occasions,  and  in  each  of  the  two 
instances  the  action  was  later  reversed. 

The  second  of  these  two  instances,  relating  to  Wall 
Street  loans  to  belligerent  governments,  has  already  been 
mentioned.  (Chapter  VII.)  The  first  had  to  do  with  a 
loan  to  China.  Soon  after  coming  to  power,  President 
Wilson  refused  diplomatic  support  to  the  Wall  Street  end 
of  a  proposed  "consortium"  loan  to  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment, in  which  financiers  of  England,  France,  Germany, 
Russia,  Japan,  and  the  United  States  had  arranged  to  par- 
ticipate. As  a  result  of  Wilson's  declaration  that  the 
scheme  "touches  very  nearly  the  sovereignty  of  China," 
the  American  bankers  withdrew,  and  Wilson's  name  was 
hailed  throughout  the  world  as  that  of  a  genuine  anti- 
imperialist.  But  in  1919,  under  the  aegis  of  Wilson,  the 
American  bankers  went  into  a  reorganized  China  consor- 
tium, paralleling  in  every  principle  and  purpose  the  old  one. 

The  President,  indeed,  had  reversed  himself  as  early  as 
1916  on  this  particular  question.  November  16  of  that 
year,  a  State  Department  letter  pledging  diplomatic  sup- 


328  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

port  to  a  loan  by  American  bankers,  and  the  enterprises 
behind  it,  was  given  to  the  press.     It  read: 

Gentlemen : 

I  have  read  the  contract  between  yourselves  and  the  republic 
of  China  with  reference  to  a  loan  of  $5,000,000  for  a  period 
of  three  years,  and  I  have  to  say  in  reply  to  your  oral  request  for  a 
statement  of  the  policy  of  this  department,  respecting  such  loans,  that 
the  Department  of  State  is  always  gratified  to  see  the  republic  of 
China  receive  financial  assistance  from  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  it  is  the  policy  of  this  department,  now  as  in  the  past,  to 
give  all  proper  support  and  protection  to  the  legitimate  enterprises 
abroad  of  American  citizens. 

I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Robert  Lansing. 

That  these  words  were  not  a  mere  polite  "bon  voyage" 
to  the  adventuring  American  dollars  was  soon  made  mani- 
fest. The  particular  loan,  to  which  the  published  state- 
ment of  the  Secretary  of  State  referred,  was  secured  by  a 
mortgage  upon  wine  and  tobacco  taxes.  Another  loan, 
floated  at  about  the  same  time,  involved  a  contract  for  the 
construction  of  a  railroad  and  the  improvement  of  a  canal 
by  the  Siems-Carey  Railway  &  Canal  Company,  a  subsid- 
iary of  the  American  International  Corporation;  in  other 
words,  it  was  tied  to  a  government  concession  promising 
large  profits. 

In  pursuance  of  its  policy  of  establishing  a  modernized 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  the  benefit  of  Japanese  capitalists  in 
the  Far  East,  the  Japanese  government  promptly  made  rep- 
resentations to  the  Wilson  Government,  objecting  to  the 
first  loan  on  the  ground  that  it  was  political  in  its  nature, 
and  to  the  second  on  the  ground  that  the  enterprise  came 
into  conflict  with  concessions  held  by  Japanese  citizens. 

The  French,  Russian,  and  British  governments,  at  the 
instance  of  French,  Russian,  and  British  financiers,  regis- 


Wilson  Imperialism  329 

tered  similar  protests,  but  the  sharpest  issue  was  made  by 
the  Japanese.  The  diplomatic  correspondence  is  still  a  se- 
cret, but  the  attitude  of  our  government  was  sufficiently  re- 
vealed to  make  it  quite  certain  that  Lansing's  term,  "all 
proper  diplomatic  support  and  protection,"  meant  conven- 
tional support  and  protection,  nothing  less. 

The  crisis  brought  Viscount  Ishii  to  America  on  his 
special  mission."  How  near  the  two  governments  came 
to  an  open  break  over  a  profiteering  contract  gouged  out 
of  the  weak  and  needy  Chinese,  the  American  public  may 
never  know.  The  signed  statement  of  Lansing,  published 
coincidently  with  the  so-called  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement 
(Nov.  7,  1917),  suggests  that  actual  hostilities  were  nearer 
than  any  one  not  on  the  inside  could  have  suspected.  The 
agreement  dissipated  that  particular  crisis,  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  both  governments  expressed  themselves  as 
delighted.  What  the  real  understanding  was  remained  a 
matter  of  speculation;  for  the  published  version,  to  any 
one  familiar  with  the  processes  of  secret  diplomacy,  is  ob- 
viously a  blind. 

The  published  version  appears,  on  its  face,  however,  to 
record  a  victory  for  Japan,  as  it  registers  a  recognition  by 
the  United  States  of  Japanese  special  interests  in  China. 
It  is  self-evidently  hypocritical;  for,  while  professing  to 
guarantee  the  integrity  and  sovereignty  of  China,  it  vio- 
lates it,  and  was  protested  against  for  this  reason  by  the 
Chinese  government. 

The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  is  a  conventionally  impe- 
rialistic document,  arrived  at  by  conventionally  imperialistic 
paths.  The  character  of  the  new  consortium  is  the  same. 
These  things  begin  to  show  how  far  America  has  gone 
afield  to  exploit  weaker  countries  and  to  risk  future  war 
through  competition  in  such  business  with  the  Old  World 
predatory  powers. 


XXXII 

MEXICO 

FOR  the  completed  picture  of  our  recent  imperialism,  it  is 
necessary  to  look  nearer  home.  In  words  we  find  Presi- 
dent Wilson  playing  two  roles  here,  as  elsewhere. 

Before  we  injected  ourselves  into  European  affairs,  Pres- 
ident Wilson  had  promised  equality  to  Latin  America: 
"All  the  governments  of  America  stand,  so  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  upon  a  footing  of  genuine  equality  and  unques- 
tioned independence."  (Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  7, 
1915.)  Yet  the  following  month  (Jan.  27,  1916),  he  was 
telling  us:  "What  America  has  to  fear,  if  she  has  anything 
to  fear,  are  indirect,  roundabout,  flank  movements  upon  her 
regnant  position  in  the  western  hemisphere" — and  sugges- 
ted a  willingness  to  fight  to  maintain  such  position.  But 
how  can  a  government  claiming  a  "regnant  position"  among 
a  group  of  nations  also  profess  to  stand  for  "genuine  equal- 
ity?" 

In  his  Mobile  speech  (Oct.  27,  1913),  President  Wilson 
revealed  a  clear  understanding  of  the  conventional  imperial- 
istic devices  through  which  weak  countries  nowadays  are 
drawn  under  the  dominion  of  the  strong,  and  even  promised 
the  Latin  American  countries  emancipation  from  such  sub- 
jection: 

There  is  one  peculiarity  about  the  history  of  the  Latin  American 
states  which  I  am  sure  they  are  keenly  aware  of.  You  hear  of  'con- 
cessions' to  foreign  capitalists  in  Latin  America.  You  do  not  hear 
of  concessions  to  foreign  capitalists  in  the  United  States,  .  .  .  and 
states  that  are  obliged,  because  their  territory  does  not  lie  within 

330 


+  lta     T-fioiti 


Mexico  331 


the  main  field  of  modern  enterprise  and  action,  to  grant  concessions, 
are  in  this  condition,  that  foreign  interests  are  apt  to  dominate  their 
domestic  affairs,  a  condition  of  affairs  always  dangerous  and  apt  to  be- 
come intolerable.  What  these  states  are  going  to  see,  therefore,  is 
an  emancipation  from  the  subordination,  which  has  been  inevitable, 
to  foreign  enterprise.  .  .  .  They  have  had  harder  bargains  driven  with 
them  in  the  matter  of  loans  than  any  other  peoples  in  the  world. 
Interest  has  been  exacted  of  them  that  has  not  been  exacted  of  any- 
body else,  because  the  risk  was  said  to  be  greater ;  and  then  securities 
were  taken  that  destroyed  that  risk — an  admirable  arrangement  for 
those  who  were  forcing  the  terms!  I  rejoice  in  nothing  so  much 
as  the  prospect  that  they  will  now  be  emancipated  from  these  con- 
ditions. 

Pledges  of  this  character  were  repeated  periodically 
through  the  next  five  years.  Yet  when,  in  July,  1916,  Sen- 
ator LaFollette  offered  an  amendment  to  the  Naval  Ap- 
propriation Bill  providing  that  none  of  the  ships  authorized 
therein  should  be  used  "in  any  manner  to  coerce  or  compel 
the  collection  of  any  pecuniary  claim  of  any  kind,  class 
or  nature,  or  to  enforce  any  claim  of  right  to  any  grant  or 
concession  for  or  on  behalf  of  any  private  citizen,  copart- 
nership, or  corporation,  of  the  United  States,"  the  amend- 
ment did  not  meet  with  Presidential  approval,  and  it  was 
lost.  Moreover,  in  opposing  it,  Senator  Lewis,  the  Demo- 
cratic "whip,"  told  his  colleagues  that  if  they  voted  for  it 
they  voted  "to  impeach  the  Administration  of  President 
Wilson." 

Where  did  the  Senator  get  that? 

From  Wilson's  record  in  Latin  America,  particularly  in 
Santo  Domingo,  Haiti,  Nicaragua,  and  Mexico. 

Americans  know,  in  a  hazy  way,  that  under  "anti-imperia- 
list" Wilson  we  undertook  a  military  occupation  of  Santo 
Domingo  and  Haiti,  maintained  American  forces  perma- 
nently in  Nicaragua,  and  perpetrated  two  notable  invasions 


332  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

of  Mexico.  Have  they  duly  reflected  that  each  of  these 
four  countries  won  its  independence  by  means  similar  to 
those  by  which  the  American  republic  won  its  independence ; 
that  they  were  recognized  as  sovereign  and  independent 
powers  by  the  United  States;  that  war  was  not  declared 
against  any  of  them;  that  an  act  of  invasion  constitutes  an 
act  of  war;  that,  in  sending  armed  public  forces  into  these 
countries,  the  President  not  only  violated  the  letter  and 
spirit  of  international  law,  and  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  but  that  he  made  a  mock- 
ery of  every  pretense  of  adherence  to  the  principle  of  the 
equality  of  nations? 

What  was  the  nature  and  purpose  of  President  Wilson's 
Mexican  policy?  The  President  himself  gave  answers  ir- 
reconcilable one  with  another. 

On  the  same  day  that  he  was  giving  to  Congress  the  most 
solemn  pledge  of  "scrupulous  regard  to  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  Mexico,"  he  was  wiring  our  consuls  to 
threaten  the  Mexicans  with  intervention.  While  assuring 
Mexico  and  the  world  that  he  was  concerned  solely  for  the 
interests  of  Mexico,  he  was  telling  Congress  that  the  for- 
tunes of  Americans  in  that  country  would  be  well  looked 
after.  Although  at  one  time  he  repudiated  the  big  brother 
role  for  America,  at  other  times  he  urged  it  as  an  excuse 
for  his  Mexican  meddling.  Time  after  time  he  told  his 
audiences  that  Mexico  had  a  right  to  take  as  long  as  she 
liked  in  settling  her  affairs;  meanwhile  he  was  telling  Mex- 
ico she  would  better  hurry  or  he  would  step  in  and  do  the 
settling.  While  pledging  himself  before  the  American 
people  never  to  coerce  Mexico,  he  was  employing  all  forms 
of  coercion,  including  verbal  threats  which  contradicted  his 
pledges.  While  promising  the  American  people  not  to 
overwhelm  Mexico  with  force,  he  was  threatening  to  over- 


Mexico  333 

whelm  the  strongest  and  most  popular  Mexican  party  with 
force.  When,  while  professing  to  oppose  Huerta,  he 
placed  an  embargo  on  arms,  causing  greater  embarrassment 
to  Huerta's  enemies  than  to  Huerta,  he  defended  the  action 
as  in  accordance  with  "the  best  practice  of  nations  in  the 
matter  of  neutrality,"  but,  when  he  raised  the  same  em- 
bargo, he  characterized  it  as  "a  departure  from  the  ac- 
cepted practices  of  neutrality."  To  the  American  people 
he  pledged  himself  "eventually"  to  fight  American  conces- 
sionaires in  Mexico;  eventually  he  informed  the  Mexican 
government  that  he  was  willing  to  fight  for  American  con- 
cessionaires, although  over  so  insignificant  a  question  as 
taxes.  When  he  sent  an  army  into  Mexico  "after  Villa," 
he  promised  that  it  would  not  be  used  "in  the  interest  of 
American  owners  of  Mexican  properties";  long  after  the 
Villa  chase  was  ended,  he  virtually  admitted,  through  a 
member  of  his  cabinet,  that  the  troops  were  still  held  in 
Mexico  in  the  interest  of  American  owners  of  Mexican 
properties.1 

The  varying  points  of  view  cannot  be  separated  chrono- 
logically; the  contradictions  are  not  explainable  on  any 
theory  of  a  change  of  policy.  The  conclusion  is  inevitable 
that  President  Wilson  played  the  role  of  anti-imperialist  in 
order  to  mask  a  course  of  imperialistic  purpose. 

True,  our  Chief  Executive  stopped  short  of  a  war  of 
conquest  upon  Mexico.  Did  he  refrain  because  of  any 
question  of  principle?  What  principle  could  hold  him  back 
from  war  upon  Mexico,  while  permitting  him  to  make  war 
upon  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo? 

It  must  have  been  a  question  of  expediency.  There  were 
arresting  circumstances  in  the  case  of  Mexico  that  did  not 
exist  in  the  case  of  her  weaker  neighbors — circumstances 
which  any  other  President,  equally  with  Wilson,  would  have 

1  For  quotations  see  Appendix,  pp.  438-443. 


334  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

had  to  consider.  The  theory  that  Mexico  owed  her  safety, 
at  any  time,  to  the  fact  that  one  Woodrow  Wilson  hap- 
pened to  be  President  of  the  United  States,  is  unsound. 

An  arresting  circumstance  of  a  most  decisive  nature  was 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  relative  power.  The  Executive 
was  in  a  position  to  make  war  on  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo 
almost  in  secret,  without  even  calling  the  matter  to  the  at- 
tention of  Congress,  without  asking  for  special  appropria- 
tions for  the  purpose,  without  selling  Liberty  Bonds,  with- 
out conscription,  without  a  vast  machine  of  "education" 
and  terror  to  keep  the  American  people  under  control. 
But  Mexico  he  could  not  conquer  personally  and  pri- 
vately. 

Does  this  mean  that  the  efforts  of  our  President  to  serve 
Wall  Street  in  Mexico  were  a  failure? 

Not  at  all.  The  aim  of  imperialism  is  not  conquest  pri- 
marily, but  control.  Conquest  is  resorted  to  only  as  a 
means  to  the  measure  of  political  control  essential  to  the 
"proper  protection"  of  property  "rights."  If  the  desired 
political  control  can  be  procured  without  the  expense  and 
risk  of  war,  so  much  the  better. 

Especially  in  countries  having  capacity  for  stubborn  re- 
sistance, imperialism  proceeds  more  or  less  cautiously,  re- 
sorting to  a  series  of  well-tried  tricks  and  maneuvers.  Al- 
though Wilson  did  not  see  his  way  towards  making  an  open 
effort  at  the  conquest  of  Mexico,  his  efforts  to  control  were 
unceasing,  and  the  friction  and  agitation  accompanying  such 
efforts  tended  to  prepare  the  way  to  conquer  when  the 
time  is  ripe.  Intervention  is  intervention,  even  though  it 
does  not  go  beyond  the  field  of  diplomacy — and  it  is  suc- 
cessful intervention  exactly  to  the  extent  to  which  it  suc- 
ceeds, through  threats  or  otherwise,  in  imposing  the  will 
of  the  stronger  government  upon  the  weaker.  The  threat 
to  use  an  army,  veiled  as  it  may  be  in  diplomatic  language, 


Mexico  335 

is  hardly  less  grave  an  offense  than  the  use  of  the  army  it- 
self. 

Almost  from  the  day  Woodrow  Wilson  took  office,  the 
threat  of  armed  force  was  held  over  Mexico,  with  intent  to 
mold  Mexico's  domestic  affairs  in  accordance  with  the 
wishes  of  Wall  Street.  The  Wilson  threats  cover  every 
question  remotely  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  foreign- 
ers. They  touch  every  important  item  of  the  revolution- 
ary programme,  and  have  proven  the  greatest  obstacle  to 
Mexican  reform  since  the  time  of  Huerta. 

Representations  were  almost  invariably  accompanied  by 
some  form  of  coercion.  The  refusal  to  recognize  Huerta 
in  the  beginning  was  a  form  of  coercion.  Wilson's  refusal 
to  recognize  Huerta  was  approved  by  anti-imperialists 
everywhere;  it  contributed  greatly  to  his  reputation  as  an 
enemy  of  imperialism;  by  this  very  fact  it  placed  him  in  a 
position  to  serve  imperialism  more  effectively  than  he 
would  have  been  able  to  serve  it  otherwise. 

But  why  did  Wilson  refuse  to  recognize  Huerta?  He 
sought  to  lead  the  world  to  believe  it  was  because,  as  a 
democrat,  he  could  not  approve  of  any  government  "stained 
by  blood  or  supported  by  anything  but  the  consent  of  the 
governed."  But  what  becomes  of  such  pretensions  when 
Wilson  himself  set  up  blood-stained  governments  in  Haiti 
and  Santo  Domingo,  and  employed  our  armed  forces  to 
protect  a  blood-stained  government  set  up  by  the  previous 
administration  in  Nicaragua? 

Wilson  was  in  the  beginning  not  unalterably  opposed  to 
the  recognition  of  Huerta.  I  take  the  following  Washing- 
ton dispatch  from  the  New  York  World,  April  n,  1913: 

When  asked  about  it  this  afternoon,  President  Wilson  said  the  de 
facto  government  of  Mexico  would  be  recognized  as  the  new  provi- 
sional government  when  it  had  worked  out  the  problem  now  before 
it — the  establishment  of  peace. 


336  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

In  a  speech,  November,  1913,  defending  England's  rec- 
ognition of  Huerta,  Prime  Minister  Asquith  told  Parlia- 
ment: 

We  were  informed  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  that, 
as  regarded  the  recognition  of  Huerta,  no  definite  answer  could  be 
given,  except  that  they  would  wait  some  time  longer  before  recogniz- 
ing him. 

It  was  evidently  with  ultimate  recognition  in  view  that 
Wilson  retained,  as  ambassador  to  the  court  of  Huerta, 
Henry  Lane  Wilson,  who  had  assisted  in  setting  up  the 
Huerta  regime  and  who,  so  long  as  he  remained,  was 
Hucrta's  most  conspicuous  apologist  and  support. 

It  was  evidently  with  ultimate  recognition  in  view,  also, 
that  for  176  days  after  his  inauguration,  Wilson  permitted 
agents  of  Huerta  to  purchase  arms  in  the  United  States  and 
ship  them  without  interference;  while  at  the  same  time  the 
enemies  of  Huerta,  when  caught  trying  to  export  arms, 
were  thrown  into  jail  and  their  shipments  confiscated. 

Wilson  did  turn  definitely  against  Huerta  in  August. 
Why?  The  mission  of  John  Lind  is  still  shrouded  in  mys- 
tery, and  it  is  impossible  to  state  the  full  conditions  de- 
manded at  that  time  by  Wilson.  Subsequent  events  make 
it  quite  certain  that  what  Wilson  sought  was,  literally,  to 
"maintain  the  dignity  and  authority  of  the  United  States," 
as  he  told  Congress  when  he  took  Vera  Cruz — particularly 
to  impose  the  authority  of  the  United  States  upon  Mexico; 
to  procure  from  Mexico,  if  possible,  an  admission  of  the 
right  of  the  United  States  to  dictate  in  Mexican  affairs, 
which  would  mark  the  end  of  Mexican  sovereignty. 

Wilson  pretended  to  Congress  that  he  had  to  employ 
the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  to  compel  Huerta 
to  salute  the  flag.  It  was  a  matter  of  principle.  Huerta 
had  offered  to  salute  the  flag  if  Wilson  would  at  the  same 
time  salute  the  Mexican  flag.  That  did  not  satisfy  Wil- 


Mexico  337 

son.  It  looked  too  much  like  equality.  The  regnant  posi- 
tion of  America  must  be  maintained.  At  Tampico  some 
sailors  had  landed  at  a  dock  at  which  they  had  been  warned 
not  to  land,  the  city  being  under  siege  by  the  Constitution- 
alist forces.  These  sailors  were  arrested,  taken  part  way 
uptown,  brought  back,  and  an  apology  offered.  There 
had  been  no  violence.  For  this  offense  Huerta  was  com- 
manded to  salute  the  flag.  In  April,  1919,  Japanese  sol- 
diers arrested  an  American  officer  who  was  leaving  a  theatre 
in  China,  handled  him  roughly  and  threatened  him  with  the 
bayonet.  Nobody  asked  the  Japanese  government  to  salute 
the  American  flag.  There  happened  to  be  no  occasion,  at 
that  time,  to  require  Japan  to  bow  to  uthe  dignity  and 
authority  of  the  United  States." 

When  Wilson  occupied  Vera  Cruz,  he  sent  a  friendly 
note  to  Carranza,  omitting  to  mention  the  dignity  and  au- 
thority of  the  United  States,  but  hinting  that  the  action 
was  taken  to  serve  the  cause  of  Carranza.  Had  Carranza 
not  protested  against  the  invasion,  he  would  have  fallen 
into  a  trap  evidently  designed  to  catch  him.  Tacitly,  at 
least,  he  would  have  recognized  the  dignity  and  authority 
of  the  United  States — its  authority  to  invade  Mexico  at 
pleasure. 

It  was  not  Wilson's  first  effort  to  trap  Carranza.  In 
November,  1913,  the  President  dispatched  a  personal 
agent,  one  William  Bayard  Hale,  to  Carranza  to  lay  down 
the  conditions  under  which  Carranza  would  be  recognized 
by  Wilson.  Secret  diplomacy  also  shrouds  the  Hale  pro- 
posals. Their  nature  may  be  guessed  from  a  statement 
issued  by  Carranza  on  breaking  off  the  Hale  interviews: 
"We  will  accept  no  transactions,  nor  the  interference  of 
any  nation  to  regulate  Mexico's  interior  conditions." 

All  that  Carranza  asked  of  the  United  States  was  equal 
rights  with  Huerta  in  the  purchase  and  export  of  arms. 


338  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

This  right  was  not  accorded  him  until  Wilson  had  been 
President  of  the  United  States  for  eleven  months.  Recog- 
nition was  withheld  for  nearly  two  years  after  the  Hale 
interviews. 

Once  American  forces  were  ensconced  in  Vera  Cruz, 
Wilson  forgot  to  renew  his  demand  that  Huerta  salute  the 
flag.  Nor  did  he  capture  Huerta's  shipload  of  arms — 
supposed  to  have  been  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  inva- 
sion. 

Wilson  is  credited  with  having  caused  the  downfall  of 
Huerta,  but  when  the  Vera  Cruz  assault  occurred,  the  Con- 
stitutionalist armies  had  already  won  the  series  of  victories 
which  decided  the  assassin's  end. 

At  least,  the  fall  of  Huerta  is  supposed  to  have  been 
Wilson's  purpose  in  occupying  Vera  Cruz,  and  incidentally 
killing  some  two  hundred  residents  thereof.  Why,  then, 
did  he  forthwith  renew  the  arms  embargo  against  the  Con- 
stitutionalists, who  were  also  fighting  to  down  Huerta? 
Why,  then,  did  he  stay  in  Vera  Cruz  four  months  after 
Huerta  had  fled? 

Is  it  conceivable  that  Wilson  did  not  go  down  to  Vera 
Cruz  either  to  get  the  flag  saluted,  to  help  the  Constitution- 
alists, or  even  to  hurry  the  fall  of  Huerta,  but  that  the 
occupation  was  one  maneuver  in  a  scheme  to  dictate  who 
should  succeed  Huerta — and  under  what  conditions? 

The  facts  that  support  this  view  seem  to  have  been  gener- 
ally overlooked.  Wilson  accepted  the  mediation  of  the 
A-B-C  governments  on  the  condition  that  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  Mexico  and  the  selection  of  a  new  provisional  pres- 
ident should  come  into  the  discussion.  Wilson  was  as 
anxious/  to  eliminate  Carranza  as  Huerta.  But  Carranza 
declined  mediation  on  such  terms,  and  triumphed  in  spite 
of  the  opposition  of  Wilson.  Our  forces  remained  in 
Vera  Cruz  for  four  months  after  Huerta  fled,  and  were 


Mexico  339 

withdrawn  only  after  the  announcement  had  been  blazoned 
in  Washington  that  the  early  triumph  of  Villa  was  assured. 

After  the  failure  of  his  effort  to  arrive  at  the  political 
control  of  Mexico  through  the  mediation  conference,  Wil- 
son simply  decided  to  assert  the  dignity  and  authority  of 
the  United  States  through  the  medium  of  Pancho  Villa. 
A  Wilson  consular  agent  became  Villa's  closest  adviser. 
(An  American  general  carried  to  Villa  Wilson's  pledge  that 
he  would  never,  under  any  circumstances,  recognize  Car- 
ranza.  The  State  Department  was  turned  into  a  Villa 
press  agency.  American  oil  and  mining  interests  looked 
with  favor  upon  Villa.  Villa  gave  to  Wilson  pledges  of 
"proper  protection"  to  Wall  Street  investments,  and  Wil- 
son diplomacy  assisted  Villa  and  hindered  Carranza  in  al- 
most countless  ways. 

When  Villa  succeeded  in  capturing  Mexico  City,  Wilson 
demanded  that  the  city  and  the  routes  to  it  from  Vera 
Cruz  be  "neutralized" — which  would  have  made  it  impos- 
sible ever  to  oust  Villa. 

When  the  hemp  kings  gained  the  ascendency  temporarily 
over  the  Carranza  garrison  in  Yucatan,  Wilson  prohibited 
Carranza  from  blockading  the  port  of  Progreso,  as  a 
means  to  recovering  the  state,  and  dispatched  a  warship 
to  make  sure  that  there  should  be  no  blockade. 

Even  after  Villa  had  been  decisively  beaten,  Wilson  con- 
tinued to  maintain  an  arms  embargo  against  Carranza,  ren- 
dering operations  of  the  latter  more  difficult,  and  opening 
the  way  for  the  Columbus  raid.  Even  after  the  Columbus 
raid,  Wilson  maintained  his  arms  embargo,  rendering  it 
impossible  for  Carranza  effectively  to  police  the  border — 
at  the  same  time  justifying  his  "punitive  expedition"  by  the 
conditions  for  which  the  embargo  was  responsible. 

During  his)  entire  administration,  down  to  Carranza's 
downfall,  Wilson  employed  his  authority  to  embargo  arms 


340  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

as  a  powerful  means  of  coercion  to  persuade  the  latter  to 
come  to  the  Wall  Street-Wilson  view  as  to  the  "dignity  and 
authority  of  the  United  States." 

When  the  Mexican- American  joint  commission  met  to 
arrange  for  the  withdrawal  of  American  troops,  the  Mexi- 
can delegates  came  prepared  to  enter  into  any  reciprocal 
arrangements  suggested,  and  to  concur  in  any  plan  intended 
to  prevent  future  raids.  They  discovered  to  their  surprise, 
that  the  American  delegates  did  not  come  to  talk  about 
protecting  the  border  against  raids,  but  to  talk  about  oil 
taxes,  mining  decrees,  and — in  the  words  of  Chairman  Lane 
— other  "rights  that  are  vested" 

Although  Villa  was  not  caught,  the  American  forces  had 
killed  several  hundred  Mexicans,  and!  in  April,  General 
Scott,  representing  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
had  signed  a  memorandum  to  the  effect  that  the  dispersion 
of  the  Villa  bands  had  been  completed  and  that,  therefore, 
no  reason  remained  why  the  troops  should  not  be  with- 
drawn. 

Nevertheless,  for  nine  long  months  after  the  Scott  state- 
ment, the  American  army  was  held  on  Mexican  soil  while 
Woodrow  Wilson,  through  Franklin  K.  Lane,  and  others, 
was  (attempting  to  browbeat  Carranza  into  yielding  to 
American  capital  in  Mexico  the  guarantees  desired  by  the 
Rockefellers,  and  Guggenheims,  the  Dodges  and  the  Do- 
henys. 

Wilson  finally  recognized  Carranza,  only  after  being 
urged  to  do  so  by  Argentine,  Brazil,  and  Chili,  and  after 
repeated  maneuvers  to  oust  him  in  favor  of  reactionary  ele- 
ments had  failed. 

Wilson  finally  withdrew  the  American  army  from  Mex- 
ico in  February,  1917,  only  to  prepare  it  for  action  against 
Germany. 

The  result  of  the  Wilson  policy  is  that  the  aims  which 


Mexico  341 

tWilson  set  out  to  realize  have  been  partially  realized,  and 
stand  in  a  fair  way  to  be  realized  in  full. 

While  all  the  Wilson  maneuvers  and  aggressions  did  not 
succeed — due  to  the  astuteness  and  patience  of  Carranza — 
in  procuring  from  the  latter  an  express  recognition  of  the 
"dignity  and  authority  of  the  United  States" — an  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  of  inequality — a  concession  of  the 
authority  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  to  dic- 
tate in  the  affairs  of  Mexico — they  tended  to  defeat  every 
purpose  that  Wilson  ever  professed  to  serve — Mexican 
reform,  pacification  of  the  country,  security  for  American 
lives,  except  the  one  purpose  of  protecting  vested  interests. 

It  is  obvious  that  sweeping  reforms  cannot  be  applied 
to  the  portion  of  any  given  industry  controlled  by  natives, 
without  at  the  same  time  applying  them  to  the  portion  of 
the  industry  controlled  by  foreigners. 

It  is  easily  understood  how  a  government,  say,  in  the 
United  States,  which  essayed  to  lay  war  taxes  upon  corpora- 
tions owned  entirely  by  Americans,  while  remitting  the 
taxes  upon  similar  corporations  having  foreign  stockhold- 
ers, could  not  last. 

Americans  can  figure  out  for  themselves  how  long  an 
American  President  would  last  who  negotiated,  say,  over 
Japanese  "rights"  in  California,  while  a  Japanese  army 
was  encamped  on  American  soil. 

Although,  in  the  end,  the  Carranza  regime  was  a  failure 
— although  Carranza  in  the  end  succumbed  to  the  forces 
against  him — the  greatest  force  against  him  was  the  big 
stick  of  "anti-imperialist"  Wilson.  Wilson  made  it  im- 
possible for  Carranza  to  "deliver  the  goods"  to  the  Mexi- 
can people.  Wilson  helped  to  make  the  Obregon  revolu- 
tion not  only  possible,  but  necessary.  But  towards  Obre- 
gon Wilson  pursued  the  same  policy,  in  principle,  as  to- 
wards Carranza.  As  the  condition  for  the  recognition  of 


342  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Obregon,  he  accepted  the  terms  of  Albert  B.  Fall,  which 
were  also  the  terms!  of  the  great  financial  and  industrial 
interests.  When  Obregon  rejected  these  terms,  Wilson 
turned  the  new  Mexican  president  over  to  the  tender  mer- 
cies of  his  Republican  successors. 

The  Wilson  policy  in  action  was  a  consistent  policy  ol 
intervention,  the  aim  being  to  control  Mexico  politically  for 
the  benefit  of  American  capital;  a  policy  looking  toward 
war  should  it  become  impossible  to  impose  the  desired  con- 
trol by  less  expensive  means;  meanwhile,  to  prepare  the 
way  for  easy  conquest  when  the  time  is  ripe.  This  is  pre- 
cisely the  Wall  Street  policy. 


XXXIII 

VIRGIN  ISLANDS,   HAITI,   SANTO  DOMINGO,  AND  NICARAGUA 

There  is  not  a  foot  of  territory  belonging  to  any  nation  which 
this  nation  covets  or  desires.  (Woodrow  Wilson,  Jan.  29,  1916.) 

ALTHOUGH  the  American  public  apparently  swallowed  the 
misleading  reports  of  the  press  as  to  our  acquisition  of  the 
Virgin  Islands,  the  Danish  public  was  not  so  gullible,  and 
the  Danish  government  was  forced  to  reveal  a  little  of  its 
true  inwardness.  The  Danish  foreign  minister  had  to  ad- 
mit that  he  favored  the  "sale"  only  because  "retention  of 
the  islands  might  possibly  involve  Denmark  in  interna- 
tional complications."  Edward  Brandes,  the  finance  minis- 
ter, informed  the  Lower  House  (Aug.  10,  1916),  that  the 
Danish  government  "had  no  alternative  but  to  accede  to 
the  desire  of  the  United  States."  Brandes  revealed  the 
fact  that  Denmark  had  rejected  an  offer  to  purchase  in 
1913,  as  it  "had  no  desire  to  lower  the  Danish  flag  without 
cogent  reasons." 

What  can  this  mean  except  that  little  Denmark  simply 
bowed  to  a  threat  of  force  by  the  great  American  "democ- 
racy?" 

The  one  thing  that  we  learned  from  our  own  govern- 
ment was  that,  in  consideration  of  the  yielding  of  Denmark, 
the  United  States  would  "not  object  to  the  Danish  govern- 
ment extending  its  political  and  economic  interests  to  the 
whole  of  Greenland" 

Who  gave  us  the  right  to  say  what  should  become  of 
Greenland? 

Finally,  the  Danish  foreign  minister  disclosed  the  fact 

343 


344  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

that  he  had  suggested  leaving  the  question  of  the  transfer 
to  a  referendum  of  the  population  of  the  islands,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principle  of  self-determination,  but  that 
"the  United  States  refused  to  sanction  it." 

More  than  one  hundred  years  ago,  after  desperate  fight- 
ing, now  against  France  and  now  against  England,  the 
inhabitants  of  Haiti,  like  those  of  the  American  colonies, 
won  their  independence  from  European  domination.  Un- 
til the  regime  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  sovereign  republic 
of  the  United  States  recognized  the  smaller  republic  of 
Haiti  as  equally  sovereign. 

Here  arc  the  salient  facts  of  the  Haitian  conquest,  as 
gleaned  from  the  meagre  news  dispatches  of  that  period: 

1.  That  American  forces  invaded  Haiti  July  27,  1915, 
following  a  revolution  in  which  President  Guillame  Sam 
was  killed  by  a  "mob." 

2.  That,    previously   to    the    revolution,    the   American 
State  Department  had  been  pressing  upon  Sam  a  "conven- 
tion" signing  away  the  sovereignty  of  Haiti;  that  Sam  was 
on  the  point  of  yielding;  that  the  revolution  grew  out  of 
patriotic  opposition  to  the  treaty;  that,  therefore,  our  own 
government  caused  the  very  revolution  which  occasioned 
the  intervention. 

3.  That,  July  30,  it  was  announced  from  Washington 
that  "the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  would  remain 
on  Haitian  soil  pending  negotiations  of  an  arrangement 
whereby   the   United   States   would   assume   control   over 
Haiti's   financial   affairs"— a   confession  that   intervention 
was  not  to  "restore  order,"  but  to  cram  the  convention 
down  the  throat  of  Haiti,  regardless  of  order  or  disorder. 

4.  That  Admiral  Caperton  at  once  began  to  impose  a 
military  dictatorship  over  Haiti.     August  4,  he  dispersed 
>he  government  army,  compelling  its  commander  to  resign. 


Haiti  345 


He  dissolved  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  named  by  the 
opposition  leader,  Bobo,  and  attacked  Bobo's  forces,  both 
in  the  capital  and  at  Cape  Haitien.  August  6,  he  seized 
the  government  gunboat  the  "Pacifique,"  and  disarmed  the 
forces  in  charge  of  it. 

5.  That,  August  24,  the  Haitian  National  Assembly  was 
called  together   in  the   National  Palace,   surrounded  by 
American  bayonets,  presented  with  a  draft  of  a  conven- 
tion prepared  by  the  American  State  Department,  and  was 
ordered  to   ratify  the  convention  without  discussion  and 
within   24  hours;  that  the  National  Assembly  was  over- 
whelmingly opposed  to  the  convention,  and  permission  to 
discuss  it  was  given,  and  the  time  extended,  only  after  the 
members  had  threatened  to  resign  in  a  body. 

6.  That  the  Wilson  Government  did  not  await  the  rati- 
fication of  the  convention,  either  by  the  Haitian  National 
Assembly  or  by  the  United  States  Senate,  but  began  at 
once  putting  its  provisions  into  effect.     August  27,  Caper- 
ton  began  seizing  customhouses,  collecting  the  customs  and 
disarming  all  Haitians.     September  4,  because  of  general 
opposition  to  the  American  invasion,  Caperton  proclaimed 
martial  law  in  the  entire  territory  occupied  by  his  forces. 
Before  the  end  of  September,  2,000  American  marines  were 
operating  against  Haitian  nationalists,  thereafter  termed 
"bandits." 

7.  That  resistance  to  the  American  dictatorship,  which 
began  with  the  landing  of  American  marines,  did  not  cease 
with  the  enforced  ratification  of  the  convention;  that  the 
armed  forces  of  the  United  States  engaged  in  a  prolonged 
war  of  conquest,  in  which  thousands  of  patriotic  Haitians 
and  a  few  Americans  lost  their  lives. 

The  Haitian  National  Assembly  signed  the  convention 
under  duress,  September  1 6,   1915.     Its  text  was  secret, 
[anuary   n,    1916,   the  President  sent  it  secretly  to  the 


346  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  the  Senate.  The  Com- 
mittee ordered  it  printed  in  confidence  for  the  use  of  the 
Senate  only.  Between  January  n  and  February  28,  the 
Committee  conducted  secret  hearings.  Not  a  line  of  the 
hearings  was  ever  printed,  even  for  the  confidential  use  of 
Senators.  Finally,  February  28,  meeting  in  executive  ses- 
sion, the  Senate  ratified  the  convention,  after  which  the 
bare  instrument  was  printed. 

The  brief  convention  itself  reveals  a  few  things. 

Article  2  puts  the  financial  affairs  of  the  republic  in  the 
hands  of  the  United  States,  through  a  general  receiver  and 
a  financial  adviser  named  by  the  President. 

Article  10  puts  the  police  power  in  the  hands  of  the 
Uniteol  States,  through  a  constabulary,  urban  and  rural, 
organized  and  officered  by  Americans  named  by  the  Presi- 
dent. 

Article  13  puts  "the  development  of  the  natural  resour- 
ces" in  the  hands  of  the  United  States,  through  Americans 
named  by  the  President. 

Finance — police  powers — public  works.  What  re- 
mained of  the  sovereign  republic  of  Haiti  ? 

Even  the  foreign  affairs  were  taken  over  by  Americans, 
and  in  due  course  the  "republic"  of  Haiti  declared  war 
upon  Germany  under  the  direction  of  the  United  States. 

i 

The  independence  of  Santo  Domingo  was  first  impaired 
by  an  American  receivership  of  customs,  forced  upon  it 
by  Theodore  Roosevelt.  Soon  after  Wilson  became  Presi- 
dent, a  Senatorial  investigation  revealed  a  scandalous  situa- 
tion in  which  American  politicians,  in  league  with  American 
bankers  and  concessionaires,  were  preying  upon  Santo  Do- 
mingo finances  by  virtue  of  political  control  exerted  under 
the  terms  of  the  customs  convention. 

But  the  Sullivan  scandal  brought  no  change  of  policy. 


Santo  Domingo  347 

Instead,  "anti-imperialist"  Wilson  was  soon  pressing  for 
greater  control  than  had  been  attempted  either  by  imperial- 
ist Roosevelt  or  imperialist  Taft.  The  war  of  conquest  be- 
gan in  May,  1916,  following  an  ultimatum  from  President 
Wilson  to  President  Jimenez,  giving  the  latter  seventy-two 
hours  in  which  to  resign. 

Jimenez  claims  to  have  yielded,  only  on  the  understand- 
ing that  his  resignation  would  prevent  intervention.  How- 
ever that  may  be,  six  days  afterwards,  500  marines  took 
possession  of  the  capital,  and  a  fortnight  later  Puerta 
Plata  was  occupied,  after  two  hours'  fighting. 

We  struck  at  the  enemies  of  Jimenez  as  well  as  at  Jime- 
nez. In  June,  Admiral  Capcrton  issued  a  proclamation 
stating  that  there  was  no  intention  of  infringing  on  the  sov- 
ereignty of  Santo  Domingo  or  subjugating  its  territory. 
At  the  same  time  he  was  seizing  every  vestige  of  the  civil 
power  wherever  his  forces  went.  There  were  many  bat- 
tles and  some  massacres.  By  November,  1800  marines 
were  reported  engaged  in  the  pacification  of  Santo  Do- 
mingo. On  the  twenty-ninth  day  of  that  month,  Captain 
Knapp,  on  behalf  of  Wilson,  issued  a  proclamation  estab- 
lishing martial  law  throughout  the  republic.  All  natives 
were  prohibited  from  bearing  or  possessing  arms,  and  a 
censorship  of  the  press  was  instituted,  prohibiting  any  crit- 
icism whatsoever  of  the  government  of  the  conquerors. 

The  proclamation  of  martial  law  assured  the  natives  that 
"there  is  no  intention  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
destroy  the  independence  of  the  republic,"  and  that  the 
only  purpose  of  the  occupation  was  "to  assist  the  country 
to  establish  internal  order  and  to  enable  it  to  comply  with 
the  provisions  of  its  convention  and  to  fulfill  its  obligations 
as  a  member  of  the  family  of  nations." 

Meanwhile,  at  Washington,  had  been  drawn  up  a  con- 
vention modeled  after  that  applied  to  Haiti,  placing  Santo 


348  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Domingo  under  a  civil  dictatorship  under  the  President  of 
the  United  States. 

By  January,  1917,  an  American  captain  of  marines  was 
discovered  to  be  holding  the  post  of  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  sovereign  republic  of  Santo  Domingo,  order- 
ing native  diplomatic  and  consular  officials  abroad  to  hand 
in  their  resignations.  February  n,  1919,  Washington  dis- 
patches informed  us  that  Rear  Admiral  Snowden  had  been 
"detailed  for  duty  as  military  governor  of  Santo  Domingo 
and  the  additional  duty  as  representative  of  the  United 
States  in  Haiti."  In  May,  1921,  Snowden  was  superseded 
by  Admiral  Robinson,  the  military  dictatorship  continuing.  1 

Nicaragua  completes  the  picture,  because  it  gives  the 
why  of  all  such  extraordinary  happenings  in  the  sworn  tes- 
timony of  the  persons  who  furnished  the  why. 

Among  all  of  President  Wilson's  voluble  speeches,  there 
appears  not  a  single  word  of  explanation  of  our  adventures 
in  Nicaragua — or,  for  that  matter,  in  Haiti  or  Santo  Do- 
mingo. The  fact  that  a  portion  of  our  naval  force  was 
enacting  the  role  of  an  alien  army  of  occupation  in  a  Cen- 
tral American  republic  was  briefly  mentioned  at  long  in- 
tervals in  the  press.  At  such  times  a  phrase  or  two,  such 
as  "protecting  American  lives  and  property,"  or  ua  lega- 
tion guard,"  was  all  the  explanation  deemed  necessary. 
During  Wilson's  eight  years  in  the  Presidential  chair,  no 
serious  criticism  of  our  occupation  of  Nicaragua  was  seen 
in  any  of  our  leading  newspapers  or  magazines.  Nor  did 
the  national  law-making  body  make  any  demand  upon  the 
Executive  for  an  accounting  of  his  acts.  Of  the  so-called 
Canal  Convention  Senator  Borah  remarked:  "If  the  Amer- 

1  The  "withdrawal"  from  Santo  Domingo  promised  by  the  Harding  Ad- 
ministration in  1921  did  not  mean  the  removal  of  American  control  from 
Santo  Domingo  affairs,  financial  or  political,  but  only  a  partial  withdrawal 
of  American  forces  similar  to  our  "withdrawal"  from  Nicaragua  after  we 
had  completed  the  "pacification"  of  that  little  country. 


Nicaragua  349 

ican  people  had  known  all  the  circumstances  of  its  making 
it  would  never  have  been  made."  That  was  about  all. 
Evidently  the  press  as  a  whole,  and  the  leaders  of  both 
great  political  parties,  approved  of  the  Wilson  policy  in 
Nicaragua.  When  Wilson's  successor  continued  it,  no  pro- 
test was  heard.  The  policy  had,  in  fact,  been  initiated  by 
Wilson's  predecessor  in  office. 

For  authentic  details  we  may  turn  to  the  hearings  on 
the  Nicaraguan  convention,  conducted  by  the  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee  early  in  1916.  These  hearings 
were  printed  uin  confidence,"  for  the  use  of  the  committee 
only,  one  copy  going  to  each  member  under  an  injunction 
of  secrecy.  The  writer  has  had  access  to  one  of  these  com- 
mittee copies. 

An  examination  of  this  secret  government  document 
shows  the  hearings  to  have  been  in  the  nature  of  a  "frame- 
up."  That  is  to  say,  neither  Nicaraguans  nor  Americans 
who  opposed  the  convention  were  given  an  opportunity  to 
testify.  Only  one  witness  was  heard  who  was  not  either  in- 
terested in  putting  the  convention  through,  or  in  some  way 
connected  with  the  interested  parties.  In  spite  of  the  sup- 
pression of  illuminating  details  inevitable  from  such  an  ar- 
rangement, the  document  discloses  the  following  essential 
facts : 

1.  That   the  permanent  occupation   of  Nicaragua   was 
undertaken  by  the  Taft  Administration  for  the  purpose  of 
sustaining  in  power   a   "president''   opposed  by  an  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  voters  of  the  country. 

2.  That   said   president,    Adolfo    Diaz,   was    raised   to 
power  neither  by  the  votes  of  Nicaraguans,  nor  the  arms  of 
Nicaraguans,  but  by  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States 
under  the  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

3.  That,  as  a  means  to  raising  Adolfo  Diaz  to  the  presi- 
dency and  maintaining  him  there,  we  conducted  a  series  of 


350  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

unlawful  military  campaigns,  killed  scores  of  Nicaraguans, 
overturned  three  successive  governments,  seized  public 
and  private  property,  and  prosecuted  an  actual  war  of  con- 
quest until  in  complete  possession  of  the  country. 

4.  That  Adolfo  Diaz,  on  becoming  president,  found  that 
he  could  do  nothing  of  his  own  volition,  but  was  required 
to  take  orders  like  a  butler. 

5.  That  American   domination   of   Nicaragua   did   not 
bring  a  single  "American  benefit"  to  the  Nicaraguan  peo- 
ple; that  what  liberties  Nicaraguan  citizens  had  were  per- 
manently taken  away;  that  a  free  press,  free  speech  and 
free  suffrage  are  unknown;  that  the  government  of  Nicara- 
gua under  the  American  protectorate  is  a  pure  autocracy, 
administered  by  aliens,  which  is  forced  to  hold  the  Nicara- 
guan people  under  a  reign  of  terror  in  order  to  perpetuate 
itself  in  power. 

6.  That  the  sole  purpose  of  the  American  war  on  that 
little  republic  was  to  compel  Nicaragua  to  submit  to  a  gen- 
eral looting  of  her  rich  resources  by  American  financiers. 

7.  That  Woodrow  Wilson  carried  out  in  every  essential 
the  purpose  of  the  conquest  begun  under  Taft;  that  the 
looting  of  Nicaragua  under  American  guns  was  given  a 
color  of  legality  only  under  the  Wilson  regime,  by  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Nicaraguan  convention  on  the  recommenda- 
tion of  Wilson. 

8.  That  the  feature  of  this  convention,  relating  to  the 
"purchase"  of  a  canal  concession  and  the  "lease"  of  naval 
bases,  was  an  after-thought,  conceived  and  put  through  pri- 
marily as  a  blind,  to  hide  the  purely  financial  features  of 
the  protectorate. 

9.  That  the  actual  arbiter  of  Nicaraguan  destinies  under 
the  protectorate  is  none  other  than  the  local  representative 
of  the  syndicate  of  New  York  bankers  for  whose  benefit 


Nicaragua  351 

the    conquest    was    undertaken    and    the    convention    put 
through. 

Our  Nicaraguan  adventure  began  in  1909.  The  first 
step  was  an  effort  to  remove  President  Zelaya  from  power, 
through  a  revolution  financed  by  Adolfo  Diaz.  Before  the 
launching  of  this  revolution,  Diaz  was  a  bookkeeper  on  a 
salary  of  about  $1000  a  year,  in  the  employ  of  an  American 
mining  company  owned  in  Pittsburgh.  Diaz  "loaned"  the 
revolution  $600,000  gold,  the  origin  of  which  he  was  never 
able  to  explain.  The  hand  of  Washington  began  to  be 
seen  only  when  the  anti-Zelaya  movement,  as  a  privately 
financed  undertaking,  was  on  the  point  of  failure.  De- 
cember i,  1909,  Secretary  of  State  Knox,  in  a  singularly  in- 
temperate note,  broke  off  relations  with  Zelaya  and  de- 
clared in  favor  of  the  revolution.  His  pretext  was  the 
execution  of  two  American  filibusters,  Roy  Cannon  and 
Leonard  Groce,  who  had  been  caught  trying  to  dynamite 
a  vessel  loaded  with  Zelaya's  troops.  As  these  men  had 
enlisted  in  the  forces  opposed  to  Zelaya,  they  had,  of 
course,  forfeited  whatever  rights  they  may  have  had  to  the 
good  offices  of  their  home  government. 

The  action  of  Knox  caused  the  resignation  and  flight  of 
Zelaya.  As  his  successor,  the  Nicaraguan  Congress  elected 
Dr.  Jose  Madriz,  by  all  accounts  a  person  of  high  char- 
acter. Whatever  domestic  reasons  there  existed  for  a  rev- 
olution disappeared  with  the  passing  of  Zelaya,  and  the  rev- 
olution would  have  been  quickly  dissipated  had  it  not  been 
saved  by  American  intervention.  Madriz's  forces  took 
possession  of  the  entire  country  with  the  exception  of  Blue- 
fields,  and  bottled  up  the  remnant  of  the  insurgents  in  that 
seaport.  But  our  marines  were  landed,  and  the  Madriz 
commander  was  prohibited  from  entering  the  city.  Fili- 


352  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

busters  were  imported  from  the  United  States,  the  revolu- 
tion was  reorganized  and  revictualed,  and  in  time  was  able 
to  take  the  offensive.  Protected  by  our  navy,  and  due 
wholly  to  our  assistance,  the  Diaz  movement  finally  came 
into  possession  of  the  Nicaraguan  capital. 

Immediately,  there  came  from  New  York  one  Thomas  C. 
Dawson,  who  was  named  by  the  banking  syndicate  and  ap- 
pointed by  the  Secretary  of  State.  Dawson  had  previously 
acted  in  the  same  capacity  for  our  bankers  in  Santo 
Domingo,  and  later  performed  a  similar  service  for  them 
in  Honduras.  A  meeting  with  the  revolutionary  chiefs  was 
held  on  board  an  American  warship,  and  a  bargain  entered 
into,  known  as  the  Dawson  Pact.  Diaz  was  named  vice- 
president,  and  Estrada,  the  military  head  of  the  revolution, 
was  named  president.  In  pursuance  of  the  Dawson  Pact, 
a  farcical  election  was  staged  under  the  direction  of  Ameri- 
can marines,  the  purpose  being  to  frame  a  new  constitution 
that  would  facilitate  the  bankers'  programme.  But  the 
scandal  became  so  great  that  the  packed  Congress  refused 
to  carry  out  its  full  share  of  the  scheme.  Whereupon  Es- 
trada dissolved  it  and  ruled  as  a  dictator,  taking  his  orders, 
however,  from  the  American  minister.  Estrada  was  soon 
given  the  command  to  leave — and  he  left.  So  Adolfo 
Diaz,  late  bookkeeper  for  an  American  corporation,  be- 
came president  of  the  sovereign  state  of  Nicaragua. 

Naturally,  the  people  of  Nicaragua  were  hardly  pleased 
by  the  turn  of  affairs,  and  it  was  to  be  expected  that  we 
who  had  placed  Adolfo  Diaz  in  power  should  be  called  upon 
to  defend  him.  The  Taft  Administration  poured  some 
2,350  marines  and  bluejackets  into  the  country  and  a  gen- 
eral war  of  pacification  was  prosecuted.  The  "battle  of 
Coyotepe"  and  the  "battle  of  Leon" — both  in  October, 


Nicaragua  353 

1912 — ended  the  organized  resistance  on  the  part  of  Nica- 
raguan  patriots. 

All  this  was  done  without  a  shadow  of  legality.  It  was 
murder  in  the  first  degree,  for  which  the  then  President 
of  the  United  States  ought  to  have  been  impeached  and  in- 
dicted. Had  Woodrow  Wilson,  on  becoming  President, 
entertained  any  real  regard  for  any  of  the  democratic  prin- 
ciples by  which  he  professed  to  be  guided  in  the  European 
war,  or  even  for  his  own  oath  of  office,  he  would  at  once 
have  recalled  our  forces  from  Nicaragua,  and  denounced 
and  repudiated  the  purposes  for  which  they  were  sent  there. 
Instead,  he  kept  our  marines  in  that  "sister  republic,"  and 
proceeded  to  carry  out  the  purposes  for  which  they  were 
sent  there  by  Taft. 

The  "Canal"  Convention  ratified  by  the  Senate,  February 
18,  1916,  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  following  things: 

1.  Exclusive   proprietary  rights   to   construct,   operate, 
and  maintain,   forever  free   from  all  taxation  and  public 
charges,  an  inter-oceanic  canal  across  Nicaragua. 

2.  Lease  of  the  Corn  Islands  on  the  Atlantic  side,  99 
years,  with  option  of  renewal,  for  the  purpose  of  a  naval 
base. 

3.  Lease  of  territory  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  Pacific  side, 
99  years  with  option  of  renewal,  for  the  purpose  of  a  naval 
base. 

In  consideration  whereof,  Nicaragua  purports  to  receive 
$3,000,000.  Actually,  the  money  gets  no  nearer  Nicara- 
gua than  a  bank  in  New  Yprk.  The  convention  provides 
that  it  cannot  be  drawn  out  without  authority  from  the 
American  Secretary  of  State.  In  the  working  out  of  the 
scheme,  the  money  remains  in  the  hands  of  a  New  York 
banking  syndicate,  which  never  renders  any  adequate  re- 


354  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

turn  for  it,  either  to  the  United  States,  which  paid  it  out, 
or  to  Nicaragua,  which  is  supposed  to  receive  the  benefit  of 
it. 

On  its  face  the  "Canal"  Convention  looks  like  a  simple 
purchase  and  lease.  In  the  unpublished  features  lies  its 
secret.  The  canal  "purchase"  and  the  "leases"  of  terri- 
tory were  not  urged  by  the  Naval  Board,  but  by  our  "pa- 
triotic" bankers.  Their  real  motive  may  be  judged  by  the 
things  that  Nicaragua  lost  besides  her  canal  route  and  the 
territory  set  aside  for  naval  bases. 

When  Knox  deposed  Zelaya,  Nicaragua  was  solvent;  the 
bona  fide  foreign  debt  was  only  about  $2,500,000;  the 
railroads  were  owned  by  the  government;  the  customs  were 
collected  and  disbursed  by  native  officials;  the  government 
administered  its  own  funds;  the  laws  were  framed  and 
put  through  by  citizens  of  that  republic.  But  when  the 
conquest  was  completed,  Nicaragua  was  permanently  in  the 
hands  of  a  receiver,  with  a  debt  in  the  neighborhood  of 
$15,000,000;  the  railroads  were  in  the  possession  of  Ameri- 
can bankers;  the  same  bankers  collected  and  disbursed  the 
customs,  owned  the  National  Bank  and  administered  the 
public  finances;  legislation  for  the  government  of  Nicara- 
guan  citizens  was  framed  in  Wall  Street,  enacted  at  the 
direction  of  agents  of  Wall  Street,  and  administered  by 
Americans  under  control  of  an  American  banking  syndi- 
cate. 

The  "Canal"  Convention,  ratified  at  the  instance  of 
President  Wilson,  established  Nicaragua  as  a  private  finan- 
cial preserve  of  a  group  of  American  bankers,  and  that  was 
its  primary  purpose. 

It  may  be  supposed  that  our  financiers  got  possession  of 
the  Nicaraguan  railroads,  the  banks,  the  customs,  etc.,  by 
loaning  to  Nicaragua  large  sums  of  money,  which  the  latter 


Nicaragua  355 

was  unable  to  pay;  that  intervention  was  undertaken  to  en- 
force payment  of  such  debts. 

Nothing  as  innocent  as  that.  Previously  to  the  Diaz- 
Estrada  plot,  according  to  their  own  testimony,  the  bankers 
did  not  have  a  penny  invested  in  Nicaragua.  Their  en- 
tire interest  was  based  upon  the  speculative  opportunity 
furnished  by  the  defenseless  condition  of  the  little  republic. 

Wall  Street  went  in  for  revolution,  intervention,  and  po- 
litical control  in  Nicaragua  as  a  business  proposition  purely 
—prompted  by  the  same  motives  which  later  caused  it  to  go 
in  for  intervention  in  Europe.  The  scheme  had  been  tried 
in  Santo  Domingo — and  it  worked.  It  had  been  tried  in 
Honduras — and  it  worked.  Later  it  was  to  be  tried  in 
Haiti.  The  ambition  is  ultimately  to  put  the  same  system 
in  operation  in  Mexico. 

Very  well,  as  soon  as  Adolfo  Diaz  was  well  on  his  way 
to  the  palace,  we  find  our  bankers  acquiring  bogus  claims 
upon  Nicaragua,  and,  at  the  same  time,  drafting,  in  their 
offices,  a  convention  legalizing  such  claims,  to  be  presented 
at  Washington  for  solemn  approval  and  ratification. 

The  first  big  claim  acquired  was  known  as  "the  Emery 
claim."  For  twenty  years  the  George  D.  Emery  Company 
had  exploited  a  concession  which  had  netted  it  $186,000  a 
year.  Zelaya  finally  revoked  the  concession  on  the  ground 
of  gross  violation  of  its  terms.  Emery  then  put  in  a  claim 
based,  not  upon  the  investment,  but  upon  the  profits  ex- 
pected during  a  period  of  years  to  come.  The  claim  was 
so  preposterous  that  any  honest  court  would  have  denied  it 
forthwith.  The  bankers  bought  the  Emery  claim  cheap — 
for  less  than  $100,000,  it  was  said.  The  bankers  then 
tagged  the  claim  with  a  valuation  of  $500,000,  and  at  that 
price  it  was  saddled  upon  Nicaragua,  with  the  consent  of 
both  the  Taft  and  the  Wilson  Administrations. 


356  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

As  originally  written  (in  1911),  the  Nicaraguan  conven- 
tion, known  as  the  Knox-Castrillo  Convention,  purported  to 
provide  a  loan  of  $15,000,000  to  Nicaragua.  But  an  exam- 
ination of  the  document  discloses  the  fact  that  Nicara- 
gua was  not  to  receive  the  money,  that  the  bankers  were  to 
"expend"  it.  We  discover,  indeed,  that  the  bankers  were 
never  to  pay  out  any  such  sums  as  $15,000,000;  that  such 
sums  as  they  paid  out  were  to  be  paid  chiefly  to  themselves; 
first,  to  liquidate  the  Emery  and  other  claims,  and,  sec- 
ond, to  "develop  the  country" — to  establish  a  bank,  which 
they  themselves  should  own,  and  to  improve  the  National 
Railway,  which  they  themselves  should  control,  operate, 
and  later  own.  The  bankers  were  also  to  receive  a  conces- 
sion to  build  a  new  railroad,  upon  their  own  terms,  at  the 
expense  of  Nicaragua,  the  property  to  be  controlled,  opera- 
ted, and  owned  by  themselves. 

Finally,  the  $15,000,000  was  to  be  paid  out,  but — by 
Nicaragua.  The  bankers  were  to  collect  the  customs,  and 
disburse  therefrom  the  sums  needed  to  meet  their  "claims" 
and  "improvements,"  after  which  they  were  to  pay  out  of 
this  national  revenue  $15,000,000  and  interest  to  them- 
selves— to  liquidate  a  loan  that  they  had  never  made  ex- 
cept on  paper. 

But,  by  the  election  of  1910,  Congress  went  Democratic. 
The  Knox-Castrillo  Convention  was  defeated  by  the  Demo- 
crats, and  there  was  some  denunciation  of  it  as  dollar  diplo- 
macy. Nevertheless,  its  worst  features  went  into  opera- 
tion under  a  protectorate  formally  entered  into  by  the  Wil- 
son Administration. 

Mr.  Taft's  honorable  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  bank- 
ing syndicate,  did  not,  indeed,  permit  their  scheme  to  be 
greatly  hampered  by  the  Senate.  Following  the  example 
of  Roosevelt  in  the  case  of  Santo  Domingo,  they  proceeded 
to  put  the  terms  of  their  convention  into  operation  without 


Nicaragua  357 

indulging  in  the  motions  of  legality.  For  the  paper  loan  of 
$15,000,000,  however,  was  substituted  a  " temporary  loan" 
of  $1,500,000,  which,  again,  was  not  to  be  paid  to  Nic- 
aragua, but  expended  by  the  bankers,  who  agreed  to  "reor- 
ganize" the  National  Bank,  51  per  cent,  of  the  stock  to  be 
owned  by  the  bankers,  49  per  cent,  by  the  Nicaraguan 
government. 

In  "consideration"  of  this  "loan,"  the  bankers  were  given 
a  mortgage  on  the  government's  share  of  the  bank,  a  mort- 
gage on  the  government's  railway,  a  lease  for  the  opera- 
tion of  the  government's  railway,  a  lien  upon  the  customs, 
authority  to  negotiate  a  settlement  of  the  Ethelburga 
"debt,"  a  contract  for  the  "reform"  of  the  currency,  and 
various  other  little  things  of  solid  financial  value. 

But  first  of  all,  the  bankers  were  placed  in  possession  of 
the  customhouses,  where  they  remained,  protected  in  their 
private  business  by  the  public  armed  forces  of  the  United 
States — collecting  the  customs,  paying  out  the  customs  re- 
ceipts to  run  their  Nicaraguan  enterprises,  paying  out  the 
customs  money  to  liquidate  principal  and  interest  on  the 
"loans"  that  Nicaragua  never  received. 

The  settlement  of  the  Ethelburga  "debt"  is  worth  a 
word.  The  bona  fide  foreign  debt  of  Nicaragua  was  only 
$2,500,000.  Two  and  a  quarter  million  of  this  sum  had 
been  taken  up  in  a  refunding  scheme,  negotiated  in  England 
just  before  the  expulsion  of  Zelaya,  known  as  the  Ethel- 
burga Syndicate  Bonds.  Had  this  scheme  gone  through 
it  would  have  made  the  foreign  debt  amount  to  $6,472,689. 
But  Nicaragua  had  never  received  any  money  on  this  deal. 
Moreover,  there  were  irregularities  which  placed  the  Ethel- 
burga bonds  in  the  fraudulent  class.  At  least  this  was  the 
contention  of  the  bankers,  who  offered  to  submit  the  matter 
to  the  British  courts.  The  Ethelburga  Syndicate  did  not 
wish  to  fight,  and  a  settlement  was  arranged,  not  between 


358  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

the  syndicate  and  the  bankers  acting  for  Nicaragua,  but 
between  the  syndicate  and  the  bankers  acting  for  them- 
selves. 

In  other  words,  the  bankers  acquired  control  of  the 
Ethelburga  business — cheap.  The  charge  was  made  by 
Senator  Smith  of  Michigan  that  they  acquired  the  bonds 
for  twenty-five  cents  on  the  dollar.  These  bonds  were 
grafted  upon  the  public  debt  of  Nicaragua  at  par, 
$6,250,000,  with  the  approval  of  both  Taft  and  Wilson. 
The  bankers  proceeded  to  pay  principal  and  interest  to 
themselves  out  of  the  customs  receipts  of  the  republic. 

Another  item  of  interest  is  "our"  "reform"  of  the  Nic- 
araguan  currency.  The  bankers  drew  upon  their  $  i  ,500,000 
"loan"  to  buy  up  for  themselves,  as  private  business  men, 
the  national  paper  at  the  existing  market  value,  between 
15  to  one,  and  20  to  one.  Then,  as  "fiscal  agents  of  the 
Nicaraguan  government,"  they  put  into  effect  an  arbitrary 
exchange  rate  of  12^2  to  one,  unloaded  at  this  figure, 
and  so  turned  over  a  cool  profit  of  from  25  to  75  per  cent, 
on  every  "reformed"  Nicaraguan  peso. 

While  the  reforming  was  going  on,  the  bankers  "loaned" 
Nicaragua  an  additional  half  million  dollars  for  ^ixty  days, 
to  facilitate  the  job.  On  this  half  million  they  collected 
a  profit  of  $60,000,  above  interest,  based  upon  the  differ- 
ence in  the  "value"  of  the  Nicaraguan  peso  at  the  time  that 
they  "loaned"  themselves  the  money  and  the  time  they  "re- 
paid" it. 

In  due  course  the  bankers  exercised  their  option  to  "pur- 
chase" a  majority  of  the  stock  of  the  National  Railway. 
Although  it  had  been  a  paying  investment,  and  al- 
though Zelaya  had  refused  $4,000,000  for  it,  the  bankers 
acquired  control  of  the  Nicaraguan  National  Railway  for 
$1,000,000.  Again,  Nicaragua  did  not  receive  a  cent. 


Nicaragua  359 

The  syndicate  simply  made  a  paper  payment  to  one  of  its 
New  York  banks,  announcing  that  the  "money"  would  be 
held  against  the  "debts"  it  was  rolling  up  against  Nicaragua. 

The  press  informed  us,  from  time  to  time,  that  the  chief 
purpose  of  the  intervention  and  the  financial  deals  connected 
with  it,  including  the  canal  "purchase,"  was  a  part  of  a 
big  brotherly  scheme  to  "assist  Nicaragua  to  get  on  its 
feet  financially."  It  is  apparent,  instead,  that  the  deliber- 
ate purpose,  from  the  start,  was  to  bankrupt  Nicaragua 
for  the  benefit  of  our  international  bankers. 

Had  President  Wilson  actually  cared  to  "put  Nicara- 
gua on  its  feet" — and  wanted  the  Canal  route  besides 
— he  would  have  recommended  that  Nicaragua  be  paid  in 
cash  what  the  Canal  route  was  worth,  with  the  stipulation 
that  Wall  Street  get  its  blood  money  and  be  kicked  out  of 
the  country.  But  "business  Presidents"  do  not  do  that 
sort  of  thing. 

Instead,  in  October,  1916,  Wilson  permitted  the  bankers 
to  take  over  the  internal  revenues,  completing  their  con- 
trol of  Nicaragua's  income  and  finances. 

Finally,  the  terms  of  the  Canal  "purchase"  and  naval 
base  "leases"  were  found  to  conflict  with  rights  which  Nic- 
aragua's immediate  neighbors  shared  with  her  on  the  Gulf 
of  Fonseca,  and  the  convention  was  ratified  over  the  pro- 
tests of  Costa  Rica,  Salvador,  and  Honduras.  Immedi- 
ately afterwards,  Costa  Rica  and  Salvador  brought  suit 
against  Nicaragua  in  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice, 
which  had  been  set  up  in  1907  at  the  instance  of  the  United 
States  government  to  obviate  future  wars  among  the  Cen- 
tral American  republics.  The  decision  was  against  Nicara- 
gua, and  required  the  latter  to  repudiate  the  convention. 
This  Wilson  would  not  permit  Nicaragua  to  do.  Thus 
our  own  government  was  the  first  to  flout  the  judgments  of 
an  international  peace  court  which  it  had  assisted  to  set  up, 


360,  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

and  whose  decisions,  inferentially,  at  least,  it  had  bound  it- 
self to  respect. 

In  such  circumstances  lies  the  secret  of  the  "necessity"  of 
keeping  an  army  of  occupation  permanently  on  the  soil  of 
a  "sister  republic."  On  page  511  of  the  Secret  Senate 
Committee  hearings  appears  the  following  colloquy: 

Senator  Smith  of  Michigan:  Could  the  present  government  down 
there  be  maintained  at  all  without  the  aid  or  presence  of  American 
marines  ? 

Mr.  Cole:  I  think  the  present  government  would  last  until  the 
last  coach  of  marines  left  Managua  station,  and  I  think  President 
Diaz  would  be  on  that  last  coach. 

This  brief  statement  of  Walter  Bundy  Cole,  personal  rep- 
resentative in  Nicaragua  of  our  bankers,  explains  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  bankers'  regime  by  the  people  of  Nicaragua. 
Also,  it  partially  explains  the  bankers'  sure  and  perfect 
mastership  over  the  native  "government."  Should  the 
dummy  in  the  palace  become  restive,  he  is  quickly  brought 
to  terms  by  a  simple  threat  to  withdraw  the  protecting 
fence  of  foreign  bayonets  and  leave  him  to  the  vengeance 
of  his  countrymen. 

Another  form  of  discipline  applied  by  the  bankers  is  to 
withhold  salaries  until  their  commands  are  fully  complied 
with.  The  president  of  the  sovereign  republic  of  Nicara- 
gua was  at  times  found  humbly  begging  his  wages  of  Ameri- 
can financiers.  When  the  "sale"  of  the  National  Railway 
was  being  put  through,  the  members  of  the  hand-picked 
National  Assembly  were  afraid  to  approve  the  deal — so 
violent  was  public  opposition  to  it.  It  is  recorded  that  one 
means  of  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  them  by  Bundy 
Cole  was  to  withhold  their  salaries  until  the  contracts  were 
duly  ratified. 


Nicaragua  361 

In  such  incidents  is  revealed  the  importance  of  the  bank- 
ers' possession  of  the  customhouses.  Once  there,  their  grip 
is  forever  fixed  upon  the  throat  of  Nicaragua.  They  set 
their  own  terms  upon  all  future  transactions.  They  keep 
the  books.  Nicaragua  can  never  become  solvent.  Nicara- 
gua can  never  choose  another  master.  Nicaragua  is  in  the 
position  of  a  Mexican  peon  in  the  days  of  Diaz.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  convention,  acknowledged  in  the  contracts,  is 
to  furnish  security  to  the  bankers.  That  security  is  ex- 
tended in  the  shape  of  young  men,  in  the  uniform  of  ma- 
rines, carrying  rifles  paid  for  in  taxes  by  the  American  peo- 
ple. We  protect  not  only  the  bankers,  their  customhouses, 
their  banks,  their  railroads,  but  also  their  dummy  president 
who  sits  in  the  palace.  So  we  grind  the  faces  of  the  Nicara- 
guan  people.  For  this  the  American  people  pay,  in  cash 
alone,  more  than  the  bankers  receive — although  cash  is  the 
least  of  what  we  pay. 

The  story  of  Nicaragua  is  Pan-Americanism  as  Pan- 
Americanism  is.  This  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  not  as  it 
is  written,  but  as  it  is  applied.  This  is  "protecting  Amer- 
ican lives  and  property."  This  is  "encouraging  American 
trade." 

This  is  Wilson  imperialism  in  action.  It  is  American 
imperialism,  as  approved  by  the  controlling  element  in  both 
the  Democratic  and  Republican  parties.  It  is  not  different, 
in  any  respect,  from  the  imperialism  of  England,  France, 
Germany,  Japan,  or  Italy,  at  their  worst. 

There  is  no  reason  to  debate  the  question  as  to  whether 
Wilson  called  America  into  the  European  war  in  the  hope 
of  putting  an  end  to  imperialism.  It  is  enough  to  point 
out  that  Wilson  himself  was  a  conventional  imperialist  be- 
fore the  European  war  began. 


XXXIV 

STRICTLY  BUSINESS 

THE  changing  phases  of  the  Wilson  diplomacy — and  of 
the  Wilson  domestic  policy,  as  it  bore  upon  the  conflict 
overseas — unerringly  followed  the  changing  interests  of 
Wall  Street.  When  the  war  trade  could  be  expanded  only 
if  the  war-traders  would  undertake  loans  to  the  Entente 
governments,  Wilson  reversed  himself  on  the  propriety  of 
such  loans.  When,  due  to  the  piling  up  of  their  loans,  the 
integrity  of  Entente  credit  became  of  overshadowing  im- 
portance to  our  international  bankers,  Wilson  reversed  him- 
self on  the  law  of  the  submarine,  the  law  of  the  armed 
merchantman,  and  the  question  of  equal  treatment  as  an 
attribute  to  neutrality,  swinging  America  into  a  position  of 
hostility  toward  the  Central  Powers  and  benevolence  to- 
ward their  enemies.  Looking  ahead  to  a  possible  war  on 
behalf  of  the  dominant  Wall  Street  interest,  Wilson  re- 
versed himself  on  the  question  of  preparedness,  and  put 
through  the  great  preparedness  programme  of  1916. 
Casting  about  for  a  casus  belli  with  Germany,  Wilson 
made  of  his  preparedness  tour  a  popular  educational  course 
in  the  identification  of  the  national  honor  with  the  private 
business  of  certain  exporters  and  shippers. 

Said  Robert  N.  Page,  North  Carolina  Congressman,  in 
explaining  his  opposition  to  the  President  on  the  question 
of  warning  Americans  against  traveling  as  passengers  upon 
armed  belligerent  ships,  February,  1916: 

Jesus  Christ  never  uttered  a  more  profound  truth  than  when  He 
declared,  'where  your  treasure  is,  there  will  be  your  heart  also.'  The 
loan  of  $500,000,000  to  England  by  American  capitalists,  to  say 

362 


Strictly  Business  363 

nothing  of  the  profits  of  munitions  manufacturers,  has  destroyed  the 
semblance  even  of  neutrality  in  the  United  States,  and  will  probably 
lead  us  into  war.  .  .  .  I  will  not  stultify  my  conscience  nor  stain  my 
hands  with  the  blood  of  my  countrymen. 

Wall  Street's  heart  was  with  the  Entente.  And  Wil- 
son's heart  was  with  Wall  Street.  A  day  came  when  it 
was  evident  that  the  Entente  could  never  score  a  decisive 
victory  without  the  full  assistance  of  America  as  a  bellig- 
erent. The  tightening  of  the  submarine  blockade  fur- 
nished the  pretext.  So,  guided  by  Wilson,  America  rushed 
into  the  war  in  a  blaze  of  super-patriotism  and  profit- 
taking. 

Coming  down  to  the  end  of  hostilities,  both  in  reference 
to  "reconstruction"  at  home,  and  in  arranging  the  conditions 
of  peace  with  our  allies,  it  was  our  government's  policy  that 
Wall  Street  should  retain  every  profit  and  advantage  that 
it  had  already  gained,  as  well  as  reap  every  available  fu- 
ture benefit. 

As  soon  as  the  armistice  was  signed,  Secretary  Baker  and 
other  department  heads  announced  that  the  government's 
surplus  supplies  would  be  disposed  of  in  such  a  way  as  "not 
to  break  the  market" — meaning  that  the  government  would 
cooperate  with  the  profit-makers  to  keep  up  the  cost  of 
living.  Six  months  after  the  fighting  was  endec},  it  was 
discovered  that  government  and  packers  were  acting  to- 
gether to  hoard  vast  quantities  of  food,  in  order  to  pro- 
tect the  interests  of  the  latter. 

The  same  policy  was  followed  in  steel,  copper,  and  other 
industries.  After  the  armistice  was  signed,  the  govern- 
ment generously  continued  taking  all  the  copper  output  at 
the  guaranteed  figure,  26  cents  a  pound,  until  it  had  ac- 
cumulated a  surplus  of  140,000,000  pounds.  When  cop- 
per had  dropped  to  fifteen  cents,  it  was  announced  that  the 
government  would  dispose  of  its  surplus,  "in  cooperation 


364  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

with  the  producers,"  at  the  existing  market  price.  The 
government  sold  its  surplus  back  to  the  copper  producers  at 
from  fifty  to  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  rate  they  had 
received  for  it;  the  latter  then  immediately  boosted  the 
figure  again  above  20  cents  a  pound. 

The  armistice  found  the  job  of  giving  new  railroads  for 
Did,  with  the  people's  money,  far  from  finished.  In  resign- 
ing as  Director  General,  McAdoo  recommended  an  exten- 
sion of  government  control  as  a  part  of  the  programme  of 
rehabilitation.  Hines,  a  private  railroad  executive,  who 
succeeded  McAdoo,  seconded  the  scheme,  while  Wilson 
urged  it  upon  Congress  in  his  Railroad  Bill,  which  was 
heavily  weighted  with  new  appropriations  from  the  public 
treasury.  When  the  President's  Railroad  Bill  failed,  the 
Stock  Exchange  registered  a  severe  set-back  in  railroad  se- 
curities. The  President  lost  his  temper,  and  in  a  public 
statement  (Mar.  4,  1919)  denounced  the  "group  of  men  in 
the  Senate"  who  had  "chosen  to  imperil  the  financial  inter- 
ests of  the  railway  system  of  the  country."  Pending  fur- 
ther legislation,  the  coffers  of  the  War  Finance  Corpora- 
tion were  opened  to  the  roads.1 

One  reason  acknowledged  for  the  extension  of  govern- 
ment control  was  to  give  time  for  the  enactment  of  "some 

1  In  a  report  submitted  May  9,  1921,  James  C.  Davis,  Director  General  of 
the  Railroad  Administration  under  President  Harding,  estimated  that  the 
net  "loss"  to  the  government,  in  operating  the  railroads  during  Federal  con- 
trol, would  come  to  $1,200,000,000.  In  other  words,  not  only  do  we  yield 
enormous  increases  in  freight  and  passenger  rates,  but  we  pay  one  and  one- 
fifth  billion  dollars  of  cold  cash  out  of  the  Treasury  besides.  By  the  politi- 
cal and  journalistic  henchmen  of  the  railroads,  this  vast  "loss"  is  attributed 
to  the  "failure"  of  Federal  control.  But  if  there  was  really  a  failure  of 
Federal  control,  this,  in  turn,  is  attributable  to  the  failure  of  the  railroad 
executives  themselves  to  function  honestly  as  public  servants.  For,  in  gen- 
eral, these  gentlemen  retained,  throughout  the  period  of  Federal  control, 
the  same  positions  of  trust  and  of  power  which  they  had  held  when  the 
railroads  were  running  without  a  government  guarantee.  From  1918  on, 
the  Railway  Brotherhoods,  or  experts  connected  with  them,  made  repeated 
charges  tending  to  bear  out  this  view. 


Strictly  Business  365 

new  element  of  policy,"  which,  the  President  urged,  was 
"necessary  for  the  protection  of  their  security-holders." 
(Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  2,  1918.)  The  "new  element 
of  policy,"  ultimately  enacted,  and  approved  by  Wilson, 
was  a  definite  guarantee  of  profits,  the  last  word  in  govern- 
ment gifts  to  business,  a  benefaction  to  private  persons  un- 
paralleled in  the  history  of  the  world,  an  act  of  generosity 
to  special  privilege,  so  bounteous  that  the  mere  suggestion 
of  it  would  not  have  been  tolerated  in  former  days.  2 

Government  benevolence  was  again  shown  in  the  gener- 
ous payments  made  for  the  cancellation  of  war  contracts, 
and  the  losses  cheerfully  pocketed  on  the  sale  of  war  stocks. 

After  the  Kaiser  was  gone  and  the  German  people  were 
under  our  heel,  the  government  loans  to  our  allies  did  not 
cease.  Taxes  could  have  been  reduced  by  stopping  these 
huge  loans.  It  was  urged  that  our  allies  had  to  be  sus- 
tained. Did  the  obligation  to  sustain  the  imperialistic  gov- 
ernments of  England,  France,  and  Italy,  with  money  taxed 
from  the  American  public,  have  anything  to  do  with  the 
fact  that  the  money  was  used  in  financial  and  commercial 
operations  in  which  our  international  bankers  were  inter- 

2  Wjben  the  Republican  party  came  into  power,  it  was  as  anxious  to 
serve  big  business  as  any  collection  of  politicians  had  ever  been  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  It  did  not  find  the  sailing  easy,  as  the  Wilson  Ad- 
ministration had  so  satisfied  the  greed  of  capital  that  little  more  could  be 
done  without  choking  to  death  the  goose  that  laid  the  golden  egg.  Rail- 
road freight  rates  were  higher  than  the  traffic  would  bear,  and  the  great 
railroads  found  it  expedient,  in  certain  instances,  to  effect  voluntary  re- 
ductions. Although  the  Republican  party  was  willing  enough  to  boost  the 
protective  tariff  even  higher,  warning  voices  were  heard  from  the  seats 
of  the  mighty  themselves  that  there  was  danger  of  the  tariff's  becoming  a 
boomerang  to  the  injury  even  of  the  "protected"  interests.  The  new  Ad- 
ministration was  able  to  do  little  more  than  stand  pat  on  the  business  poli- 
cies of  the  old.  One  of  the  potent  causes  of  the  depression  of  1921  was  the 
margin  that  had  prevailed  during  the  years  1917-20  between  the  earnings  of 
the  working  population  and  the  prices  of  the  necessaries  of  life.  The  pub- 
lic was  unable  to  buy  back  the  goods  that  it  had  produced  and  needed,  and 
the  business  classes  were  slow  to  let  go  of  those  goods  except  on  the  basis 
of  the  profiteering  war  prices. 


366  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ested,  and  that  every  dollar  of  it  represented  a  profit  to 
these  gentlemen?  We  even  waived  immediate  payment 
of  the  huge  sums,  due  as  interest  on  these  loans,  making  it 
easier  for  our  allies  to  continue  their  traffic  with  our  financ- 
ing and  exporting  firms. 

Millions  of  innocent  persons  had  been  led  to  believe 
that  the  merchant  marine,  built  at  such  infamous  cost  with 
the  people's  money,  was  to  belong  to  the  people.  But  we 
soon  find  the  Shipping  Board  offering  the  ships  for  sale, 
and  on  scandalous  terms.  Immediately  after  the  armistice, 
the  shipping  interests  had  formed  an  association  whose 
avowed  purpose  was  to  see  that  the  government  ships  should 
be  handed  over  to  "private  enterprise."  The  failure  of 
the  Shipping  Board,  during  the  Wilson  regime,  to  sell  more 
vessels  than  it  did  sell,  was  apparently  due  to  an  agreement 
of  the  shipping  companies  to  hold  out  for  lower  prices 
than  the  government  dared,  for  the  time  being,  to  accept. 
Meanwhile,  many  of  the  most  extravagant  hopes  of  the 
shipping  interests  were  realized  in  the  Jones  Merchant 
Marine  Act,  enacted  by  a  Republican  Congress  with  the 
approval  of  a  Democratic  President. 

Not  only  did  we  proceed  to  part  with  the  government 
ships,  but  the  funds  of  the  War  Finance  Corporation  were 
opened  to  the  hastily  formed  export  trusts.  The  acknowl- 
edged purpose  was  to  "stimulate  exports,"  and  this  was 
done  regardless  of  the  needs  of  the  people  at  home.  The 
government's  tom-tom  chase  of  the  small  profiteer  was 
staged  in  such  a  way  as  only  to  protect  and  benefit  the  large. 
While  feigning  a  campaign  to  reduce  the  cost  of  living, 
the  Administration  was  doing  everything  possible  to  assist 
in  getting  the  products  of  the  country  out  of  the  country  and 
away  from  the  people.  The  sugar  shortage  and  the  oil 
shortage  of  1920,  the  shortage  of  many  other  commodities, 
and  the  continued  rise  in  the  prices  of  common  necessities, 


Strictly  Business  367 

tvere  in  part  due  to  this  policy.  Had  the  Administration 
deliberately  conspired  with  Wall  Street  to  keep  up  the  cost 
of  living,  for  the  benefit  of  a  few  at  the  expense  of  the 
many,  it  could  not  have  chosen  a  better  course.  Notwith- 
standing the  defeat  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  the  66th  Con- 
gress, at  the  instigation  of  Wilson,  both  Republicans  and 
Democrats  concurring,  enacted  the  most  remarkable  col- 
lection of  special-privilege  laws  in  American  history. 

Our  illegal  war  in  Russia  was  pleasing  not  only  to  Paris 
and  London  bankers,  but  to  New  York  bankers  as  well. 
The  price  of  the  Czar's  bonds  rose  and  fell  on  the  Stock 
Exchange,  depending  on  the  news  of  the  military  reverses 
or  successes  of  the  Bolsheviki.  American  financiers  held 
some  50,000,000  rubles  of  the  Czar's  bonds.  When  it  ap- 
peared that  we  would  be  unable  to  overthrow  the  Soviet 
Government,  even  with  the  sacrifice  of  American  lives, 
money  from  the  public  treasury  was  used  to  pay  the  inter- 
est on  these  bonds,  as  well  as  to  liquidate  the  accounts  of 
the  defunct  Kerensky  Government,  and  to  promote  the 
Kolchak  revolution.  More  than  fifty  million  dollars 
were  paid  out  for  such  purposes.  (Hearings  of  House 
Committee  on  Expenditures  in  the  State  Department, 
1919.) 

At  Paris,  two  American  financiers  were  closer  in  the  con- 
fidence of  the  President,  and  had  more  to  do  in  shaping 
the  treaties,  than  the  Senate,  or  any  part  or  member  of  it. 
Senator  Knox  disclosed  the  fact  (Mar.  3,  1920)  that  on 
file,  in  the  office  of  a  firm  of  New  York  lawyers,  was  the 
complete  data  of  the  Peace  Conference,  access  to  which  the 
President  had  steadfastly  refused  the  treaty-advising, 
treaty-ratifying  body.  Mr.  Lamont,  a  partner  of  Morgan 
and  at  the  same  time  a  Peace  Conference  official,  was 
permitted  to  send  an  advance  copy  of  the  peace  con- 
ditions to  his  Wall  Street  associates.  While  acting 


368  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

for  the  American  people  at  Paris,  Lament  participated 
in  the  organization  of  the  China  Consortium  and  the  Inter- 
national Committee  of  Bankers  on  Mexico.  So,  along  with 
the  peace  arrangements,  we  find  the  beginnings  of  the  "def- 
inite plan  of  international  cooperation  in  the  financing  of 
foreign  enterprises,"  advocated  by  President  Farrell  of  the 
U.  S.  Steel  Corporation,  a  year  before. 

President  Wilson  procured  from  our  allies  an  express 
recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  means  that 
"we"  were  promised  a  freer  hand  in  the  western  hemisphere 
in  "the  protection  of  American  lives  and  property."  As 
a  part  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  plan,  it  was  reported  that 
arrangements  were  under  way  for  the  United  States  to 
take  over  the  British  and  French  loans  to  Latin  American 
republics.  A  characteristic  Latin  American  interpretation 
of  this  action  was  voiced  by  a  Brazilian  journalist,  Madeiros 
de  Albuquerque,  as  follows : 

Brazil  is  considered  by  the  United  States  only  as  a  possible  fu- 
ture colony.  .  .  .  The  United  States  wants  to  obtain,  as  part  of  the 
payment  of  the  debt  of  France  and  England,  a  bond  for  Brazil's 
debts  to  those  powers.  On  the  day  this  is  realized,  Brazil  will  be 
sold  to  the  United  States,  which,  on  the  first  occasion,  will  do  to  us 
as  she  has  done  to  Central  American  nations.  .  .  .  The  United 
States  is  incontestably  the  Prussia  of  to-morrow.  (New  York 
Times,  May  13,  1919.) 

The  statement  was  frequently  made,  sometimes  self- 
righteously,  sometimes  complainingly,  that  "America  gets 
nothing  out  of  the  peace."  But  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate, 
September  3,  1919,  Senator  Hitchcock,  the  Administra- 
tion's spokesman  in  the  treaty  debates,  urged  ratification, 
on  the  ground  of  the  "enormous  benefits  and  advantages 
which  the  United  States  derives  from  this  treaty,  wrung 
from  Germany  at  the  cannon's  mouth."  The  Democratic 


Strictly  Business  369 

minority  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,   in 
submitting  its  report,  said: 

To  adopt  an  amendment  or  to  reject  the  treaty  means  that  the 
United  States  will  sacrifice  all  the  concessions  secured  from  Germany 
by  a  dictated  peace.  While  these  concessions  are  not  as  large  as 
those  which  other  nations  associated  with  us  secure  in  reparations, 
they  are  nevertheless  of  tremendous  importance  and  could  only  be 
secured  under  a  dictated  peace. 

The  report  then  goes  into  detail,  the  American  advan- 
tages from  the  treaty  being  arranged  under  twelve  heads. 
Upon  the  twelfth  point,  which  sets  forth  the  financial  and 
commercial  advantages  to  be  derived  from  our  membership 
on  the  Reparations  Commission,  President  Wilson  him- 
self enlarged  somewhat  in  his  speech  at  St.  Louis  (Sept. 
5): 

Some  of  you  gentlemen  know  we  used  to  have  trade 
with  Germany.  All  of  that  trade  is  going  to  be  in  the  hands  and 
under  the  control  of  the  Reparations  Commission.  I  humbly  begged 
leave  to  appoint  a  member  to  look  after  our  interests,  and  I  was 
rebuked  for  it.  I  am  looking  after  the  industrial  interests  of  the 
United  States.  I  would  like  to  see  the  other  men  who  are.  They 
are  forgetting  the  industrial  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  they 
are  doing  things  that  will  cut  us  off,  and  our  trade  off,  from  the 
normal  channels,  because  the  Reparations  Commission  can  determine 
where  Germany  buys,  what  Germany  buys,  how  much  Germany 
buys.  ...  It  is  going  to  stand  at  the  centre  of  the  financial  opera- 
tions of  the  world.  .  .  .  Under  the  League  plan,  the  financial  lead- 
ership will  be  ours,  the  industrial  supremacy  will  be  ours,  the  com- 
mercial advantage  will  be  ours. 

Although,  in  the  beginning,  the  autocrat  of  our  war 
policies  had  said:  "We  look  for  no  profit.  We  look  for  no 
advantage.  We  will  accept  no  advantage  out  of  this 
war"  (May  12,  1917),  yet  here  we  have  a  direct  confes- 
sion that  he  was  moved  by  the  same  solicitude  for  business 


370  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

after  the  war  as  during  the  war,  before  the  war,  and  when 
getting  into  war;  that  at  Paris  he  was  a  patron  saint  of  the 
privileged  class,  just  as  were  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau. 
The  theories  of  a  war  of  defense,  a  war  for  international 
law,  a  war  for  democracy,  a  war  for  permanent  peace,  all 
break  down  before  examination.  The  theory  of  a  war  for 
business  alone  harmonizes  with  the  facts. 


XXXV 

"THE  ENEMY  AT  HOME" 

Ix  serving  business,  and  acknowledging  himself  a  servant 
of  business,  President  Wilson  never,  of  course,  acknowl- 
edged serving  big  business  at  the  expense  of  small  busi- 
ness, or  of  the  general  public;  but  invariably  held  that  his 
service  to  business  was  service  to  the  nation.  Said  Wilson 
on  one  occasion: 

Nothing  can  be  for  the  interest  of  capital  that  is  not  for  the  inter- 
est of  labor;  and  nothing  can  be  in  the  interest  of  labor  that  is 
not  in  the  interest  of  capital.  (Indianapolis,  Oct.  12,  1916.) 

This  brilliant  pronouncement,  if  true,  would  perhaps 
justify  any  course  that  any  politician  might  wish  to  follow  at 
any  time.  It  is  almost  equal  to  saying  that  what  is  good 
for  any  given  group  of  us  is  good  for  all  the  rest  of  us. 

The  proposition  that  the  interests  of  business — meaning 
very  big  business — are  identical  with  the  interests  of  the 
nation,  did  not,  of  course,  originate  with  Woodrow  Wilson. 
It  is  upon  this  assumption  that  an  important  share  of  past 
governmental  policies  has  been  based.  Our  time-honored 
protective  tariff  is  indefensible  under  any  other  theory — 
also  our  various  currency  systems — also  a  major  share  of 
the  activities  of  our  Departments  of  State  and  of  Commerce. 
All  agitation  for  government  subsidy,  or  other  aid  to  a  pri- 
vately owned  merchant  marine,  has  been  based  upon  this 
theory.  The  doctrine  of  the  protection  of  private  enter- 
prises abroad,  with  the  public  armed  forces,  necessarily 
rests  upon  the  assumption  that  such  enterprises  are  in  some 
way  bound  up  in  the  general  welfare. 

37i 


372  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

If  the  position  can  be  maintained,  that  what  is  for  the 
interest  of  big  business  is  for  the  interest  of  the  country, 
then  the  Wilson  policies,  in  peace  and  in  war,  are  possibly 
vindicated.  But  can  it  be  maintained?  The  question  is 
doubly  important — and  timely — because  this  is  the  posi- 
tion now  taken  by  the  dominant  element  in  both  the  Demo- 
cratic and  Republican  parties.  It  is,  in  the  main,  the  posi- 
tion of  Wilson's  successor  in  office.  The  leaders  of  both 
the  big  political  parties  heartily  approve  of  the  general 
policy  which  Wilson  pursued  toward  American  business,  in 
getting  into  war,  in  the  conduct  of  war,  in  negotiating  peace, 
and  in  "reconstruction."  The  Administration  which  suc- 
ceeded Wilson's  did  not  abate  a  single  American  business 
"benefit"  which  Wilson  arranged  for  at  Paris  or  elsewhere, 
no  matter  how  questionable  the  means,  and  it  did  not  wish 
to  do  so.  It  has  to  be  said  that  any  "business  President" 
would  have  been  willing  to  follow  about  the  course  that 
Wilson  followed  between  1915  and  1921 — and  if,  as  has 
been  suggested,  American  history  might  have  been  dif- 
ferent had  Wilson's  opponent  been  elected  in  1916,  it 
would  have  been  due  altogether  to  the  circumstances  men- 
tioned.1 Wilson  as  a  statesman  was  singular  only  in  his 
unusual  ability  to  mislead  the  public  as  to  his  motives  and 
intentions. 

Very  well,  our  captains  of  industry  have  long  tried  to 
convince  their  workmen  that  "nothing  can  be  for  the  inter- 
est of  capital  that  is  not  for  the  interest  of  labor,"  while 
our  professional  labor  leaders  have  long  tried  to  convince 
our  captains  of  industry  that  "nothing  can  be  in  the  inter- 
est of  labor  that  is  not  in  the  interest  of  capital."  Unhap- 
pily, employers  have  seldom  succeeded  in  persuading  em- 
ployees that  low  wages  are  good  for  employees;  while 

1  Mentioned  in  Chapter  VII. 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  373 

employees  have  seldom  succeeded  in  convincing  employers 
that  high  wages  are  good  for  employers. 

True,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  workmen  that  they  shall  have 
employment,  but  it  is  not  in  the  interest  of  workmen  that 
the  employers  shall  take  any  more  of  the  product  than  is 
economically  necessary  to  maintain  operations — although  it 
is  in  the  interest  of  the  latter  to  do  so. 

Likewise,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  farmer  that  there 
shall  be  a  market  for  his  product,  but  it  is  not  in  the  interest 
of  the  farmer  that  he  should  be  forced  to  sell  to  a  monopoly 
which  skims  the  cream  of  the  profit,  nor  that  he  should  pay 
exorbitant  rent  for  his  land,  or  usurious  interest  on  bor- 
rowed money,  or  excessive  prices  for  supplies.  Yet  it  is 
in  the  interest  of  some  other  social  group  that  the  farmer 
should  be  exploited  in  each  of  these  various  ways. 

It  is  in  the  interest  of  the  public  that  there  shall  be  rail- 
roads, but  it  is  not  in  the  interest  of  the  public  that  charges 
should  be  assessed  to  cover  dividends  on  watered  stock,  or 
that  rates  should  be  higher  than  economically  necessary  to 
provide  the  desired  service.  2 

It  is  in  the  interest  of  the  public  that  food  supplies  should 
be  well  distributed  and  easy  to  obtain,  but  it  is  not  in  the 
interest  of  the  public  that  the  supply  and  distribution  of 
food  should  rest  in  the  hands  of  a  monopoly  which  exacts 
prices  in  excess  of  those  economically  necessary. 

It  is  in  the  interest  of  the  public  that  manufactured  goods 
should  be  obtainable,  but  it  is  not  in  the  interest  of  the  pub- 
lic that  manufacturers  should  be  protected  by  a  tariff  wall, 

2  In  defense  of  government  benevolence  to  the  Transportation  Trust,  great 
stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  large  number  of  small  security-holders.  But, 
unless  a  major  share  of  the  latter's  income  is  from  railroad  profits,  his  in- 
terest is  rather  that  of  the  public  than  that  of  the  trust;  he  loses  more  by 
high  rates  than  he  gains.  As  the  history  of  railroad  financing  is  one  long 
story  of  the  robbery  of  the  small  investor  by  the  big  insider,  the  railroad 
kings'  pretense  of  consideration  for  the  small  security-holder  cannot  be 
accepted  as  genuine. 


374  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

enabling  them  to  charge  higher  prices  at  home  than  those 
for  which  they  can  profitably  sell  abroad. 

The  proposition  that  "nothing  can  be  for  the  interest 
of  capital  that  is  not  for  the  interest  of  labor,"  or  that 
what  is  good  for  any  given  group  of  us  is  good  for  all  the 
rest  of  us,  might  possibly  be  true  if  taken  in  some  far- 
fetched spiritual  sense,  but  in  no  practical  sense  is  it  true. 
Dollars  constitute  the  only  accepted  measure  of  interest  in 
this  material  world,  and  the  dollar  interests  of  individuals 
and  groups  everywhere  conflict. 

Buyer  and  seller,  employer  and  employee,  farmer  and 
middleman,  carrier  and  consumer,  packer  and  public,  may 
have  interests  in  common,  but  they  have  opposing  interests 
also.  It  is  the  function  of  democratic  government  to  serve 
only  the  common  interests  of  the  majority.  The  prosperity 
of  the  majority  alone  represents  the  prosperity  of  the  coun- 
try. 

Officially,  the  country's  prosperity  is  measured  by  corpo- 
ration profits,  the  prices  of  commodities,  banking  statistics, 
and  trade  statistics.  Such  figures  do  not  measure  the  pros- 
perity of  the  majority.  It  has  long  since  been  proven  that 
the  profits  of  a  corporation  tell  nothing  of  the  standard  of 
living  of  its  employees;  that  industries  protected  by  the 
tariff  and  yielding  the  greatest  profits  frequently  pay  the 
lowest  wages.  High  prices  usually  mean  that  somebody 
is  making  a  lot  of  money;  they  do  not  mean  that  everybody 
is  making  a  lot  of  money.  High  food  prices  do  not  always 
mean,  even,  that  the  farmer  is  making  a  lot  of  money,  but 
often  the  opposite. 

On  the  other  hand,  large  profits  in  any  quarter  signify 
a  one-sided  transaction,  in  which  somebody  suffers,  usually 
a  numerically  large  group.  Wherever  one  party  to  a 
transaction  becomes  inordinately  rich,  it  means  that  some 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  375 

other  party  to  the  transaction  is  getting  the  worst  of  the 
deal.  An  economic  structure,  or  a  governmental  policy, 
that  makes  millionaires  of  a  few  of  us,  necessarily  sacri- 
fices the  interests  of  most  of  us.  Prosperity  of  any  numeri- 
cally small  group  represents,  not  national  prosperity,  but 
national  exploitation.  In  general,  what  is  for  the  inter- 
est of  big  business,  is  against  the  interest  of  the  country. 
Is  it  possible  that  the  interest  of  big  business  in  the  war 
furnishes  an  exception  to  the  rule  ? 

We  have  seen  how,  while  the  war  was  being  fought, 
Wall  Street  gathered  in  enormous  profits,  while  the  lot 
of  the  majority  was  unrelieved  sacrifice.  We  have  seen 
how  the  "American"  commerce  which  Wilson  essayed  to 
protect,  in  approaching  war,  while  a  source  of  gain  to 
Wall  Street,  was  an  injury  to  the  public.  We  have  seen 
how  the  President's  reconstruction  policy,  while  immedi- 
ately protecting  the  Wall  Street  pocketbook,  did  so  at  the 
expense  of  the  masses.  The  last  possible  justification  for 
our  war  and  our  war  policies,  therefore,  would  have  to 
lie  in  the  proposition  that  what  has  herein  been  termed 
the  permanent  advantages  accruing  to  Wall  Street,  from 
American  belligerency,  will  ultimately  enhance  the  well- 
being  of  the  nation  as  a  whole;  that,  as  Mr.  Vanderlip, 
Mr.  Farrell,  and  Mr.  Wilson  maintained,  the  interest  of 
Wall  Street  and  the  public  in  foreign  trade,  in  a  large  mer- 
chant marine  under  the  American  flag,  in  foreign  enterprise 
and  government  protection  thereof,  is  identical — that,  in 
a  word,  imperialism  is  a  wise,  democratic,  and  nationally 
profitable  policy. 

After  the  lessons  that  have  been  spread  before  the  world 
in  the  past  half-dozen  years,  it  seems  almost  an  insult  to 
the  intelligence  of  the  reader  to  set  aside  any  space,  how- 
ever brief,  for  an  examination  of  this  question.  Yet,  as 


3?6  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

these  lines  are  written,  big  business  and  the  government  are 
cooperating  in  a  strenuous  and  intensive  propaganda  to 
convince  the  public  that  the  answer  should  be  affirmative. 

Begin  with  the  question  of  simple  trade.  The  primary 
interest  of  the  majority  in  foreign  trade  is  in  imports,  and 
arises  from  a  desire,  first,  for  goods  not  produced  in  this 
country,  and,  second,  for  goods  produced  here,  but  obtain- 
able only  at  prices  higher  than  the  cost  of  purchasing  and 
importing  similar  goods  from  other  countries.  But  the 
interest  of  the  big  business  minority  in  the  first  class  of 
imports  is  secondary,  while  it  is  not  interested  at  all  in 
the  second  class,  but  only  desires  its  complete  strangula- 
tion, by  means  of  protective  tariffs  and  "anti-dumping" 
laws. 

The  primary  interest  of  the  big  business  minority  in 
foreign  trade  is  in  exports.  But  the  interest  of  the  major- 
ity in  exports  is  limited  to  exporting  sufficient  goods  to 
balance  the  desired  imports.  Nothing  pleases  Wall  Street 
more  than  ua  balance  of  trade  in  our  favor" — meaning  an 
excess  of  exports  over  imports.  But  the  majority  has  no 
interest  whatever  in  a  "balance  of  trade  in  our  favor."  On 
the  other  hand,  every  dollar  of  such  a  balance  represents 
an  economic  loss  to  the  country  as  a  whole.  Where  is 
the  benefit  in  always  giving  a  greater  value  than  is  received? 

There  is  a  benefit  to  the  minority — collected  chiefly  at 
the  expense  of  the  majority.  Why  is  the  minority  so 
pleased  by  a  large  "balance  of  trade  in  our  favor?"  One 
important  reason  is  that  it  tends  to  limit  the  home  supply  of 
goods,  and  so  facilitates  the  boosting  of  home  prices.  The 
profit  on  foreign  sales  themselves  is  small  in  comparison 
with  the  enhanced  profit  on  domestic  sales,  which  a  large 
volume  of  export  makes  possible. 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  377 

In  his  report  to  the  Mayor  of  New  York  on  the  food 
situation,  in  the  spring  of  1917,  Health  Commissioner 
Emerson  declared  that  "the  first  cause  of  the  rise  in  food 
prices  is  the  increase  in  the  exportation  of  staple  articles." 
The  war  trade  was  employed  as  a  lever  to  boost  domestic 
prices,  with  the  result  that,  even  before  America  became  a 
belligerent,  the  American  public  was  paying  a  larger  cash 
tax  to  the  war  monster  than  some  of  the  belligerent  coun- 
tries themselves. 

Mr.  Hoover  himself  told  the  Senate  Committee  on  Agri- 
culture that  "in  the  last  five  months,  $250,000,000  has  been 
extracted  from  the  American  consumer  in  excess  of  normal 
profits  of  manufacturers  and  distributors,"  and  that  the 
average  prices  to  consumers  of  our  own  food  in  the  fighting 
countries  of  Europe  "are  lower  than  those  prevailing  in 
the  United  States.  In  England  the  price  of  bread  is  even 
25  per  cent,  lower  than  the  price  we  pay"  (June  18, 
1917.) 

In  the  year  preceding  our  declaration  of  war,  according 
to  Department  of  Labor  reports,  average  food  prices  ad- 
vanced 32  per  cent.  The  operation  is  the  same,  whether 
in  war  or  peace,  in  any  period  of  inflated  exports.  After 
the  armistice  had  been  signed,  the  cost  of  living  did  not 
fall,  as  had  been  predicted  and  promised,  but  continued  to 
increase.  Exports  continued  to  increase.  In  a  statement 
on  the  economic  situation  (Sept.  9,  1919),  in  which  it 
urged  speeding  up  in  the  factories  and  a  reduced  standard 
of  living  in  the  home,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  admitted: 

Looking  at  the  matter  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  ordinary 
American  consumer,  however,  the  effect  of  such  a  'favorable'  bal- 
ance of  trade  is  far  from  favorable  to  him.  .  .  .  The  immediate  pres- 
ent effect  of  it  ...  is  to  curtail  the  supplies  available  for  the 
American  consumer,  and  thereby  to  become  a  factor  of  considerable 


378  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

importance  in  our  price  level.  .  .  .  Buying  in  competition  with  ex- 
port demand  undoubtedly  has  been  a  major  cause  of  rising  prices 
in  the  post-war  period  of  the  United  States. 

Which  means  that  the  government  policy  of  promoting 
"our"  foreign  trade  simply  tends  to  establish  high  living 
costs  on  a  permanent  basis. 

Of  course,  the  foreign  trade  propagandists  put  forward  a 
series  of  propositions  intended  to  convince  the  majority 
that  it  shares  in  the  benefits.  Otherwise  the  minority 
would  be  unable  to  put  through  its  programme. 

The  wage-worker  is  informed  that  a  large  volume  of  ex- 
ports means  that  home  industry  will  travel  along  at  full 
blast,  and  so  jobs  will  be  available  for  all.  This  stock 
argument,  lifted  bodily  from  the  propaganda  of  the  pro- 
tective tariff,  may  appear  good  and  sufficient  to  anyone 
who  holds,  with  the  minority,  that  the  interest  of  labor  is 
adequately  served  so  long  as  the  working  population  is  per- 
mitted to  exist  and  work  at  any  price. 

So,  also,  might  industry  travel  along  at  full  blast  if  the 
goods  representing  the  "balance  of  trade  in  our  favor" 
were  offered  for  sale  at  home,  and  the  workers  of  the  coun- 
try were  paid  enough  more  for  their  labor  to  enable  them 
to  purchase  these  goods  for  themselves.  The  interests  of 
labor  would  really  be  served  by  such  an  arrangement.  But 
of  course  that  would  mean  restricted  profits  to  our  captains 
of  industry;  the  real  incentive  of  business  patriots  would 
disappear;  they  would  sabotage  their  beloved  country  by 
shutting  down  their  plants,  and  panic  would  stalk  through 
the  land. 

The  bland  assertion  that  labor  is  bound  to  benefit  by  a 
large  export  trade  may,  or  may  not,  convince  the  employee 
working  at  a  fixed  salary  which  he  is  unable  to  raise,  who 
only  knows  that  the  rising  living  cost  is  a  terrible  reality. 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  379 

There  is  a  suggestion,  of  course,  that  wages  will  be  raised. 
Who  will  raise  wages?  Did  any  important  fraction  of 
the  employing  class  ever  consent  to  wage  increases  except 
in  case  of  necessity,  due  to  strikes,  threats  of  strikes,  or 
scarcity  of  labor  arising  from  some  unusual  condition? 

The  wage  increases  in  1915  and  1916  were  not  due  to 
war-trade  prosperity,  or  the  benevolence  of  employers,  or 
even  to  higher  living  costs.  They  were  due  to  a  restricted 
labor  market,  arising  from  the  stoppage  of  immigration, 
which  made  it  possible  for  workmen  to  demand  and  get 
more  money  for  their  labor.  After  America  entered  the 
war,  the  draft  was  a  prime  factor  in  wage  increases.  But 
neither  in  1915,  1916,  1917,  1918,  1919,  nor  1920,  did 
wage  increases  equal — on  the  average — increases  in  living 
costs.  In  February,  1920,  the  Department  of  Labor  in- 
formed us  that  food  prices  had  increased  105  per  cent,  in 
seven  years.  This  estimate,  based  upon  figures  furnished 
by  retail  dealers  on  certain  staple  commodities,  told  only  a 
part  of  the  story. 

As  in  April,  1917,  the  Department  of  Labor  had  in- 
formed us  that  the  effect  of  the  European  war  upon 
America  had  been  to  "force  up  prices  faster  than  wages," 
so,  again,  in  May  1920,  another  government  agency,  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  admitted:  "Wages  have  apparently 
fallen  behind  the  advance  in  prices  and  cost  of  living." 

Do  our  foreign  trade  propagandists  mean  to  assert  that 
the  employing  class  will  'voluntarily  share  the  proceeds  with 
the  workers?  How  can  any  workman  be  foolish  enough 
to  expect  anything  of  the  kind,  especially  when  he  hears 
the  voices  of  millionaires  warning  the  country  that  wages 
must  be  kept  down,  and  strikes  prevented  as  a  part  of  the 
foreign  trade  programme  itself — indeed,  that  the  produc- 
ing classes  in  general  must  work  harder  and  consume  less 
— "if  we  are  to  meet  the  competition  of  other  countries?" 


380  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Again,  the  farmer  is  told  in  glowing  terms  of  the  ex- 
panded market  for  his  products,  and  is  told  he  can  com- 
mand higher  prices.  But  how  can  he  command  higher 
prices  as  long  as  he  remains  subject  to  extortion  by  the 
middlemen's  trusts? 

Said  Mr.  Hoover,  in  a  statement  to  the  Associated  Press, 
May  10,  1917 : 

I  am  assured  that  the  American  farmer  did  not  realize  $1.30  per 
bushel  for  the  1916  wheat  harvest.  Yet  the  price  of  wheat  in  N.  Y. 
to-day  is  $3.25  per  bushel,  and  flour  is  $14  per  barrel,  with  all  its 
attendant  hardships  and  dislocation  of  social  and  industrial  life. 

Of  what  value  to  the  farmer  is  a  government  subsidized 
merchant  marine,  so  long  as  grain  exchange  gamblers, 
packer  monopolies,  and  other  rings  of  middlemen  deter- 
mine the  price  he  shall  receive,  without  reference  to  the 
selling  price  abroad  or  the  conditions  of  ocean  carriage? 

What  evidence,  indeed,  is  there  that  ships  flying  the 
American  flag,  operated  for  the  private  profit  of  a  few 
men  in  Wall  Street,  backed  by  a  government  peculiarly  de- 
voted to  the  interests  of  big  business,  will  charge  lower 
rates  than  ships  flying  any  other  flag — or  that  a  large  num- 
ber of  ships  under  the  American  flag  will  tend  to  break 
either  the  private  shipping  monopoly,  the  transportation 
monopoly  on  land,  or  the  middlemen's  monopolies? 

On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  first  moves  of  the  Ship- 
ping Board  under  the  Jones  Merchant  Marine  Act  was 
taken  with  a  deliberate  purpose  of  producing  the  opposite 
effect.  Early  in  August,  1920,  it  was  disclosed  that  the 
Shipping  Board  was  holding  conferences  with  foreign  ship- 
ping interests,  in  an  effort  to  reach  an  understanding,  and 
through  the  operation  of  a  world  monopoly,  to  establish 
as  a  permanent  evil,  the  scandalous  carriage  charges 
reached  during  the  war. 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  381 

As  to  the  small  business  man,  he  is  assured  that  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  export  trade  will  find  their  way  into  all  the 
channels  of  the  country's  business,  and  so,  in  some  manner, 
he  is  certain  to  share  in  the  benefits.  But  what  becomes  of 
this  argument  when  our  rich  fellow-citizens  are  going  in 
for  the  export  trade,  frankly  with  a  view  to  reinvesting  the 
proceeds  not  in  America,  but  in  foreign  countries? 

For  another  important  reason  why  Wall  Street  is  pleased 
with  a  "balance  of  trade  in  our  favor"  is  that  it  makes 
practicable  the  export  of  capital.  During  the  fiscal  year 
ending  June  30,  1919,  the  "balance  of  trade  in  our  favor" 
was  $4,129,200,000.  The  nation  gave  away  a  four  bil- 
lion greater  value  of  goods  than  it  received  in  return. 

Wall  Street  invests  its  foreign  trade  profits  in  Mexico, 
Cuba,  Central  America,  China,  and  other  countries,  not 
only  in  anticipation  of  greater  profits  from  the  exported 
money,  but  also  in  order  to  enable  the  money  remaining  be- 
hind to  collect  greater  profits  here. 

Hand  in  hand  with  the  export  of  goods,  goes  the  export 
of  capital.  As  the  export  of  goods  tends  to  increase  the 
price  of  home  goods,  so  the  export  of  capital  tends  to  in- 
crease the  price  of  home  capital — and,  in  the  last  analysis, 
of  home  goods  also.  So  the  majority  pays — and  pays. 
Financiers  and  captains  of  industry  are  enabled  to  demand 
a  higher  return  on  the  investment.  They  refuse,  for  exam- 
ple, to  reinvest  in  their  own  railroads  any  part  of  the  prof- 
its, until  the  investment  is  made  more  attractive.  So  the 
public  is  forced  to  pay  higher  rates  for  poorer  service. 
The  small  business  man,  whose  enterprises  require  frequent 
borrowing,  must  pay  more  for  borrowed  money.  The 
farmer  does  the  same.  Domestic  enterprise,  instead  of 
being  expanded,  is  restricted.  The  capital  that  was  prom- 
ised to  give  jobs  to  American  workmen  is  found  in  for- 
eign countries  employing  foreigners.  The  development  of 


382  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

constructive  projects,  recognized  as  essential  to  material 
progress  at  home,  is  pushed  aside  for  the  exploitation  of 
China.  The  undeveloped  western  States,  which  have  been 
begging  for  more  capital  for  decades,  are  told  to  wait  a 
while  longer. 

All  this  begins  from  an  artificially  stimulated  export 
trade,  and  an  artificially  restricted  import  trade.  Another 
result  of  an  artificially  stimulated  export  trade  is  the  impov- 
erishment of  the  natural  resources  of  the  country.  An 
Associated  Press  dispatch  from  Washington,  dated  March 
20,  1919,  reads: 

Original  supplies  of  pine  in  the  south  will  be  exhausted  in  ten 
years,  and  at  least  3,000  mills  will  go  out  of  existence  within  five 
years,  according  to  Henry  S.  Graves,  chief  of  the  United  States 
Forest  Service.  .  .  .  'Our  country  is  progressively  destroying  its 
forests,'  declared  Colonel  Graves.  'The  consequences  are  very  far- 
reaching.  The  exhaustion  of  the  forest  is  followed  by  the  closing 
of  industries,  the  steady  increase  of  waste  lands,  the  abandonment 
of  farms  that  depended  for  their  market  on  the  lumber  communities, 
and  the  impoverishment  of  many  regions. 

'No  section  of  the  country  can  afford  to  have  a  large  part  of  its 
land  an  unproductive  waste,  with  the  loss  of  taxation  value,  of  indus- 
tries, and  of  population,  that  would  be  supported  if  tjiese  lands  were 
productive.  No  section  can  afford  to  be  dependent  for  its  supply  of 
wood  products  on  another  section  from  1,000  to  3,000  miles  away.' 

More  or  less  the  same  story  is  told  of  oil,  coal,  and  other 
natural  resources.  Viscount  Cowdray,  the  British  oil 
king,  in  a  letter  to  the  Westminster  Gazette,  (in  1917) 
remarked : 

According  to  American  scientific  estimates,  there  is  only  oil  in 
sight  in  that  great  continent  for  another  twenty-nine  years.  This 
situation  is  causing  serious  disquietude  to  the  government  of  the 
United  States. 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  383 

Yet  at  the  very  time  that  Cowdray  was  uttering  these 
words,  the  American  government  was  using  the  money  and 
authority  of  the  American  people  to  stimulate  the  export 
of  such  resources,  and  so  hasten  their  exhaustion. 

If  the  government  policy  of  serving  the  minority's  for- 
eign business  by  building  ships  for  it,  loaning  it  money  to 
stimulate  exports,  subsidizing  trade  routes,  negotiating 
monopolistic  rate  agreements  with  foreign  shippers,  raising 
tariff  walls,  enacting  anti-dumping  laws,  Webb  laws,  Edge 
laws,  Jones  laws,  promoting  the  establishment  of  foreign 
banks,  trade-spying,  and  other  peaceful  activities — all  at 
the  expense  of  the  public — is  of  questionable  value,  what 
can  be  said  of  that  policy  when  it  is  carried  so  far  as  to 
jeopardize  the  peace  of  the  nation  and  the  lives  of  its  young 
men? 

For,  government  assistance  in  the  expansion  of  "our" 
merchant  marine  has  its  corollary  in  the  building  of  a  great 
navy  to  protect  "our"  ships  "in  their  peaceful  pursuits  upon 
the  high  seas."  Government  encouragement  of  "our"  for- 
eign investments  has  its  corollary  in  the  protection  of  such 
investments  against  "confiscation"  by  the  country*  in  which 
the  investment  is  made,  as  well  as  against  the  machinations 
of  other  powerful  governments,  committed  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  investments  of  their  nationals. 

No  part  of  the  foreign  trade  programme  is  innocent. 
Business  groups  strong  enough  to  command  peaceful  gov- 
ernment service  are  also  strong  enough  to  command  public 
diplomacy  and  public  arms.  Public  officials  who  are  won 
to  the  advocacy  of  reaching  out  for  "our  proper  place  in 
world  trade"  are  also  won  to  the  advocacy  of  compelling 
countries  like  Mexico  to  "observe  their  international  obliga- 
tions," as  well  as  compelling  countries  like  Japan  to  respect 
the  Morganized  Monroe  Doctrine — in  other  words,  our 


384  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

"right"  to  coerce  Mexico  as  "we"  see  fit,  and  for  "our" 
interests. 

The  United  States  is  not  in  danger  of  invasion,  and  has 
not  been  for  generations.  It  is  not  in  danger  of  war  ex- 
cept as  it  chooses  to  perpetrate  aggressions  upon  the  weak, 
or  except  as  it  arouses  the  animosity  of  other  business 
governments  by  its  aggressive  pursuit  of  imperialistic 
spoils. 

As  government  service  to  Wall  Street's  foreign  business 
carried  America  into  the  war  against  Germany,  so  a  con- 
tinuation of  that  policy  is  certain  to  carry  it  into  future 
wars.  There  is  no  course  to  imperialistic  greatness  except 
through  seas  of  blood,  and  the  American  people  have  no 
interest  whatever  in  imperialistic  greatness,  or  in  any  part 
of  the  programme  of  imperialism. 

During  the  decades  when  America  was  without  a  mer- 
chant marine  or  foreign  investments,  the  American  people 
were  as  prosperous  as  the  people  of  the  countries  boasting 
the  largest  merchant  marines  and  the  most  valuable  for- 
eign investments.  Foreign  ships  have  always  been  glad 
to  carry  American  cargoes,  and  to  charge  no  more  for  the 
service  than  American  ships.  Foreign  trade,  within  cer- 
tain limits,  is  desirable,  and  there  is  no  objection  to  Ameri- 
can ships  as  such. 

The  point  is  that  subsidized  trade  and  ships  are  not 
worth  the  price,  and  that  the  trade  of  the  vessel  that  re- 
quires a  warship  to  protect  it  is  a  national  calamity.  Had 
there  not  been  a  handful  of  ships  flying  the  American  flag 
between  1915  and  1917,  it  would  have  been  more  difficult 
to  find  a  pretext  for  involving  America  in  the  world  war 
on  the  side  of  the  Entente  governments.  So  long  as  the 
imperialistic  madness  lasts,  America  would  be  safer  and 


"The  Enemy  at  Home"  385 

more  prosperous  without  merchant  ships  than  with  them.  3 
As  to  foreign  investments,  every  adventuring  dollar  that 
calls  back  to  the  United  States  government  to  protect  it 
is  a  traitor  dollar.  It  would  be  a  saner  economic  policy 
for  the  nation  to  buy  out  the  foreign  investments  of  its 
citizens,  paying  them  dollar  for  dollar,  and  paying  them 
expected  profits  besides,  to  the  end  of  time,  than  to  continue 
In  the  policy  of  aiding,  encouraging,  and  protecting  such 
investments. 

One  stroke  of  government  service  to  the  minority  leads 
on  to  another  and  bolder  stroke.  At  each  stroke  the  minor- 
ity collects  another  profit,  while  the  majority  pays — the 
protective  tariff — inflated  export  of  goods — the  export  of 
capital — the  building  and  operation  of  a  merchant  marine 
— army  and  navy  contracts — war. 

The  "foreign  trade"  propaganda,  like  our  "war  for 
democracy,"  is  a  national  swindle  whose  success  can  be 
explained  only  by  the  almost  complete  control  by  the  mi- 
nority of  all  the  great  opinion-forming  agencies  of  the  coun- 
try, and  especially  of  the  press.  Had  this  control  been 
any  less  complete,  the  simple  fact  that  the  rich  favored  the 
war  would  have  been  sufficient  in  the  beginning  to  make  the 
public  quite  certain  that  it  was  not  for  democracy.  For 
our  millionaire  class  was  created  by  the  desecration  of  de- 
mocracy, and  can  be  perpetuated  only  by  its  continued  dese- 
cration. 

3  Of  the  "American"  ships  for  whose  protection  we  quarreled  with  Ger- 
many, many — as  those  of  the  International  Mercantile  Marine — belonged 
to  British-controlled  corporations.  An  overwhelming  number  of  the  others 
became  legally  American  only  after  the  European  war  began.  Previously, 
a  majority  of  them  had  flown  the  British  flag  and  had  been  built  in  England. 
Their  owners  changed  them  from  British  registry  as  a  means  to  procuring 
the  "protection"  of  the  American  government.  The  British  government 
permitted  these  vessels  to  be  changed  to  the  American  flag  in  order  to 
furnish  the  American  government  a  convenient  excuse  for  getting  into  a 
quarrel  with  Germany. 


386  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

The  Congressional  Library  at  Washington,  and  the  ar- 
chives of  the  Department  of  Justice,  the  records  of  courts 
and  official  bodies  everywhere,  are  packed  with  sworn  tes- 
timony proving  that  the  accumulation  of  America's  great 
private  fortunes  was  accomplished  by  the  corruption  of 
government,  national,  State,  and  local,  and  the  habitual 
commission  of  crimes  of  almost  every  known  character; 
that  these  fortunes  are  to-day  maintained  and  expanded  by 
similar  practices;  that  the  lives  of  our  rich  super-patriots, 
and  the  corporations  which  they  represent,  are  a  standing 
offense  against  every  democratic  principle;  even  that  many 
of  these  gentlemen  were  in  the  past  personally  involved  in 
operations  peculiarly  unpatriotic. 

There  is  nothing  either  about  the  recent  war  or  any  pre- 
vious one  to  indicate  that  Wall  Street  has  ever  had  any 
more  concern  for  the  national  welfare  in  war  time  than 
in  peace  time.  Our  richest  fellow-citizens  have  made 
money  out  of  the  blood  of  their  countrymen  in  all  our  wars. 
Big  business  supported  the  recent  war  because  the  war  was 
in  support  of  big  business,  and  only  for  that  reason.  The 
great  financiers  and  their  banks  gave  the  same  support  to 
the  Liberty  Loans  as  they  were  in  the  habit  of  giving  to  a 
bond  issue  of  a  railroad  owned  by  themselves;  it  meant 
the  same  kind  of  satisfaction  to  them;  the  proceeds  were 
intended  to  go  into  their  pockets.  During  the  war,  it  was 
treason  to  denounce  the  great  profit-makers.  That  was 
logical,  for  the  war  was  for  their  sake.  It  would  have 
been  quite  impossible  for  President  Wilson  to  have  begun 
a  war  really  intended  to  "make  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy" without  facing  the  united  opposition  of  Wall  Street. 

The  real  enemy  of  America  is  not  autocracy  abroad.  It 
i's  not  kings  or  kaisers  or  czars.  The  real  enemy  of 
America  is  our  rich  fellow-citizen  who  is  willing  to  plunge 
our  country  into  war  for  his  own  selfish  purposes — his 


;'The  Enemy  at  Home"  387 

political  servant,  without  whose  voluntary  cooperation  pub- 
lic war  for  private  profit  would  be  impossible — his  intellec- 
tual henchman,  of  the  press,  the  pulpit,  and  the  college, 
whose  function  is  to  identify  the  national  honor  with  the 
business  ambitions  of  a  small  but  powerful  minority. 


XXXVI 

PROOF  OF  THE  PUDDING 

'But  what  good  came  of  it  at  last?' 
Quoth  little  Peterkin. 
'Why,  that  I  cannot  tell,'  said  he; 
'But  'twas  a  famous  victory.' 

DISILLUSIONMENT  must  be  final  when  one  faces  the  results. 
One  hundred  thousand  young  Americans  died  on  European 
battlefields  and  in  army  camps.  Nearly  as  many  more  are 
permanently  insane  from  the  shocks  and  horrors  of  war. 
Half  a  million  are  mutilated  for  life.  x  The  direct  money 
cost,  disbursed  by  the  government  alone,  was  in  excess  of 
thirty  billion  dollars — and  this  was  only  a  beginning. 
What  have  we  to  show  for  the  price  we  pay,  except  our 
soaring  living  costs,  our  21,000  new  millionaires,  our  muti- 
lated Constitution,  our  European  entanglements,  our  per- 
manently enlarged  military  and  naval  establishment,  and 
a  complete  set  of  war  laws  ready  to  clap  down  upon  the 
country,  the  moment  it  is  decided  that  the  thing  shall  be 
done  again? 

What  one  fine  promise  did  the  "noble  democracies"  ful- 
fill? What  one  pernicious  institution  did  they  banish  from 
the  earth?  What  one  thing  did  they  do  for  democracy? 

1  "In  all,  more  than  71,000  of  our  soldiers  and  sailors  have  been  dis- 
charged as  mentally  disabled,  and  more  than  38,000  as  tubercular." — Ameri- 
can Legion  Weekly,  January,  1921.  In  a  letter  to  Senator  Ashurst,  during 
the  same  month,  Surgeon-General  Cummings  estimated  that  the  sick  and 
insane  men,  whose  afflictions  can  be  charged  to  service  in  the  war,  were 
increasing  at  the  rate  of  1000  per  month.  According  to  a  report  of  the 
National  Disabled  Soldiers'  League,  at  the  beginning  of  1921,  the  number  of 
disabled  soldiers  was  641,900. 

388 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  389 

Has  America  more  or  fewer  friends  abroad  than  it  had  in 
1914  or  1916?  Are  we  more  "united,"  as  we  were  in- 
formed that  we  would  be?  Is  there  less  mutual  fear  and 
suspicion  among  us?  Are  our  personal  liberties  more  or 
less  secure  than  they  were?  Is  it  easier  for  the  masses  to 
earn  a  living  than  before?  Are  the  social  poles  nearer 
together,  or  wider  apart?  What  one  domestic  evil  has 
been  corrected  at  home? 

A  year  after  the  German  autocracy  fell,  our  diplomats 
and  our  armed  forces  were  meddling  in  a  dozen  foreign 
countries,  breaking  strikes  here,  denying  the  right  of  free 
assembly  there,  suppressing  newspapers,  acting  as  spies  and 
informers  for  counter-revolutionists,  overturning  popular 
governments,  seeking  to  return  to  power  the  very  minions 
of  autocracy  whom  we  had  proclaimed  it  our  mission  to 
overthrow — at  times,  as  at  Archangel,  driving  citizens  into 
the  trenches  to  fight  against  their  own  people — everywhere 
making  war  upon  every  high  principle  for  which  we  pro- 
fessed to  fight. 

At  home,  the  Terror  had  been  defended  only  as  a  war 
measure.  But  month  after  month  passed,  and  no  part  of 
the  repressive  legislation  had  been  repealed;  the  prisons 
remained  crowded  with  objectors;  the  Postmaster-General 
continued  to  exercise  his  extraordinary  powers.  Although 
countless  assurances  had  been  given  that  Americans  would 
get  back  their  constitutional  liberties,  it  became  more  and 
more  evident  that  those  who  had  set  up  the  Terror  intended 
to  make  it  permanent. 

The  machinery  created  to  make  war  on  "pro-German- 
ism" was  kept  intact  to  make  war  on  "Bolshevism."  As 
the  German  peril  was  played  out,  a  new  peril  had  to  be  in- 
vented. Bolshevism  was  any  criticism  of  existing  political 
or  financial  leadership,  any  dissatisfaction  with  existing  ty- 
ranny, any  effort  of  workmen  towards  higher  wages,  any 


390  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

movement  among  the  masses  for  better  conditions,  any  dis- 
position towards  reform,  and  especially  any  demand  for  a 
fulfillment  of  the  war  pledges.  Bolshevism  was  painted  as 
an  even  more  horrible  menace  than  Kaiserism,  and  in  order 
to  strike  fear  to  the  hearts  of  the  people,  Russian  Bolshe- 
vism was  lied  about  as  recklessly  as  we  had  lied  about 
Kaiserism. 

So,  unlawful  arrests  and  imprisonments,  and  unlawful 
raids,  did  not  come  to  an  end.  Espionage  in  the  schools, 
colleges,  and  elsewhere,  did  not  cease.  We  had  our  Fed- 
eral, State,  and  local  inquisitions  into  all  forms  of  radical- 
ism, and  a  flock  of  sedition  laws  for  peace  times.  The 
Federal  Secret  Service  was  permanently  enlarged.  At  the 
request  of  President  Wilson,  a  peace-time  Passport  Law 
was  enacted  and,  in  conjunction  with  our  allies,  we  estab- 
lished an  international  espionage  system  for  the  persecu- 
tion of  "Bolshevists"  of  every  kind.  The  Attorney-Gen- 
eral, while  maneuvering  for  a  Presidential  nomination,  pro- 
ceeded periodically  to  "discover"  and  "frustrate"  a  series 
of  bomb  plots,  just  in  time  to  "save  the  country  from  the 
horrors  of  Bolshevism,"  and  to  use  the  people's  money  to 
publish  abroad  his  Don  Quixote  exploits — although  he 
never  succeeded  in  constructing  a  single  plausible  case,  or 
bringing  a  single  political  bomb-thrower  to  justice.  Never 
before  in  our  history  had  the  Federal  government  been  so 
openly  and  militantly  an  ally  of  the  employing  class  in 
industrial  disputes.  Never  had  it  been  so  easy  to  procure 
the  aid  of  the  military  to  break  a  strike.  The  democracy 
which  we  enjoyed  before  the  war  was  of  purest  ray  serene, 
in  comparison  with  the  thing  that  faced  us  afterwards. 
The  American  people  were  given  czarism  and  solemnly 
told  it  was  Americanism. 

To  the  official  peace-time  Terror  was  added  an  unofficial 
Terror,  and  the  two  worked  in  harmony.  The  same  public 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  391 

leaders  who  had  been  most  vociferous  in  the  "war  for 
democracy"  now  led  the  marching  hosts  in  the  war  on 
"Bolshevism."  Patriotic  organizations  of  every  kind  were 
kept  intact  to  assist  in  the  new  war,  and  others  were  created 
for  that  purpose.  The  social,  commercial,  or  religious 
organization  that  did  not  issue  its  diatribe  against  Bol- 
shevism was  not  in  good  form.  Men  holding  the  highest 
positions  in  public  life  habitually  gave  voice  to  sentiments 
which  could  be  interpreted  only  as  an  incitement  to  riot 
against  any  one  dissenting  from  the  blind,  reactionary, 
brutal,  and  dangerous  state  of  mind  which  the  powerful 
were  seeking  to  impose  upon  the  nation  under  the  name  of 
patriotism. 

As  a  direct  consequence,  in  the  year  of  its  military 
triumph,  America  saw  more  civil  strife,  more  domestic  vio- 
lence, more  lawlessness,  more  intolerance  of  private  opin- 
ion, more  assaults  upon  common  democracy,  than  in  any 
other  year  within  half  a  century.  "One-hundred-per-cent 
Americans"  went  on  a  nation-wide,  anti-Bolshevik  shadow- 
hunt,  conjuring  up  an  enemy  where  there  was  none — break- 
ing up  peaceful  meetings,  burning  "red  literature,"  destroy- 
ing property,  sacking  newspaper  offices,  maltreating  defense- 
less and  inoffensive  persons.  They  ran  no  risk;  for  the 
Federal,  State  and  local  authorities  gave  them  license  and 
protection.  The  cowardice  brewed  in  the  fear  propaganda 
of  1917  and  1918  was  utilized  in  1919,  in  the  most  das- 
tardly series  of  attacks  on  civil  liberties  known  in  American 
history. 

The  excuse  was  that  somebody  wanted  to  overthrow  the 
government  by  force.  Since  somebody  wanted  to  over- 
throw the  government  by  force,  nobody  must  criticize  the 
government  or  advocate  change.  Anybody  who  criticized 
the  government  must  be  put  down  by  force.  The  govern- 
ment must  put  down  the  Constitution  by  force.  An  organ- 


392  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ization  of  ex-service  men  calling  itself  the  American  Le- 
gion assumed  to  set  up  a  super-government  in  many  commu- 
nities, to  censor  public  discussion,  to  break  strikes,  to  abolish 
"American  liberties'1  in  the  name  of  "Americanism,"  and 
to  exert  a  nation-wide  influence  in  favor  of  black  reaction. 
The  only  wonder  is  that  these  things  did  not  of  themselves 
produce  a  series  of  bomb  plots  having  a  more  tangible  basis 
than  the  imagination  of  the  Attorney-General. 

When  before  was  the  American  republic  so  steeped  in  sin 
that  it  dared  not  look  itself  in  the  face?  While  many  sin- 
cere though  thoughtless  persons  were  drawn  into  this 
scheme  of  violence,  there  is  no  question  whence  the  impulse 
for  it  emanated,  nor  what  its  motive.  Its  basic  motive, 
undoubtedly,  was  to  impose  permanent  restrictions  upon 
expression,  and  so  conceal  the  war  swindles,  to  hold  the 
public  mind  in  subjection  and  prepare  it  again  to  accept 
military  service  on  behalf  of  Wall  Street's  foreign  ambi- 
tions, in  the  name  of  patriotism  and  the  national  honor. 

The  conservative  reaction  of  1919,  like  the  "democratic" 
brain-storm  of  1917,  was  artificially  stimulated — by  the 
same  interests  and  for  similar  ends. 

But,  in  spite  of  the  peace-time  Terror,  the  war  swindle 
became  more  and  more  discernible  to  the  naked  eye. 
Abroad,  it  was  impossible  entirely  to  conceal  the  dangerous 
friction  among  our  various  allies,  or  the  source  of  that 
friction — the  hungry  desire  of  righteous  governments  to 
"administer"  new  territories  "for  the  benefit  of  the  inhabi- 
tants." It  was  impossible  to  keep  from  us  some  knowledge 
of  their  sanctimonious  atrocities,  particularly  the  butcheries 
of  England  in  India,  Egypt,  and  Ireland;  of  Japan  in  Ko- 
rea, as  well  as  of  our  proteges,  Rumania,  Poland,  Greece, 
and  Finland,  either  within  or  without  their  own  borders. 
It  was  also  impossible  to  suppress  the  fresh  evidence, 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  393 

brought  to  light  from  time  to  time  by  the  Bolsheviki  and 
others,  of  Allied  plotting  for  vast  territorial  grabs  in  a 
general  European  war,  years  before  Serbian  officers  mur- 
dered an  Austrian  prince.  It  was  impossible  to  hide  from 
us  the  fact  that  Britons  were  beginning  to  mention  America 
as  the  next  world  peril — according  us  the  same  position  in 
the  British  scheme  of  things  that  Germany  had  held  during 
the  past  generation,  that  Russia  held  for  nearly  a  century, 
that  France  held  before  Russia,  that  Spain  held  before 
France.  It  was  impossible  to  hide  the  fact  that,  even 
greater  than  the  discrepancy  between  the  Fourteen  Points 
and  the  various  peace  treaties,  was  the  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  best  promises  written  into  these  documents  and 
the  performances  that  we  proceeded  to  stage. 

Weak  nations  were  liberated,"  only  to  be  used  as  pawns 
in  the  same  old  game.  "Mandatories"  were  conquered 
with  blood  and  iron,  only  to  be  fenced  off  for  economic  ex- 
ploitation. Offensive  and  defensive  alliances  continued  to 
be  made.  Diplomacy  was  never  more  secret  nor  sinister. 
Aggression  was  the  order  of  the  day.  The  new  govern- 
ments which  we  set  up  turned  out  to  be,  in  notable  instances, 
less  restrained  in  autocracy  and  in  egoistic  madness  than  the 
great  empires  of  which  they  had  formerly  been  a  part. 
The  folly  of  championing  with  the  sword  the  irredentism  of 
any  nation  became  increasingly  evident.  All  of  us  pro- 
ceeded to  prepare  to  make  use  in  the  next  war  of  all  weap- 
ons, however  frightful,  developed  by  Germans  as  well  as 
by  our  allies  and  ourselves.  Never  did  the  British  imperial- 
istic machine  work  at  such  high  pressure,  and  the  same  may 
be  said  of  the  imperialistic  machines  of  France,  Japan,  and 
even  of  ourselves. 

In  a  twelvemonth  we  had  sowed  more  seeds  of  new  wars 
than  Germany  had  sowed  in  all  her  history.  The  League 
of  Nations  was  laughed  to  scorn  by  the  Supreme  Council, 


394  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

which  dwindled  to  two  premiers,  who  happened  to  hold  the 
strings  of  the  greatest  military  establishments  in  Europe. 
The  old  international  law  was  made  a  mockery,  and  in  its 
place  was  set  up  the  authority  of  two  politicans.  The 
"democratic"  and  "glorious"  France,  which  we  had  ideal- 
ized during  the  fighting,  was  revealed  as  being  in  the  grip 
of  the  most  aggressive  militarism  of  modern  times. 

Not  the  least  damning  are  the  words  of  the  "utter  demo- 
crat" himself,  in  his  efforts  to  "explain"  to  the  Senate  and 
the  country  the  settlement  which  he  brought  back  from  the 
European  mire.  Although  the  purpose  of  these  explana- 
tions was  to  assure  the  nation  that  the  Versailles  Treaty 
realized  the  President's  peace  pledges,  and  to  reassure  it 
of  the  validity  of  the  entire  body  of  the  war  propaganda, 
and  although,  in  the  effort  to  carry  out  this  purpose,  the 
President's  explanations  became  a  mass  of  misstatements 
as  to  what  was  contained  in  the  treaty,  yet  within  these  ex- 
planations themselves  appear  a  series  of  admissions  and 
contradictions  which  are  themselves  a  confession  of  the 
monumental  imposture. 

While  assuring  his  audiences  that  his  settlement  provided 
for  general  disarmament  and  would  end  war,  he  was  urg- 
ing upon  Congress  a  bill  to  create  a  standing  army  of 
576,000  men — a  standing  army  only  300,000  smaller  than 
that  of  Germany  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

While  assuring  his  audiences  that  "when  the  treaty  is 
accepted  men  in  khaki  will  not  have  to  cross  the  seas  again," 
he  was  awaiting  a  politically  favorable  moment  in  which  to 
ask  Congress  to  approve  an  American  mandatory  in  Tur- 
key, which  would  require  a  new  army  to  be  sent  immediately 
to  Europe. 

While  solemnly  declaring  America  incapable  of  violat- 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  395 

ing  the  political  independence  of  any  other  nation,  he  was 
announcing  that  American  troops  would  remain  indefinitely 
in  Russia. 

While  informing  the  public  that  "the  essential  object 
of  the  treaty  is  to  establish  the  independence  of,  and  pro- 
tect, the  weak  peoples  of  the  world,"  he  was  threatening 
Mexico  with  ua  radical  change  of  policy,"  which  Could  have 
meant  nothing  less  than  another  invasion  of  that  country. 

While  informing  us  that  "only  the  free  peoples  of  the 
world  can  join  the  League  of  Nations,"  he  was  confessing 
that  a  certain  charter  member  (France)  was  under  the  con- 
trol of  its  general  staff  at  the  Conference,  that  "they  were 
dominated  by  the  military  machine  that  they  had  created, 
nominally  for  their  own  defense,  but  really,  whether  theV 
willed  it  or  not,  for  the  provocation  of  war." 

While  protesting  that  the  members  of  his  league  were 
drawn  together  by  a  common  passion  for  the  political  inde- 
pendence and  the  territorial  integrity  of  weak  nations,  he 
was  admitting  that  at  least  one  of  the  most  important  of 
the  number  had  to  be  permitted  to  transgress  the  political 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  a  defenseless  neigh- 
bor, as  a  bribe  to  induce  it  to  enter  his  league. 

In  one  speech  we  find  him  proclaiming  that,  "There  can 
be  cited  no  instance  where  these  governments  [the  govern- 
ments of  England,  France,  Japan,  etc.]  have  been  dishonor- 
able" ;  yet  within  the  week  we  find  him  describing  their 
aggressions  upon  China,  and  characterizing  them  as  "a 
very  serious  impairment1,  of  the  territorial  integrity"  and 
"a  very  serious  interference  with  the  political  independence 
of  that  great  political  kingdom." 

In  one  speech  we  find  him  asserting  that  the  representa- 
tives of  France  and  England  had  promised  him  to  return 
to  China  "the  exceptional  rights"  which  they  had  extorted 


396  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

from  that  country — giving  pledges  similar  to  the  alleged 
pledge  of  Japan  to  return  Shantung;  three  days  later  we 
find  him  saying  that  no  such  promise  had  been  made.  In 
one  breath  we  find  him  acknowledging  that  his  treaty  would 
subject  Germany  to  a  punitive  indemnity;  in  the  next  breath 
we  find  him  denying  it.  On  one  day  we  find  him  suggest- 
ing that  the  German  commercial  classes  wanted  war  for 
commercial  reasons;  on  the  following  day  we  find  him 
asserting  that  the^  German  commercial  classes  wanted  to 
avoid  war  for  commercial  reasons.  To  one  audience  he 
portrayed  our  proposed  after-war  union  with  our  allies,  as 
a  "moral  union";  to  another  audience  he  portrayed  it  as 
eminently  a  financial  union.  On  one  day  he  averred  that 
he  consented  to  participate  upon  the  Reparations  Commis- 
sion only  to  assist  our  dear  allies;  on  another  day  he  ac- 
knowledged that  his  purpose  was  to  serve  what  he  termed 
"the  industrial  interests  of  the  United  States."  At  times 
he  proclaimed  in  the  most  positive  terms  that  his  peace 
pledges  had  been  completely  realized  at  Paris;  at  other 
times  he  confessed  that  they  had  not  been  realized,  and  of- 
fered excuses  of  various  kinds.2 

While  asserting  that  "the  League  of  Nations  makes 
every  agreement  of  every  kind  invalid,"  he  was  confessing 
that  one  of  its  primary  objects  was  to  validate  and  enforce 
a  peace  based  upon  the  multifarious  agreements  written 
into  the  secret  treaties. 

In  admitting  that  in  making  peace  he  was  guided  by  the 
secret  treaties,  he  defended  the  action  on  the  ground  that 
the  war  was  fought  partly  to  vindicate  the  sacredness  of 
treaties;  pretending  that  his  obligation  to  observe  these 
secret  robber  bargains  was  greater  than  his  obligation  to 
insist  upon  the  conditions  of  a  permanent  and  democratic 
and  just  peace,  which  he  had  promised  his  own  people  and 

*  For  more  complete  quotations  see  Appendix. 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  397 

the  world,  and  which  the  makers  of  the  secret  treaties  had 
solemnly  agreed  to  abide  by. 

Although,  in  his  Memorial  Day  address  at  Paris  (1919) 
he  asserted:  "Private  counsels  of  statesmen  cannot  now 
and  cannot  hereafter  determine  the  destinies  of  nations"; 
and  although,  at  Oakland,  California  (Sept.  18,  1919)  he 
declared:  "From  this  time  forth,  all  the  world  is  going  to 
know  what  all  the  agreements  between  nations  are.  It  is 
going  to  know,  not  their  general  character  merely,  but  their 
exact  language  and  contents";  yet  in  the  intervening  period 
he  refused  the  Senate  information  upon  which  his  Paris  de- 
cisions were  based;  mentioned  the  "intimacies"  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  and  the  "indiscretion"  of  talking  about 
them,  even  to  the  treaty-ratifying  body;  declared  it  a  mis- 
take "to  redebate  here  [with  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee]  the  fundamental  questions  that  we  debated  at 
Paris" ;  refused  data  on  the  ground  that  it  was  agreed  at 
Paris  that  they  should  be  "confidential";  acknowledged  pos- 
session of  "international  secrets"  which  he  declined  to  share 
even  with  the  Senate;  confessed  to  the  view  that  his  Paris 
secrets  should  never  become  public  property  (Conference 
with  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  at  White  House, 
Aug.  19,  1919)  ;  brought  out  more  and  more  clearly  the 
facts  that  the  treaty  itself  was  but  a  skeleton  of  secret 
understandings  known  only  to  five  old  men  who  whispered 
together  at  Paris;  that  he  was  attempting  to  bind  America 
to  courses  of  action  which  would  be  revealed  to  the  coun- 
try only  after  they  had  become  accomplished  facts ;  that  he 
had  entered  into  far-reaching  engagements  with  foreign 
governments  to  use  the  money  and  the  blood  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  in  secret  enterprises  over  which  neither  the 
American  people  nor  their  representatives  in  Congress 
would  ever  exercise  choice  or  dominion;  that  his  projected 
League  of  Nations  was  not  intended  to  be  under  the  control 


398  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

of  peoples  or  of  national  legislatures,  but  that  it  was  to  be 
an  instrument  of  executives,  as  secret,  irresponsible,  and 
autocratic  as  the  Peace  Conference  itself. 

He  asserted  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  secret  treaties 
until  after  he  arrived  at  Paris,  although  they  had  been  pub- 
lished in  Europe  and  in  America,  debated  in  the  Parlia- 
ments of  our  allies  and  acknowledged  by  Allied  statesmen. 
He  asserted  that  he  did  not  know,  until  we  went  to  war, 
that  "Germany  was  not  the  only  country  that  maintained 
a  secret  service,"  although  he  himself  maintained  a  secret 
service  of  precisely  the  same  sort  as  Germany's.  He  as- 
serted that  Japan  had  promised  to  return  the  sovereignty 
of  Shantung,  "without  qualification,"  although  Japanese 
statesmen  had  already  announced  that  there  would  be  quali- 
fications. "Japan  has  kept  her  engagements,"  he  declared, 
although  he  could  not  be  ignorant  of  the  history  of  the 
strangling  of  Korea. 

In  declaring  the  unwisdom  of  defining  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  the  covenant  of  the  League  "because  I  do  not  know 
how  soon  we  may  wish  to  extend  it,"  he  confessed  himself 
capable  of  the  trickery  which  "extending"  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine would  involve. 

In  conceding  that  "America  was  not  directly  attacked," 
he  acknowledged  as  fraudulent  the  proposition  upon  which 
he  had  asked  Congress  to  declare  war,  "that  the  recent 
course  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  is  nothing  less 
than  war  against  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States." 

In  admitting  that  "America  was  not  immediately  in  dan- 
ger," he  branded  as  a  hoax  the  entire  scare  propaganda,  for 
which  he  himself  had  struck  the  keynote.  In  confessing 
that  "This  was  a  commercial  and  industrial  war,  not  a  po- 
litical war,"  he  discarded  in  a  word  the  theory  of  a  German 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  399 

world  peril,  upon  which  his  own  high  professions  of  a  war 
against  ''autocracy"  were  based. 

In  suggesting  that  he  "waited  on"  the  American  people 
a  long  time  before  he  asked  Congress  to  declare  war,  he 
pleaded  guilty  to  practicing  deception  upon  the  American 
people  during  the  critical  weeks  of  February  and  March, 
1917. 

In  reiterating  what  he  told  us  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
that  the  German  people  did  not  choose  war  and  did  not 
want  war,  he  condemned  the  punishment-for-wrong-done 
theory,  upon  which  his  settlement  was  based,  and  which  else- 
where he  sought  to  justify.  In  urging  ratification  on  finan- 
cial and  commercial  grounds,  he  confessed  to  charlatanry 
in  all  his  pretenses  of  an  unselfish  war. 

Mr.  Walsh,  do  you  think  that  any  considerable  number  of  peo- 
ple, when  they  read  my  declarations,  thought  that  these  settlements 
were  to  be  made  at  some  particular  place,  automatically,  immediately  ? 
(President  Wilson  to  Frank  P.  Walsh,  Paris,  June  II,  1919,  as  re- 
ported to  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  by  Messrs. 
Walsh  and  Dunne.) 

What  is  this  but  an  admission  that  the  promises  upon 
which  100,000  American  youths  gave  up  their  lives  were 
never  intended  to  be  carried  out? 

So,  Wilson's  own  explanations  of  his  settlement,  as  given 
to  the  Senate  and  in  his  treaty  tour,  become  the  final  word 
against  Wilson  himself,  against  Wilson's  war  propaganda, 
against  Wilson's  treaties,  against  Wilson's  war. 

The  wisest  and  best  men  honestly  fail  to  reach  their 
highest  aims,  honestly  make  mistakes,  honestly  change  their 
minds,  honestly  reverse  themselves.  But  the  inconsisten- 
cies of  Woodrow  Wilson  cannot  be  explained  on  any  theory 
that  includes  an  assumption  of  honesty.  Apologists  for  the 


400  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

individual  may  still  argue  that  Wilson  was  "forced"  to  re- 
verse himself,  forced  to  break  his  promises,  forced  against 
his  will  to  ask  for  a  declaration  of  war,  forced  to  con- 
sent to  an  imperialistic  peace,  forced  by  uthe  invisible 
government."  Were  there  no  other  answer  it  would 
be  enough  to  point  to  the  fact  that  Wilson  always  had  the 
alternative  of  resigning  his  office.  The  theory,  indeed,  re- 
veals a  woeful  misunderstanding  of  the  operations  of  the 
so-called  invisible  government.  The  great  force  of  the 
latter  is  exerted  before  election,  not  afterwards.  Had 
Wilson  idealism  been  anything  but  verbal,  he  would  not 
have  been  nominated  and  elected.  The  great  myth  of  the 
world  war  was  Wilson  idealism.  Our  noble  President 
was  simply  a  one  hundred  per  cent.  American  politician. 
The  secret  of  Wilson  is  hypocrisy. 

By  the  close  of  1919,  it  had  become  more  or  less  respecta- 
ble to  confess  disillusionment  as  to  Wilson,  and  especially 
as  to  Wilson's  peace.  We  may  have  become  disillusioned 
regarding  Wilson,  but  how  about  ourselves  ?  Why  were  we 
so  long  in  finding  out  that  Wilson  and  perfection  arc  not 
synonymous  terms  ?  3 

What  happened  from  1917  on  would  have  been  impos- 
sible had  not  the  "leaders  of  the  people"  generally  been  of 
much  the  same  character  as  Wilson,  and  willing  to  serve 
the  same  ends  by  similar  means.  Had  the  convictions  of 
the  majority  of  Senators  and  Representatives  gone  any 
deeper  than  regard  for  their  own  immediate  political  for- 
tunes, they  would  not  have  yielded  the  day  on  so  many  im- 
portant points,  upon  which  in  the  beginning  they  were  op- 
posed to  the  President.  Although  the  President  was  more 

3  "What  matters  the  error  or  the  incapacity  of  a  single  man  compared 
with  the  incapacity  and  the  error  of  the  entire  nation  which  glorified 
him?"  I  borrow  these  words  from  Martin  Luis  Guzman,  who  applied  them 
not  to  Woodrow  Wilson  and  the  American  people,  but  to  Porfirio  Diaz  and 
Mexico,  in  a  little  book,  "The  Complaint  of  Mexico." 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  401 

willing  to  plunge  the  country  into  war,  readier  to  go 
against  the  peace  spirit  of  the  country,  and  bolder  in  du- 
plicity and  contempt  for  the  laws  of  the  land,  the  members 
of  the  national  law-making  body  did,  in  the  end — with  a 
few  honorable  exceptions — swallow  the  Wilson  pro- 
gramme, tolerate  the  Wilson  usurpations,  and  connive  at 
the  Wilson  duplicities.  Every  Wilson  war  lie  was  echoed 
with  becoming  sanctity  by  Wilson's  leading  political  op- 
ponents. 

Senatorial  opposition  to  the  Wilson  settlement,  insofar 
as  it  saved  the  country  from  financial,  political,  and  military 
deals  to  which  the  President  attempted  to  commit  us,  and 
insofar  as  it  operated  to  explode  the  myth  of  Allied  and 
Presidential  perfection,  was  a  real  service.  The  service, 
however,  was  an  incident  of  party  politics.  For  it  was 
almost  universally  conceded  that,  had  the  President's  head 
not  been  turned  by  adulation,  had  he  continued  to  employ 
ordinary  political  sagacity;  once  the  Republican  party  had 
won  the  election  of  1918,  instead  of  piling  up  slights  and 
insults,  had  he  permitted  it  to  go  through  the  motions  of 
participating  in  the  drafting  of  the  treaties,  had  he  been 
willing  to  share  the  "honor,"  his  work  would  have  been 
promptly  ratified,  without  the  dotting  of  an  "i"  or  the 
crossing  of  a  "t." 

Notwithstanding  the  iniquity,  one  cannot  refrain  from 
a  passing  regret  that  the  Senate  did  not  at  once  ratify  the 
Wilson  treaties,  thus  yielding  the  final  item  of  his  war  pro- 
gramme, just  as  it  had  yielded  every  other  item  of  impor- 
tance from  the  beginning.  For  there  will  always  remain 
some  simple  persons  to  contend  that  Senatorial  perversity 
was  the  one  thing  that  prevented  the  whole  of  the  beautiful 
edifice  of  world  peace  and  democracy,  promised  by  Wilson, 
from  being  realized  then  and  there. 

Such  persons  really  have  little  to  complain  of.     Smart- 


402  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

ing  under  a  thousand  indignities,  and  with  an  eye  upon  the 
1920  election,  the  Republicans  blocked  ratification,  pledged 
themselves  to  withdraw  from  European  entanglements, 
promised  immediate  peace,  won  the  election  on  such  pledges 
— only  to  project  the  country  again  into  the  European  mess 
as  deeply  as  they  dared. 

The  League  of  Nations  under  that  name  must  forever 
remain  anathema,  but  under  other  forms  we  join  in  the 
imperialistic  schemes  for  which  the  League  was  set  up. 
The  Armenian  mandate  and  the  French-British-American 
special  alliance  are  shelved;  from  that  much  the  Republi- 
can party  saved  us — for  the  time  being,  at  least.  Other- 
wise, it  did  not  right  a  single  wrong,  or,  in  any  important 
particular,  attempt  to  change  the  course  of  the  country. 
The  Wilson  policy  towards  reparations,  mandatories,  ter- 
ritorial disputes,  the  China  Consortium,  Shantung,  Russia, 
alien  property,  railroads,  shipping,  dye  tariffs,  the  army 
and  navy,  passports,  foreign  trade,  "anti-dumping,"  Haiti, 
Nicaragua,  Cuba,  Mexico,  oil,  Federal  espionage,  our  Eur- 
opean debtors,  we  take  up  where  Wilson  left  off,  and  carry 
forward  from  there.4  Even  in  his  speeches,  Wilson's  suc- 
cessor can  do  little  else  than  feebly  echo  Wilson.  The  re- 
sult of  uthe  great  and  solemn  referendum"  was  that  the 
public,  while  believing  it  was  repudiating  the  Wilson  poli- 
cies, was  only  putting  them  into  other  hands  quite  as  will- 
ing to  carry  them  out.  The  election  of  1920  was  a  fraud 

*  Under  the  name  of  a  "Conference  for  the  Limitation  of  Armaments," 
we  stage  at  Washington  a  parley  of  governments  reminiscent  of  the  con- 
ferences of  "the  powers"  of  Europe  so  frequently  held  in  the  years  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  world  war.  While  China's  finish  is  being  duly  ar- 
ranged, we  are  positively  assured  that,  as  a  result  of  the  conference, 
armaments  will  be  reduced  all  around.  At  the  same  time  the  still  small 
voice  of  a  cabinet  member  is  informing  us:  "Plans  now  initiated  for  prep- 
aration for  national  defense  contemplate  a  more  complete  state  of  pre- 
paredness than  at  any  previous  period  in  the  peace-time  history  of  our 
country."  (Annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Dec.,  1921.) 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  403 

of  the  same  character  as  that  of  1916,  though  of  lesser 
magnitude. 

By  the  middle  of  1920,  it  was  no  longer  "Bolshevism" 
to  criticize  the  Wilson  peace;  it  was  still  "Bolshevism"  to 
question  the  validity  of  the  Wilson  war.  So  the  saviors 
of  our  country,  in  the  Republican  group  in  the  Senate,  con- 
tinued to  glorify  the  Wilson  war  while  condemning  the  Wil- 
son peace,  and  many  of  the  rest  of  us,  sheep-like,  followed 
their  example.  But  had  the  major  premises  of  the  war 
propaganda  been  valid — the  perfection  of  Wilson  and  the 
purity  of  our  allies — the  settlement  could  not  have  been 
other  than  a  pure  and  perfect  one.  It  is  impossible  now 
to  offer  any  criticism  of  the  Wilson  settlement,  or  of  Wil- 
son, or  of  any  of  the  post-war  conditions,  without  tearing 
down  some  essential  part  of  the  theory  upon  which  the  war 
was  put  through.  But  the  invalidity  of  that  theory  was  as 
demonstrable  before  the  war  as  afterwards.  There  was 
no  occasion  for  the  experiment  that  we  made.  No  one  who 
joined  in  the  "Stand-Behind-the-President!"  cry,  or  partici- 
pated in  the  purity-versus-depravity  nonsense,  has  a  right  to 
cast  a  stone  at  Wilson.  He  got  what  he  bargained  for. 
The  Liberal  patriots  who  raised  their  hands  in  holy  horror 
at  the  peace-time  Terror  got  what  they  bargained  for. 
The  "now-that-we're-in"  patriots  got  what  they  bargained 
for.  The  Labor  patriots  of  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor  got  what  they  bargained  for.  The  anti-union  drive 
of  the  Garys  and  the  government,  like  the  lawless  war  on 
"Bolshevism,"  was  an  almost  certain  aftermath  of  a  war 
for  the  enrichment  of  the  Garys,  although  that  war  would 
hardly  have  been  possible  without  the  voluntary  coopera- 
tion of  the  Gomperses. 

Certain  "liberal"  editors  have  sought  to  excuse  our  war 
lies  on  the  ground  that  they  were  necessary  for  victory. 


404  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

But  had  America's  cause  been  just,  there  would  have  been 
no  need  to  bolster  it  up  with  lies.  Even  had  this  argument 
been  valid  once,  it  would  long  ago  have  lost  its  force. 
Nevertheless,  the  movement  to  keep  alive  the  memory  of 
our  dead  in  Europe  also  became  a  movement  to  keep  alive 
the  war  lies,  and  forever  hide  the  war  swindles.  Let  us 
face  the  truth. 

The  truth  is  that  there  was  not  a  particle  of  democracy 
about  our  war,  either  in  the  way  it  was  achieved,  in  the 
way  it  was  conducted,  in  the  distribution  of  its  burdens,  in 
the  fighting  organization  itself,  in  its  real  motives,  in  the 
manner  of  making  peace,  or  in  its  fruits,  either  at  home 
or  abroad;  that  we  quarreled  with  Germany,  went  to  war, 
and  negotiated  peace,  purely  in  the  interest  and  at  the 
direction  of  high  finance,  and  at  all  stages  to  the  prejudice 
of  the  general  welfare;  that  no  American  died  for  his 
country  in  Europe  in  1917,  1918,  or  1919,  since  there  was 
no  occasion  for  any  American  to  die  for  his  country,  either 
in  Europe  or  elsewhere. 

A  great  truth  is  that  we  have  lied — we  have  indulged  in 
an  orgy  of  lying.  We  have  not  been  honest  even  with  our 
own  allies.  No  American  could  honestly  ask  for  freedom 
for  Ireland  on  any  ground  of  principle,  and  put  the  soft 
pedal  on  Haiti.  No  one  could  consistently  criticize  the 
Shantung  award  and  keep  still  about  Nicaragua.  America 
has  nothing  to  be  afraid  of  except  its  own  conscience,  and 
has  not  had  for  a  long  time.  The  truth  is  that  we  have 
given  the  world  a  spectacle  of  white-livered  hysteria  that 
will  require  years  of  self-respecting  conduct  to  live  down. 

For  the  mere  money  cost  of  our  war,  every  person  who 
works  for  a  living  in  America,  every  bread-winner,  every 
propertyless  family,  could  have  been  provided  with  a  mod- 
ern and  comfortable  home,  free  of  liability.  Instead,  we 
have  what  are  called  Liberty  Bonds.  We  were  informed 


Proof  of  the  Pudding  405 

that  they  were  a  good  investment,  but  that  was  not  enough; 
they  were  forced  upon  us.  We  paid  our  good  money  for 
them.  We  were  then  taxed  to  pay  for  them  again.  Our 
government  then  proceeded  to  confiscate  a  large  share  oi 
their  value,  by  printing  paper  money  in  greatly  increased 
quantities.  At  the  end  of  the  war  we  could  sell  our  bonds 
for  something  less  than  half  the  goods  the  same  money 
would  have  bought  before.  But  whether  we  sell  our  bonds 
or  whether  we  keep  them,  we  shall  continue  paying  for 
them — over  and  over  again;  in  taxes  and  in  swollen  prices. 
By  the  simple  trick  of  inflation,  the  government  confiscates 
a  part  of  the  wages  of  every  workman;  and  by  its  financial 
operations  turns  the  money  over  to  the  multimillionaire 
owners  of  our  "essential  industries." 

Instead  of  gaining,  we  have  everywhere  lost.  Our  Lib- 
erty Bonds  turn  out  to  be  a  gold  brick  from  every  point 
of  view. 

The  case  against  the  war  is  also  the  case  against  existing 
leaders  of  the  people  in  every  walk  of  life,  against  big  busi- 
ness patriotism,  against  Wall  Street  democracy,  against 
the  press  as  it  is,  against  a  trust-in-the-President  form  of 
government,  against  a  social  system  that  could  permit  the 
great  American  swindle  of  1916-1919. 

There  remains  a  single  chance  for  America  to  derive  a 
benefit  from  the  war  just  past.  It  is  to  perceive  the  lesson 
and  act  upon  it.  It  is  for  common  folks  to  recognize  the 
real  character  of  past  events,  and  so  take  measures  to  pre- 
vent a  recurrence  with  probably  more  costly  results. 


XXXVII 


"RECONSTRUCTION" 


THE  programme  that  would  preserve  the  peace  of  America, 
promote  its  prosperity,  and  serve  democracy  at  home  and 
abroad,  would  have  to  include  an  honest  application  of  prin- 
ciples by  which  President  Wilson  professed  to  be  guided  in 
sending  American  armies  to  European  battlefields. 

For  international  application,  the  cardinal  principles  are 
self-determination  and  equality  of  sovereignty.  Before 
there  could  be  any  question  of  fighting  to  compel  the  observ- 
ance of  these  fundamentals  by  others,  we  would  first  have 
to  observe  them  ourselves,  as  well  as  to  heal,  as  far  as  may 
be,  the  scars  that  we  have  cut  in  trampling  upon  them  in 
the  past.  In  other  words,  we  would  have  to  purge  our- 
selves with  a  course  of  repudiation,  withdrawal,  and  repara- 
tion. 

i.  Repudiation.  Formal  repudiation  of  every  "Ameri- 
can" and  other  policy  in  foreign  affairs  that  conflicts  with 
the  principles  of  self-determination  and  equality  of  sov- 
ereignty. 

Repudiation  of  the  policy  of  employing  diplomatic  coer- 
cion or  armed  intervention  on  behalf  of  business  invest- 
ments in  any  country,  whether  under  the  name  of  "protect- 
ing American  lives  and  property,"  "preserving  order,"  or 
any  other  guise. 

Repudiation  of  dollar  diplomacy  in  any  form. 

Repudiation  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  asserting  a  "right" 
to  intervention  in  Cuba. 

Repeal  of  the  legislation  empowering  the  President 

406 


"Reconstruction"  407 

to  proclaim  an  arms  embargo,  as  a  means  to  assisting  or 
hindering  one  side  or  another  in  an  internal  dispute  in 
Latin  America,  or  countries  elsewhere. 

Repudiation  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement,  recogniz- 
ing special  interests  of  Japan  in  China  foil  considerations 
kept  secret. 

Repudiation  of  the  imperialistic  "peace"  treaties,  and  all 
special  alliances  with  imperialistic  governments. 

Renunciation  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  Convention,  the 
Haitian  and  Santo  Domingan  conventions,  and  every  other 
international  "agreement"  procured  under  duress  from  our 
neighbors. 

Renunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  our  time-honored 
excuse  for  a  denial  of  full  sovereignty  to  Latin  American 
states.  In  practice  we  have  not  fully  enforced  observance 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  upon  others.  Much  less  have  we 
observed  it  ourselves.  We  permitted  England  to  take  and 
keep  Belize.  "With  the  existing  colon.es  or  dependencies 
of  any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall 
not  interfere."  But  in  1898,  we  stripped  Spain  of  all  her 
colonies  in  this  part  of  the  world,  and  in  1916  we  coerced 
Denmark  into  selling  us  the  Virgin  Islands.  "Our  policy 
with  regard  to  Europe  .  .  .  is  not  to  interfere  in  the  in- 
ternal concerns  of  any  of  its  powers"  Yet  we  projected 
America  into  the  middle  of  European  affairs  in  1917. 

In  abandoning  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  would  abandon 
a  policy  that  long  ago  outlived  whatever  usefulness  it  ever 
had  as  a  protector  of  the  weak,  or  as  a  means  for  our  own 
defense;  which  long  ago  became  a  scrap  of  paper  in  our 
hands,  and  whose  only  present  use  is  as  a  cloak  for  aggres- 
sion. 

2.  Withdrawal.  Immediate  and  unconditional  with- 
drawal of  all  American  military  and  naval  forces  from  all 
countries  not  a  part  of  the  United  States. 


408  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Withdrawal  from  Nicaragua,  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo, 
and  Cuba. 

Immediate  withdrawal  from  all  protectorates,  official 
and  unofficial.  Withdrawal  of  American  collectors  from 
all  foreign  customhouses.  Withdrawal  of  all  support  of 
Latin  American  dictators  whom  we  have  set  up,  or  who 
owe  their  tenure  to  our  favor.  Abandonment  of  all  meas- 
ures inimical  to  popular  movements  in  neighboring  coun- 
tries requiring  revolution  for  their  success. 

Withdrawal  of  all  military  forces  from  Europe  and  Asia. 

Immediate  and  complete  independence  to  Filipinos, 
Porto  Ricans,  and  Virgin  Islanders. 

3.  Reparation.  Full  reparation  to  all  countries,  such  as 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras,  whom  we  have  assisted  into 
bankruptcy  by  compelling  them  to  acknowledge  exorbi- 
tant claims  of  our  bankers,  having  no  just  foundation. 

Restoration  of  Guantanamo  to  Cuba,  and  the  Corn  Is- 
lands and  other  territory  taken  from  Nicaragua. 

Restoration  of  full  sovereignty  to  Cuba,  Nicaragua, 
Haiti,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Honduras. 

Adequate  reparation  to  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Nic- 
aragua for  injuries  done  to  their  citizens  in  our  wars  of 
conquest. 

Restoration  of  all  indemnities  to  our  late  enemies,  includ- 
ing merchant  ships  appropriated  in  American  harbors,  and 
property  confiscated  on  land. 

Satisfactory  reparation  and  apologies  to  all  neutral  na- 
tions against  whom  we  committed  injuries  in  violation  of 
international  law  during  the  late  war. 

Having  freed  the  subject  peoples  under  our  heel,  having 
washed  our  hands  of  the  blood  of  our  weaker  brethren, 
having  righted  every  international  wrong  that  we  have 
committed,  so  far  as  that  is  possible ;  having  taken  the  fear 


"Reconstruction"  409 

from  the  hearts  of  our  nearest  neighbors,  we  may  consider 
ourselves  competent  then — and  only  then — to  offer  pro- 
posals to  other  nations,  looking  toward  the  maintenance 
of  the  peace  of  the  world,  and  the  safety  of  democracy. 

Governments  which  really  cared  nothing  for  democracy, 
or  international  justice,  or  peace,  might  not  take  kindly 
to  our  proposals;  they  would  know  that  they  were  sincere. 
All  governments  care  for  peace  of  a  sort;  all  wish  to  avoid 
great  wars  if  they  can  have  their  way  without  them.  But 
no  government  devoted  to  the  interests  of  a  minority  which 
fattens  upon  the  profits  of  aggression  wishes  to  see  estab- 
lished the  bases  of  permanent  world  peace.  They  do  not 
wish  to  be  deprived  of  the  "right"  to  make  public  war  for 
private  profit. 

But  every  government  not  devoted  to  imperialism,  or 
under  the  thumb  of  an  imperialistic  government,  or  in  im- 
mediate terror  of  reprisals  from  imperialistic  governments, 
would  be  interested  in  our  proposals  and  willing  to  join  a 
genuine  peace  league.  They  would  have  everything  to 
gain  and  nothing  to  lose. 

Such  a  league  would  have  a  larger  charter  membership 
than  the  spurious  league  which  President  Wilson  brought 
back  from  Versailles.  At  the  same  time  it  would  not  at 
once  be  a  league  of  all  nations.  For  the  "noble  democra- 
cies," our  late  comrades  at  arms,  would  be  conspicuous 
by  their  absence — unless  our  magnificent  example  should 
lead  to  the  downfall  of  imperialism  everywhere. 

It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  probable  effect  through- 
out the  world  of  such  an  example.  The  downfall  of  Rus- 
sian imperialism  caused  all  imperialistic  governments  to 
tremble  in  their  shoes.  Either  the  restoration  of  Russian 
imperialism  or  the  partition  of  that  country  among  impe- 
rialistic governments  was  everywhere  deemed  essential  to 
the  safety  of  imperialistic  "civilization."  Yet  the  lesson 


410  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

of  America's  renunciation  would  be  infinitely  clearer  and 
more  inspiring.  Russian  imperialism  crumbled  under  the 
stress  of  war,  under  circumstances  in  which  the  issue  was 
clouded,  at  a  time  when  the  new  regime  was  subject  to 
misinterpretation,  hostile  prejudice,  and  attack,  from  which 
we  in  America  would  be  comparatively  free. 

We  have  talked  much  and  we  have  not  udelivered  the 
goods."  The  world  will  never  again  credit  our  high  pre- 
tensions, until  they  are  proven  by  deeds.  It  is  easy  to  be- 
lieve that  one  magnificent  act  of  renunciation  would  nerve 
a  suffering  world  to  deliver  the  death-blow  to  the  cause  of 
its  travail. 

And  if  it  did  not,  what  then?  Would  it  mean  danger  or 
disaster  for  ourselves?  Would  we  stand  in  peril  of  our 
noble  allies,  the  only  remaining  governments  in  the  world 
either  interested  in  aggression  or  in  a  position  to  perpetrate 
aggressions? 

These  governments  will  have  their  hands  overfull  for 
years — and  probably  as  long  as  they  last — in  enforcing  the 
conditions  of  settlement  upon  their  late  enemies,  in  carry- 
ing out  other  schemes  nearer  home,  and  in  keeping  their 
own  people  in  subjection  at  the  same  time.  The  with- 
drawal of  our  support  would  vastly  limit  their  capabilities 
for  aggression.  If,  with  our  support,  a  supreme  effort 
to  subjugate  Russia  was  impracticable,  as  Entente  statesmen 
admitted — Russia,  impoverished  by  war,  weakened  by  rev- 
olution and  counter-revolution,  disorganized,  blockaded, 
geographically  within  easy  reach,  her  ports  in  their  posses- 
sion and  their  armies  upon  her  soil — how  much  more  im- 
practicable would  it  be  for  these  governments  to  attempt 
to  send  any  force  across  the  Atlantic  in  an  effort  to  dictate 
in  our  affairs! 

Our  imperialistic  allies  will  continue  to  perpetrate  ag- 
gressions in  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  in  proportion  to  the 


"Reconstruction"  411 

"practicability"  of  the  undertakings.  They  are  the  world 
peril,  they  and  their  system,  a  far  greater  peril  to  the  world 
than  the  Kaiser  ever  succeeded  in  becoming — only  because 
they  are  stronger  than  he  and  his  Junkers  ever  were  or  had 
a  chance  to  be. 

So  long  as  these  governments  last,  the  world  cannot  be 
made  "safe  for  democracy,"  especially  that  part  of  the 
world  "practically"  within  their  reach.  Yet  I  do  not  advo- 
cate that  we  attack  this  peril  as  we  attacked  the  Kaiser. 
The  struggle  against  autocracy  and  imperialism  is  essen- 
tially an  internal  one.  The  autocracy,  militarism,  and  im- 
perialism of  a  given  country  can  best  be  dealt  with  by  the 
democratic  forces  within  that  country.  Imperialistic  gov- 
ernments may,  on  occasion,  overthrow  imperialistic 
governments,  as  in  the  present  era.  But  the  sum  of  the 
World's  imperialism  is  not  decreased  thereby.  Autocracy, 
militarism  and  imperialism  thrive  on  external  hostilities. 
So  long  as  the  democratic  forces  within  imperialistic  coun- 
tries are  not  strong  enough  to  deal  with  their  own  govern- 
ments, the  death-blow  to  imperialism  cannot  be  delivered, 
and  a  part  of  the  world  will  remain  in  danger. 

I  would  not  advocate  an  effort  of  America  against  this 
peril,  even  to  the  extent  of  attempting  to  save  the  next 
intended  victims  of  European  and  Asiatic  imperialism  in 
Europe,  Asia,  or  Africa.  But  in  the  western  hemisphere 
something  of  the  kind  might  wisely  be  done. 

In  the  past,  the  independent  states  of  the  western  hemi- 
sphere have  owed  their  comparative  immunity  from  Euro- 
pean aggression  more  to  distance  and  their  own  strength 
than  to  the  protection  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  They  had 
been  under  European  rule,  and  with  their  own  strength  had 
cast  it  off.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  pronounced  against 
their  reconquest,  which  was  under  consideration  by  the 


412  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

Holy  Alliance.  Nevertheless,  the  credit  for  saving  them 
from  new  wars  at  that  time  cannot  be  claimed  for  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  For  the  withdrawal  of  England  from 
the  Holy  Alliance,  which  happened  before  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  appeared,  was  sufficient  to  cause  the  abandonment 
of  the  scheme  as  impracticable. 

No  one  can  say  that,  if  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  not 
been  promulgated,  the  whole  of  the  Americas,  outside  of 
the  United  States,  would  have  come  into  the  possession 
of  European  powers.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that,  had  they 
come  into  the  possession  of  European  powers,  such  posses- 
sion would  now  constitute  a  peril  to  the  independence,  the 
territorial  integrity,  or  the  institutions  of  the  United 
States.  Is  Canada  a  peril  to  this  country? 

Although,  in  our  national  pride,  we  have  greatly  exag- 
gerated the  effect  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  upon  the  rela- 
tions between  Europe  and  the  western  hemisphere,  it  has 
not  been  wholly  without  influence.  What  would  be  the 
effect  of  its  formal  renunciation?  Would  our  late  allies 
— one  or  more  of  them — rush  in  and  seize  Mexico  and 
other  Latin  American  states? 

Mexico  is  the  issue  upon  which  the  policy  of  imperialism 
may  next  be  tested  in  the  western  hemisphere.  British 
gentlemen,  like  American  millionaires,  have  properties, 
claims,  and  ambitions,  which  they  are  anxious  shall  be  made 
good  by  the  strong  arm  of  the  United  States  govern- 
ment. Let  us  suppose  that  America  should  refuse  to  use 
either  its  arms  or  its  diplomacy  on  behalf  of  British  inter- 
ests— should  unreservedly  recognize  the  sovereignty  of 
Mexico,  as  it  has  repeatedly  promised  to  do — should  con- 
cede the  full  right  of  Mexico  to  tax,  or  otherwise  control, 
foreign  property  within  her  borders,  in  accordance  with 
her  own  ideas  of  the  public  welfare — would  Britain  then 


"Reconstruction"  413 

proceed  to  enforce  her  "rights"  in  Mexico  with  British  arms  ? 

I  grant  that  England  or  any  other  imperialistic  govern- 
ment is  capable,  morally,  of  entering  upon  a  war  of  con- 
quest upon  Mexico.  Every  imperialistic  government  every- 
where stands  ready  to  perpetrate  a  war  of  conquest  any- 
where, the  moment  that  it  appears  practicable  to  do  so. 
But  would  it  be  practicable  for  England  to  invade  Mexico? 

Certainly  not  nearly  as  practicable  for  England  as  for 
the  United  States.  That  is  a  reason  why  England  is  quite 
willing  for  America  to  "attend  to  her  interests"  there. 
Why  not  wait  and  see  if  England  would  consider  it  prac- 
ticable to  enter  upon  a  war  of  conquest  upon  Mexico,  before 
entering  upon  such  an  enterprise  on  her  behalf  ourselves? 

The  Mexicans  would  rather  have  us  do  that,  feeling  that 
they  would  be  safer  without  the  "protection"  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  than  with  it.  Latin  Americans  generally! 
would  be  most  happy  to  have  us  withdraw  from  them  the 
"protection"  of  our  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  only  because 
they  have  reason  to  consider  it  more  of  a  menace  than  a 
protection.  They  know  the  history  of  American  aggres- 
sion— and  understand  its  significance — better  than  do  the 
American  people  themselves. 

Should  the  United  States  formally  renounce  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  recognize,  in  its  stead,  what  has  sometimes 
been  called  the  Carranza  Doctrine — which  places  foreign- 
ers on  the  same  level  with  citizens,  denying  to  the  former 
the  "right"  to  call  upon  their  home  governments  to  inter- 
vene on  behalf  of  their  business  enterprises — the  action 
would  be  hailed  with  rejoicing  throughout  Latin  America; 
the  fear  and  hatred  felt  generally  for  Americans  would 
disappear  with  the  removal  of  its  cause;  and  it  is  certain 
that  the  Carranza  Doctrine  would  be  adopted  generally  by 
Latin  American  countries.  In  which  case  it  is  probable 


414  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

that  the  eastern  hemisphere  would  be  forced,  by  circum- 
stances already  mentioned,  to  accept  the  dictum  of  the  west- 
ern hemisphere,  and  refrain  from  pressing  any  imperialistic 
claims  in  this  part  of  the  world. 

But  supposing  that  it  should  not?  The  people  of  the 
United  States  would  then  have  to  determine  how  far  they 
would  go  in  standing  with  their  near  neighbors  against 
European  aggression. 

There  would  be  several  courses  open  to  us.  First,  we 
could  give  military  assistance  of  a  strictly  defensive  charac- 
ter, such  as  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine  contemplated, 
and  such  as  was  contemplated  for  all  threatened  states  in 
Wilson's  original  scheme  for  a  genuine  League  of  Nations. 
If  we  must  have  a  war  over  Mexico  of  some  kind,  why  not 
fight  to  save  Mexico  from  being  grabbed  by  others,  instead 
of  grabbing  Mexico  ourselves? 

Second,  if  we  did  not  think  it  wise  to  fight,  we  could 
stand  aside,  selling  our  neighbors  the  arms  with  which  to 
protect  themselves — our  right  as  a  neutral  nation — leaving 
the  issue  to  be  determined  between  them  and  their  enemies. 

A  third  possible  course  would  be  to  use  our  good  offices, 
and  a  small  portion  of  our  great  wealth,  if  need  be,  to  set- 
tle any  immediate  claims  of  a  pressing  nature  that  might 
seem  to  threaten  the  peace  of  the  western  hemisphere. 

We  paid  out  more  money  for  our  part  in  the  European 
war  than  the  combined  investments  of  all  Europeans  in  all 
the  independent  states  of  Latin  America.  One  of  our  rea- 
sons for  doing  this,  we  said,  was  to  save  small  states  from 
the  peril  of  aggression.  We  did  not  save  small  states 
from  such  peril.  A  far  wiser  policy,  and  a  far  less  expen- 
sive one — at  least,  so  far  as  the  western  hemisphere  is  con- 
cerned— would  have  been  to  guarantee,  with  the  Treasury 
of  the  United  States,  the  foreign  debt  of  all  our  neighbors 
who  happened  to  be  in  financial  trouble,  to  adjust  all  Euro- 


"Reconstruction"  415 

pean  claims,  and  to  put  every  state  "on  its  feet"  financially, 
even  if  we  never  received  a  penny  of  our  money  back. 

An  objection  to  this  will  be  that  some  of  these  countries 
are  in  the  hands  of  corrupt  and  inefficient  governments, 
which  would  continue  to  contract  European  obligations  and 
would  soon  be  found  again  in  financial  difficulties.  An 
answer  is  that,  once  an  adjustment  were  made,  coupled 
with  the  declaration  that  henceforth  no  debts  were  to  be 
collected  by  governmental  intervention,  future  risks  would 
not  be  taken  with  the  expectation  of  making  them  good  by 
such  means. 

Another  answer  is  that  our  present  policy  is  largely 
responsible  for  the  insolvency  of  Latin  American  govern- 
ments, their  inefficiency  and  corruption.  In  order  to  be 
in  a  position  always  to  assert  American  supremacy  for  the 
sake  of  selfish  interests,  we  have  created  the  fiction  that 
Latin  Americans  are  unfit  to  look  after  their  own  affairs, 
and  are  incapable  of  self-government.  At  the  same  time 
we  ourselves  have  forced  Latin  American  states  into  bank- 
ruptcy. We  have  set  up  dictators  who  betrayed  their  own 
people.  We  have  furnished  Latin  America  with  the  for- 
eign peril  that  everywhere  plays  into  the  hands  of  autoc- 
racy. We  supported  the  counter-revolutions  that  have 
kept  Mexico  in  turmoil.  Our  own  citizens  and  our 
own  government  are  responsible  for  the  very  danger 
to  life  and  property  that  we  are  asked  to  end  by  interven- 
tion. 

It  is  probable  that  Mexico,  if  left  to  herself,  would  ulti- 
mately pay  all  just  claims  of  foreigners.  But  the  demands 
of  foreign  capitalists,  intent  on  getting  away  with  Mexico's 
natural  resources  without  adequate  return  to  the  country, 
ought  not  to  be  met.  The  great  oil  corporations  would 
have  the  American  people  war  upon  the  Mexican  people  in 
order  to  save  the  oil  deposits  from  what  they  term  confisca- 


416  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

tion  by  the  Mexican  government.  What  an  unterrified  Mex- 
ican government  would  do  with  the  remaining  oil  resources 
it  is  impossible  to  say.  We  will  suppose  that  it  would  con- 
fiscate them.  Then  let  it  confiscate  them.  The  interests 
of  the  American  people  are  not  the  interests  of  the  oil  cor- 
porations in  this  matter.  They  are,  rather,  the  interests 
of  the  Mexican  people.  Perhaps  some  American  would 
really  suffer.  But  the  Americans  who  are  interested  in  the 
exploitation  of  Mexican  oil  are,  for  the  most  part,  mil- 
lionaires with  great  holdings  elsewhere.  Were  they  dis- 
possessed in  Mexico,  without  a  dollar  of  compensation,  they 
would  not  forego  any  luxury,  nor  would  their  families 
starve.  There  may  be  foreign  "rights"  in  Mexico,  but 
how  about  the  rights  of  Mexicans?  Public  undertakings 
on  a  large  scale,  serviceable  to  the  Mexican  nation,  must 
wait  until  there  are  funds  to  prosecute  them.  Mexico  has 
both  the  legal  and  the  moral  right  to  tax  such  funds  from 
the  rich  holdings  in  her  natural  resources.  The  vested  in- 
terests of  a  minority,  whether  native  or  foreign,  cannot 
stand  against  the  needs  of  the  great  majority. 

America  needs  a  new  patriotism — a  patriotism  that  is 
able  to  see  our  neighbor's  viewpoint,  as  well  as  our  own; 
that  is  willing  to  accord  genuine  "equality  of  rights,"  re- 
gardless of  relative  might;  that  dares  to  look  our  own 
faults  in  the  face,  in  order  that  they  may  be  rectified. 

But  we  cannot  make  democracy  safe  abroad,  not  even 
from  ourselves,  until  we  have  first  made  democracy  safe  at 
home.  It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  book  to  offer 
any  detailed  suggestions  for  making  democracy  safe  at 
home.  When  the  eyes  of  the  American  masses  are  opened 
to  the  real  motives  of  their  war  and  the  fruits  of  their 
peace,  they  will  then  begin  to  see  what  they  must  do.  Cir- 
cumstances will  have  to  determine  how  rapidly  progress 


"Reconstruction"  417 

may  be  made,  as  well  as  what  means  may  be  most  effectively 
employed  to  make  it. 

It  may  be  suggested,  however,  that  those  Americans 
whose  professions  of  love  for  their  Constitution  are  gen- 
uine cannot  do  less  than  to  press  for  its  restoration,  and 
the  righting,  so  far  as  possible,  of  the  domestic  wrongs 
that  have  been  accomplished  by  its  profanation.  They 
will  at  least  insist  that  every  imprisoned  victim  of  any 
war  law  be  set  free,  also  all  victims  of  army  courts-martial. 
They  will  cast  about  for  a  means  of  defending  their  Consti- 
tution against  the  President  and  the  Supreme  Court. 
Since,  in  our  foreign  policy,  we  remain  subject  to  a  Stand- 
behind-the-President-trust-in-the-President  system — to  a 
scheme  of  things  that  holds  us  at  the  mercy  of  the  secret 
whims,  blunders,  treacheries,  and  machinations  of  one  man 
— they  will  seek  to  take  from  the  President  the  power  which, 
for  that  matter,  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  never  in- 
tended that  he  should  have,  to  make  war  practically  at 
will;  they  will  try  to  accomplish  at  home  the  thing  that 
Woodrow  Wilson  declared  to  be  a  war  aim  of  the  United 
States:  "The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  any- 
where that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of  its  single  choice, 
disturb  the  peace  of  the  world." 

Again,  all  Americans,  whose  professions  of  love  for  de- 
mocracy are  sincere,  will  at  least  clamor  for  the  immediate 
and  absolute  abolition  of  secret  diplomacy,  and  of  conscrip- 
tion, for  the  obliteration  of  existing  class  distinctions  in 
the  armed  forces,  for  the  abolition  of  the  present  barbar- 
ous system  of  military  ''justice" — "reformed"  though  it 
be.  They  will  perhaps  press  for  a  prohibition  of  the  use 
of  the  armed  forces  outside  the  territory  or  territorial 
waters,  except  after  referendum.  Certainly  they  will  de- 
mand that  the  entire  cost  of  the  war  be  collected  from  the 
interests  that  profited  by  it  and  furnished  the  motive  for  it. 


418  Shall  It  Be  Again? 

They  will  even  seek  to  make  an  end  of  government  service 
to  the  big  business  minority,  whether  in  foreign  or  do- 
mestic affairs. 

The  majority  will  have  to  gain  actual  control  of  the 
public  business  in  every  department  thereof.  But  to  hope 
to  gain  such  control  and  keep  it  will  be  futile  so  long  as  a 
minority  retains  possession  of  the  means  of  information, 
and  uses  it  to  deceive  the  others  for  its  own  selfish  and  se- 
cret purposes.  A  simple  observance  of  the  Constitution 
would  preclude  the  imprisonment  of  persons  for  expressing 
their  views  upon  public  affairs,  but  real  freedom  of  speech 
and  of  the  press  cannot  be  restored  without  fundamental 
economic  changes. 

So  long  as  a  handful  of  men  in  Wall  Street  control  the 
credit  and  industrial  processes  of  the  country,  they  will  con- 
tinue to  control  the  press,  the  government,  and,  by  decep- 
tion, the  people.  They  will  not  only  compel  the  public  to 
work  for  them  in  peace,  but  to  fight  for  them  in  war. 

Democracy  is  not  a  reality  in  America.  America  is  a 
financial  oligarchy,  in  which  the  President  is  the  willing, 
though  pretendedly  reluctant,  servant  of  the  great  finan- 
cial powers. 

The  events  of  the  past  half-dozen  years  have  demon- 
strated not  only  the  moral  bankruptcy  of  the  political  and  in- 
tellectual leaders  that  capitalism  has  given  the  world,  but 
the  inability  of  capitalism  to  save  the  world  from  periodic 
disaster.  Imperialism  is  simply  a  phase  of  capitalism. 
Big  business  government  must  go,  but  big  business  govern- 
ment will  not  go  until  big  business  goes.  Only  the  institu- 
tion of  a  new  social  order,  based  upon  economic  equality, 
will  save  the  world  from  more  and  more  wars  for  business. 


APPENDIX 

A  FEW  DEADLY  PARALLELS  OF  WOODROW  WILSON 

EXPLAINING  THE  VICTORY  AND  ITS  RESULTS 

WHAT  BECOMES  OF  THE  GERMAN  PERIL? 

German  Peril  is  Destroyed. 

"The  object  of  the  war  is  attained.  .  .  .  Armed  imperialism  .  .  . 
is  at  an  end.  .  .  .  The  arbitrary  power  of  the  military  caste  of 
Germany  ...  is  discredited  and  destroyed." — Message  to  Congress 
announcing  armistice  terms,  Nov.  u,  1918. 

German  Peril  is  not  Destroyed. 

"It  [the  world]  knows  that  not  only  France  must  organize  against 
this  peril  [the  German  peril]  but  that  the  world  must  organize 
against  it." — Speech  to  French  Senate,  Jan.  20,  1919. 

THE  FUTURE  OF  ARMAMENTS 

Heavy  Armaments  are  no  Longer  Necessary. 

"The  nations  of  the  world  are  about  to  consummate  a  brotherhood 
which  will  make  it  unnecessary  in  the  future  to  maintain  those  crush- 
ing armaments  which  make  the  people  suffer  almost  as  much  in  peace 
as  they  suffered  in  war." — Speech  to  French  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
Feb.  3,  1919. 

But  American  Armament  must  be  Increased. 

"I  take  it  for  granted  that  Congress  will  carry  out  the  naval  pro- 
gramme. .  .  .  These  plans  have  been  prepared  .  .  .  with  the  in- 
tention of  adhering  to  a  definite  method  of  development  for  the 
navy.  I  earnestly  recommend  the  uninterrupted  pursuit  of  that 
policy." — Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  2,  1918. 

419 


42O  Appendix 

WHAT  HAS  BECOME  OF  MILITARISM? 

//  is  Banished  from  the  Earth. 

"To-day  the  world  stands  freed  from  the  threat  of  militarism." 
— Victory  Loan  message  to  American  people,  Apr.  19,  1919. 

//  is  in  the  Saddle  in  France. 

1  'Again  and  again,  my  fellow-citizens,  in  the  conference  at  Paris, 
we  were  face  to  face  with  this  situation :  that  in  dealing  with  a  partic- 
ular civil  government  we  found  that  they  would  not  dare  to  promise 
what  their  general  staff  was  not  willing  that  they  should  promise; 
and  that  they  were  dominated  by  the  military  machine  that  they 
had  created,  nominally,  for  their  own  defense,  but  really — whether 
they  willed  it  or  not — for  the  provocation  of  war.  And  so,  as  long  as 
you  have  a  military  class,  it  does  not  make  any  difference  what  your 
form  of  government  is.  If  you  are  determined  to  be  -armed  to  the 
teeth,  you  must  obey  the  orders  and  directions  of  the  only  men  who 
can  control  the  great  machinery  of  war." — Kansas  City,  Sept.  6, 
1919- 

THE    PRIVATE    COUNSELS    OF    STATESMEN 

They  cannot  Determine  Destinies  of  Nations. 

"Private  counsels  of  statesmen  cannot  now  and  cannot  (hereafter 
determine  the  destinies  of  nations." — Memorial  Day  address  at 
Paris,  1919. 

They  must  Determine  America's  Destiny  without  Review  by  Treaty- 
making  Body. 

"No  stenographic  reports  were  taken  of  the  debates  on  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  such  memoranda  as  were  taken  it  was  agreed 
should  be  confidential.  .  .  .  The  various  data  bearing  upon  or  used 
in  connection  with  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany  .  .  .  would 
include  many  memoranda  which  it  was  agreed,  on  grounds  of  public 
policy,  it  would  be  unwise  to  make  use  of  outside  the  conference."- 
Letter  to  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  Aug.  8,  1919,  refus- 
ing data  upon  which  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  formulated. 


Appendix  421 

ON    THE    RESPONSIBILITY    AND    FOREKNOWLEDGE    OF    THE 
GERMAN    PEOPLE 

German  People  had  neither  Knowledge  nor  Choice. 

"The  German  nation  had  no  choice  whatever  as  to  whether  it  was 
to  go  into  that  war  or  not,  did  not  know  that  it  was  going  into  it 
until  its  men  were  summoned  to  the  colors." — Speech  at  Billings, 
Mont.,  Sept.  n,  1919. 

German  People  had  Knowledge  and  are  Responsible. 

"In  the  last  analysis,  my  fellow-countrymen,  as  we  in  America 
would  be  the  first  to  claim,  a  people  are  responsible  for  the  acts  of  their 
government.  .  .  .  Germany  was  self-governed.  Her  rulers  had 
not  concealed  the  purposes  they  had  in  mind." — Columbus,  Sept.  4, 
1919- 

THE   QUESTION   OF   INDEMNITIES 

Explains  Indemnity  Germany  must  Pay. 

"In  the  first  place,  my  fellow-countrymen,  it  [the  treaty]  seeks 
to  punish  one  of  the  greatest  wrongs  ever  done  in  history,  the  wrong 
which  Germany  sought  to  do  to  the  world  and  to  civilization,  and 
there  ought  to  be  no  weak  purpose  with  regard  to  the  application  of 
the  punishment.  She  attempted  an  intolerable  thing,  and  she  must 
be  made  to  pay  for  the  attempt." — Columbus,  Sept.  4,  1919. 

Says  there  is  no  Indemnity  (Same  Speech). 

"There  was  no  indemnity — no  indemnity  of  any  sort  was  claimed 
— merely  reparation,  merely  paying  for  the  destruction  done,  merely 
making  good  the  losses.  .  .  .  There  is  no  indemnity  in  this  treaty." 
— Columbus,  Sept.  4,  1919. 

Justifies  Collecting  Damages  as  Punishment. 

"My  fellow-citizens,  Germany  tried  to  commit  a  crime  against 
civilization  and  this  treaty  is  justified  as  a  memorandum  to  make 
Germany  pay  for  the  crime  up  to  her  full  capacity  for  payment." 
— Billings,  Sept.  n,  1919. 


422  Appendix 

Pledge  against  Collection  of  such  Damages. 

"Punitive  damages,  .  .  .  we  deem  inexpedient  and  in  the  end 
worse  than  futile,  no  proper  basis  for  a  peace  of  any  kind,  least  of 
all  for  an  enduring  peace." — Reply  to  Pope,  Aug.  27,  1917. 

DID  GERMAN  COMMERCIAL  CLASSES  WANT  WAR? 

Evidently  So. 

"The  real  reason  that  the  war  we  have  just  finished  took  place 
was  that  Germany  was  afraid  her  commercial  rivals  were  going  to 
get  the  better  of  her,  and  the  reason  why  some  nations  went  into  the 
war  against  Germany  was  that  they  thought  Germany  would  get 
the  commercial  advantage  of  them.  The  seed  of  the  jealousy,  the 
seed  of  the  deep-seated  hatred,  was  hot  successful  commercial  and 
industrial  rivalry." — St.  Louis,  Sept.  5,  1919. 

Emphatically  Not! 

"The  German  bankers  and  the  German  merchants  and  the  German 
manufacturers  did  not  want  this  war.  They  were  making  con- 
quest of  the  world  without  it,  and  they  knew  it  would  spoil  their 
plans." — Speech  at  St.  Paul,  Sept.  9,  1919. 

NATURE   OF   THE    "UNION"    WITH   OUR   ALLIES 

A  Moral   Union. 

"There  is  no  way,  which  we  ought  to  be  willing  to  adopt,  which 
separates  us  in  dealing  with  Germany  from  those  with  whom  we 
were  associated  during  the  war.  .  .  .  because  I  think  it  is  a  moral 
union  which  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  break." — Conference  with 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  Aug.  19,  1919. 

A  Financial  Union. 

"Under  the  League  plan,  the  financial  leadership  will  be  ours,  the 
industrial  supremacy  will  be  ours,  the  commercial  advantage  will  be 
ours." — Speech  at  St.  Louis,  Sept.  5,  1919. 


Appendix  423 

WHY  DO  WE  WISH  TO  PARTICIPATE  UPON  REPARATIONS  COMMISSION  ? 

To  Assist  our  dear  Allies. 

"Why,  we  were  disinclined  to  join  in  that  [the  Reparations  Com- 
mission], but  yielded  to  the  urgent  request  of  the  other  nations  that 
we  should,  because  they  wanted  our  advice  and  counsel." — White 
House  conference  with  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  Aug. 
19,  1919. 

To  Make  Money  for  Ourselves. 

"Some  of  you  gentlemen  know  we  used  to  have  trade  with  Ger- 
many. All  of  that  trade  is  going  to  be  in  the  hands  and  under  the 
control  of  the  Reparations  Commission.  I  humbly  asked  leave  to  ap- 
point a  member  to  look  after  our  interests,  and  I  was  rebuked  for 
it.  I  am  looking  after  the  industrial  interests  of  the  United  States. 
I  would  like  to  see  the  other  men  who  are.  They  are  forgetting 
the  industrial  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  they  are  doing 
things  that  will  cut  us  off,  and  our  trade  off,  from  the  normal  chan- 
nels, because  the  Reparations  Commission  can  determine  where  Ger- 
many buys,  what  Germany  buys,  how  much  Germany  buys.  .  .  . 
It  is  going  to  stand  at  the  centre  of  the  financial  operations  of  the 
world." — Speech  at  St.  Louis,  Sept.  5,  1919. 

AS  TO  THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  ALLIES 

They  have  Never  been  Dishonorable. 

"I  challenge  anybody  to  show  where,  in  recent  years,  .  .  .  there 
has  been  the  repudiation  of  an  international  obligation  by  France 
or  Italy  or  Great  Britain  or  Japan.  Japan  has  kept  her  engage- 
ments. .  .  .  There  can  be  cited  no  instance  where  these  governments 
have  been  dishonorable." — Billings,  Sept.  n,  1919. 

Dishonorable  Record  is  Cited. 

"Let  me  remind  you  of  some  of  the  history  of  this  business.  It 
was  in  1898  that  China  ceded  these  rights  and  concessions  to  Ger- 
many. The  pretext  was  that  some  German  missionaries  had  been 


424  Appendix 

killed.  .  .  .  Two  Christian  missionaries  are  killed,  and  therefore 
one  great  nation  robs  another  nation  and  does  a  thing  which  is  funda- 
mentally unChristian  and  heathen!  .  .  .  Then,  what  happened,  my 
fellow-citizens?  Then  Russia  came  in  and  obliged  China  to  cede  to 
her  Port  Arthur  and  Talien  Wan,  not  for  quite  so  long  a  period, 
but  upon  substantially  the  same  terms.  Then  England  must  needs 
have  Wei-Hai-Wei  as  an  equivalent  concession  to  that  which  had 
been  made  to  Germany;  and  presently  certain  ports,  with  the  terri- 
tory back  of  them,  were  ceded  upon  similar  principles  to  France. 
Everybody  got  in,  except  the  United  States,  and  said:  'If  Germany 
is  going  to  get  something,  we  will  get  something.'  Why,  none  of 
them  had  any  business  in  there  on  such  terms.  Then  when  the 
Japanese-Russian  war  came,  Japan  did  what  she  has  done  in  this 
war.  She  attacked  Port  Arthur  and  captured  Port  Arthur,  and 
Port  Arthur  was  ceded  to  her  as  a  consequence  of  the  war.  .  .  . 
Just  so  we  could  trade  with  these  stolen  territories,  we  were  willing 
to  let  them  be  stolen.  .  .  .  She  [Japan]  has  it  [Shantung]  as  spoils 
of  war." — San  Francisco,  Sept.  17,  1919. 

EUROPEAN   SPHERES  OF  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA 

Governments  Promised  to  Return  Them. 

"Sitting  around  our  council  board  in  Paris  I  put  this  question: 
'May  I  expect  that  this  will  be  the  beginning  of  the  retrocession  to 
China  of  the  exceptional  rights  which  other  governments  have  en- 
joyed here?'  The  responsible  representatives  of  the  other  great 
governments  said,  'Yes,  you  may  expect  it.'  " — San  Francisco,  Sept. 
17,  1919- 

Governments  did  not  Promise  to  Return  Them. 

"Back  of  this  provision,  with  regard  to  Shantung,  lies,  as  every- 
body knows  or  ought  to  know,  a  very  honorable  promise  which  was 
made  by  the  government  of  Japan  in  my  presence  in  Paris,  namely, 
that,  just  as  soon  as  possible  after  ratification  of  this  treaty,  they 
will  return  to  China  all  sovereign  rights  in  the  province  of  Shantung. 
Great  Britain  has  not  promised  to  return  Wei-Hai-Wei ;  France  has 
not  promised  to  return  her  part." — Los  Angeles,  Sept.  20,  1919. 


Appendix  425 

OBLIGATION    TO    HOLD    STRICTLY    TO    PEACE    PROMISES 

Pledge  not  to  Compromise. 

"They  [the  issues  of  the  struggle]  must  be  settled — by  no  arrange- 
ment or  compromise  or  adjustment  of  interest,  but  definitely  and  once 
for  all,  and  with  a  full  and  unequivocal  acceptance  of  the  principle 
that  the  interest  of  the  weakest  is  as  sacred  as  the  interest  of  the 
strongest.  That  is  what  we  mean  when  we  speak  of  a  permanent 
peace,  if  we  speak  sincerely,  intelligently.  .  .  .  No  peace  shall  be 
obtained  by  any  kind  of  compromise  or  abatement  of  the  principles 
we  have  avowed  as  the  principles  for  which  we  are  fighting." — Sept. 
27,  1918. 

Compromise  is  Admitted  and  Excused. 

"Old  entanglements  of  every  kind  stood  in  the  way — promises 
which  governments  had  made  to  one  another  in  the  days  when  might 
and  right  were  confused,  and  the  power  of  the  victor  was  without 
restraint.  Engagements  which  contemplated  any  dispositions  of  ter- 
ritory, any  extensions  of  sovereignty  that  might  seem  to  be  to  the 
interest  of  those  who  had  the  power  to  insist  upon  them,  had  been 
entered  into  without  thought  of  what  the  peoples  concerned  might 
wish  or  profit  by;  and  these  could  not  always  honorably  be  brushed 
aside." — Address  to  Senate,  in  presenting  Treaty  of  Versailles,  July 
10,  1919. 

THE  GERMAN  PERIL 

WHO   STARTED  THE   EUROPEAN   WAR? 

Germany  Started  It. 

"The  war  was  begun  by  the  military  masters  of  Germany." — Flag 
Day  address,  1917. 

Nobody  in  Particular  Started  It. 

"Have  you  ever  heard  what  started  the  present  war?     If  you 
lave,  I  wish  you  would  publish  it,  because  nobody  else  has.     So  far 


426  Appendix 

as  I  can  gather,  nothing  in  particular  started  it,  but  everything  in 
general." — Speech  at  Cincinnati,  Oct.  26,  1916. 


MOTIVE    DOMINATING   GERMAN    WARFARE 

A  Desire  to  Impose  Will  upon  the  World. 

"The  power  against  which  we  are  arrayed  has  sought  to  impose 
its  will  upon  the  world  by  force." — Proclamation  to  American  peo- 
ple, May  1 8,  1917. 

An  Intense  Conviction  that  it  is  Fighting  for  Justice. 

"Every  nation  now  engaged  in  the  titanic  struggle  on  the  other 
side  of  the  water  believes,  with  an  intensity  of  conviction  that  can- 
not be  exaggerated,  that  it  is  righting  for  its  rights,  and  in  most  in- 
stances that  it  is  fighting  for  its  life,  and  we  must  not  be  too  critical 
of  the  men  who  lead  those  nations." — Speech  at  Des  Moines,  Feb.  I, 
1916. 

REAL   NATURE  OF  THE  STRUGGLE 

Political,  not  Commercial. 

"The  object  of  the  war  was  to  destroy  autocratic  power;  that  is 
to  say,  to  make  it  impossible  that  there  should  be  anywhere,  as  there 
was  in  Wilhelmstrasse,  in  Berlin,  a  little  group  of  military  men,  who 
could  brush  aside  the  manufacturers,  brush  aside  the  Emperor  him- 
self, and  say:  'We  have  perfected  a  machine  with  which  we  can 
conquer  the  world ;  now  stand  out  of  the  way,  we  are  going  to  con- 
quer the  world.'  " — Minneapolis,  Sept.  9,  1919. 

Commercial,  not  Political. 

"Why,  my  fellow-citizens,  is  there  any  man  here,  or  any  woman 
— let  me  say,  is  there  any  child  here — who  does  not  know  that  the 
seed  of  war  in  the  modern  world  is  industrial  and  commercial 
rivalry?  .  .  .  This  war,  in  its  inception,  was  a  commercial  and 
industrial  war.  It  was  not  a  political  war." — St.  Louis,  Sept.  5> 
1919- 


Appendix  427 

WHAT  SORT  OF  PEACE  WAS  GERMANY  FIGHTING  FOR? 

The  Very  Opposite  to  a  Democratic  Peace. 

"They  [the  Central  Powers]  are  striking  at  the  very  existence  of 
democracy  and  liberty." — Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  4,  1917. 

A  Democratic  Peace  as  Outlined  by  Wilson  Himself. 

"Each  side  desires  to  make  the  rights  and  privileges  of  weak  peo- 
ples and  small  states  as  secure  against  aggression  or  denial,  in  the 
•future,  as  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  great  and  powerful  states 
now  at  war." — Note  to  belligerent  governments,  Dec.  18,  1916. 

"WILSON  PRINCIPLES,"  GENERAL 

ON  THE  WISDOM  OF  CRUSHING  ONE'S  ENEMIES 

Germany  must  be  Crushed. 
"The  German  power  .  .  .  must  be  crushed." — Dec.  4,  1917. 

Neither  Side  should  be  Crushed. 

"Fortunately  ...  the  statesmen  of  both  of  the  groups  of  nations, 
now  arrayed  against  one  another,  have  said,  in  terms  that  could  not 
be  misinterpreted,  that  it  was  no  part  of  the  purpose  they  had  in  mind 
to  crush  their  opponents." — Jan.  22,  1917* 

FORCE    AS    A    MEANS    FOR    ESTABLISHING    INTERNATIONAL    JUSTICE 

Force  is  Acknowledged  as  a  Policy  of  Action. 

"Force,  force  to  the  utmost,  force  without  stint  or  limit,  the 
righteous  and  triumphant  force  that  shall  make  right  the  law  of  the 
world." — Apr.  6,  1918. 

Force  Neifer  Accomplished  Anything  Permanent. 

"I  have  not  read  history  without  observing  that  the  greatest  forces 
in  the  world,  and  the  only  permanent  forces,  are  the  moral  forces. 
We  have  the  evidence  of  a  very  competent  witness,  namely,  the 


428  Appendix 

first  Napoleon,  who  said  that,  as  he  looked  back  in  the  last  daj^s  of 
his  life  upon  so  much  as  he  knew  of  human  history,  he  had  to  record 
the  judgment  that  force  had  never  accomplished  anything  that  was 
permanent.  Force  will  not  accomplish  anything  that  is  permanent." 
— Speech  before  New  York  Press  Club,  June  30,  1916. 


ON  THE  EFFICACY  OF  GOING  TO  WAR  TO  GET  PEACE 

The  Way  to  get  Peace  is  to  make  War. 

"What  I  am  opposed  to  is  not  the  feeling  of  the  pacifists,  but 
their  stupidity.  My  heart  is  with  them,  but  my  mind  has  a  con- 
tempt for  them.  I  want  peace,  but  I  know  how  to  get  it  and  they 
do  not.  You  will  notice  that  I  sent  a  friend  of  mine,  Colonel 
House,  to  Europe,  who  is  as  great  a  lover  of  peace  as  any  man  in 
the  world;  but  I  did  not  send  him  on  a  peace  mission;  I  sent  him 
to  take  part  in  a  conference  as  to  how  the  war  is  to  be  won,  and  he 
knows,  as  I  know,  that  is  the  way  to  get  peace  if  you  want  it  for  more 
than  a  few  minutes." — Speech  at  Buffalo,  Nov.  12,  1917. 

Peace  so  Imposed  would  not  Last. 

"First  of  all  it  [the  peace  to  be  concluded]  must  be  peace  without 
victory.  .  .  .  Victory  would  mean  peace  forced  upon  the  loser,  a 
victor's  terms  imposed  upon  the  vanquished.  It  would  be  accepted 
in  humiliation,  under  duress,  at  an  intolerable  sacrifice,  and  would 
leave  a  sting,  a  bitter  memory,  upon  which  terms  of  peace  would 
rest,  not  permanently,  but  only  as  upon  quicksand.  Only  a  peace 
between  equals  can  last;  only  a  peace  the  very  principle  of  which  is 
equality  and  a  common  participation  in  a  common  benefit." — Peace- 
without-victory  speech,  Jan.  22,  1917. 

ON  HANDING  DOWN   LIBERTY  FROM   ABOVE 

We  claim  It  as  our  Motive. 

"We  are  to  be  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  God  to  see  that  lib- 
erty is  made  secure  for  mankind." — Speech  at  Confederate  veterans* 
reunion,  June  5,  1917. 


Appendix  429 


'Yet  It  cant  be  Done. 

"I  challenge  you  to  cite  me  an  instance  in  all  the  history  of  the 
world  where  liberty  was  handed  down  from  above.  Liberty  always 
is  attained  by  the  forces  working  below,  underneath." — Blythe  inter- 
view, Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  23,  1914. 

SHOULD  THE   PEOPLE   OR  THE   GOVERNMENTS  DECIDE   WHEN    PEACE 
MAY  BE  CONCLUDED? 

War  must  not  be  Continued  unless  Public  Approves  Objectives. 

"No  statesman  who  has  the  least  conception  of  his  responsibility 
ought  for  a  moment  to  permit  himself  to  continue  this  tragical  and 
appalling  outpouring  of  blood  and  treasure  unless  he  is  sure  beyond 
a  perad venture  that  the  objects  of  the  vital  sacrifice  are  part  and 
parcel  of  the  very  life  of  society,  and  that  the  people  for  whom  he 
speaks  think  them  right  and  imperative  as  he  does." — Message  to 
Congress  on  war  aims,  Jan.  8,  1918. 

Public  Warned  against  Expressing  either  Approval  or  Disapproval. 
"I  earnestly  request  every  patriotic  American  to  leave  to  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Allies  the  momentous  dis- 
cussions initiated  by  Germany,  and  to  remember  that  for  each  man  his 
duty  is  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  these  governments." — Statement 
to  American  people,  Oct.  14,  1918. 

ON  DICTATORSHIPS  IN  WAR 

They  are  Inconsistent  with  the  Traditions  of  America. 

"It  is  inconsistent  with  the  traditions  of  the  country  that  their 
[the  people's]  knowledge  of  arms  should  be  used  by  a  governmental 
organization  which  would  make  and  organize  a  great  army  subject 
to  orders  to  do  what  a  particular  group  of  men  might  at  the  time 
think  it  was  best  for  them  to  do.  That  is  the  militarism  of  Europe, 
where  a  few  persons  can  determine  what  an  armed  nation  is  to  do." 
— Statement  to  committee  from  American  Union  against  Militarism, 
White  House,  May  9,  1916. 


43O  Appendix 

Participation  in  Conduct  of  War  is  Denied  even  Congress. 

"I  should  regard  the  passage  of  this  resolution  as  a  direct  vote 
of  want  of  confidence  in  the  Administration.  .  .  .  Such  activities  [a 
Senate  Committee  investigation  of  the  conduct  of  the  war]  would 
constitute  nothing  less  than  an  attempt  to  take  over  the  conduct  of 
the  war,  or  at  least  so  superintend  and  direct  and  participate  in  the 
executive  conduct  of  it  as  to  interfere  in  the  most  serious  way  with 
the  action  of  the  constituted  Executive." — Letter  to  Senator  Martin, 
May  14,  1918. 

THE   TRUE   BASIS  OF   FOREIGN   POLICY 

Material  Interests  Must  not  Determine  Anything. 

"It  is  a  very  perilous  thing  to  determine  the  foreign  policy  of  a 
nation  in  terms  of  material  interest.  It  is  not  only  unfair  to  those 
with  whom  you  are  dealing,  but  it  is  degrading  as  regards  your 
own  actions." — Speech  at  Mobile,  Oct.  27,  1913. 

Material  Interests  Justify  War. 

"There  is  a  moral  obligation  laid  upon  us  to  keep  free  the  courses 
of  our  commerce  and  our  finance,  and  I  believe  that  America  stands 
ready  to  vindicate  those  rights." — Topeka  speech,  Feb.  2,  1916. 

WHAT    AMERICAN    INTERESTS    NEED    PROTECTION  ?       , 

Spiritual  Interests  Only. 

"Therefore,  what  America  is  bound  to  fight  for  when  the  time 
comes  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  her  self-respect.  There  is  no 
immediate  prospect  that  her  material  interests  may  be  seriously  af- 
fected, but  there  is  constant  danger  every  day  of  the  week  that  her 
spiritual  interests  may  suffer  serious  affront." — Speech  at  Chicago, 
Jan.  31,  1916. 

Spiritual  Indeed! 

"It  would  depend  upon  the  patriotic  spirit  of  the  employers  of 
the  country  whether  they  made  it  possible  for  the  younger  men  in 


Appendix  431 


their  employ  to  respond  under  favorable  conditions  or  not.  I,  for 
one,  do  not  doubt  the  patriotic  devotion  either  of  our  young  men  or 
of  those  who  give  them  employment — those  for  whose  benefit  and 
protection  they  would  in  fact  enlist." — Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  7, 


THE   EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARMED  FORCES  TO   FURTHER   PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE  ABROAD 

epudiated  as  a  Policy. 
"A  great  many  men  ...  are  complaining  that  the  government 
of  the  United  States  has  not  the  spirit  of  other  governments,  which 
is  to  put  the  force,  the  army  and  navy,  of  that  government,  behind 
investments  in  foreign  countries.  Just  so  certainly  as  you  do  that, 
you  join  this  chaos  of  hostile  and  competing  ambitions  [the  European 
war]." — Speech  at  Cincinnati,  Oct.  26,  1916. 

Endorsed  as  a  Policy. 

"Americans  have  gone  to  all  quarters  of  the  world.  Americans 
are  serving  the  business  of  the  world  .  .  .  and  every  one  of  these 
men  ...  is  our  ward  and  we  must  see  to  his  rights  and  that  they 
are  respected." — Jan.  29,  1916. 

THE  COMPATIBILITY  OF  PATRIOTISM  AND  PROFITS 

They  are  Incompatible. 

" Patriotism  leaves  profits  out  of  the  question.  In  these  days 
.  .  .  when  we  are  sending  hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  young  men 
across  the  seas.  ...  no  true  patriot  will  permit  himself  to  take 
toll  of  their  heroism  in  money,  or  seek  to  grow  rich  by  the  shedding 
of  their  blood." — Appeal  to  business  interests,  July  11,  1917. 

They  are  not  Incompatible. 

"Of  course  somebody  is  going  to  make  money  out  of  the  things 
privately  manufactured,  manufactured  by  private  capital.  There 
are  men  in  the  great  belligerent  countries  making,  I  dare  say,  vast 


432 .  Appendix 

sums  of  money  out  of  the  war,  and  I,  for  one,  do  not  stand  here  to 
challenge  or  doubt  their  patriotism  in  the  matter." — Speech  at  Des 
Moines,  Feb.  i,  1916. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICIES  LEADING  TO  BELLIGERENCY 

THE  EFFICACY  OF  ARMED  NEUTRALITY  FOR  AVOIDING  WAR 

Armed  Neutrality  not  a  Step  toward  War. 

"There  may  be  no  recourse  but  to  armed  neutrality,  which  we 
shall'  know  how  to  maintain.  ...  I  am  not  now  proposing  or  con- 
templating war,  or  any  steps  that  lead  to  it." — Address  to  Congress, 
Feb.  26,  1917. 

Armed  Neutrality  certain  to  Result  in  War. 

"Armed  neutrality  ...  is  worse  than  ineffectual.  ...  It  is  prac- 
tically certain  to  draw  us  into  the  war." — Address  to  Congress,  Apr. 
2,  1917- 

INTERNATIONAL   LAW   AND   FREEDOM   OF  THE   SEAS. 

Freedom  of  Seas  is  Provided  by  International  Law  and  America  is 
willing  to  Fight  for  Same. 

"The  government  of  the  United  States  notes  with  satisfaction 
that  the  Imperial  German  Government  recognizes  without  reserva- 
tion .  .  .  the  principle  that  the  high  seas  are  free.  .  .  .  The  rights 
of  neutrals  in  time  of  war  are  based  upon  principle,  not  upon  expe- 
diency, and  the  principles  are  immutable.  .  .  .  The  government  of 
the  United  States  will  continue  to  contend  for  that  freedom  [of  the 
seas]  from  whatever  quarter  violated,  without  compromise,  and  at 
any  cost." — Note  to  Germany,  July  21,  1915. 

Freedom  of  Seas  is  not  Provided  by  International  Law  and  Rule? 
should  be  Altered  by  Agreement  to  Legalize  It. 

"No  doubt  a  somewhat  radical  reconsideration  of  many  of  the 


Appendix  433 

rules  of  international  practice  .  .  .  may  be  necessary  in  order  to 
make  the  seas  indeed  free  and  common  in  practically  all  circumstances 
for  the  use  of  mankind.  ...  It  need  not  be  difficult  to  define  or  to 
secure  the  freedom  of  the  seas  if  the  governments  of  the  world  sin- 
cerely desire  to  come  to  an  agreement  concerning  it." — Peace-without- 
victory  speech,  Jan.  22,  1917. 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   OF   THE   SUBMARINE 


The  Submarine  a  Lawful  Weapon  for  Operations  against  Commerce. 
"The  events  of  the  past  two  months  have  clearly  indicated  that 
it  is  possible  and  practicable  to  conduct  such  submarine  operations 
as  have  characterized  the  activity  of  the  Imperial  German  Navy 
within  the  so-called  zone,  in  substantial  accord  with  the  accepted 
practices  of  regulated  warfare." — Note  of  July  21,  1915,  to  Ger- 
many. 

"I  do  not  feel  that  a  belligerent  should  be  deprived  of  the  proper 
use  of  submarines  in  the  interruption  of  enemy  commerce." — Letter 
of  Secretary  Lansing  to  British  ambassador,  Jan.  18,  1916. 

The    Submarine    an    Unlawful    Weapon    for    Operations    against 
Commerce. 

"Manifestly,  submarines  cannot  be  used  against  merchantmen. 
.  .  .  without  an  inevitable  violation  of  many  sacred  principles  of 
justice  and  humanity." — Note  of  May  13,  1915,  to  Germany. 

"The  use  of  submarines  for  the  destruction  of  an  enemy's  commerce 
is  ...  utterly  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  humanity,  the 
long-established  and  incontrovertible  rights  of  neutrals,  and  the 
sacred  immunities  of  non-combatants." — Note  of  Apr.  18,  1916,  to 
Germany. 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW  OF  ARMED  MERCHANTMAN 

Presence  of  Armament  Creates  Presumption  of  Offensive  Purpose. 
The  presence  of  an  armament  and  ammunition  on  board  a  mer- 


434  Appendix 

chant  vessel  creates  a  presumption  that  the  armament  is  for  offensive 
purposes,  but  the  owners  or  agents  may  overcome  this  presumption  by 
evidence  showing  that  the  vessel  carries  armament  solely  for  defense. 
Evidence  necessary  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  armament  is  solely 
for  defense  .  .  .  must  be  presented  in  each  case  independently  at 
an  official  investigation.  The  result  of  the  investigation  must  show 
conclusively  that  the  armament  is  not  intended  for,  and  will  not  be 
used  in,  offensive  operations." — American  memorandum  of  Sept.  19, 
1914- 

Presence  of  Armament  does  not  Create  Presumption  of  Offensive 
Purpose. 

"The  determination  of  warlike  character  must  rest  in  no  case 
upon  presumption  but  upon  conclusive  evidence.  .  .  .  The  belliger- 
ent [submarine]  should,  in  the  absence  of  conclusive  evidence,  act  on 
the  presumption  that  an  armed  merchantman  is  of  peaceful  charac- 
ter. .  .  .  Conclusive  evidence  of  a  purpose  to  use  the  armament  for 
aggression  is  essential  ...  in  the  absence  of  which  it  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  vessel  has  a  private  and  peaceful  character,  and  it 
should  be  so  treated  by  an  enemy  warship." — American  mem- 
orandum of  Mar.  25,  1916. 

ON  THE  RIGHT  OF  A  SOVEREIGN  GOVERNMENT  TO  CONTROL  FOREIGN 
PROPERTY   WITHIN    ITS  BORDERS 

Confiscation  Right  for  America. 

"By  exercising  in  this  crisis  our  admitted  right  to  control  all 
property  within  our  territory,  we  do  no  wrong  to  Holland." — Public 
statement,  explaining  confiscation  of  Dutch  ships,  Mar.  20,  1918. 

Even  Right  of  Taxation  is  Denied  Mexico. 

"The  United  States  cannot  acquiesce  in  any  procedure  ostensibly 
or  nominally  in  the  form  of  taxation  or  the  exercise  of  eminent  do- 
main, but  really  resulting  in  confiscation  of  private  property  and  arbi- 
trary deprivation  of  vested  rights." — Note  of  Apr.  2,  1918,  threaten- 
ing Mexico  on  account  of  oil  tax  decree. 


Appendix  435 


ON  THE  POWER  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE  TO  ARM  MERCHANT  SHIPS 
AGAINST  WAR  VESSELS  OF  A  COUNTRY  WITH  WHICH  AMERICA  IS 
TECHNICALLY  AT  PEACE 

President  has  not  the  Power. 

"At  the  same  time  the  President  authorized  the  further  statement 
that  what  rendered  the  situation  even  more  grave  than  it  had  been 
supposed  that  it  was,  was  the  discovery  that,  while  the  President  un- 
der his  general  constitutional  powers  could  do  much  of  what  he  had 
asked  Congress  to  empower  him  to  do,  it  had  been  found  that  there 
were  certain  old  statutes,  as  yet  unrepealed,  which  raised  insuperable 
practical  obstacles  and  virtually  nullified  his  power." — Supplemen- 
tary statement  from  White  House,  Mar.  4,  1917. 

President  has  the  Power. 

"The  President  is  convinced  that  he  has  the  power  to  arm  Ameri- 
can merchant  ships  and  is  free  to  exercise  it  at  once." — Statement 
from  White  House,  Mar.  9,  1917. 

VARIOUS 

WAS  AMERICA  IN  DANGER? 

Very  Much  in  Danger. 

"We  find  ourselves  fighting  again  for  our  national  existence." — 
Independence  Day,  1918. 


Not  in  Danger. 

"America  was  not  immediately  in  danger.  .  .  .  America  was  not 
irectly  attacked." — Speech  at  Billings,  Sept.  n,  1919. 


* 


DISINTERESTED   OR    INTERESTED? 

Disinterested. 

It  [our  war]  is  absolutely  a  case  of  disinterested  action." — Ad- 
ess  to  Mexican  editors,  June  7,  1918. 

Very  Interested. 

"Every  man  in  every  business  in  the  United  States  must  know  by 


436  Appendix 

this  time  that  his  whole  future  fortune  lies  in  the  balance." — Address 
at  Urbana,  Jan.  31,  1918. 

THE  RULE  OF  THE  KAISER  OVER  GERMANY 
The  Kaiser  need  not  Go. 

"It  is  no  business  of  ours  how  that  great  people  [the  Germans] 
came  under  its  [the  German  government's]  control  or  submitted 
with  temporary  zest  to  the  domination  of  its  purpose." — Reply  to 
Pope,  Aug.  27,  1917- 

"Neither  do  we  presume  to  suggest  to  her  [Germany]  any  altera- 
tion or  modification  of  her  institutions." — Message  to  Congress,  Jan. 
8,  1918. 

The  Kaiser  must  Go. 

"Significant  and  important  as  the  constitutional  changes  seem  to  be, 
which  are  spoken  of  by  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  in  his  note 
of  the  2Oth  of  October,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  principle  of  a 
government  responsible  to  the  German  people  has  yet  been  fully 
worked  out.  .  .  .  It  is  evident  .  .  .  that  the  power  of  the  King  of 
Prussia  to  control  the  policy  of  the  empire  is  unimpaired  .  .  .  The 
President  deems  it  his  duty  to  ...  point  out  that  in  concluding 
peace  .  .  .  the  government  of  the  United  States  cannot  deal  with 
any  but  veritable  representatives  of  the  German  people  who  have 
been  assured  of  a  genuine  constitutional  standing  as  the  real  rulers 
of  Germany." — Note  of  Oct.  23,  1918,  replying  to  further  conces- 
sions by  Germany. 

WAS    BORGLUM    OFFICIAL   AIRCRAFT   INVESTIGATOR? 

E  or  glum  s  Appointment.  January  2,  1918 

"Mv  DEAR  MR.  BORGLUM  :  .  .  .  I  have  conferred  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  and  at  his  request  and  with  my  hearty  concurrence,  I 
urge  you  to  come  at  once  to  Washington  .  .  .  and  by  your  own 
investigation  discover  the  facts  in  this  business.  The  Secretary  of 
War  assures  me  that  he  will  be  delighted  to  clothe  you  with  full 


Appendix  437 

authority  to  get  at  the  bottom  of  every  situation,  and  that  he  will 
.  .  .  direct  that  every  facility  of  inquiry  be  placed  at  your  disposal. 
When  you  have  thus  investigated  ...  I  would  be  most  happy  to 
have  a  report  from  you  personally.  .  .  . 

"Cordially  yours, 

"Woodrow  Wilson." 

B  'or  glum  '3  Disappointment.  April  15,  1918 

"Mv  DEAR  MR.  BORGLUM:  I  am  afraid  that  you  have  for  some 
time  past  been  under  a  serious  misapprehension.  ...  I  never  at  any 
time  constituted  you  an  official  investigator.  .  .  .  We  have  at  no 
time  considered  you  as  the  official  representative  of  the  Administra- 
tion in  the  investigation.  If  I  had  so  regarded  you  I  would,  of 
course,  have  supplied  you  with  such  assistance  as  you  feel  that  you 
have  lacked. 

"Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 
"Woodrow  Wilson." 

WHAT  IS  PRO-GERMANISM? 


"They  [certain  Americans]  declare  this  is  a  foreign  war  which  can 
touch  America  with  no  danger  either  to  her  lands  or  her  institutions 
.  .  .  appeal  to  our  ancient  tradition  of  isolation  in  the  policies  of 
nations.  ...  It  is  only  friends  and  partisans  of  the  German  govern- 
ment whom  we  have  already  identified  who  utter  these  thinly  dis- 
guised disloyalties."  —  Flag  Day  address,  1917. 

But  Woodrow  Wilson  Said  the  Same  Things. 

*'A  war  [the  European  war]  .  .  .  whose  causes  cannot  touch  us." 
—  Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  8,  1914. 

"Nobody  seriously  supposes,  gentlemen,  that  the  United  States 
needs  to  fear  an  invasion  of  its  own  territory."  —  New  York  speech, 
Jan.  27,  1916. 

"We  need  not  and  we  should  not  form  alliances  with  any  nation 
in  the  world."  —  Address  at  unveiling  of  statue  of  Barrv,  May  16, 
1914. 


438  Appendix 

THEORY  OF  A  PEOPLE'S  WAR 

Ours  was  a  People's  War. 

"The  great  fact  that  stands  out  above  all  the  rest  is  that  this  is 
a  people's  war." — Flag  Day  address,  1917. 
There's  no  such  thing  as  a  People's  War. 

"No  people  ever  went  to  war  with  another  people.  Govern- 
ments have  gone  to  war  with  one  another.  Peoples,  so  far  as  I 
can  remember,  have  not,  and  this  is  a  government  of  the  people,  and 
this  people  is  not  going  to  choose  war." — Speech  at  Milwaukee,  Jan. 
31,  1916. 

MEXICAN  POLICY 

MOTIVE  FOR  MEXICAN  MEDDLING 

The  Interest  of  Mexico  Alone. 

"We  act  in  the  interest  of  Mexico  alone,  and  not  in  the  interest 
of  any  person  or  body  of  persons  who  may  have  personal  or  property 
claims  in  Mexico  which  they  feel  that  they  have  a  right  to  press." — 
Message  to  Huerta,  conveyed  through  John  Lind,  Aug.   1913. 
The  Fortunes  of  Americans. 

"We  should  let  every  one  who  seems  to  exercise  authority  in  any 
part  of  Mexico  know,  in  the  most  unequivocal  terms,  that  we  shall 
watch  the  fortunes  of  those  Americans  who  cannot  get  away,  and 
shall  hold  those  responsible  for  their  sufferings  and  losses  to  a  definite 
reckoning.  That  can  and  will  be  made  plain,  beyond  the  possibility 
of  a  misunderstanding." — Message  to  Congress,  Aug.  27,  1913. 

SOVEREIGNTY  VERSUS   INTERVENTION 

Pledge  to  Respect  Sovereignty. 

"It  is  our  purpose,  in  whatever  we  do  ...  to  pay  the  most  scrupu- 
lous regard  to  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  Mexico.  That 
we  take  as  a  matter  of  course,  to  which  we  are  bound  by  every 
obligation  of  right  and  honor." — Message  to  Congress,  Aug.  27,  1913. 


Appendix  439 

lint  at  Intervention.     (Same  Day) 
"You  will  convey  to  the  authorities  the  indication  that  any  mal- 
treatment of  Americans  would  be  likely  to  raise  the  question  of  inter- 
vention."— Instructions  dictated  by  the  President,  and  wired  to  all 
consuls  in  Mexico,  Aug.  27,  1913. 


TO  COERCE  OR  NOT  TO  COERCE 

romise  not  to  Coerce. 

"We  will  aid  and  befriend  Mexico,  but  we  will  not  coerce  her;  and 
our  course  with  regard  to  her  ought  to  be  sufficient  proof  to  all 
America  that  we  seek  no  political  suzerainty  or  selfish  control." — 
Annual  message,  Dec.  8,  1914. 

What  is  This  but  Coercion? 

"You  will  understand  that  if  our  messages  are  occasionally  couched 
in  terms  of  strong  emphasis,  it  is  only  because  they  contain  some 
matters  which  touch  the  very  safety  of  Mexico  itself  and  the  whole 
process  of  its  future  history.  ...  It  is  our  duty  to  speak  very  plainly 
about  the  grave  danger  which  threatens  them  [the  Mexicans]  from 
without.  .  .  .  To  speak  less  plainly,  or  with  less  earnestness,  would 
be  to  conceal  from  you  a  terrible  risk,  which  no  lover  of  Mexico 
should  care  to  run." — President  Wilson,  in  note  to  Carranza,  Mar. 
14,  1915. 

WHO  IS  ENTITLED  TO  CHOOSE  POLITICS  OF  MEXICO? 
Only  Mexicans  may  Choose. 

"America  stands,  first  of  all,  for  the  right  of  men  to  determine 
whom  they  will  obey  and  whom  they  will  serve;  for  the  right  of 
political  freedom  and  of  peoples'  sovereignty.  .  .  .  She  made  up  her 
mind  long  ago  that  she  was  going  to  stand  up,  so  far  as  this 
western  hemisphere  is  concerned,  for  the  right  of  peoples  to  choose 
their  own  politics,  without  foreign  interference  of  any  kind" — 
Pittsburgh  speech,  Jan.  29,  1916. 


44O  Appendix 

American  Government  May  Choose. 

"I  feel  it  my  duty  to  tell  them  [the  leaders  of  Mexico]  that  if 
they  cannot  accommodate  their  differences  and  unite  .  .  .  within 
a  very  short  time,  this  government  will  be  constrained  to  decide 
what  means  should  be  employed  by  the  United  States  in  order  to 
help  Mexico  save  herself  and  serve  her  people."  —  June  2,  1915. 

HOW  LONG  MAY  MEXICO  TAKE  TO  RECONSTRUCT  HER  GOVERNMENT  ? 
As  Long  as  she  Pleases. 

"Until  this  recent  revolution  in  Mexico,  eighty  per  cent,  of  the 
people  never  had  a  'look  in'  in  determining  what  their  government 
should  be.  ...  It  is  none  of  my  business  and  it  is  none  of  yours 
how  long  they  take  in  determining  it.  It  is  none  of  my  business 
and  it  is  none  of  yours  how  they  go  about  the  business.  The  country 
is  theirs.  The  government  is  theirs.  Have  not  European  nations 
taken  as  long  as  they  wanted,  and  spilt  as  much  blood  as  they  pleased, 
in  settling  their  affairs?  And  shall  we  deny  that  to  Mexico  be- 
cause she  is  weak?  No,  I  say!"  —  Indianapolis  speech,  Jan.  8, 


This  Long  and  No  Longer. 

"It  is  time,  therefore,  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
should  frankly  state  the  policy  which  ...  it  becomes  its  duty  to 
adopt.  It  must  presently  .  .  .  lend  its  active  moral  support  to  some 
man  or  group  of  men,  if  such  may  be  found,  who  can  ...  set  up 
a  government  at  Mexico  City  which  the  great  powers  of  the  world 
can  recognize  and  deal  with."  —  June  2,  1915. 

THE    RIGHT   WAY   TO    HELP    MEXICO 
It  is  not  to  Overwhelm  her  with  Force. 

"I  have  heard  some  gentlemen  say  they  want  to  help  Mexico,  and 
the  way  they  propose  to  help  her  is  to  overwhelm  her  with  force. 
.  .  .  What  makes  Mexico  suspicious  of  us  is  that  she  does  not 
believe  as  yet  that  we  want  to  serve  her.  She  believes  we  want  to 
possess  her.  And  she  has  justification  for  the  belief  in  the  way  in 


Appendix  441 

which  some  of  our  fellow-citizens  have  tried  to  exploit  her  privileges 
and  possessions.  For  my  part,  /  will  not  serve  the  ambitions  of 
those  gentlemen'' — Address  at  Detroit,  July  10,  1916. 

Threat  to  Overwhelm  Mexico  with  Force. 

"The  government  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  desires  General 
Obregon  and  General  Carranza  to  know  that  it  has,  after  mature 
consideration,  determined  that  if  ...  Americans  should  suffer  .  .  . 
because  they  fail  to  provide  means  of  protection  to  life  and  property, 
it  will  hold  General  Obregon  and  General  Carranza  personally 
responsible  [and]  .  .  .  will  take  such  measures  as  are  expedient  to 
bring  to  account  those  who  are  personally  responsible." — Note  to 
Carranza,  Mar.  9,  1915. 

WHY  DID  WE  ATTACK  VERA  CRUZ  ? 
To  Maintain  the  Dignity  and  Authority  of  the  United  States. 

"I,  therefore,  come  to  ask  your  approval  that  I  should  use  the 
armed  forces  of  the  United  States  ...  to  obtain  ...  the  fullest 
recognition  of  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  We 
seek  to  maintain  the  dignity  and  authority  of  the  United  States." — 
Message  to  Congress,  Apr.  20,  1914. 

To  Reestablish  Constitutional  Government  in  Mexico. 

"The  feelings  and  intentions  of  the  government  in  this  matter 
...  are  based  upon  ...  a  profound  .  .  .  interest  in  the  reestab- 
lishment  of  their  [the  Mexicans']  constitutional  system." — Reply 
to  Carranza's  protest  against  Vera  Cruz  attack. 

THE  PUNITIVE  EXPEDITION 

Troops  not  to  be  Used  in  Interest  of  American  Owners  of  Mexican 
Properties. 

"It  is  my  duty  to  warn  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  there 
are  persons  along  the  border  who  are  actively  engaged  in  originat- 
ing and  giving  as  wide  currency  as  they  can  to  rumors  of  the  most 


442  Appendix 

sensational  and  disturbing  sort.  .  .  .  The  object  of  this  traffic  in 
falsehood  is  obvious.  It  is  to  create  intolerable  friction  between  the 
government  of  the  United  States  and  the  de  facto  government  of 
Mexico,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  intervention  in  the  interest 
of  certain  American  owners  of  Mexican  properties.  This  object  can- 
not be  attained  so  long  as  sane  and  honorable  men  are  in  control  of 
the  government." — Statement  explaining  object  of  expedition,  Mar. 
25,  1916. 

Troops  Remain  in  Interest  of  American  Owners  of  Mexican  Prop- 
erties. 

''The  border  troubles  are  only  symptoms.  Mexico  needs  system 
treatment,  not  symptom  treatment.  .  .  .  The  world  has  great  re- 
spect for  rights  that  are  vested,  and  we  shall  go  along  with  the 
world  in  protecting  such  rights.  .  .  .  Mexico  will  either  do  right 
without  our  help — or  with  it.  This  is  her  choice.  .  .  .  We  do  not 
wish  to  be  forced  into  intervention  until  this  opportunity  is  exhausted. 
To  this  end  we  must  pass  from  the  border  matters  to  the  conditions 
of  Mexico  which  affect  the  lives  and  property  of  our  nationals. 
These  must  be  made  secure" — Franklin  K.  Lane,  speaking  for 
Wilson,  explaining  non-agreement  with  Mexico  in  negotiations  for 
withdrawal  of  American  forces,  Nov.  1916. 


AS   TO   THE   CONSENT   OF   CARRANZA  TO   THE    PUNITIVE   EXPEDITION 

Carranza  Gave  Consent. 

"The  expedition  into  Mexico  was  ordered  under  an  agreement 
with  the  de  facto  government  of  Mexico." — President  Wilson,  in 
statement  to  the  public,  Mar.  25,  1916. 

Carranza  did  not  Give  Consent. 

"It  is  admitted  that  American  troops  have  crossed  the  interna- 
tional boundary  in  hot  pursuit  of  the  Columbus  raiders,  and  without 
notice  to  or  the  consent  of  your  government." — American  note  to 
Carranza,  June  20,  1916. 


Appendix  443 

NEUTRALITY  AND   THE   MUNITIONS  TRADE 

Neutrality  Requires  an  Embargo. 

"I  shall  follow  the  best  practice  of  nations  in  the  matter  of  neu- 
trality, by  forbidding  the  exportation  of  arms  or  munitions  of  war  of 
any  kind  from  the  United  States  to  any  part  of  the  republic  of 
Mexico." — Message  to  Congress,  Aug.  27,  1913. 

Neutrality  Forbids  an  Embargo. 

"The  Executive  order,  under  which  the  exportation  of  arms  and 
ammunition  into  Mexico  is  forbidden,  is  a  departure  from  the  ac- 
cepted practices  of  neutrality.  .  .  .  The  order  is  therefore  rescinded." 
— Statement  issued  from  White  House,  Feb.  3,  1914. 


'"Eventually"  he  will  Fight  against  Them. 

"Eventually,  I  shall  fight  every  one  of  these  men  who  are  now 
seeking  to  exploit  Mexico  for  their  own  selfish  ends.  I  shall  do  what 
I  can  to  keep  Mexico  from  their  plundering.  There  shall  be  no 
individual  exploitation  of  Mexico,  if  I  can  stop  it." — Blythe  inter- 
view, Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  23,  1914. 

Eventually  he  Threatens  to  Fight  for  Them. 

"It  becomes  the  function  of  the  government  of  the  United  States 
...  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Mexican  government  to  the  neces- 
sity which  may  arise  to  impel  it  to  protect  the  property  of  its  citi- 
zens in  Mexico" — Note  of  Apr.  2,  1918,  threatening  Mexico  on  ac- 
count of  oil  taxes. 


THE   END 


INDEX 


AFRICA,   221,   222,   229. 

Alien  enemies,  67,   69,   130-133,  304, 

402,  408. 
American  International  Corporation, 

298,  299,  301,  302,  321,  '328. 
American  Legion,  388,  392. 
Angary,  law  of,  137,  138. 
Angell,   Norman,  248. 
Armed    merchantman,    law    of,    109- 

112,  433- 

Armed  neutrality,  35-38,  432. 
Armed  Ships  Bill,  23,  28,  29,  31,  37, 

119,   142,  143. 
Armed  ships  dispute,  22,  42,  46,  101, 

102,  103,  105,  106. 
Armistice   conditions,    158,    159,    169, 

241,   242. 
Atrocities,  Allied,  205-207,  211,  212, 

392. 

Atrocities,  American,   207-214,    389. 
Autocracy  in  foreign  relations,   168- 

170,  175. 

BAGDAD  Railway,  231. 

Baruch,  Bernard,  266,  268,  292,  293. 

Belgium,  186,  191,  199-206,  208,  209 

215. 

Bernhardi,  178,  179,  185. 
Bernstorff  peace  plot,   141. 
Borglum,    Gutzon,  436,  437. 
Brailsford,  H.  N.,  229,  233. 
British  blockade,  33,  92,  99,  115,  116, 

117,   119,   122,   135,   ^36,  211. 
British  democracy,  167,  168,  171,  217- 

221,  226. 
Broken  submarine  promises,  120,  124, 

213- 
Bryan,  21,  40,   101. 

CARRANZA  Doctrine,  413. 
China,    203-205,   222,   224,   225,    327- 
329,   382,  395,  396,  402,  424. 


Clark,  Champ,  22,  55,  292. 

Conscription,  48,  51,  55,  58,  63-66,  74, 
75,  417.  (See  draft.) 

Constitution  of  the  United  States,  vi- 
olations of,  29,  51,  64-69,  174,  3'32, 
353,  391-  (See  Presidential  usurp- 
ations.) 

Corporation  statements  of  war  profits, 
281-284. 

Council  of  National  Defense,  42,  43, 
265-268,  289. 

Cravath,  Paul  D.,  271. 

Cuba,   181,   182,  402,  406,  408. 

DAVISON,    Henry    P.,    263,    277,    278, 

288. 

Debt  to  France,   105. 
Declaration   of   London,    92,    93,    95, 

123,    124,    133,    134. 
Defense    as    a    war    motive,    13-19, 

389,  398,  435- 
Dent,    Chairman,    55,    63. 
Draft,  9,  55,  76.     (See  Conscription.) 
Dutch  ships,  confiscation  of,  136-138, 

145-150,  214. 

EGYPT,  200,  203,  205,  219,  225,  226, 

232,  252,  392. 
Election   of   1916,   6,  43-46,   48,   104- 

107,  317,   3i8,   326. 
Embargo     and     European     neutrals, 

145-150. 

Enlistments,   12. 
Espionage  Act,  52,  57,  66,  70,  73,  74. 

FARRELL,   James   A.,   267,    288,   292, 

321,   323,   324,   368,   375. 
Fear   propaganda,    13,    19,    166,   178, 

i8'3,  235. 
Federal   Trade   Commission   reports, 

281,  282,   283,   284,   304. 
Fisher,  First  Sea  Lord,  185,  189. 


445 


446 


INDEX 


Food-control,  55,  59-61,  268,  269,  304,  Hylan,    Mayor,   9. 

363. 

Fourteen  Points,  242,  244-248,   393-  IMPERIALISM  of  Entente  Allies,  224- 

Freedom  of  speech,  2,  52,  70,  79,  418.  231,  393,  410,  4",  4*3,  4*5,  424- 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  125,   179,  235,  Imperialism   of    United    States,    319- 

244,  252,  432.  36i,    362,   '363,    365,    367-370,    375, 

Future  wars,  1-5,  166,  243,  253,  254,  384,  409,  4IO»  4*3,  43i- 

293,   392,  409,  418.  Impossibility   of    a    German   victory, 

233,   234,   237. 

GARY,  Elbert  H.,  256,  267,  288,  291,  India,  205,  211,   217,  226,  232,  252, 

292.  392. 

German-Mexican    plot,    14,    142-144,  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World,  74. 

21  A,  International    law    as    an    American 

German  war  plot,   178-198.  war  motive,  81-83,   102,   103,   104- 

German    world    peril,    18,    166-236,  107,   127,    128,   133,   150. 

250,  251,   399,  411,  419,  426.  British    offenses    against,    115-127, 

Gibbons,  Herbert  Adams,  206,  230.  *34,  J35»  203,  204. 

Gibbs,  Philip,  213.  our  reversals  on,  108-114,  126,  127, 

Glynn,  Martin,  43,  105.  432-434- 

Gompers,  Samuel,  262,  403.  our  violations  of,  128-142,  146-150, 

Gore,  Senator,  22,   105.  204,  332. 

Grey,    Foreign    Secretary,    135,    171,  International      Mercantile      Marine 

172,  220.  Company,    36,    90,    258,    259,    268, 

Greece,  203,  204,   212,  219.  270,  385. 

Gregory,    Attorney- General,    42,    56,  Ireland,  '392,  404. 

57,  70,  71,  72,  73,  309. 

Guggenheim,   Daniel,  262,  282,   290,  JOHNSON,    Senator    Hiram,     56,    68, 

292,  294.  75- 

HAGUE  conferences  and  conventions,  KEEPING  us  out  of  war,   6,   44,   82- 

117,    129,    132,    149,    203.  84,    362,    363.     (See    responsibility 

Haiti,    172-174,    207,    331,    333,    334,  of  Wilson.) 

335,    344-346,    348,    355,   402,    404,  Korea,    200,    392,    398. 

407,  408. 

Hanotaux  revelations,  260,   261.  LAFOLLETTE,  Senator,  28,  36,  55,  101, 

Harding,    President,    105,    308,    348,  331. 

364,   372,  402.  Lamont,  Thomas  W.,  258,  271,  367, 

Hitchcock,   Senator,  62,  368.  368. 

Hog  Island,  298-303,   306,  307.  Lansing-Ishii    Agreement,    174,    329, 

Honduras,  352,  355,  408.  407. 

Honor    and    American    belligerency,  Lawlessness   of   war    administration, 

81,  83,  96,  102,  103,  135,  150,  255,  56-63,  70-79,  435- 

322,   362,   387.  Lawrence,    Professor,   '32,    129,    131, 

Hoover,    Herbert,    59-61,    268,    308,  137,    149. 

377,  380.  League  of  Nations,  246-250,  255,  394- 

Howe,  Frederic  C.,  230.  397,  402,  409,  422. 

Hughes,  44,   45.  Liberty  Bonds,  8,   76,  263,  288,   289, 

Hunger  blockade,  211-212.  290,    291,   294,    386,  404,   405. 


INDEX 


447 


"Lusitania,"   97,    101,    119,   209,   211. 


MEXICO,  10,  149,  150,  182,  209,  210, 

252,    322,    323,    330342,    355,    3^8, 

'383,    3&l->    395,    402,    4I2-4*6,    434, 

438-443- 
Militarism,  53,  153,  175,  176,  177. 

of  France,  176,  188,  394,  395,  420. 
Mining  the  high  seas,   99,   100,   119, 

124. 
Monroe  Doctrine,  320,  322,  361,  368, 

398,  407,  411,  412,  413,  414. 
Morel,  E.  D.,   185,  188. 
Morgan,  J.  P.,  36,  90,  91,  258,  260, 

271,  275,  278,  288,  294,  '306,  367. 
Morocco,   201,   205,   206,   227,   252. 

NATIONAL  Security  League,  260,  322. 

Navy  League,  260,   319. 

Neilson,  Francis,  171,   179,  184,   186, 

189. 
Neutrality,      American       departures 

from,   41,    100,    122,    126,    128. 

and    war   loans,   40,   41,   327,    362. 

law  of,  112,  113,  114,  129. 
New  York  election  of  1917,  9. 
Nicaragua,  172-174,  201,  202,  208, 

209,    253,    331,    334,    348-36i>    404, 

407,  408. 

Non-partisan   League,    77. 
"Now/-that-we're-in"      patriots,      19, 

403- 

OBREGON,  341,  342,  441. 
Opium   War,  224. 
Overman   Bill,   62,    63. 

PAGE,  Robert  N.,  22,  362. 

Pan-Americanism,    182,  '361. 

Paris  Economic  Conference,  239,  '322. 

Passports,   10,   56,   390,  402. 

Peace   without  victory,   155-165,  236- 

238,   247. 
People's   Council  on  Democracy  and 

Terms  of  Peace,  73. 
Permanent  business  advantages  from 

American    belligerency,    319,    326, 

367-369,  375-387. 


Persia,   201,   220,  231,  232,  252. 
Philippines,  207,  408. 
Pledges  of  1912,  '314-318. 
Preparations  for  European  war,  183- 

189. 
Preparedness  legislation  of  1916,  21, 

42,   324. 
Preparedness  tour,  26,  41,  82-84,  326, 

362. 
Presidential  usurpations,  26-31.     (See 

Constitution,    violations    of.) 
Profits  and  profiteering,  279-284,  286- 

307,   364,   365,   386. 

RAILROADS,  57,  262,  269,  293-298,  306, 

311,   312,   314,  '315,   364,   365,  373, 

381,  402. 

Red   Cross,   9,  263. 
Reparations    Commission,    369,    396, 

423- 
Republican  party,  i,  6,  44,  361,  365, 

372,    401,    402,    403. 
Responsibility  for  European  war,  189- 

198,  421-423,  425- 
Responsibility  of   Wilson,   20-25,   '39, 

105,  106,  143,  170,  400,  401.     (See 

Keeping  us  out  of  war.) 
Rhodes,  Cecil,  will  of,  180. 
Rockefeller,   262,   264,   294,    340. 
Roosevelt,  200,  346,  347,  356. 
Russia  since  1917,  149,  203,  204,  212, 

213,  245,  367,  395,  402,  409,  410. 
Ryan,   John   D.,   267,   270,   282,   288, 

292,  293,  294,  306. 

SANTO  DOMINGO,  172,  173,  174,  207, 

253,   '331,    333,    334-348,    355,    356, 

402,  407,  408. 
Schwab,   Charles   M.,   258,  267,  270, 

288,    292,    303,    306,    309. 
Scraps  of  paper,  Allied,  200-204,  221. 
Scraps  of  paper,  American,  129,  201, 

202,   204,   242,   316,  407. 
Secret  diplomacy,  170-175,  244,  293. 
Secret     diplomacy,     American,     172- 

175,   336,   337,   345,   346,  '349,   397, 

417,   420. 


448 


INDEX 


Secret  of  Wilson,  400. 

Secret    treaties,    239,    243,    254,    396, 

397,  398. 
Self-determination,  243,  251,  253,  '344, 

406,  436. 

Serbia,   190-192,   194-196,  221. 
Shantung,    396,   398,   424. 
Shaw,    193. 
Sims,  Admiral,  188. 
Slackers   and   slacker   raids,   10,   75. 
Small  nations,  215-223,  243,  414. 
Socialists  and  Socialist  party,   9,   73, 

77,  235. 
Standing  behind  the  President,  4,  20, 

24,  38,  151,  257,  258. 
Stettinius,   Edward   R.,   271,   288. 
Stone,  Senator,  23,  34,  35,  102,   106. 
Stone  &  Webster,  272,  299,  '301,  302. 
Submarine  and  American  commerce, 

81-84,  86-96,  101-103. 

and    American    lives,    81,    97-103. 

dispute,    27,    81-138. 

dispute,     German    tractability    in, 

92-95,   98,    99,    124,    125. 

law   of,   28,    109,    120,  433. 
Supreme  Court,  28,  64,  65. 

TAFT,  347,  349,  350,   352,  353,  355, 
'356,  358,  361 


Terror,  peace-time,   389,   392,  403. 
Terror,   war-time,    52,    61,   68-79. 
Townsend,   Senator,   146,   147. 
Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act,  67,  134. 
Treaty  of   1828,    129-131. 
Tumulty,  Joseph  P.,  106,  114. 

UNDERWOOD,  27,  62. 

VANDERLIP,  Frank  A.,  256,  264,  273, 
288,  303,  306,  321,  322,  323,  '375. 

Versailles  Treaty,  243-255,  367-370, 
394-399,  420-425. 

Virgin  Islands,  172,  173,  '343,  344, 
407,  408. 

WAR  after  the  war,  322,  323,  324,  325. 
War  aims  of  Entente  Allies,  239,  240, 

243,    248,   251,   252,   254,   255. 
War  prices,   91,   280,   316,   366,    367, 

377,  378,  '379- 
White  Book,  American,  29,  123,  124, 

127,  186. 

ZIMMERMANN  letter,  142,  143,  144, 
145. 


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